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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER
INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

U.S. Congress, Senate
" COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

PART 1

JULY 25, 26, 31, AUGUST 2 AND 7, 1951

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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

WEDNESDAY, JULY 25, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10:30 a. m., pursuant to call, in room 424 Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Eastland, O'Connor, Smith, Wiley, Watkins, and Ferguson.

Also present: Senator McCarthy.

J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Will one of the members of the staff please see to it that the door is open so that the public may come in? If there is a sign outside "Executive session," it should be taken off.

We regret that perhaps this room may be too small to accommodate the public, but we will accommodate as many as we can. It is the only room available today.

The Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee was empowered on December 21, 1950, under the terms of Senate Resolution 366 of the Eighty-first Congress to—

make a complete and continuing study and investigation of (1) the administration, operation, and enforcement of the Internal Security Act of 1950; (2) the administration, operation, and enforcement of other laws relating to espionage, sabotage, and the protection of the internal security of the United States; and (3) the extent, nature, and effects of subversive activities in the United States; its territories and possessions, including, but not limited to, espionage, sabotage, and infiltration by persons who are or may be under the domination of the foreign government or organizations controlling the world Communist movement or any other movement seeking to overthrow the Government of the United States by force and violence.

This authority was subsequently extended under Senate Resolution 7 of the Eighty-second Congress, until December 31, 1952. I think it would be well to place these two resolutions in the record at this point.

(The resolutions referred to follow:)

[S. Res. 366, 81st Cong., 2d sess.]

RESOLUTION

Whereas the Congress from time to time has enacted laws designed to protect the internal security of the United States from acts of espionage and sabotage and from infiltration by persons who seek to overthrow the Government of the United States by force and violence; and

Whereas those who seek to evade such laws or to violate them with impunity constantly seek to devise and do devise clever and evasive means and tactics for such purposes; and

Whereas agents and dupes of the world Communist conspiracy have been and are engaged in activities (including the origination and dissemination of propaganda) designed and intended to bring such protective laws into disrepute or disfavor and to hamper or prevent effective administration and enforcement thereof; and

Whereas it is vital to the internal security of the United States that the Congress maintain a continuous surveillance over the problems presented by such activity and threatened activity and over the administration and enforcement of such laws: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Committee on the Judiciary, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized and directed to make a complete and continuing study and investigation of (1) the administration, operation, and enforcement of the Internal Security Act of 1950; (2) the administration, operation, and enforcement of other laws relating to espionage, sabotage, and the protection of the internal security of the United States; and (3) the extent, nature, and effects of subversive activities in the United States, its Territories and possessions, including, but not limited to, espionage, sabotage, and infiltration by persons who are or may be under the domination of the foreign government or organizations controlling the world Communist movement or any other movement seeking to overthrow the Government of the United States by force and violence.

SEC. 2. The committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such places and times during the sessions, recesses, and adjourned periods of the Senate, to hold such hearings, to require by subpoenas or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to take such testimony, to procure such printing and binding, and, within the amount appropriated therefor, to make such expenditures as it deems advisable. The cost of stenographic services to report hearings of the committee or subcommittee shall not be in excess of 25 cents per hundred words. Subpoenas shall be issued by the chairman of the committee or the subcommittee, and may be served by any person designated by such chairman.

A majority of the members of the committee, or duly authorized subcommittee thereof, shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, except that a lesser number to be fixed by the committee, or by such subcommittee, shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of administering oaths and taking sworn testimony.

SEC. 3. The committee, or duly authorized subcommittee, shall have power to employ and fix the compensation of such officers, experts, and employees as it deems necessary in the performance of its duties, and is authorized to utilize the services, information, facilities, and personnel of the various departments and agencies of the Government to the extent that such services, information, facilities, and personnel, in the opinion of the heads of such departments and agencies, can be furnished without undue interference with the performance of the work and duties of such departments and agencies.

SEC. 4. The expenses of the committee, which shall not exceed \$10,000, shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee on or before January 31, 1951.

[S. Res. 7, 82d Cong., 1st sess.]

RESOLUTION

Resolved, That the limitation of expenditures under S. Res. 366, Eighty-first Congress, relating to the internal security of the United States, agreed to December 21, 1950, is hereby increased by \$75,000, and such sum together with any unexpended balance of the sum previously authorized to be expended under such resolution shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee and covering obligations incurred under such resolution on or before January 31, 1952.

The CHAIRMAN. One of the lines of inquiry undertaken by the Internal Security Subcommittee concerned the extent to which sub-

versive forces may have influenced or sought to influence the formulation and execution of our Far Eastern policy.

In this connection, the committee, acting on advice that certain files of the Institute of Pacific Relations had been removed to a barn in Lee, Mass., and that these files contained information bearing on matters of concern to the committee, took possession of the files in question, under subpoena, and relegated to its staff, under close supervision, the lengthy and arduous task of sifting those files.

The committee was aware, at the time, of the fact that the board of trustees of the institute had been studded with personalities of such respectability, and of such preeminence of capitalistic achievement, that the very presence of their names on a letterhead might have put at rest all suspicion of intrigue or subversive influence. The committee was also aware of the possibility that this aggregation of prominent individuals may have been used as a facade for Communists operating shrewdly behind the scenes. It has been done before. The committee knew that it is not possible to identify a Communist by his appearance or by his attire or by his station in life, or even by the size of his bank account.

The committee's staff was instructed to maintain, and the committee sought to maintain, a high standard of evidence, and to proceed with a truly objective approach. The committee did not want first impressions. It wanted facts.

It is virtually impossible to define fully and accurately, in the abstract, the components of disloyalty or subversion. The inner currents of the human mind are at best difficult to gauge. Motives are often so obscure that sometimes one does not fully comprehend his own impelling urges, and may completely misjudge the motives of an associate. Successful conspirators usually are consummate dissemblers; and thus the acts of such persons are often shrouded in the darkness of stealth, accompanied by acts of misdirection, or clouded by ambiguity of meaning. The measurement of men's motives, the assessment of the strands of thought and the elements of pressures which may have influenced another's behavior, is not a task to be sought. And yet if we are to do our full part to save our country and our way of life from subversion and erosion, we must make the effort. But we must withhold our judgment in all respects until the proper time. We must first make the record, so that the facts will be known.

In such an investigation as this, where a possible conspiracy is being examined, very often the only evidence obtainable derives from persons who once participated in the conspiracy. Only eyes that witnessed the deeds, and ears that heard the words, of intrigue can attest thereto. Thus, ex-Communists, and agents of the Government who posed as Communists, often are the only sources of evidence of what transpired behind doors closed to the non-Communist world. Government agencies do not readily yield up their concealed agents. Fortunately, it is possible to verify the loyalty of an ex-Communist, in large part, by the very extent of his willingness to give full and frank testimony against the Communist Party. Many ex-Communists have labored loyally and valiantly to expose the intrigues of their former associates. They often have no illusions about the Communist Party and its purposes, and have developed antibodies against further infection.

"Once a Communist, always a Communist" has become, in effect, a Communist slogan; but no one who professes to comprehend the significance of transgression and repentance, of wrongdoing and contrition, can subscribe to such a shibboleth. These facts must be borne in mind as, later in these hearings, the testimony of ex-Communists is used to supplement the evidence found in the files.

It should be made clear that the committee was mindful at the outset that we had under subpoena only some of the files of the institute, and that we might for that reason run the risk of getting a distorted view of the workings of the organization. We, therefore, extended our subpoena and brought all the records of the institute under our scrutiny. We have, further, repeatedly asked the secretary general of the institute to be sure that everything that should be seen by us is made available to us.

The press and the public, as well as the committee, should bear in mind that the mere fact that a person is shown during the course of these hearings to have been associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations or to have been mentioned in certain letters which may be placed in evidence should give rise to no conclusions. Each bit of documentary evidence will speak with its own voice, but no such evidence should be weighed alone and without reference to the whole body of evidence which ultimately will comprise the record of these hearings. Neither should the testimony of any witness, standing alone and uncorroborated, be given undue weight, but, rather, the testimony of all witnesses should be weighed one against the other, after the record has been made, in an effort to sift the wheat from the chaff and arrive at the truth. Undoubtedly many good men will be mentioned in the course of these hearings, and it is in the interest of such men so mentioned that I make this statement.

We begin these hearings making no charges. We propose to let the evidence precede our conclusions. We shall hear the witnesses and read letters and other documents. We shall strive to be fair. The first witnesses will be persons long associated with the institute and undeniably competent to testify from the standpoint of the institute itself. The first witness, Edward C. Carter, was secretary general of the IPR for some 16 years and is still a member of its executive board. He will tell us what the institute is. The next witness, Frederick V. Field, was national secretary for many years and is a former member of the executive committee of the institute.

Before we proceed with the first witness I want to say a word or two about the future conduct of these hearings.

First, it should be known that we propose to continue public hearings probably 2 days a week for a number of weeks to come. The 2 days will probably be Tuesday and Thursday, in most weeks, although we are opening these hearings on a Wednesday and expect to continue tomorrow.

The question has arisen with regard to television, radio, and news pictures. The committee has specifically discussed these matters, and the ruling of the committee is that none of the proceedings of the committee will be televised and that no direct radio coverage of the proceedings of the committee will be permitted. News pictures may be permitted before and after the actual hearing sessions of the committee, but the taking of news pictures during the actual conduct of the hearings will not be allowed.

Neither will the committee permit the photographing of witnesses with members of the committee in the hearing room, nor the photographing of witnesses in the hearing room without the permission of the witnesses.

The committee has made these decisions because we are seeking facts, not publicity. We want to make a record, not to make headlines. Furthermore, we want to make it clear that no witness who is called here will be subjected to undue publicity against his will.

The committee has also discussed the matter of the submission of questions by Senators who are not members of the Internal Security Subcommittee. It is the order of the committee that any such questions should be submitted in writing to the chairman presiding at the hearing, to be asked by him at his direction.

Any witness called here may have the privilege of being accompanied and advised by counsel of his choice; but witnesses' counsel will not be permitted to testify nor to ask questions. This is not a trial, but an inquiry, and we intend to proceed in an orderly way. In the interests of expediting these hearings, members of the committee have agreed to refrain from filling the record with their own observations; and witnesses will be asked to limit their testimony to responsive answers to questions. However, after the conclusion of his testimony, any witness may file, for the record, any such supplementary statement as he may desire to make; and a reasonable time limit will be allowed, in any case, for the submission of such a statement.

The committee will proceed. Mr. Morris, you may proceed with the witness. The witness will be sworn.

You do solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States, will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

TESTIMONY OF EDWARD C. CARTER, NEW YORK, N. Y.

Mr. CARTER. I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give your name and address to the reporter?

Mr. CARTER. Edward C. Carter, 215 East Seventy-second Street, New York.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation?

Mr. CARTER. Retired. I am an educator retired, teaching part time at the New School at 66 West Twelfth Street.

Mr. MORRIS. You hold no position other than that of a teacher?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever hold a Government position or a position with the United Nations?

Mr. CARTER. I have held no position with the United States Government. For 2½ months I served as a senior consultant to a United Nations organization in the Far East. It is called the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. That was a consultancy for about 10 weeks with reference to technical training of industrial workers in the underdeveloped countries of Asia and the Far East.

Mr. MORRIS. You say that was in 1948?

Mr. CARTER. I think it was in 1948.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you now associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. CARTER. I am one of its roughly 50 board of directors of the American section of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. What position have you held with the Institute of Pacific Relations in the past?

Mr. CARTER. Shortly after it was founded in 1925 I served for a year or two as honorary secretary of the American IPR. Then I became an executive secretary. Then in 1933 I think it was I became secretary general of what was called the Pacific Council, namely, the governing body of 10 or 12 national councils in the Pacific countries, similar to, in a general way, the American section.

Then in 1946 I retired as secretary general of the international organization and became executive vice chairman of the American section, the American IPR, which position I held until roughly, 2½ years ago when I retired. Since then I have been one of 50 trustees of American IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you still maintain an active interest in IPR work?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Attend the board meetings?

Mr. CARTER. So far as possible, if I was in the country.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you would give us very briefly in paragraph or so the construction or function of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. CARTER. It would have to be a long paragraph, Senator, but I will do my best.

Mr. MORRIS. As briefly as you can.

Mr. CARTER. The institute, as I have said a moment ago, is a loose federation of some 10 or 12 national institutes devoted to the study of the problems of the Pacific—economic, social, political, and so on. To take as a sample of those 10 or 12 councils, I will mention the structure of the American IPR which has grown from rather small beginnings in Hawaii in 1925 into an organization in a way you might compare it with the American Geographical Society or the Brookings Institution, of some fluctuating twelve to sixteen or eighteen hundred members, businessmen, journalists, academic people, a few labor, and so on, researchers, and the aim of the American IPR being to carry on competent research and discussion on America's interest in the Pacific and the whole of southern and eastern Asia. Its principal channels are publications. It might pretty nearly fill one of those larger cases over there, four or five hundred volumes over the years, and then two or three periodicals—the Far Eastern Survey, et cetera.

Then every 2 or 3 years the American IPR participates in international conferences which the Chinese, Japanese, Filipinos, and the Europeans who have an interest in the Pacific meet, not for a week end but for 12 to 14 full days, living together, eating together, in an attempt to get some integration of the various points of view for people who have interests in the Pacific area.

The American IPR has maintained a research staff of varying size over the years, and similarly the international secretariat has had a staff over the years, being unofficial and not endowed with great funds. It has had nothing the size of the personnel of, say, the United Nation. We have tried always, except in wartime, to keep Japanese, Chinese, Filipinos, Australians, New Zealanders, Frenchmen on the staff, but we never have had the money. We have always had people

of several nationalities on the staff so as to get as many points of view as possible and serve all the member councils impartially.

Our principal failures have been our inability to get sufficient funds to do as good a job as we would have liked to do.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your annual budget?

Mr. CARTER. It varied from around \$90,000 to \$150,000 for the American IPR, and there was a similar spread for the international secretariat.

Then the Royal Institute in London, which was the British chapter, has its own budget.

The China IPR was one of the most generous supporters and had its budgets, and so on around the different countries. I think the figures probably have been made available to the committee. I suppose altogether the IPR internationally and the various national councils have raised and expended \$2 million or \$3 million over the whole period, a very small budget compared with the budgets we hear about these days, Senator.

Mr. MORRIS. We have heard a great deal about the fact that Mr. Field, Frederick V. Field, was a large contributor to the institute. I wonder if you could tell us the extent to which he did contribute to the financing of the IPR.

Mr. CARTER. The IPR could give you the exact details. I looked over the figures some time ago and gathered from the figures in the New York office that it totaled around \$60,000 during the whole period of his active connection. In one or two publications a considerably larger sum has been mentioned, but I think the sum of around \$60,000 would stand up.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it his practice to make up the deficit for certain years?

Mr. CARTER. I am not quite certain that he made up the deficit for the American section for several years. You would have to consult the New York office as to which years and how much. That was not over the whole period.

I remember a similar case where a partner of the bank firm of Lee, Higginson & Co. made up a deficit of around \$17,000 or \$19,000. So Mr. Field was not the only such person.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to offer you a carbon copy of a letter, sent reportedly by you, to Mr. W. L. Holland. I would like in particular to call your attention to the third paragraph from the end which reads:

It is impossible for Field to go on paying each year's deficit. I think he now feels that contraction should have been effected 2 years ago.

I offer you this and ask you if you can recall sending that letter, Mr. Carter.

Mr. CARTER. The third of June 1940—which paragraph is that?

Mr. MORRIS. The third from the end on the second page.

Mr. CARTER (reading):

It is impossible for Field to go on paying each year's deficit. I think he now feels that contraction should have been effected 2 years ago.

Senator, this clearly is a letter I wrote in 1940. Clearly we were in the midst of one of our periodic doldrums when we were short of money, and Mr. Field had helped out as others had. Apparently from

this he had told me that he just couldn't be sugar daddy for year after year and unless we got money from other sources we would have to contract. Happily, we did find other sources. I have forgotten, in what amount, and survived.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the expression you used?

Mr. CARTER. Sugar daddy. I was afraid you would pick me up on that.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to offer this in evidence, and have it marked as "Exhibit 1."

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1

[Private and confidential]

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,
New York, N. Y., June 3, 1940.

W. L. HOLLAND, Esq.

Care Giannini Foundation,

University of California, Berkeley, Calif.

DEAR BILL: With the unsettlement in the minds of potential contributors and the May 10 news from the Carnegie Endowment that it would not renew its contribution to Amco and the news a few days later that the Carnegie Corp. could not respond favorably to Amco's appeal, Field decided that, in addition to the salary cuts which I have already reported to you, very radical reductions should be made in rent, library purchases, and staff.

Field and the whole American council staff has been going through a terribly painful 10 days of group self-examination and reduction. Half a dozen plans have been proposed. The latest plan which was, I believe adopted at a meeting of the union on Friday afternoon, called, among other things, for giving notice and paying severance pay to Lasker's secretary, Shiman's secretary, Miss Taylor's secretary, and in addition Lasker, Mrs. Barnes, and Helen Wiss. About half the office space is to be given up. About half of the library is to be stored. Catherine Porter is to become field secretary and is to be responsible for regional conferences. She is also to be office manager. The number of pages of the Far Eastern Survey is to be reduced and Kurt Bloch will probably be added to the staff in order that Amco may have someone who can cover a half a dozen fields at the same time.

The present thought, I believe, is to cut the American Council contribution from \$10,000 to \$5,000 a year; to look for a successor to Fred; and to ask all of the research staff to do their own typing and recondition the entire staff so that in the future they will cooperate in membership and financial work and public relations generally.

This letter to you is unofficial and off the record. It is intended for you alone and nothing that is herein contained should be passed on to Alsberg, Wilbur, Oakie, or anyone else. In due season Field will be communicating, I assume, to all of these people in their American Council capacity and it would be unfortunate if any of them got the slightest hint of the reorganization that is taking place from you or me.

At this juncture I simply wanted you to know that after the 15th of June Lasker and Mrs. Barnes would presumably be open for university appointments. Lasker is, I think, entitled to 6 months' severance pay and Mrs. Barnes 3 months. I haven't the faintest idea what their plans for the future are.

It may be that it will be much sounder for the American council and for the institute as a whole if these two gifted staff members find their future careers entirely outside the framework of the IPR. Thus, though for humanitarian reasons I would like to propose one or two minor temporary international secretariat assignments to Lasker and Mrs. Barnes, my thought at the moment is that such proposals might be a disservice to both of them in that it would postpone just by so many weeks or months their facing up to the realities of the new situation that they unfortunately have to face. My present thought is that the biggest service we can do them is by commending them to other societies and to universities where their qualifications would be of very special value.

Would you write me privately your reaction to what I have written.

I need hardly say that practically the whole staff of the American council at the moment has been in a state of pretty nearly complete collapse. Everyone has suffered fearfully all along the line. It is impossible for Field to go on paying each year's deficit. I think he now feels that contraction should have been effected 2 years ago.

In connection with my future responsibility as pro tem part-time secretary of the American council, I have been more concerned with a study of the failure of the staff to secure the necessary income. I would have preferred to see the staff reorient itself completely to the problem of public relations and income production rather than engage in drastic curtailment of expenditure. I feel confident that the present plight could have been avoided if the entire staff had cooperated intelligently and loyally with those responsible for income production. However, there is no use in crying over spilt milk, and my objectives on this point can better be contributed orally rather than in writing.

Please send me your best thought on all these matters at the earliest possible moment.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Frederick Field write for IPR publications?

Mr. CARTER. Yes. He wrote several articles for the Far Eastern Survey, the fortnightly of the American IPR. He may have written for the International Quarterly, Pacific Affairs. I can't remember specifically, but the office could tell you and he did two major research volumes, one on American participation in the Chinese consortium. We had the late Thomas W. Lamont read that carefully and he felt that it was an exceedingly competent piece of work. Then Mr. Field edited a very large volume, the Economic Handbook of the Pacific, and Chinese, Japanese, and others worked on it. That was a standard economic handbook for several years.

Mr. Newton D. Baker has studied it and wrote the foreword.

As I remember it, those were the only two books, in addition to the other articles you have inquired about.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter, while you were secretary general and executive vice chairman, did you know Frederick Field was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. CARTER. I did not, no.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you first learn that?

Mr. CARTER. In the Saturday Evening Post a few years ago. I knew that while he was active in the IPR he wrote for the New Masses and Daily Worker, and when I inquired I was told that those two militant Communist publications frequently asked nonparty members to write.

I checked up on it and found that was true, and so I did not at the time think that his writing for his publications, later I think he served on the editorial board of one, constituted him as a party member.

The CHAIRMAN. That expression "later"—I did not catch what you said after the word "later." You said "Later he served," on something.

Mr. CARTER. My impression, Senator, is he contributed an occasional article to either New Masses or Daily Worker before he went on the masthead as a member of the editorial board of one or the other. I can't from memory give you the exact dates.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say you checked, exactly how would you check on this affiliation?

Mr. CARTER. I didn't do it very scientifically the way the Senator would have, but I, in talking to people about the country, asked a

good many of my friends, "Here is the New Masses. Are all of these people Communists?" Several people said to the best of their knowledge and belief they were not all Communists. I haven't any doubt whatsoever but what the Daily Worker and New Masses were 100 percent Communist lines as far as their management was concerned, but I also got the idea at a certain period that they did invite non-Communists to contribute.

Senator EASTLAND. Then he was a member of the editorial board of one of the publications?

Mr. CARTER. As I said, at a later time.

Senator EASTLAND. You did not believe then he was a Communist; is that your testimony?

Mr. CARTER. My testimony is that he was aiding the Communist cause.

Senator EASTLAND. That was not enough to open your eyes that he was a Communist when he went on the editorial board?

Mr. CARTER. I had my eyes open for a considerable time, Senator, and I was never able to actually prove that he was a Communist Party member in a way an authoritative Government agency would. I assumed that he was someone who should be watched.

I would like to, if I may, ask counsel, Mr. Morris, who must have all these dates at his fingertips, whether Mr. Field was an executive officer of the IPR concurrently with being on the editorial board.

Mr. MORRIS. He certainly was a member of the executive board of trustees right up until 1948.

Mr. CARTER. That is a little different. I would like to comment on that, if I may, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. You made the remark that you were going to ask counsel. You may confer with counsel but counsel is not going to testify.

Mr. CARTER. I meant your counsel, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I beg your pardon.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Crossman, at this time I think for your sake we should have the record show precisely in what capacity you are here. I know, Mr. Crossman, I am acting now in response to your letter in which you objected to our listing you as having been present for Mr. Carter at the various hearings, the executive hearings to date. Will you notify the chairman exactly in what capacity you are here?

Mr. CROSSMAN. I will be glad to do that, Mr. Chairman. I am a partner in the firm of Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Sunderland & Kiendl. We represent the Institute of Pacific Relations, the American council of the institute to be technically accurate, and do not represent any individual witness just because we appear here. We are representing the institute.

I realize I am not supposed to testify, but I thought I had the privilege of conferring, or rather the witness had the privilege of conferring with me. May I do that for a second now?

The CHAIRMAN. I rather take it you have put yourself out of that category now. You are here now representing the Institute of Pacific Relations. The witness is testifying. You are not here representing the witness; is that correct?

Mr. CROSSMAN. I am not representing the witness as an individual, that is correct, sir; but I think in my representation of the institute

I should like to have the privilege of having witnesses who have been connected with the institute confer with me. I will make it very brief.

The CHAIRMAN. You will not be permitted to testify, nor will you be permitted to interrogate. You have the same privilege as anyone else who comes here. You are representing the Institute of Pacific Relations. When the question arises as to the questions you may propound to any one witness, or what your attitude will be, the Chair will rule on it at that time.

Mr. CROSSMAN. I did not want to ask questions of the witness; I merely wanted to say something to him.

Mr. MORRIS. You have already stated he is not your client.

Mr. CROSSMAN. He is a witness for the institute.

The CHAIRMAN. That settles it. Proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it not a fact you tried to assist Mr. Field to get an Army intelligence commission in 1942?

Mr. CARTER. When Mr. Field was seeking an Army commission I am sure that I wrote to someone in the War Department speaking of his intellectual qualifications for such a job.

Mr. MORRIS. You do recall that?

Mr. CARTER. I just don't remember the way that a letter I probably wrote looks.

Senator EASTLAND. You did recommend him for a commission?

Mr. CARTER. I am sure I did recommend him.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that consistent with your testimony about your knowledge of Mr. Field and your being suspicious of him and checking with certain authorities about his Communist membership?

Mr. CARTER. I thought so at the time.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you think so now?

Mr. CARTER. It looks a little fishy now.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever knowingly employed or used in the IPR in your official capacity which you described people you knew to be Communists?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember ever employing in a paid position anyone whom I knew to be a Communist. I did, Senator, seek the cooperation of Communists in the Soviet Union and Communists from the Soviet Union because in the early days of the IPR, before I was active in it, the leaders in Hawaii felt that the only way to understand the total picture in the Pacific was to learn as much as we could of the activities, good or bad, of the Russians in the Far East in relation to China and Japan. And so following the visits of people sent by the committee in Hawaii in the early days—Mr. Merle Davis, C. F. Loomis, and J. B. Condliffe—I went with Roland Boyd, Jerome Greene, and others to Moscow on our way to the Kyoto conference in 1929 and sought contact with Russian scholars who were specializing in the Far East, urging them to participate and to form a national council of the IPR in the Soviet Union. I backed them. I tried to get money for them. I tried to get publications. We tried to get them to write articles because we thought the only way to look objectively at the whole picture was to try and understand every conflicting point of view whether we liked it or not.

We sometimes felt the points of view we did not like were more important than those we did.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you drawing distinction now that you consulted with and worked with Russian Communists rather than American Communists and Chinese Communists?

Mr. CARTER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. May I rephrase my question, then: Did you while you were secretary general and executive vice president of the IPR ever knowingly use or employ in your organization people you knew to be American Communists, Chinese Communists, German Communists, or any other than Russian Communists?

Mr. CARTER. We employed two or three people whom we knew definitely had been Communists and had repudiated communism.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not the question exactly. The question is, Did you employ those whom you knew to be Communists? I think you had better listen to the question.

Mr. CARTER. Thank you.

Save for this debatable question of Mr. Frederick V. Field, who had been employed long before he began writing for New Masses, and so on, I don't remember employing anyone who I knew at the time to be a Communist. I did employ one or more who subsequently I seemed to be very certain if they had not become party members were playing the party line 100 percent.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were they?

Mr. CARTER. Dr. Chao-ting Chi, a Chinese Communist, a graduate of Columbia had been recommended to us highly by the people who had given him his Ph. D. at Columbia on Chinese economic history who subsequently became secretary general of an international monetary stabilization board—British, American, and Chinese—to aid T. V. Soong, Chiang Kai-shek, and H. H. Kung, in establishing the Chinese currency.

Then he served under Dr. Kung as head of the Research Department of the Central Bank of China and then subsequently about the time the Chinese Communists took over Peking he made a trip to Peking and in an incredibly short time transferred himself from being an employee of the Kuomintang to the apparently much trusted employee of the Mao-tse Tung government.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you first realize that Dr. Chi was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. CARTER. I first realized he was playing the Communist game when I received word that he had moved from Kuomintang employ in Shanghai to Chinese Communist employment in Peking. I can't give the date of that.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you not know back in 1945 or 1946 that he wrote under a pseudonym for a Communist-controlled publication China Today?

Mr. CARTER. I didn't know it at that time. I only learned that very recently.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you learn it?

Mr. CARTER. You brought it out at a hearing here 2 or 3 weeks ago.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say "brought it out," what do you mean?

Mr. CARTER. I have forgotten whether you had a document or a copy of China Today.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it not the case that you brought Mr. Holland in here with you, who was your successor as secretary general and vice

chairman and you were willing to state for the aspects of the testimony you could not recall and you would assent to his testimony? Remember, you brought Mr. Holland in here to supplement your testimony and you said that his testimony would be your testimony as far as it was consistent with your recollection?

Mr. CARTER. Yes. He had much greater familiarity with the whole research and publication program, as he had been my international research officer, and as Dr. Chi had been employed on a research project which was under Mr. Holland——

Mr. MORRIS. When was that?

Mr. CARTER. Well——

Mr. MORRIS. Was that in 1940?

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Holland was international research secretary in 1940.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you not recall he conceded at that time he knew some time around 1945 that Dr. Chi had been writing in China Today under the pseudonym of Han-su Chan?

Mr. CARTER. I don't just remember that part of a very long session, but if you have the record there, or later wish to check on it, I am sure I said nothing at that time apropos of confirming Mr. Holland's statement that I would want to withdraw now.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you or the IPR first feel that Dr. Chi was no longer a person to be trusted by the IPR?

Mr. CARTER. It didn't come up while he was with us.

Mr. MORRIS. You trusted him at all times?

Mr. CARTER. Well, as much as you trust a temporary employee whom you think is competent to do a good job. You naturally want to give them every facility for doing the job you hired him for.

At that time I had trust in his competence, and we had always the validation right up to very recently when he quipped to the Communist side that he was in the good graces of the Kuomintang government. I met him when I went to the home of Dr. H. H. Kung's house in Chungking. Dr. Chi was there as one of his intimate friends and in view of the way Dr. Kung liked Communists, I thought that was good enough for me. They were fellow Chinese.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you testify at 1945 that the institute maintained friendly relations with Dr. Chi?

Mr. CARTER. I remember in 1948—you referred, Senator, to my short service with the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia—a part of my duty there was to attend to a Far East United Nations Conference at Ootacamund and Dr. Chi was one of the principal members of the Kuomintang delegation.

Mr. MORRIS. What about Mr. Holland's knowledge of 1945 when he knew Dr. Chi had been writing under the name Han-su Chan for a Communist-controlled publication called China Today in New York City?

Mr. CARTER. I prefer to have you ask that of Mr. Holland if you will later on, or if he is in the room now, because I would say my memory is not perfect. I thought in a previous executive session here Mr. Holland said that he did not know of Chi's writing under a pen name until the last year or so. But that I would like to have in the record—as I say, my memory may be faulty and it may be Mr. Holland testified that in 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer in evidence at this time the executive session testimony of Mr. Carter. At the request of Mr. Carter and at the request of Mr. Crossman, I believe we allowed Mr. Holland to participate in Mr. Carter's testimony in executive session. Mr. Carter has been out of the institute, at least in his official capacity, for a year or so now.

Mr. CARTER. Two and a half years.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland is more familiar with more of the details. So at his request we allowed Mr. Holland to participate.

The CHAIRMAN. At Mr. Carter's request?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. He just stated so a few minutes ago. He has already stated—and I want him to correct me if I am wrong—he knows nothing in Mr. Holland's testimony he would now withdraw or repudiate.

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. On page 44 of the executive session testimony I would like to read the colloquy:

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter, or Mr. Holland, did you know, or is it a fact, that Dr. Chi was one of the editors of China Today?

I addressed my question to both you and Mr. Holland, and Mr. Holland answered:

Speaking for myself, I have since learned this fact; at the time Chi worked in the IPR office, I was not aware of that. I understand, having heard it since, that he used another name when he was an editor.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that the name of Han-su Chan?

Mr. HOLLAND. I can't identify that name. My recollection is that it was something different. I can't say that I ever troubled to find out what his pseudonym or alibi was, but I do remember that—I think I first had it drawn to my attention after the Amerasia case broke into the news—

I might mention that that was in 1945—

that Chi under another name, had previously been on this magazine China Today.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, Mr. Holland, Mr. Field was the editor in chief of that publication, was he not?

Mr. HOLLAND. Of which publication?

Mr. MORRIS. China Today?

Mr. HOLLAND. This was also something which I heard after, heard told the first time, because I understand he also used another name.

Do you remember hearing that testimony?

Mr. CARTER. As I said, my memory was a little vague and clearly Mr. Holland stated that he learned this in 1945, and I would fully subscribe to Mr. Holland's memory, which is usually better than my own.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that portion of the executive session testimony introduced into the public session testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. It may go in. I think it is already in. You have inserted it already.

Mr. CARTER. Could it also be an extension of that, because either Mr. Holland or I indicated that Dr. Chi had left the employment of the IPR considerably in advance of 1945. You said in your opening statement you wanted to get the full rounded picture, and I think that would be appropriate.

The CHAIRMAN. If that is in the record it may go in with it.
(Portion of the testimony referred to follows:)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Frederick Spencer.

Mr. HOLLAND. This is one of the names that I heard, but I also heard other people say it was not the one he used, and I don't pretend to know.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your understanding that China Today is a Communist publication, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. I myself have never studied it, and certainly I have never accepted it as a Communist publication in the sense that I have always accepted, say, the New Masses or the Daily Worker.

It seemed to me occasionally, when I heard of it, to have articles that were critical of the Nationalist Government and sympathetic to communism, from what I heard of it. But I have no personal recollection of saying it was a Communist publication.

Mr. MORRIS. But the fact that the principal editors chose to use pseudonyms, is it not an unusual fact, don't you think, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. I think so now, but at the time I was not aware that they used pseudonyms.

Mr. MORRIS. And I should think that the fact that Dr. Chi used a pseudonym and was one of the editors of China Today, that that would be a factor in aiding you to come to the conclusion that Dr. Chi, all during this period prior to 1949, rather than being a loyal supporter of the Nationalist Government was secretly a Communist working against the Government.

Mr. HOLLAND. Well, Mr. Morris, you are entitled to your opinion. I don't wish to argue on it.

Mr. CROSSMAN. Wait a minute. The way the question is put, it seems to me a little difficult for Mr. Holland to answer. You assume that he knew that these people were writing under a pseudonym. At least that is how I get it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland said he knew.

Mr. HOLLAND. At that time I said I was not aware of that they were writing under pseudonyms.

Mr. CROSSMAN. When did you learn that?

Mr. HOLLAND. After the Amerasia case broke, which was sometime in 1945. In fact, even later than that, because at that time I was in China and didn't come back here until about November 1945.

So it was only then that, chiefly because I was curious to know what happened about this and troubled to read some of the reports.

But I want to be perfectly frank, and I recognize Mr. Morris here is asking a reasonable question, and certainly if, in the light of today's developments, what has happened, say, over the past few years, what we know about Soviet and Communist espionage, if I were today for the first time learn that these people were writing under pseudonyms in a magazine which had this general complexion, I would certainly be suspicious.

On the other hand, I have to report, in all honesty, that I saw this man's work, when he worked for the IPR, very closely. He gave no evidence of being Communist or biased. He was competent enough to report on wartime economic developments in China.

And I know enough from the people, Chinese bankers like Dr. K. P. Chen, and the British and American officials who served on this Exchange Stabilization Board, to know that they, too, were able and well-informed people.

And all I can say is that if he was at that time secretly a Communist he concealed it very successfully.

And even more remarkable is that he managed apparently to conceal it from so high an official as Dr. H. H. Kung, and many other top Nationalist Government officials right throughout the war period, including the Chinese secret police, who certainly must have been on the look-out for such people.

Mr. MORRIS. You were testifying in 1948 you were maintaining friendly relations to Dr. Chi?

Mr. CARTER. I met him at the Ootacamund conference. I met him at Dr. H. H. Kung's house. I tried to be friendly with people from all countries who were at that conference.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the present attitude of the IPR toward Dr. Chi? That is, as you know it.

Mr. CARTER. I think a clear recognition of the fact that Dr. Chi had a distinguished record at Columbia; that he served satisfactorily a very influential American-British-Chinese stabilization committee. He represented Dr. H. H. Kung in highly important relationships and then he slipped. Whether he slipped, whether he saw the way the tide was going, or whether he had always at heart been a Communist, your guess is just as good as mine.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think your answer is responsive to the question.

Mr. CARTER. Thank you. I accept your rebuke and will try to mend my ways.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not mean it as a rebuke. I mean you did not address your answer to the question.

Mr. MORRIS. You do know he was the proposed Chinese Communist delegate to UNESCO?

Mr. CARTER. Oh, yes; I learned that after he had gone over to the other side.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you testify that after you learned that you were no longer friendly with Dr. Chi?

Mr. CARTER. I never saw him; never wrote him.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your outlook toward Chi now? Or the outlook of the institute now?

Mr. CARTER. I can only speak for myself.

Mr. MORRIS. Speak for yourself.

Mr. CARTER. The institute does not take a position either on ideas or personalities. My own position is that he is a brilliant young Chinese that I think has gone wrong by throwing in his lot with the Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I had not anticipated introducing this letter at this time, but I think it is appropriate that I introduce a photostatic copy of a letter which bears the date of February 10, 1950. It is a copy of a letter from Mr. Holland, secretary general of the IPR, to Mr. Ivison Macadam in London.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you might well identify the letter unless you have already identified it.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to bring out this one paragraph first.

Mr. Mandel, will you vouch for the authenticity of this document?

I think, Mr. Chairman, from time to time we will have to swear in Mr. Mandel to verify the authenticity of documents.

The CHAIRMAN. You do solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. MANDEL. I do.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your name and address?

Mr. MANDEL. Benjamin Mandel, 3101 Pennsylvania Avenue SE.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. I am the research director of the Internal Security Subcommittee.

Mr. MORRIS. How long have you had that position?

Mr. MANDEL. Since March 1, 1951.

Mr. MORRIS. Prior to that time did you ever hold any similar position?

Mr. MANDEL. I was with the Committee on Un-American Activities, on its research staff, since 1939 until the end of 1944.

Then I was for 2 years with the State Department in 1945 and 1946. From 1947 until I took the position with the present committee, I was research director of the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you testify that photostatic copy is of a letter that was in the file of the Institute of Pacific Relations that was in your custody?

Mr. MANDEL. I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read the last paragraph of this letter.

If Loudon goes to Shanghai I hope he will see Chi Chao-ting, vice president of the Bank of China, who has been recently named Chinese delegate to the Economic and Social Council of the UN. You may remember that Chi was attached to the IPR international secretariat in 1940 and wrote one of the inquiry reports on China's wartime economic development (distributed only in brief form because it was incomplete).

This is the sentence I want to call your attention to:

Chi may well prove to be one of our more influential friends in China.

This is Mr. Holland writing about Chi after he had assumed this position as proposed Chinese delegate to UNESCO. Will you comment on that?

Mr. CARTER. May I have the privilege of looking at that?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly. I think the question should be read back to you.

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Mr. CARTER. I am very happy to do so, although I am handicapped in that this was a letter from my successor, Mr. Holland, to Mr. Ivison Macadam of the World Institute in London, and just from internal evidence I note that I remember this man Loudon was a high official of the British-American Tobacco Co. in London who apparently had been commended to Mr. Holland, and Mr. Holland thought Mr. Loudon, if he was going out to Communist China, would find a Chinese who had been trained in a democratic country useful in getting a picture.

But I would much prefer, Senator, as this is a letter from Mr. Holland to Mr. Macadam, to have the committee interrogate Mr. Holland at the appropriate time.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a matter the committee will have to decide on. I think you have answered the question.

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you.

Mr. CARTER. Senator, may I have your permission just to go back to an item earlier regarding Mr. Field? I did not quite get the point of one of Mr. Morris' questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you remember the question?

Mr. CARTER. The point I wanted to clear up was whether the committee's records show that Mr. Field wrote for the New Masses or the Daily Worker before 1940 and the date he went on the board of New Masses and the relationship of the date of his withdrawal from the secretaryship of the institute.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you something, Mr. Carter. Are you asking that question yourself, or is your attorney asking that question?

Mr. CARTER. My attorney, as you noted, reminded me to follow up and clarify a question that I thought at the time I was speaking was left hanging in the air.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not propose to let you have anything hanging in the air. The Chair will see that you have an opportunity to clarify anything you wish to clarify. I wish to say to the attorney, if you violate the rule of this committee we will remove you to the audience, and we will do it very fast.

Mr. CROSSMAN. May I have—

The CHAIRMAN. That is all; I have said the last word and that is all there is to it.

Mr. CROSSMAN. May I have an opportunity to discuss that question?

The CHAIRMAN. No, sir. I said no and that settles it.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to offer into evidence that letter from Mr. Holland to Mr. Macadam as exhibit 1-A.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit 1-A" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1-A

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS,
1 EAST FIFTY-FOURTH STREET,
New York, N. Y., February 10, 1950.

IVISON S. MACADAM, Esq.,

Royal Institute of International Affairs,

Chatham House, St. James' Square, London, South Wales 1.

DEAR IVISON: Many thanks for your note of February 7 about Loudon's visit to the Far East. I shall certainly be grateful for anything he can do to get in touch with leading members of the Chinese IPR. The senior man is the research chairman, L. K. Tao, 15 Shao San Tiao, Pei Shin Chiao, Peking. Other members concerned with IPR research projects are Prof. Chien Tuan-sheng, department of political science, Peking National University, author of the forthcoming book on Chinese government and politics now being printed for the IPR by the Harvard University Press. Another is Prof. Chen Chen-han, economics department, Peking National University, who is working on a study of the rise of the modern Chinese business class, on the progress of which I would appreciate having some news. Another is Prof. Fei Hsiao-tung, sociological department, Tsinghua University, and his colleague, Prof. Quentin Pan who have been doing some work on an IPR study of the Chinese gentry.

I spoke to C. P. Fitzgerald about these people in Hongkong last November just before he left for Shanghai, but I have heard nothing from him as yet. If Loudon gets a chance to talk privately to Tao and to Chien, I hope, of course, that he will stress our desire to have a qualified group of professors and journalists come from China to the IPR conference in India (probably at Lucknow, starting during the last week in September and dealing mainly with the subject of nationalism in the Far East and its consequence for the Western World). I also hope that he will convey my hope that they reorganize the Chinese IPR or establish a new Council of International Affairs which would participate as a national council in the international IPR. Finally I would like him to assure them that the Indian Council of World Affairs as host, and Pandit Nehru personally, are eager to have Chinese delegates or observers at the conference and will do everything possible to facilitate their travel.

Loudon may also have an opportunity to talk to such Chinese IPR members as K. P. Chen (of the Shanghai Commercial Bank in Hongkong). Impossible as it seems now, I have an idea that K. P. will later go to Shanghai, and even before then may perhaps be disposed to make a token contribution to the Pacific Council budget.

If Loudon goes to Shanghai, I hope he will see Chi Chao-ting, vice president of the Bank of China, who has recently been named as Chinese Communist delegate to the Economic and Social Council of the UN. You may remember that Chi was attached to the IPR international secretariat in 1940 and wrote one of the inquiry reports on China's economic development (distributed only

in brief form because it was incomplete). He may well prove to be one of our more influential friends in China.

Yours,

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND, *Secretary-General*.

(W. L. Holland, Correspondence 1950, Royal Institute: Macadam.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter, approximately how many members of the IPR would have been employed in an average year during these years of your tenure?

Mr. CARTER. The American IPR would have employed anywhere from 4 to 5 to perhaps 15 or 20 of all grades. I couldn't give the exact figures.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to go back, if you please. You wanted to clarify something. I do not want to deprive you of that privilege.

Mr. CARTER. Thank you very much. What I wanted to know was from the records of the Senate committee the date when Mr. Field went on the board of New Masses and the relationship of that date to his resignation as an executive officer of the American IPR. Just for my own knowledge I would like to know for how long a period, if any, he served jointly as an executive officer of our organization and on the editorial board of New Masses.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give that clarification from your records?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, that is a fact that we will present in due time. If Mr. Carter will be patient, he will see we will bring that out.

Senator EASTLAND. You testified you recommended Mr. Frederick V. Field for a commission in Army Intelligence. I would like to ask you if, to your knowledge, Mr. Owen Lattimore or Mr. Lauchlin Currie also recommended him for a commission?

Mr. CARTER. I would trust the committee's files on that.

Senator EASTLAND. I want you to answer my question now. Do you know whether or not they did that?

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember. They may or may not. If you could refresh my memory, I could give you a less equivocal answer.

Senator EASTLAND. Here is a letter dated February 18, 1942, Mr. Edward C. Carter, Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City:

DEAR MR. CARTER: Someone suggested the other day that Merion Cooper, our friend John Cooper's brother, was fairly high up in the Army Air Intelligence. This information was not definite but sufficient so as to warrant checking. Am I not right in believing that you met him in Hollywood through a letter from his brother? If so, do you know whether he actually is in Air Intelligence and do you know him well enough to bring my case to his attention?

I am enclosing a confidential account of my attempt to get into Army to serve as a sort of aide m  moire to anyone looking into it. I am also enclosing a copy of my original Who's Who on the basis of what is regarded as sufficiently qualified for the job. Nothing new to report. I had a good talk with Justine Wise Polier and her husband. Both are working on the matter. Presumably Owen is taking it up with Currie. Again many thanks.

Sincerely,

FRED.

Does that refresh your recollection?

Mr. CARTER. May I look at it?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify the people in that letter as much as possible, Mr. Carter.

Mr. CARTER. John Cooper was at that time vice president of Pan American Airways. I think he was Juan Trippe's legal adviser.

Merion Cooper, according to this letter, is John Cooper's brother. I knew John Cooper very well when he was in Pan American. I don't remember ever meeting Merion Cooper, his brother. Field says am I right in believing that I know the brother, that I met him in Hollywood. I don't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. I direct your attention to Owen and Currie. That is Owen Lattimore, is it not?

Mr. CARTER. Presumably.

Mr. MORRIS. That is who it is, is it not?

Mr. CARTER. Yes. Presumably Owen is taking it up with Currie.

Mr. MORRIS. That is Lauchlin Currie, an assistant to President Roosevelt?

Mr. CARTER. I believe he was one of the five or six executive assistants to President Roosevelt.

Here Mr. Field is telling me that presumably Owen Lattimore is taking it up with Lauchlin Currie.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any knowledge of that?

Mr. CARTER. Beyond this letter I remember nothing.

Mr. MORRIS. You testified that all you did to assist Mr. Field was to write a letter and outline his intellectual attainments. That was your testimony, was it not?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Why is it that you were in correspondence with him over a period of time if all you did was write a letter and outline his intellectual attainments?

Mr. CARTER. Here was a man who apparently wanted to serve his country. At that time I think he would have been an asset.

Mr. MORRIS. Wasn't your testimony wrong when you said you just wrote a letter and outlined his intellectual attainments?

Mr. CARTER. I think what I meant, Senator, was that I didn't go down to the Pentagon or go and see Senators or did not pull wires through Mr. Hull, or whoever was Secretary of State, but I wrote a letter. Beyond that I don't remember today going out in a campaign.

Senator EASTLAND. I would like to read you another letter. This is May 4, 1942, signed Edward C. Carter, and I quote part of it: It begins "Dear Fred."

I am very sorry that my efforts on behalf of you and also on behalf of Uncle Sam have not as yet yielded any substantial results.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is Fred?

Senator EASTLAND. That is Frederick V. Field. That was a letter you wrote.

Senator SMITH. What date was that?

Senator EASTLAND. May 4, 1942.

Mr. CARTER. I remember distinctly saying earlier this morning that I must have written a letter commending Mr. Field and that was presumably considerably earlier than May 4, 1942, and that I was sorry that my effort—maybe there was something besides that letter. I don't remember any personal campaign of buttonholing to get Mr. Field—

Senator EASTLAND. What else did you do beside write that letter?

Mr. CARTER. Well, I received a letter from Mr. Field that I have already referred to and read it.

Senator EASTLAND. What did you do beside write that letter to get Mr. Field a commission? I want to have you answer that question.

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember anything else, but if you or Mr. Morris or Senator McCarran could refresh my memory—

The CHAIRMAN. Would not this record that you just read, these 2 letters, refresh your memory?

Mr. CARTER. Well, the record is made to Justine Wise Polier. On seeing this letter, it is the first time I ever knew that Mr. Field knew Justine Polier, or her husband.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question there?

Mr. Carter, at or about the time that you were making this effort to get Mr. Field a commission in the Intelligence, did you have a conference with either or both Owen Lattimore or Lauchlin Currie?

Mr. CARTER. I remember no such conference.

Senator SMITH. Were you acquainted with those two gentlemen?

Mr. CARTER. Yes; I had known Mr. Lattimore since I recruited him as editor of Pacific Affairs in late 1933.

I had occasion to call on Lauchlin Currie when he was one of the President's executive assistants in connection with China relief, of which I was the director, and in connection with a visit to Chungking when Mr. T. V. Soong told me that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek wished me to come out and make a visit.

I remember very distinctly a contact with Mr. Currie at that time. I had not known him before he went into the President's office.

Senator SMITH. You had no contact with Mr. Currie about this proposal to get Mr. Field in the Intelligence Service?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember.

Senator EASTLAND. But you knew that Mr. Currie and Mr. Lattimore were attempting to get Mr. Field a commission in the Army Intelligence, did you not?

Mr. CARTER. I had it on Mr. Field's say-so from this letter.

Senator EASTLAND. And you knew that that was in 1942?

Mr. CARTER. 1942.

Senator EASTLAND. And you knew at that time that Mr. Field was on the editorial board of either New Masses or the Daily Worker, did you not?

Mr. CARTER. One reason that I wanted to get these dates straightened out—

The CHAIRMAN. Answer the question, if you can. There was a direct question put to you, Mr. Carter.

Mr. CARTER. I must have known that he had contributed articles to one or the other.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Mr. Carter, you and I will get along fine if you will just listen to the question and answer it, if you please.

Mr. CARTER. I am afraid I am trying to think of the answers too fast.

There is one question that "buggles" me in that I was asked 10 minutes ago to get dates.

Senator EASTLAND. Answer the question, please, sir.

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember.

Senator EASTLAND. You do not remember, then, whether or not you attempted to get a commission in Army Air Force Intelligence

for a member of the editorial board of either the Daily Worker or the New Masses?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter, you do recall that Mr. Field took a position as chairman of the American Peace Mobilization, do you not?

Mr. CARTER. That I knew.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that the American Peace Mobilization was a Communist-controlled organization?

Mr. CARTER. I knew it was very definitely cited as that, and I came to the conclusion that the Commies took it over.

Senator EASTLAND. When did he take that position with the Peace Mobilization?

Mr. MORRIS. In 1940, was it not, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. It was the autumn of 1940, at the time that the Quakers, pacifists, and Reds were trying to keep us out of what was described as the Chamberlain-Daladier world.

Senator EASTLAND. Yes, but you knew that Field was a Communist, did you not?

Mr. CARTER. I know at that time he was behaving like a Communist.

Senator EASTLAND. You knew at that time that he was a Communist, did you not?

Mr. CARTER. I didn't deduce, as I said earlier, Senator, that because a man wrote for a Communist paper that accepted articles from non-Communists, that Mr. Field was a Communist.

Senator EASTLAND. That they have non-Communists on the board of editors?

Mr. CARTER. I am speaking of the earlier period when he was a contributor, not on the board of editors.

Senator EASTLAND. He was on the board of editors before 1940, was he not?

Mr. CARTER. That was the question that I challenge and beseech and beg Mr. Morris to produce for me.

Senator WATKINS. I would like to know what his memory is on it.

Mr. MORRIS. Excuse me, Senator.

You do know that he was executive secretary of the American Peace Mobilization in 1940, do you not?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And you do admit now that the American Peace Mobilization was a Communist-controlled organization. Did you know it then?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you learn it?

Mr. CARTER. When they began picketing the White House.

Mr. MORRIS. When was that?

Mr. CARTER. In the following spring.

Senator EASTLAND. In 1941.

Mr. MORRIS. It certainly must have been before June 22, 1941, is that not so, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. Definitely.

Mr. MORRIS. And is not any date in 1940, a date preceding this 1942 date in which you helped to get Mr. Field a commission in the Intelligence?

Mr. CARTER. That is logical.

Senator EASTLAND. Is it not? Answer the question.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you had better be frank with the committee.

Mr. CARTER. I am trying to be. I am trying to understand the question.

Senator EASTLAND. So you knew, in 1942, that he was a Communist, did you not?

Mr. CARTER. I knew that he was playing the Communist line.

Senator EASTLAND. You knew that he was executive secretary of the American Peace Mobilization in 1940, that you say that you knew was a Communist organization?

Mr. CARTER. That I learned in 1941 was a Communist organization.

Senator EASTLAND. And then the following year, the following year there, you attempted to get that man a commission in Army Intelligence?

Mr. CARTER. I did.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Carter, did you make those facts known to the Army that you were possessed of?

Mr. CARTER. If I had the letter here, I am pretty sure that I mentioned his left-wing interests.

Senator O'CONOR. You have no recollection of it, or just what facts you did make known to the Army?

Mr. CARTER. No; but I believe Mr. Morris has the letter, and I would like to refresh my memory.

If I may explain that, Senator O'Conor, I felt here was a fellow who was torn between the left and 100 percent Americanism. I had the feeling that when we entered the war, and the issues were perfectly clear, that we were out on a democratic campaign, that he would, because of his very profound—he is a scholarly guy, I mean, everyone admits that.

Senator O'CONOR. Of course, a lot of Communists are who are un-American.

Mr. CARTER. Yes, sir. That he would throw himself in as a loyal servant of Uncle Sam, and could use his great knowledge to aid the United States in winning the war with Japan.

Senator O'CONOR. Did you really believe that he was so disposed?

Mr. CARTER. I did, frankly. I did.

Subsequent history would imply that I was wrong. But, at the time, I sincerely believed he could be switched over and made an asset on our side.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you thought he might be switched over after he went into the Intelligence Department of the Army?

Mr. CARTER. No; I thought that he realized already that he had made some mistakes, and that he was ready to come clean and serve our Government.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Carter, my question is, though, how much of that information you imparted to the Army, how much you told them as to your knowledge of his identification with Communist movements.

Mr. CARTER. Well, if I could get the letter, which undoubtedly Mr. Morris has—

Senator O'CONOR. I was really testing your memory, and wanted to get from you just what you recalled as to the extent of information

that you gave to the Army on which you based your recommendation for his commission in the Intelligence.

Mr. CARTER. I think there are two factors, if I may, in answer to your questions. One was a positive statement that he had assets that might be used. The other side was I felt sure that even in those days Government security would check up, and if they found out things that I didn't know, or interpreted the items in a different way, that they would have the final say, that I wasn't sufficiently a big guy with Army Intelligence for them to take him on my say so, because even then there was a good deal of checking.

Senator O'CONOR. But you have not any further knowledge as to how much you revealed and how much you told the Government about your personal knowledge?

Mr. CARTER. No. I, presumably, didn't say as much as I would now, because my convictions now are quite different from what they were then.

Senator O'CONOR. How much do you know as to Owen Lattimore's connection with Frederick Field and as to his knowledge of Field's identification with these movements?

Mr. CARTER. Contrarily, Lattimore and Field were employees of the IPR, Lattimore of the international body, the Pacific Council; Field as secretary of the American IPR.

Field was considerably junior to Lattimore in years and in intelligence; though Field was very intelligent, I considered Lattimore a far better informed man. I think they met at conferences. I don't think they were buddies or pals.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you have information then that Lattimore followed the Communist Party line?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Senator EASTLAND. Is that your testimony?

Mr. CARTER. That is my testimony.

Senator EASTLAND. Then you had no information that Lattimore followed the Communist Party line?

Mr. CARTER. I made up my own mind, and I was quite convinced at that time that Lattimore did not follow the party line. If you want me to extend my remarks, I still believe that Lattimore is completely opposed to communism and to the imperialistic Russian expression of communism at the present time.

Senator SMITH. I was going to ask a question.

As I recall, that letter said something about your efforts in behalf of getting Mr. Field a commission in Intelligence.

Now, what other efforts did you make; what were those efforts other than a letter that you wrote?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember.

Senator SMITH. You do not remember talking to anybody about that, anybody connected with the Army or with the Government?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember to this day. It is some years ago; but if Mr. Morris has something that will be refreshing to my memory—

Senator SMITH. You do not recall any talk, conference, or conversation with Mr. Currie, who was then at the White House, as I understand it?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember. It may be.

Senator WATKINS. Mr. Chairman, I have a question.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Proceed.

Senator WATKINS. Before you wrote this letter in behalf of Field, did you discuss the matter with him?

Mr. CARTER. Undoubtedly.

Senator WATKINS. What is your memory about what he told you, about what he wanted to do?

Mr. CARTER. That he wanted to serve Uncle Sam. I was convinced that he did. I had no thought at that time that he would use a position in Intelligence to serve any enemies, though, of course, at that time, our allies were somewhat different than what they are at the present time.

Senator WATKINS. Did you call to his attention, then, his left-wing activities?

Mr. CARTER. I think, undoubtedly, I said that I think, "You were very questionable to picket the White House," and I probably reminded him that I had told him that I thought it was a great mistake for him to join the American Peace Mobilization, that it would hurt his usefulness, but that if that really was attaining the task, that he might be a very useful intelligence officer.

Senator EASTLAND. How can you testify now that all you did was write a letter, call his intellectual attainments to the attention of the Government, when, in the light of this letter—and I hand you a letter dated December 15, 1941, addressed to Frederick V. Field, and signed Edward C. Carter.

Did you write that letter? Answer my question, sir. Did you write that letter?

Mr. CARTER. It clearly is my letter.

Senator EASTLAND. Now, let me have it, please. [Reading:]

DEAR FRED: I WAS all set to talk to two or three people in Washington when I got your letter of the 10th at the Mayflower, with Stone's rather surprising reaction. I wonder if this reflects his attitude or merely that of his colleague. I am anxious to talk the whole situation over with you before I make the next move. I want very much to see your unusual gifts utilized to the fullest extent during the emergency. We can discuss this fully when you come to see me at the IPR Tuesday morning, at 9:45.

Now, explain that letter.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the date of that letter?

Senator EASTLAND. That is December 15, 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is Mr. Stone?

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify Mr. Stone, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. I can't for certain, but I believe it is William T. Stone, who was formerly Washington representative of the Foreign Policy Association, who was then in some Government agency job. I don't know which.

Senator EASTLAND. What do you mean by "I was all set to talk to two or three people in Washington"?

The CHAIRMAN. Now, about this letter, do you want it inserted in the record?

We are getting some letters here that have not been inserted in the record. I would like to keep the record as straight as I can.

Senator EASTLAND. He has identified this.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be marked for identification and inserted in the record.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 3-C," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 3-C

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,
New York City, December 15, 1941.

Mr. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
16 West Twelfth Street, New York City.

DEAR FRED: I was all set to talk to two or three people in Washington when I got your letter of the 10th at the Mayflower, with Stone's rather surprising reaction. I wonder whether this reflects his attitude or merely that of his colleagues.

I am anxious to talk the whole situation over with you before I make the next move. I want very much to see your unusual gifts utilized to the fullest extent during the emergency. We can discuss this fully when you come to see me at the IPR Tuesday morning at 9:45.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. SOURWINE. Might the other two previous letters go in the record ahead of this one?

The CHAIRMAN. There are a couple of other letters here that have been referred to that should go in the record, or at least be identified.

Mr. SOURWINE. They have been identified in the record, sir, but not for the record.

Mr. MORRIS. We will call one of them 3-A, another one 3-B, and this one 3-C. Those will be entered in the record as 3-B, 3-C, and 3-A.

(Documents referred to were marked "Exhibits No. 3-A and 3-B," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 3-A

16 WEST TWELFTH STREET,
February 18, 1942.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City.

DEAR Mr. CARTER: Someone suggested the other day that Merian Cooper, our friend John Cooper's brother, was fairly high up in the Army Air Intelligence. This information was not definite, but sufficiently so to warrant checking. Am I not right in believing that you know him, that you met him in Hollywood through a letter from his brother? If so, do you know whether he actually is in Air Intelligence? And, do you know him well enough to bring my case to his attention?

I am enclosing a confidential account of my attempt to get into the Army to serve as a sort of aide memoire to anyone looking into it. I am also enclosing a copy of my original who's who on the basis of which I was regarded as sufficiently qualified for the job.

Nothing new to report. I had a good talk with Justine Wise Polier and her husband. Both are working on the matter. Presumably Owen is taking it up with Curry.

Again, many thanks,
Sincerely,

/S/ FRED.

EXHIBIT No. 3-B

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,
New York City, May 4, 1942.

Mr. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
16 West Twelfth Street, New York City.

DEAR FRED: This is a belated acknowledgment of your letter of April 16 enclosing copies of the interchange of correspondence with Pollard.

I am terribly sorry that my efforts on behalf of you and also on behalf of Uncle Sam have not as yet yielded any substantial result.

I certainly hope that the situation will change in the near future.

May I congratulate you on the great value of the last issue of Amerasia.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

APRIL 16, 1942.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City.

DEAR MR. CARTER: The enclosed copies of an exchange of correspondence with Mr. Pollard of the Office of Coordinator of Information speak for themselves. I propose devoting a large part of the next few months to baseball games and New Hartford.

Thank you again for your efforts.

Sincerely yours,

/S/ FRED
FREDERICK V. FIELD.

APRIL 16, 1942.

Mr. JOHN A. POLLARD,
Coordinator of Information,
270 Madison Avenue, New York City.

DEAR MR. POLLARD: This will acknowledge receipt of your letter informing me that in the light of an FBI report your office could, or would, no longer consider me for a job.

This came as a great disappointment to me for I have been most anxious to serve the Government in some capacity that might be useful. It did not, however, come as a surprise. For I have yet to hear of a single person alleged by the FBI of having engaged in radical or liberal activities being assisted in obtaining a fair and open examination of the charges against him. I had also just learned of Mr. Gilmore's being fired by the Office of the Coordinator of Information.

One cannot help but be disturbed at the power which a small clique in the Government seems to have in judging the fitness of individuals for Government service without right of trial or defense. I am also disturbed at the apparent fear of those in charge of Federal offices to take any steps whatsoever to terminate this witch hunt against those whose entire record is that of being anti-Fascist.

I am, nevertheless, far more interested in seeing the war won than in creating any disturbance over this issue. At this particular period I fear that the latter course would be divisive. I shall, therefore, take no further steps to engage in war service so long as the present system of personnel selection prevails.

May I thank you most sincerely for your personal kindness in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

[Confidential]

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION,
270 Madison Avenue, New York, April 14, 1942.

Mr. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
16 West Twelfth Street, New York City.

DEAR MR. FIELD: There seems to be nothing at all which can be done by this division to clarify your standing in the light of the Federal Bureau of Investigation report.

I am extremely sorry to have to advise that this is so, but the fact stands and there seems to be no conclusion to draw from it except that we could not go further in considering your availability for and expressed interest in the work of our division.

I wish you luck in finding war service which will be open to you.

Cordially yours,

JOHN A. POLLARD,
Special Reports Division.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. They have been referred to in the testimony by the witness.

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Chairman, I wonder, attached to that short letter that I just identified was another letter which I didn't look at. May I have the privilege of looking at that?

Senator EASTLAND. I just asked you to identify the letter so I could question you about it.

What were those activities that you say you were about to make?

Mr. CARTER. I thought I could give you a more satisfactory answer.

Senator EASTLAND. No, sir. I want you to answer what those activities were. That other letter was not to you, you know that.

Mr. CARTER. I haven't seen it. We have established, Mr. Chairman—

Mr. MORRIS. Have you identified Mr. Stone? You mentioned William Stone. What does Mr. Stone do?

Mr. CARTER. Well, at the time, I remember these facts: He had been president of the Foreign Policy Association, had been Washington representative of the Foreign Policy Association. Then, at the time of the war, he went into some Government agency. I do not know what.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know what he is doing now?

Mr. CARTER. He is in some Government agency. I haven't seen him for several years.

Senator EASTLAND. I want him to answer my question now.

What is it that you were going to talk about, and who was it that you were going to talk to?

Mr. CARTER. We have established, Senator Eastland, the fact that I wrote a letter commending him. This letter clearly indicates that from this man Stone, presumably W. T. Stone, Mr. Field received something very discouraging about the chance of his getting a commission, and that I was inclined to do something further. But it was suggested that we get together to talk over what the instructions were.

Senator EASTLAND. You said here a very plain statement. I want you to answer the question. You are dodging the question, Mr. Carter.

Mr. CARTER. I am sorry.

Senator EASTLAND [reading]:

I was all set to talk to two or three people in Washington when I got your letter of the 10th at the Mayflower.

Now, who are those people, and what were you going to talk to them about?

Mr. CARTER. For the first question, I haven't the faintest idea now who were the two or three people he was going to talk to.

The second thing is that I felt that the matter should be pressed forward, and that I would talk to two or three people following up the letter.

Senator EASTLAND. You had intended, now, making some contacts?

Mr. CARTER. I certainly did.

Senator EASTLAND. To get Field a commission in Army Intelligence; had you not?

Mr. CARTER. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. Now you just told us a little while ago that you did not propose to enter into any wire-pulling or seeing Senators, or anything of that kind.

Mr. CARTER. This has refreshed my memory and given me a more adequate basis for answering the question.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Carter, Mr. Stone is now in the State Department; is he not?

Mr. CARTER. William T. Stone is, presumably the same man.

Senator SMITH. He has been for several years; has he not?

Mr. CARTER. I think so.

Senator SMITH. You knew that. Is he one of the men that you intended to see to assist in getting Field a commission in the Intelligence?

Mr. CARTER. I can't answer. It would be quite likely because I had known him in New York long before the war.

Senator SMITH. Now, do you know whether or not Mr. Stone, Mr. Currie, and Mr. Lattimore were friends or acquaintances?

Mr. CARTER. Well, I know that Mr. Lattimore knew Mr. Lauchlin Currie because it was through the President's, I think Mr. Currie, executive assistant to the President, executive assistant who handled a number of the President's negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek; and, that in connection with the invitation from Chiang Kai-shek for Lattimore to go out as his political adviser—

Senator SMITH. That is not what I asked you, Mr. Carter. We have heard that.

I am asking you whether or not you knew Mr. Stone, Lattimore, and Currie were all friends at that time, at the time you were trying to get Field a commission in the Intelligence.

Mr. CARTER. I didn't picture them as a special group.

The CHAIRMAN. In fairness to yourself, you should answer the question, Mr. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. May I supplement the question?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

I think in fairness to yourself, you should answer the question. The question was: Did you know that they were all friends at the time?

Mr. CARTER. I knew they were acquaintances.

Senator SMITH. You knew they were interested in one capacity or another in the foreign affairs and foreign relations of the Government?

Mr. CARTER. Absolutely.

Senator SMITH. And did you know whether or not each of the three knew Field?

Mr. CARTER. I knew that Lattimore did. I don't remember about Currie. I am certain that Stone knew Field, because they were in the same general foreign affairs gang when Stone was in the AIPR and Field was in the IPR.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Carter, after having your memory refreshed by these letters and conversations, will you tell us now whether or not you aimed at Lattimore, Mr. Currie, and Mr. Stone to participate in securing a commission in the Intelligence for Mr. Field?

Mr. CARTER. Certainly, it points that way very definitely, and whether I had other people in mind, I don't know.

Senator SMITH. And you realized that each of those three gentlemen were in strategic positions to assist in that effort?

Mr. CARTER. That is quite clear.

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Carter, just on that point, and to clear up something that you have left in doubt, I have a letter before me addressed to you from Frederick V. Field, dated December 10, 1941, on the letterhead of Amerasia, and it shows that on the editorial board Frederick V. Field was chairman, and members of the board were Owen Lattimore and William T. Stone.

Mr. CARTER. Thank you very much for refreshing my memory.

Senator O'CONOR. How could you indicate any doubt as to the association among those men when the very letter addressed to you shows it on the letterhead, that they are all associated?

Mr. CARTER. Well, I wasn't always carrying a letterhead of Amerasia around with me.

Senator O'CONOR. Yes, but here was a letter which came to you and from Field. I will read it to you, one or two sentences, to indicate that you were put on notice of something very serious, that a man whom you had recommended for a commission in the Army Intelligence, knowing that he was a Communist, had already met with resistance.

Let me read you a line or two to indicate that it was not just a passing thing, that you would not have to regain in your memory a letterhead, but it was a serious thing, that you were doing something detrimental to the interests of your country. Let me just read it to you. It is from Field to you.

I have just had a conversation with Bill Stone over long distance. He was speaking from the office of the Economic Defense Board and indicated that we should go into the problem of my getting a job more fully in personal conversation. Nevertheless we had enough of a talk to convey a pretty clear picture.

Bill said that there would be very formidable obstacles indeed to my getting a Washington job.

Now, do you recall that?

Mr. CARTER. Have I seen that before, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. I have not shown it to you, Mr. Carter.

Senator O'CONOR. It is a letter to you, addressed to you, and, ostensibly, was received. Do you need to see it to remember that that important development occurred?

Mr. CARTER. Yes; I don't need to see it. I take it from you that I wrote it.

Senator O'CONOR. No; that you received it.

The CHAIRMAN. Identify that, Senator, if you will.

Senator O'CONOR. Yes; this is a letter on the stationery of Amerasia, dated December 10, 1941, addressed to Edward C. Carter, Hotel Mayflower, Washington, D. C. It is signed Fred. It is on the stationery of Amerasia, and the editorial board has Frederick V. Field, chairman. I would be very glad to have you examine it.

Mr. CARTER. I identify it as having been received, and with the members of the editorial board, including Kenneth Colegrove, who is with Northwestern University.

Senator O'CONOR. I refer, Mr. Carter, to the point in answer to your question to the Senator from North Carolina, where you indicated

some doubt as to William T. Stone's identification with these other persons, Frederick V. Field and Owen Lattimore.

My question is: Did that, in any sense, clarify it?

Mr. CARTER. Very greatly.

Senator O'CONOR. Very greatly. Now, having been clarified, what is your response to it, and what do you say now?

Mr. CARTER. Well, that Stone indicated that Field hadn't had a chance of a Government job.

Senator O'CONOR. Does it? In the very next sentence, he says he believed, referring to Stone, that these difficulties might disappear in time. Does that not indicate that there was still a chance, and that you all were still hoping for the day when Field would get by and get a commission in Army Intelligence?

Mr. CARTER. Speaking for myself, I was in that position.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to get that cleared up. He said, "Speaking for myself, I was in that position."

Just what did you mean by that, please?

Mr. CARTER. Well, I am not presuming to tell what 8 or 10 years ago the position of other people was. I felt it was only fair for me to state that I clearly, at that time, saw there were difficulties, I anticipated them, I had talked to Field and said his Peace Mobilization and his picketing the White House were pretty lousy, and that this was confirmation from this man Stone that there were difficulties, and that Stone thought they might be surmounted.

The CHAIRMAN. You yourself thought they might be surmounted? Did you mean that as a part of your answer?

Mr. CARTER. And still, at that time, I did feel that, on balance with the checks and balances of security checking up on him, and so on, that if he passed all the hurdles, that he would be a good officer.

The CHAIRMAN. And he might get in?

Mr. CARTER. Might get in.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Carter, at that time, then, you were possessed with at least some degree of determination to get Mr. Field into that Intelligence job, if you could, even in spite of the fact that you knew there were questionable circumstances about his career up to that point?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator SMITH. You were still determined to try to get him into Government service?

Mr. CARTER. Yes. All the evidence points that out.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the answer.

Mr. CARTER. That was my honest conviction, with all of these provisos and hedges, and so on.

Senator WATKINS. During that time that this conversation was going on, and at the time you had been requested to aid him, he was the financial angel for IPR, was he not?

Mr. CARTER. Not financial agent.

Senator WATKINS. Angel. He was helping all the time.

The CHAIRMAN. You may use your own term, if you wish.

Mr. CARTER. He was a minor cherub. The main support came from the Rockefeller Foundation and Carnegie Foundation and large American business corporations.

The CHAIRMAN. But he was picking up the deficit?

Mr. CARTER. He picked up several deficits very handsomely.

Senator EASTLAND. Did the Institute of Pacific Relations follow the Communist Party far-eastern program?

Mr. CARTER. I would say definitely not.

Senator EASTLAND. You did not?

Mr. CARTER. If anyone has read the 400 volumes and the periodicals, rather than simply a letter here and there, I think they would become convinced.

Senator EASTLAND. I would like to ask you this question, Sir: Did the institute, or did you as an official of the institute, recommend people to the State Department of the United States for employment?

Mr. CARTER. Several times we had requests from various agencies of the Government to suggest a man for this or that job.

Senator EASTLAND. I asked you about the State Department. We will get to the others later.

Mr. CARTER. A number of our people, more of our junior people, were employed by the State Department during the war and since.

Senator EASTLAND. Who were those people?

Mr. CARTER. I think more of the people who went into the Army. Of the State Department, Robert W. Barnett is in the State Department at the present time. He went from us, however, to General Chennault's staff in Kunming. There must have been others.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you instrumental in having Mr. Jessup go into the State Department?

Mr. CARTER. No. We regarded him as a competent man.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, he was chairman of your board of trustees, was he not?

Mr. CARTER. He was chairman of the Pacific Council for some time, and we found him very useful.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is, Was he chairman of your board of trustees? Will you answer that question yes or no, please?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. Let him tell who else. Let him tell who else they placed in the State Department.

Mr. CARTER. Jessup was chairman of the American IPR in 1939 and 1940.

The CHAIRMAN. Chairman of what?

Mr. CARTER. Chairman of the American IPR.

The CHAIRMAN. The American IPR is the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. CARTER. Of the American Institute of Pacific Relations, and he was chairman of the Pacific council from 1939 to 1942.

I may have something here, Senator, that refreshes my memory on what other members of the IPR staff were employed in the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. My recollection is, and perhaps the record would correct me, that Senator Eastland's question was, Who did you recommend for employment in the State Department?

Senator EASTLAND. That is right.

Mr. CARTER. The one that I referred to, he went on to General Chennault's staff in Kunming, on intelligence work, and from there went into the State Department.

Senator EASTLAND. You testified to that. Now, who else was there?

Mr. CARTER. I would like to give the most complete answer. My

memory is a blank. I don't know whether it would be permissible for me to consult Mr. Holland, who is in the room or not. I am anxious to give every name.

Senator EASTLAND. Will you give us that information?

Senator WATKINS. Did you recommend anybody to the State Department?

Senator EASTLAND. He testified they did.

Senator WATKINS. I did not get that, if he did.

Mr. CARTER. I think you are right. If the State Department consulted us on men like Barnett, I am very certain that they did in good character, because I don't remember anyone that we had who, at the time, would have hesitated to recommend. Maybe there was.

The CHAIRMAN. Your answer stands thus: The only one whom you recommended was a man by the name of Barnett.

Mr. CARTER. I think we must have given him a letter to OSS, if he was in OSS with Chennault.

The CHAIRMAN. The question by Senator Watkins is: Did you recommend anybody?

Mr. CARTER. That, I prefer, with a little time, to look up. Perhaps if we had an intermission shortly this afternoon, I could do it.

Senator WATKINS. Mr. Chairman, there is one matter I started a while ago, but it was overcome by a lot of other questions.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. You may proceed.

Senator WATKINS. I would like to have the witness finish the conversation that he had with Mr. Field about helping him get the commission in the Air Force Intelligence.

You detailed some, but I want to give the full conversation as you remember it, what you said, and what Mr. Field said.

Mr. CARTER. One of the American Peace Mobilization picketing the White House, and the relation to New Masses, very likely to hit him in the eye and throw him out, that I personally at that time thought he could be useful.

Senator WATKINS. What was his reply when you made that statement to him?

Mr. CARTER. That he had done these things for conscience's sake, because he didn't want to get into a Chamberlain-Daladier war. If it was a real war, to fight for democracy, he would go into it with both feet.

Senator WATKINS. Did he show any signs of repentance?

Mr. CARTER. A little sheepish.

Senator WATKINS. What did he say? Let us judge whether it was sheepish or not by what he said.

Mr. CARTER. I wish my memory was photographic. I can only remember the impression, not the exact words.

Senator WATKINS. Did he tell you the people that he thought could help him?

Mr. CARTER. You mean in getting—

Senator WATKINS. Yes; did he discuss the matter of who to help him get that commission?

Mr. CARTER. He may have mentioned Gen. Frank McCoy and Admiral Yarnell, both of whom he knew and who had been very useful in the IPR. Both of them had been members of the board, General McCoy and Admiral Harry E. Yarnell.

Senator WATKINS. You say he may have done it. Actually, did he mention those?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. He did mention those. Did he mention any others who could help him? How about Mr. Lauchlin Currie?

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember any more.

Senator O'CONOR. I have just one point along the line of what Senator Watkins was asking you about.

To clear up and finish this letter, Mr. Carter, was there any other position under discussion which Mr. Field thought he might get?

Mr. CARTER. I remember none.

Senator O'CONOR. I see. Well, now, I read just two additional passages from this letter.

The CHAIRMAN. Identify the letter.

Senator O'CONOR. Yes. It is the same letter of December 10, 1941, addressed by Mr. Field to Mr. Carter, on the letterhead of Amerasia.

After saying that he believed that the difficulties against him might disappear, he said, "I told him," that is, Bill Stone, "that I thought it would be a great mistake for me to get officially turned down, that is, that I should make no formal attempt until the way had been cleared."

Then, dropping down, it says, "Bill entirely agreed with this view."

After stating that, in the light of that, he sees no reason for him to come to Washington, he makes this statement, "I recognize that one of the difficulties of employing a person in my position, perhaps the chief difficulty, is not in the attitude of the directors of these Government agencies * * *." Apparently he thought that was pretty easy to get past. Do you think so? "* * *" but in their desire to avoid criticism from Congress or other sources."

He mentions about newspapers.

Now, here is the important thing that I would like to ask you about, all of this difficulty about his getting this particular position of the Army Intelligence, "Perhaps, however, it would not apply to the other form of Government work which you yourself suggested."

Now, I would like to ask you what other form of Government work you, Mr. Carter, suggested to Frederick Field that he could get, knowing that he was a Communist or had Communist sympathies.

Mr. CARTER. I think the obvious ones; I don't remember in detail, would have been OWI or OSS, or, because of his knowledge of the economics of both China and Japan, the Board of Economic Warfare, where he had already shown himself very competent as an economist on the whole far-eastern area.

Senator EASTLAND. What about the State Department, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember. It might have been.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Morris has a question.

Mr. MORRIS. In connection with Senator Eastland's question about the Communist Party line, I would like to introduce one letter into evidence, and I would like to ask Mr. Carter to comment on it.

The CHAIRMAN. Identify the letter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter, I am going to read to you from the photostatic copy of a letter addressed to Mr. E. C. Carter.

The CHAIRMAN. Before you go on with that, the letter that Senator O'Connor used in interrogating the witness, perhaps, should be introduced to the record.

Senator O'CONOR. Yes; I would like to offer it in evidence. It has not been offered, and I would like to do so.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be offered and inserted in the record.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 3-D," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 3-D

AMERASIA

EDITORIAL BOARD

Frederick V. Field, Chairman

Philip J. Jaffe, Managing Editor

T. A. Bisson, Ch'ao-ting Chi, Kenneth W. Colegrove, Owen Lattimore, Kate Mitchell, Cyrus H. Peake, David H. Popper, William T. Stone

NEW YORK, *December 10, 1941.*

MR. EDWARD C. CARTER,

Hotel Mayflower, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I have just had a conversation with Bill Stone over long distance. He was speaking from the Office of the Economic Defense Board and indicated that we could go into the problem of my getting a job more fully in personal conversation. Nevertheless we had enough of a talk to convey a pretty clear picture.

Bill said that there would be very formidable obstacles indeed to my getting a Washington job, and that that included the Economic Defense Board which was quite liberal. He believed that these difficulties might disappear in time. I told him that I thought it would be a great mistake for me to get officially turned down, that is that I should make no formal attempt until the way had been cleared. A turn-down would be a most unfortunate precedent not only for myself but also for a large number of other liberals. It would be particularly unfortunate for the Government itself, for it would indicate that they don't mean to carry out the President's plea for unity. No one is now interested in putting them, or ourselves in that position. Bill entirely agreed with this view.

In the light of that conversation, he and I agreed that there was little point in my coming to Washington this week. Instead we arranged to meet in New York next week.

I recognize that one of the difficulties of employing a person in my position—perhaps the chief difficulty—lies not in the attitude of the directors of these Government agencies, but in their desire to avoid criticism from Congress or other sources (e. g., certain newspapers, the Reader's Digest, those willing to print articles by unqualified liars). This is obviously a legitimate reason.

Perhaps, however, it would not apply to the other form of Government work which you yourself suggested. It might not apply because the very nature of that work, as I understand it, implies avoidance of personnel publicity.

I would, therefore, be most grateful to you if, on your return to New York, you could suggest that I be considered for that type of work. This assuming that the attitude you find regarding a Washington job is similar to Bill Stone's information.

Many thanks for your help, and apologies for adding one more incidental to your many preoccupations.

Best regards.

FRED.

The CHAIRMAN. This letter that you are now working on should be identified in some way.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, this is a letter on the letter-head of Pacific Affairs. It is dated Independence, Calif., July 10, 1938. It is addressed to Mr. E. C. Carter. It is signed by Mr. Owen Lattimore. It is a two-and-one-half-page letter.

I am going to ask Mr. Mandel if he will testify to the authenticity of this document.

Mr. MANDEL. I do.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to read, before offering this into evidence, Mr. Chairman, two paragraphs from this letter.

Senator EASTLAND. Who is the letter from or to?

Mr. MORRIS. It is from Mr. Owen Lattimore to Mr. E. C. Carter, dated July 10, 1938.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the witness should do it.

Senator WATKINS. He probably can identify it better than anyone.

Mr. CARTER. I would like to read it later, but identify it as having been written by Lattimore to me; that I received it.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter, I would like to read two paragraphs from this, and ask your comments on them. This is Mr. Lattimore writing to you.

Senator WATKINS. What is the date of the letter?

Mr. MORRIS. It is July 10, 1938. [Reading:]

I think that you are pretty cagey in turning over so much of the China section of the inquiry to Asiaticus, Han-seng, and Chi. They will bring out the absolutely essential radical aspects, but can be depended on to do it with the right touch.

Continuing:

For the general purposes of this inquiry, it seems to me that the good scoring position for the IPR differs with different countries. For China, my hunch is that it will pay to keep behind the official Chinese Communist position, far enough not to be covered by the same label, but enough ahead of the active Chinese liberals to be noticeable. For Japan, on the other hand, hang back so as not to be inconveniently ahead of the Japanese liberals who cannot keep up whereas the Chinese liberals can.

I am skipping a sentence here:

For the U. S. S. R.—

that is, for the Soviet Republic—

back their international policy in general, but without using their slogans and, above all, without giving them or anybody else an impression of subservience.

I stop reading at that point.

Now, I would like to ask you a few questions, Mr. Carter, on those two points.

What was the inquiry that you referred to in this letter?

Mr. CARTER. The inquiry was a research financed to the extent of \$90,000 by the Rockefeller Foundation, an inquiry into the issues of the Sino-Japanese War.

I was in Peking in 1937 when the Japanese came in and took Tientsin and Peking at the time of the famous Marco Polo Gate incident.

It was clear that the Japanese were on the march for aggression throughout China and further afield. It seemed to me that here we had an opportunity, while their major war was starting, to get people from different points of view to analyze the various features.

As a matter of fact, though Lattimore implies it, neither Asiaticus, Chi, nor Han-seng were major contributors to this study.

A number of other scholars—British, American, Australian, and so on—did contribute. For some reason or other, these three men did not make major contributions.

Mr. MORRIS. I think the letter, in that Mr. Lattimore said:

I think you are pretty cagey in turning over so much of the China inquiry to Asiaticus, Han-seng, and Chi.

Mr. CARTER. Presumably Mr. Lattimore was uninformed, or maybe I talked about it and didn't go through with it.

Senator EASTLAND. What did he mean by "cagey"?

Mr. CARTER. Did I use the word?

Senator EASTLAND. No; he said that in his letter. What did he mean by "cagey"; that you were cagey to turn it over to some Communists? That is what they were.

Mr. CARTER. He was attributing a skill or motive that I did not implement and carry out. I think he probably was trying to pay me a compliment.

Senator EASTLAND. Pay you a compliment to turn over that China section there to Communists, noted Communists?

Mr. CARTER. First of all, they were not noted Communists at that time.

Senator EASTLAND. They are noted Communists; are they not?

Mr. CARTER. They are today.

Senator EASTLAND. Yes, and they were then; were they not?

Mr. CARTER. I didn't know they were.

Senator EASTLAND. Are you a Communist?

Mr. CARTER. No. I have never been, am not now, and I plan never to be.

Senator EASTLAND. Now, he told you there that he recommended you to follow the Russian line without the appearance of subservience; did he not?

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Lattimore's letter, and I received it. I haven't followed the party line.

The CHAIRMAN. This expression here says: "I think that you are pretty cagey in turning over so much of the China section of the inquiry to Asiaticus." That "you are pretty cagey."

You had evidently done something that he was commending as being "cagey."

Mr. CARTER. The facts are, Senator, that I didn't actually do it.

Senator EASTLAND. Who was Asiaticus?

Mr. CARTER. He was a man who personally I never met, who was long on the China coast, who wrote for continental——

Senator EASTLAND. What was his name, sir?

Mr. CARTER. I haven't the slightest memory.

Senator EASTLAND. But you know he is a Communist?

Mr. CARTER. I now know that.

Senator EASTLAND. Yes. He wrote for Communist publications; did he not?

Mr. CARTER. I now know that.

Senator EASTLAND. Yes, sir.

Mr. CARTER. And for capitalists as well.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Carter, you answered Senator McCarran's question that you did not entirely adopt this Owen Lattimore's suggestion in following the party line. Would you say that Owen Lattimore was following the Communist Party line?

Mr. CARTER. No; I said that earlier, and I reaffirm it now.

Senator O'CONOR. Have you any other explanation to make as to why he would propose, in these words, "My hunch is that it will pay to keep behind the official Chinese Communist position?"

Senator EASTLAND. Wait a minute: "* * * far enough not to be covered by the same label."

Senator O'CONOR. Can you give any further explanation of that, if he was not following the Communist Party line?

Mr. CARTER. Here, if I may take your time, Senator, I don't think it will take long.

The CHAIRMAN. You are going to answer the question?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. CARTER. I said earlier that the Institute of Pacific Relations was made up of 10 or 12 national scientific academies—England, Japan, Australia, and the U. S. S. R. That was our biggest headache, to get cooperation.

We sincerely wanted cooperation on two theories, either that they were devils, and we should know the worst, or that their Oriental scholars had something to contribute.

One of the most active councils was the China IPR, which was made up of people who were friendly to Chiang Kai-shek and the Comintern. Then, until Pearl Harbor, the Japanese were in.

If you take the tensions of the British Council, the Dutch Council, and so on, along with Japanese and Russians, we were walking a tight-rope. Maybe we were fools to think that people in Russia could ever find a meeting ground for cooperating with scholars in a democratic world. But we made that attempt in good faith. I am inclined to think that, thinking of this balancing act of our 10 or 12 national councils, Lattimore was thinking more in institute terms than in general political terms, and that we were using such as Sir George Sansom, and a whole kaleidoscope of people of different points of view, and trying to keep a reasonably united group of scholars, aiming to find a basic path of the Far East countries.

The CHAIRMAN. Now let me go back to the question. Reading the language of this letter—that is, of July 10, 1938—which you say is from Mr. Lattimore to you, I read again:

I think that you are pretty cagey in turning over so much of the China section of the inquiry to Asiaticus, Han-seng, and Chi.

I draw your attention to this:

They will bring out the absolutely essential radical aspects, but can be depended on to do it with the right touch.

Does that draw your attention to anything at the time you received it?

Mr. CARTER. It clearly must have. It was within this framework of getting all tints of view.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you intent on bringing out and assisting the absolutely radical aspect of the U. S. S. R.?

Mr. CARTER. We were intent on bringing out this complex of contending forces with different national groups having different ends, and we could only serve the American public and the wider international public if we had spokesmen for all substantial points of view. That, Mr. Chairman, was my aim for a great many years.

The CHAIRMAN. That would indicate to you that Mr. Lattimore was pretty conversant with conditions in the radical line; is that not true?

Mr. CARTER. I think in his later years he spent a good deal of time—

The CHAIRMAN. No, when you received that. Would that not arouse your interest immediately to Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. CARTER. What is the date of that?

The CHAIRMAN. I am dwelling on the language again: "They will bring out the absolutely essential radical aspects." He must have known what they would bring out. He must have been familiar with them; must he not?

Mr. CARTER. He must certainly have been convinced that it was important to get radical, conservative, all points of view.

The CHAIRMAN. And did that not immediately arouse your attention as to Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. CARTER. It didn't, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator WATKINS. I wanted to ask one question. I understood you to say, Mr. Carter, that you did not know Asiaticus.

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember ever having met him, nor do I remember what names or name this was a nom de plume for.

Senator WATKINS. How about Han-seng?

Mr. CARTER. I knew Dr. Han-seng for several years.

Senator WATKINS. And Chi?

Mr. CARTER. I knew him for several years.

Senator WATKINS. How did it come about that you would recommend a man to take over this section of the inquiry that you did not know?

Mr. CARTER. I testified earlier, Senator Watkins, that I did not hand over major sections of the inquiry to Asiaticus, Han-seng, or Dr. Chi. Lattimore seemed under the impression that I had, or was about to. Lattimore was in error in that assumption.

Senator WATKINS. This letter itself was in answer to correspondence you had with him?

Mr. CARTER. Presumably, yes.

Senator WATKINS. I know he mentioned the letter from Wellington about the paper bombs and so forth.

Mr. CARTER. Well, Wellington was secretary of the China IPR, and was still an official of the National government.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, if you are adjourning now, in the afternoon session I would like to introduce the evidence that we have compiled on Asiaticus, Han-seng, and Chi. But, at the same time, I would like for this to be inserted in the record as exhibit No. 4.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 4," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 4

PACIFIC AFFAIRS,
Independence, Calif., July, 10, 1938.

Mr. E. C. CARTER.

DEAR CARTER: For a fortnight I have been without a stenographer, and things have piled up on me so that I must have a whack, in my own bad typing, at trying to clear the accumulation a bit.

The letter from Wellington about the paper bombs was illuminating. I was interested to hear about the Mr. Kuo who had spent 20 years in Japan. The Japanese have some first-class experts whose finesse in dealing with warlords and crooked politicians is extraordinary. Their weakness is that they do not know the young China that is growing up from under all the rotten debris; and what they do know they underrate.

I was also interested in the Timperley correspondence. One of the most subtle and difficult problems in timing is to attempt to plot the graph showing the moment when all the liberal and decent opinion in England, discrepant

and unintegrated as it is, ranging from the Timperleys to the Lyttons to the Alexanders to the Barbara Woottens to the Freda Utleys and back toward the Amalgamated Engineers and so on, will coalesce enough to check Chamberlain and his bunch. I think it will coalesce all right, but will it be too late?

In this connection I was especially interested, in the remark, in your letter to Alsberg, about the possibility that the Chamberlain government might countenance a Far East settlement that would be totally unacceptable to Washington. This cuts near the bone. Naturally, the remark led me to wonder whether you would consider my proposed September editorial a well-timed poke in the eye or an ill-timed thorn in the pants.

The letter to Alsberg also brought me up to date on a number of points. I was interested to hear that Hu Shih is going to Europe. At the end of his considerable stay, what is your estimate of the weight that he swings in American circles and the extent to which he molds or leads the opinions of Chinese in America?

I think that you are pretty cagey in turning over so much of the China section of the inquiry to Asiaticus, Han-seng and Chi. They will bring out the absolutely essential radical aspects, but can be depended on to do it with the right touch.

For the general purposes of this inquiry it seems to me that the good scoring position, for the IPR, differs with different countries. For China, my hunch is that it will pay to keep behind the official Chinese Communist position—far enough not to be covered by the same label—but enough ahead of the active Chinese liberals to be noticeable. For Japan, on the other hand, hang back so as not to be inconveniently ahead of the Japanese liberals, who cannot keep up, whereas the Chinese liberals can. So the chief thing is to oppose the military wing of Japanese aggression in China, counting on a check there to take care of both the military and the civilian components of aggression in Japan. For the British—scare the hell out of them, always in a polite way, but usually in a way that looks as if it might turn impolite. The British liberal groups are badly flustered; and being British, the way to encourage them to pull themselves together is to fluster the Tories. For the U. S. S. R.—back their international policy in general, but without using their slogans and above all without giving them or anybody else an impression of subservience. When it comes to the French, my wisdom fails. I haven't the vaguest idea what the real French constituency of our French affiliates is. The guy in Yosemite who thought he was on a ranch in the wild West may be the equivalent in France of Alexander in England, but I can't spot the French opposite number of Archie Rose, or Barbara Wootten, or George Taylor.

Yasuo seems to be functioning very creditably on the change from direct current to alternating current; but you are right, at any moment that whole fuse may blow out.

With Kurt Block I have begun a correspondence, but I am waiting for a clearer line on him. So many of the Germans drifting around now are interpermeated in the most curious way with both Marxism and Nazi hokum.

For the Italian stake in the Far East, have you checked on a tame, or at least semidomesticated Italian whom Lasswell has on some kind of a string (possibly frayed and still more possibly defrayed) in Chicago? Name of Renzo Sereno.

The news that Motylev may actually be over here in August is splendid. Tell him I have a mountain right here that he can climb any time.

Back to Block. Fred has sent me a copy of his letter to you of June 28, commenting on Block's memorandum on Germany's Far Eastern interests. I agree with Fred's main point—about the confusion caused to German commercial interests in China. Undoubtedly the German trading community in China bitterly resented the Japanese invasion and the political attitude taken by Germany. German trade even in Japan has also been thrown out of gear by the Japanese exchange restrictions. Nevertheless, the Germans who actually earn their living in the Far East are not the real big shots. Therefore I think Block may be broadly right; the determining interests in Germany decided that it was time to put their money on the eventual triumph of Japan; which necessarily means discounting immediate losses.

Fred has also sent me a copy of his letter to you of June 27, commenting on the San Francisco Japanese attacks on the IPR personnel. My position in this is a little different from Fred's. His work, even where it touches political controversy, is a logical extension of his economic research. He is also, as he points out in his letter, careful to the point of punctilio in his public appearances and speeches.

In my own case, before I had anything to do with the IPR I made my living partly by commercial lecturing and freelance writing. My political, travel and personal-observation and personal-opinion writing was undoubtedly better known than my academic work. In the circumstances, it would be silly and look timid for me to creep into the shelter of my desk and avoid further expression of opinions that I am already known to have. Considering, also, the way in which individuals of the Japanese IPR (Nasu specifically) have publicly endorsed such challenging measures of Japanese "forward policy" as military agricultural colonization in Manchuria, I do not see that Japanese publicists are entitled to question American employees of the IPR who express themselves on public issues as American citizens.

We are all doing fine now, and I am getting on with my book.

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, at what hour would it be convenient to reconvene, 2 o'clock or 2:30?

The committee stands recessed until 2:30.

(Whereupon, at 12:40 p. m., the hearing was recessed until 2:30 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

You may proceed, Mr. Morris. Mr. Sourwine advises the Chair that he wishes to take up a letter at this point, however.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Carter, I hold in my hand a press release marked for immediate release July 25, 1951, from the Institute of Pacific Relations. I ask you have you seen that press release?

TESTIMONY OF EDWARD C. CARTER, NEW YORK, N. Y.—Resumed

Mr. CARTER. I saw it just before the morning session.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you in any way participate in its preparation?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have opportunity when you saw it before the morning session to read it and note its contents?

Mr. CARTER. Hurriedly.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are then familiar with the fact that this press release states that Mr. William L. Holland, executive vice president of the American IPR today made the following statement:

Despite the fact that some of the institute's dead files were illegally seized last February by an agent of the subcommittee * * *.

In other words, that this press release at the outset seeks to convey the charge that the subcommittee acted illegally of taking possession under subpoena of the files that were in the barn in Lee?

Mr. CARTER. My understanding, Mr. Sourwine, is that the question on the legal basis of subpoena, I thought a subpoena could subpoena people, but I didn't know that it could subpoena documents.

Mr. SOURWINE. I wasn't asking at the moment for your opinion in regard to what a subpoena could or could not do. I was asking if you were familiar with the charge made.

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it in any sense your charge?

Mr. CARTER. I would associate myself with it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Disassociate yourself from it or with it?

Mr. CARTER. I associate with it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you had legal advice with regard to that charge?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you yourself a lawyer?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your position is that the committee took an illegal action when it took possession of the files under subpoena in Lee, Mass.?

Mr. CARTER. Yes; because they didn't take them from an officer of the Institute of Pacific Relations. They didn't take them from me, on whose property they were stored. They could have gotten them all by asking the IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Carter, I wasn't asking for an argument on the matter and I didn't intend to make one. I simply wanted the record to show that if the charge was made that you were associating yourself with it, that that was the fact, and whether or not you had legal advice in connection with it.

Mr. CARTER. The institute had legal advice. It was reported to me that the institute had legal advice. I personally had great confidence in the legal firm that gave the advice. Personally, I associate myself with it.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was that firm?

Mr. CARTER. Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Sunderland & Keindl.

Mr. SOURWINE. What would you say, sir, was the purpose of making that charge in this press release distributed here at this time?

Mr. CARTER. You would have to ask an officer of the institute.

Mr. SOURWINE. No, sir; you have said you would associate yourself with the charge. For what purpose do you associate yourself with it?

Mr. CARTER. I was quite naturally surprised that after the institute had invited J. Edgar Hoover——

Mr. SOURWINE. If you will pardon me, sir. I do not mean to interrupt you unduly, but I would like to have an answer in regard to what purpose you had in associating yourself with that charge.

Mr. CARTER. My neighbors in Lee, Mass., wanted to know what the situation was. It is the first time in my life that an agency of the American people, an official agency, had——

Mr. SOURWINE. Pardon me, sir, but you are making another speech. The charge is being made now. I am trying to get at the purpose of making the charge at that time.

Mr. CARTER. To indicate that though it was something that appeared questionable at the outset, the institute has shown, ever since the seizure of those files, its willingness to cooperate in every possible way.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am glad you brought that point out, that the institute has made no previous challenges to the legality of taking possession of files by the committee.

Mr. CARTER. I couldn't answer that question.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, as you have pointed out, the committee has been given the files of the institute, have they not?

Mr. CARTER. So far as I know the institute has given everything requested.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am simply wondering whether it was either your intention or purpose, or whether it was the intention or purpose of the institute in making this charge at this time in a press release to seek in any way to discredit the committee.

Mr. CARTER. It was an effort to accredit the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know when these files were taken, sir?

Mr. CARTER. Yes, sometime in February of this year.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you thought this was illegal, why wasn't there a contention to that effect made in February or in March rather than here in July in connection with these particular hearings?

Mr. CARTER. Because I was not an officer of the institute and that question should be addressed to a responsible officer of the institute.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anything concerning the purpose of the institute with regard to this press release?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, when you were shown the press release, discuss with Mr. Holland or others its purpose or possible effect?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have no more questions on that point, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SMITH. May I ask some questions?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Did you protest at the time these papers were seized?

Mr. CARTER. I didn't have any chance. They were taken out of my barn and brought down to Washington under guard. Who was I?

Senator SMITH. They were in your barn, on your property, near Lynn, Mass.?

Mr. CARTER. No; Lee, Mass. Two miles from Lee, not 17 miles, as was said in one of the papers. It is a very accessible place. It is my summer home. They had been sent there because of the fact that storage in New York of dead files was very expensive. It was hoped by the officers of the institute that because I retired if those old files were there I might spend some of my time writing a history of the institute.

Senator SMITH. How long had they been there at the time of seizure?

Mr. CARTER. I can't say, over a year, 2 years. They were there when the institute invited Mr. Edgar Hoover to inspect everything in the IPR files, both in New York and at Lee. I handed over the key of the barn to the representatives of the FBI that had a dozen people there. I gave them every facility for seeing everything. I didn't stay around. I gave them the freedom of the barn.

Senator SMITH. So you had no objection to these papers being seized or examined by the committee?

Mr. CARTER. I had no objection to their being seen by the FBI. I was not consulted as to whether I was for or against their being seen by this committee.

Senator SMITH. Did you protest against their being seen by this committee at the time?

Mr. CARTER. I certainly didn't myself write to Senator McCarran or to any of the committee.

Senator SMITH. Did you protest to any of the people who took charge of any of the papers in the barn?

Mr. CARTER. I didn't see any of them.

Senator SMITH. Did you have any agents on your farm that protested or that you entrusted to protest?

Mr. CARTER. No. Our next door neighbor, a nice New England farmer's wife who kept the key for us in case the electrician or the fire department wanted to come along, she was presented with a subpoena. She didn't have legal advice. She was told she had to do it. She might have asked for a court order. I didn't hear about it until the next day.

Senator SMITH. They were in her custody; she had the key?

Mr. CARTER. They were not in her custody.

Senator SMITH. Who else had a key?

Mr. CARTER. They were in my custody as owner of the property. They had been stored on my property for the reasons that I have given, as a convenience for the fire department, and so on, so they could get quick access in case of need when I was living in New York 130 miles from Lee.

The commissioner of fire and police could go to our next-door neighbor and get the key for those specified purposes. She was not employed by the Institute of Pacific Relations; she wasn't an officer of the IPR; she wasn't custodian of the property; she had a friend who had the key.

The CHAIRMAN. The files were the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. CARTER. They were.

The CHAIRMAN. You know them to be authentic files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. CARTER. I know that the files came up from New York as the authentic files. Whether anyone ever slipped anything in that wasn't authentic, I have no means of saying. Anyone knows that in an old New England barn that if you haven't the key you can get up through the manure chute. You could go both ways.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you think anything was put up through the manure chute?

Mr. CARTER. I have no evidence of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you believe there was? Have you any reason to say that?

Mr. CARTER. I have no reason except certain New England skepticism. I am not making any charge.

Senator FERGUSON. You indicated that someone of this committee could have slipped something up through the chute. Isn't that true, and they are going to pull it out here as a part of the rabbit out of the hat of the IPR files?

Mr. CARTER. I think you can read that into what I said.

Senator FERGUSON. Would not any reasonable person read it into your remarks?

Mr. CARTER. Apparently you have, and I regard you as highly reasonable.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you want to let it stand? Is that your charge?

Mr. CARTER. I do not wish to make any charge that any member of this committee or any member of the United States Government slipped anything up through the manure chute into the IPR files.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you say it?

Mr. CARTER. I am human.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask another question?

The CHAIRMAN. I think his answer is "to err is human," and he has erred.

Senator FERGUSON. You say there were certain charges made against the IRP. Have any officer or group of officers of the IRP, since those charges have been made, made an independent check to ascertain whether there was any reasonable grounds for the charges?

Mr. CARTER. I don't want to duck, but I would prefer an executive officer of the institute answer that question, because I don't know all the operations.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you caused any such research to be made to see whether or not there was anything to the charges or reasonable grounds for the charges?

Mr. CARTER. You mean charges by the Senate committee?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. You say charges were made.

Mr. CARTER. Charges were made in the press. Those charges in the press purported to stem from the process of seizure of those files.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there any independent check made by the institute itself to ascertain if there was any truth to the charges—well, let me ask if there was an indication at least that this was a front for communism? Has anyone made a search to ascertain whether or not it was a front?

Mr. CARTER. Oh, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Who did it?

Mr. CARTER. A group of which Robert Gordon Sproul, president of the University of California, was a member; Prof. Joseph P. Chamberlain at Columbia, recently deceased; Brooks Emeny, formerly of Cleveland, Ohio, and now president of the Foreign Policy Association; Arthur Deane, a colleague of John Foster Dulles and Allan Dulles, a partner of Southerland & Cromwell, and a few others.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they question you on that matter?

Mr. CARTER. They did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they question Field?

Mr. CARTER. Whether all of them did, I know Mr. Arthur Deane did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they make a written finding, a report?

Mr. CARTER. You are referring, Senator Ferguson, just to what period? After the seizure?

Senator FERGUSON. No; any time, even after the seizure.

Mr. CARTER. Before the seizure—

Senator FERGUSON. Did they make a written report?

Mr. CARTER. They made a written report. I think copies have been sent to Mr. Morris with the facsimile signatures.

Senator FERGUSON. After the seizure did they make an investigation and make a report?

Mr. CARTER. They considered the question of various applications—

The CHAIRMAN. The question is: Did they make an investigation and make a report, and not whether they considered it.

Senator FERGUSON. It will not take long to answer that.

Mr. CARTER. Not an investigation in the sense of reading 400 books and thousands of letters.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not think it would have been proper for an organization such as this to make a search to attempt to see whether

or not serious charges are true, so, if there were, they could clean their own house rather than to have a congressional committee do it?

Mr. CARTER. The charges made in a few papers appeared to the members of the committee—

The CHAIRMAN. The question is susceptible to a "yes" or "no" answer, and you can explain afterward. If you do not care to answer "yes" or "no," I think the matter ought to terminate.

Mr. CARTER. Would you repeat it once more?

Senator FERGUSON. I want to know whether or not it would be a reasonable thing when charges are made against an organization as large as this that they were acting as a front of communism, that somebody in there would not have had an examination, a detailed investigation of their own house after these papers were seized and whether or not they did and whether or not they made a report.

Mr. CARTER. Charges that were made at the time of the seizure were in large part the same charges that had been made by a New York businessman, Mr. Alfred Kohlberg. They were investigated in view of the officers of the IRP. They were not substantiated. The new charges were so similar, in some cases so identical, that I imagine the committee felt there was no use of going through it again.

Senator FERGUSON. Was this investigation made after the papers were found in the office of Amerasia? Didn't that put an entirely different complexion on this whole Communist front and this organization being a Communist front?

Mr. CARTER. It would have been an entirely different complexion if there had been a proven charge that the Amerasia passed on restricted documents to representatives of foreign governments.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean the fact that they stole the papers out of the files of the Federal Government, and used them, the mere fact they didn't pass them on to foreign governments made a difference?

Mr. CARTER. I think it did, because I think one would be espionage or something more serious.

The CHAIRMAN. One would be theft and the other would be treason; is that not true?

Mr. CARTER. You are the chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. Were they not both serious matters?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Wasn't Mr. Field connected with both?

Mr. CARTER. He was not connected with Amerasia at the time of the seizure of the Amerasia files.

Senator EASTLAND. How do you know copies of those documents were not passed on to foreign governments?

Mr. CARTER. A lot of people have been trying to prove it and it has not been proven.

Senator EASTLAND. You just testified they were not passed on. How did you know that?

Mr. CARTER. Every effort was made by very competent and virile people to prove it and it was never proven.

Senator EASTLAND. Stolen by Communists, were they not?

Mr. CARTER. They were stolen; they certainly were stolen. They were secured irregularly by people who were accused of being Communists.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, gentlemen. Go ahead, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Before commencing this next line of inquiry, I would like to call attention to the fact that exhibit 3-B has two corollary letters which I would also like to introduce into the record at this time. I show you them so you might see everything that is going into the record. We introduced that top letter and there were two corollary letters underneath.

Mr. CARTER. These appear to be authentic letters.

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you, Mr. Carter.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you offering them?

Mr. MORRIS. I now offer the corollary letters on exhibit 3-B into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. They will all be a part of exhibit 3-B. They are attached together.

(Documents referred to attached to exhibit 3-B were filed for the record. See p. 26.)

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to get back to a line of questioning we had just before the luncheon recess.

I refer you to a letter dated July 10, 1938, from Mr. Lattimore to Mr. Carter. Among other things it says:

I think you are pretty cagey in turning over so much of the China section of the inquiry to Asiaticus, Hang-seng and Chi.

Also that portion of the next paragraph:

For the U. S. S. R.—back their international policy in general, but without using their slogans, and above all without giving them or anybody else an impression of subservience.

Do you know that Asiaticus, who was referred to in that letter, wrote for Imprecorr, which is the official organ of Communist International published in Moscow?

Mr. CARTER. I didn't know it at the time. As I said this morning, I did not employ Asiaticus on the inquiry.

Mr. MORRIS. Asiaticus did write for official Communist publications, did he not?

Mr. CARTER. I am so informed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would introduce into the record a writing of Asiaticus in Imprecorr.

Mr. MANDEL. Asiaticus was a writer for the publication Imprecorr, which is an abbreviation for International Press Correspondence. He was a writer of at least one article in 1927 and seven articles in 1928. I have before me a photostat of one of his articles entitled "Dollar Imperialism in the Far East," which appears in the issue of May 31, 1928, page 534.

To get the flavor of the article I would just read one sentence:

The United States which issued from the World War as the main creditor state, wanted us to maintain the financial control of the predatory campaign of imperialist finance in China.

The Imprecorr was a weekly official organ of the Communist International. This is shown by the following: In a Communist publication entitled "The Worker's Monthly," of December 1926 on its back cover, reference is made to the Imprecorr as follows:

A weekly mine of information about the international Communist movement, articles by the leading Communists of the world, reports from every land, indispensable as a source of information of the world revolutionary movement.

There are other excerpts I could show that this paper was an organ of the Communist International. Just to summarize, I want to point out that in its issue beginning September 6, 1928, a series of articles is devoted to the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International.

Mr. MORRIS. How many articles did Asiaticus write for *Imprecorr*?

Mr. MANDEL. He wrote at least one in 1927, and seven in 1928. I can read the titles and dates if you desire.

Mr. MORRIS. I don't think it will be necessary, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. I suggest he put them in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. One of them is quite voluminous.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to offer the one article referred to by Mr. Mandel in the record and have it marked as exhibit No. 5.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 5" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 5

[From International Press Correspondence, May 31, 1928]

POLITICS—DOLLAR IMPERIALISM IN THE FAR EAST.

(By Asiaticus)

The Japanese attack on Shantung, the military operations around Tientsin and the comprehensive preparations "for the purpose of preserving Manchuria from civil war," which means occupying it with Japanese troops, very naturally raise the question as to how the United States imperialists will reply to this Japanese campaign. As from 1905, when by its victory over imperial Russia, Japan was enabled to appropriate Korea and the southern part of Manchuria, the United States were for practically two decades the most obstinate and dangerous opponent of Japanese expansion on the Asiatic Continent.

Nevertheless, in spite of the appeals issued from Nanking, the United States imperialists are continuing to observe the most mysterious silence and are so far refraining from any steps toward hemming the desire of the Japanese for intervention and annexation. Nay, more than that. For when the Japanese had expelled the south Chinese troops from the railway zone of Tsingtao and Tsinanfu and Japan suggested to the diplomatic corps at Peking that the task of defending Tientsin against the advance of the south Chinese be entrusted to the Japanese troops, the United States minister at Peking was one of the first to agree. It was only subsequently, upon instructions received from Washington, that the minister withdrew his consent, whereupon the Japanese Government simply proceeded with the military safeguarding of Tientsin on its own account without the sanction of the United States although, according to the Washington agreement of 1922, such an action in the Peking-Tientsin zone was only permissible with the consent of all the "interested" powers.

It is obvious, moreover, that Washington entertains no illusions in the matter of the Japanese promises, according to which Japan is ready to respect the Washington agreement regarding Shantung and according to which the Japanese campaign purports no intervention in the Chinese civil war but merely the protection of the Japanese interests in the zone of military operations.

The explanation of this attitude on the part of the United States toward Japan during the last few years can, nevertheless, not be sought in even a partial surrender of United States imperialism to Japan. The Washington Conference, at which the United States Government presented its claims to the hegemony in the Far East, obliged Japan to evacuate Shantung, while conceding that the harbor of Tsingtao, the railway line from Tsingtao to Tsinanfu and the bulk of the iron and coal occurrences in these regions should remain pronouncedly under Japanese financial control. The Japanese Government, or rather Japanese capital interests, were to have their creditor claims guaranteed, in the case of the mines also their proprietary claims.

The Washington Conference, moreover, determined that the interested powers were only to act in corpore in the question of granting loans to the Chinese Government. The United States which issued from the World War as the main creditor state, wanted thus to maintain the financial control of the predatory campaign of imperialist finance in China. For this reason the outcome of

the Washington Conference in China was not received as a general expression of the "traditional friendship" of the United States for China, but on the contrary as an imperialist front under the lead of the United States for the purpose of a maintenance and extension of the subjugation of China. It is merely characteristic of Chiang Kai-shek and his clique, as also their entire policy of treachery toward the national revolution, that they should now appeal against Japan to the "traditional friendship" of the United States.

So as to safeguard this policy of maintaining the financial lead of the imperialist proceedings of the powers, the United States required the dissolution of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, a development which actually came about under pressure from Washington after the conclusion of peace. The evacuation of Shantung was a further success, making Japan more liable to accede to an American financial control of the Japanese imperialist expansion in northern China.

Since the Washington Conference, however the United States have got nearer and nearer to their object by different ways. True, the loans, which can only be granted to the Chinese Government by an international financial consortium, have not materialized, partly because the Chinese Government was obliged, under the pressure of the national-revolutionary forces, to refuse to deal with the international financiers, and partly because in the last few years the so-called Central Government at Peking was not capable of negotiating a loan. On the other hand, United States capital has found its way to Japan and into the Japanese enterprises in China, especially in Manchuria. In Japan itself and in the United States, there has been a visible change in the matter of mutual confidence, naturally only among such circles as are interested in the policy of expansion in Asia.

Since the World War and since the earthquake of 1923, Japan has not been able to extricate itself from its financial crisis. During the World War it was in a position to develop its national industries and to strengthen its commercial positions both in China and in India. European and American competition was partially suspended for the time being in view of the necessity of war requirements. After the World War it was inevitable that Japan should experience a serious economic and financial crisis by reason of the resumption of competition on the part of the industrially strengthened victorious powers. The earthquake in 1923 made the position still worse for Japan. Nevertheless, Japan is the only power that has managed to make big capital investments in China since the Washington Conference. At Tsingtao and Shanghai, big Japanese cotton mills have been erected in Chinese territory. Large and expensive railway systems have been constructed in Manchuria, and the mining industry in Manchuria and other north Chinese districts has made gigantic strides under Japanese management. This could only be effected with United States money.

According to United States estimates, some two thousand million dollars of United States money have been invested in the Japanese enterprises in Manchuria and northern China. Only a few weeks ago the Japanese South-Manchurian Railway management negotiated with Morgan for a loan of \$50 million. This loan had already found the sanction of the United States Government, and it was only upon protest being raised in China that the consent of the United States authorities was withdrawn. The United States financiers are, however, in general undoubtedly acting with the consent of their Government in their repeated grants of financial "aid" to Japan. This development explains the present attitude of the United States in regard to the Japanese intervention in China. Japanese imperialism is also defending interests of the United States. The foreign policy of the United States limits itself to watching that these interests should not be endangered by the Japanese military operations in China and that the Japanese should not gain such positions as might threaten the future of the financial control of the United States in the Far East.

United States imperialism sees its strongest rival at present not in Japan, but in Great Britain. At the last disarmament conference, which was frustrated by the impossibility of an agreement between the United States and Great Britain, Japan played the part of a mediator. In the present struggle in the Far East, the United States are mainly interested in preventing a revival of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. It is therefore wrong to imagine that the United States are anxious to preserve their attitude of "traditional friendship" for China. The United States will safeguard their own interests, i. e., see to the realization of financial control in the Far East even on the basis of an increased Japanese colonization of Manchuria.

With its present action in the north of China and Manchuria, Japan is attempting to emancipate itself somewhat from United States capital by gaining further

positions. And here it is that the old conflict may possibly revive, on the basis of a struggle for the division of China and for the hegemony of the United States financial capital in such parts of China as have already been subjugated.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have a record of Asiaticus writing any publication under Communist auspices?

Mr. MANDEL. Asiaticus under that name also wrote a book in German entitled "Von Canton Bis Shanghai," which means from Canton to Shanghai, published by Agis Verlag. On page 53 of this book Asiaticus refers in German—and this is a translation—to "the Communist Party, the sole leader of the national and social revolution."

That gives the flavor and line of the book.

The CHAIRMAN. I like that word "flavor."

Go ahead.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was Chen Han-seng?

Mr. CARTER. I think I referred to him this morning. Chen Han-seng was a Chinese scholar, a graduate of American universities, got his doctorate over here, head of a section of the Academia Sinica, order of social sciences research council, who was an authority on the farm problems of China, who came to this country, and when we made a study of China and its labor he was recommended to us as a highly competent Chinese scholar who knew more about the tussles between landlord and so on, than any other Chinese, so we employed him.

Mr. MORRIS. For how long was he employed by the IPR?

Mr. CARTER. I can't say.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know he used a pen name?

Mr. CARTER. I didn't until you brought it up at the executive session.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter, I would like to show you a photostatic copy of a letter purportedly from you, dated January 15, 1940, to Dr. V. E. Motylev, Pacific Institute, 20 Razin Street, Moscow, U. S. S. R.

I will read this to you and then offer it for your examination:

DEAR MOTYLEV: I am not certain whether you are informed that the pen name of Dr. Chen Han-seng and Miss Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley are Raymond D. Brooke and Edith Cromwell.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. CARTER. You recall it to my attention. I had forgotten it.

Mr. MORRIS. You do recall writing that letter to Mr. Motylev?

Mr. CARTER. It is from my address. It hasn't got any signature on it, but my signature is typed in. It makes sense to me.

Mr. MORRIS. I offer this in evidence and wish it to be marked "Exhibit No. 6."

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 6" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 6

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,
New York City, January 15, 1940.

Dr. V. E. MOTYLEV,
Pacific Institute, 20 Razin Street,
Moscow, U. S. S. R.

DEAR MOTYLEV: I am not certain whether you are informed that the pen name of Dr. Chen Han-seng and Miss Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley are Raymond D. Brooke and Edith Cromwell.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. CARTER. A great many members of the British Foreign Office wrote for IPR publications under pen names because in their position they couldn't write under their own signatures.

Mr. MORRIS. Why did these two people, Chen Han-seng and Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley, use pen names?

Mr. CARTER. I can't say. My only guess would be that some writers write so prolifically in order to get publishers to take their stuff they sign different names, appearing to have different individualities.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you identify Miss Fairfax-Cholmeley for us, please?

Mr. CARTER. She comes from an English aristocratic Yorkshire family. She is a cousin of Sir John Chancellor, or rather a niece of Sir John, who is British colonial governor in the West Indies. Her cousin is Christopher Chancellor, the present head of Reuters, known to many in this room, and a relative of hers, Mrs. Yates Thompson, who lived in Portland Square in London and owned Apollinaris which is a water that prosperous people drink in certain parts of the world. She was working for someone who joined my staff on a trip to the Far East and was told Mrs. Yates Thompson would be interested in helping finance the trip, as I didn't have money for a big staff. Mrs. Cholmeley went on the trip as my stenographer without cost either to me or to the institute.

(Subsequent to the hearing the following letter was received from Mr. E. C. Carter which was ordered inserted in the record at this point:)

NEW YORK CITY, September 6, 1951.

Mr. ROBERT MORRIS,
Senate Judiciary Committee,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. MORRIS: In my testimony some weeks ago I believe that I stated that Miss Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley was a cousin of Christopher Chancellor, the present head of Reuters. My wife tells me that this is inaccurate. It seems that when the Chancellor children were young they went to stay for long periods in Yorkshire at the Cholmeley's home. It was because of this intimate relationship under the same roof that I made the mistake of thinking they were cousins.

I believe that the mistake is quite unimportant, but I want to correct it.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to show you a photostatic copy of an article appearing in the publication Far Eastern Spotlight for June 1949.

Mr. CARTER. This was considerably after my contact.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to call your attention to what purports to be page 16 which contains an article by Raymond D. Brooke, which you will notice is the same name as the name you told Mr. Motylev was the pen name of Dr. Chen Han-seng who was employed on your staff at the time.

Mr. CARTER. This is the review of the Columbia Press book.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the Far East Spotlight? Do you know, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. I don't see Far East Spotlight on it. This is just a photostat of part of a magazine.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify the photostat we are discussing here?

Mr. CARTER. Oh, yes. Far East Spotlight. It was down at the bottom, not the top caption.

I remember in the list of books received a lot of books by eminent people—Macmahon Ball, of Australia; Margaret Bourke-White; Pearl Buck—I am trying to recall what this Far Eastern Spotlight is. It seems whatever its political connection, which I can't establish from this, it was putting the spotlight on fairly important folks, which were by eminently democratic and capitalistic writers.

Mr. MORRIS. Don't you know that the Far East Spotlight is the official publication for the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

Mr. CARTER. I didn't know that.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter, aren't you an expert in the field of the Far East?

Mr. CARTER. I have done my role. My role has been more to organize and secure experts than to pose as an expert myself. My position has been more managerial than highly trained research person.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it not part of your function to be able to distinguish Communist from non-Communist, particularly—

Mr. CARTER. No; it was to distinguish scholars from nonscholars.

Mr. MORRIS. It did not make any difference to you whether they were Communist or not?

Mr. CARTER. If a Communist, especially in the period before the war, after we recognized the Soviet Union and during the period when we were allies of the Soviet Union, if I knew a Russian Communist who knew more about Kamchatka than any one else, I would try to get him to write. If he knew more about the Arctic Sea route or about fish—

Mr. MORRIS. Would you employ him on your staff and have him do your secretarial work?

Mr. CARTER. I certainly in the period that—

Mr. MORRIS. We are now talking about Chen Han-seng, who was working on the staff of IPR.

Mr. CARTER. I would certainly employ a Soviet Russian scholar whom I knew to be highly competent in the period when the Russians were allies and in the longer period when we were trying to extract all we could from the Soviet Union for the benefit of all the member countries.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter, I would like to call your attention—

Mr. CARTER. I tried to get a Russian Communist on my staff several times and never succeeded.

Mr. MORRIS. We are talking about a particular man, Chen Han-seng.

Mr. CARTER. The answer is I have already said he was employed by the institute.

Mr. MORRIS. You made a point and I am developing it. You said at the time when United States was allied to the Soviet Union you would have been glad to do it. We are now talking about Chen Han-seng, who you advised Mr. Motylev used the pen name of Raymond D. Brooke. I have shown you an article under the name of Raymond D. Brooke, under the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, which is an organization on the Attorney General's list, a subversive organization. At the time we discussed this letter and Mr. Chen, it was January 15, 1940. That was during the time of the Hitler-Stalin pact. That was the time when the United States was in no sense allied with the Soviet Union.

I would wonder if that would alter your comment in any way?

Mr. CARTER. A great many people knew that the Hitler-Stalin thing was only a matter of a few months, that it was up. We still had diplomatic representation in Moscow. Moscow had diplomatic relations here.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, it is your testimony you would have turned anything over to a Soviet citizen, anything of value, on the ground that the Soviet Union was allied to the United States?

Mr. CARTER. We turned over material——

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me the question calls for a "yes" or "no." Then you may explain.

Mr. CARTER. Sure, I would pass on any publication of the IPR to a Russian scholar knowing he was a Communist, because we were giving stuff to British and American people everywhere. We were not dealing in secret information. We were dealing in what we believed to be facts. The more facts people, friend or foe, do—it was based on research on economic and social questions, more conceivably the human rights which might step forward in a few instances.

Senator FERGUSON. You believe that a Communist can be an objective scholar? You think their thinking allows them to be scholars in the true sense of the word?

Mr. CARTER. Not in what we conceive to be the true sense of the word. I think an enormous amount of their so-called scholarly stuff is puerile.

On the other hand, in certain areas a great many scientific publications of the Soviet Union stand up under the most searching criticism of the capitalistic world. A lot of them are "hooey."

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think they can be really scholars? You were looking for scholars, as I understand it. Do you really believe that a Communist can be a real scholar in the true sense of the word?

Mr. CARTER. I will just repeat what you say, "in the true sense of the word."

Senator FERGUSON. That is begging the question. In any sense of the word. I will change it.

Mr. CARTER. Oh, yes, in the Communist sense, certainly.

Senator FERGUSON. Then he is a Communist and not a scholar, that is all.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to offer this Raymond D. Brooke article as exhibit No. 7 and I would like to show it to Mr. Carter.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 7" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 7

[From Far East Spotlight, June 1949]

FAR EAST READING—PEASANTS AND FREEDOM

(By Raymond D. Brooke)

AGRARIAN UNREST IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, by Erich H. Jacoby, Columbia University Press, New York.

Erich H. Jacoby, a Scandinavian who has none of the political biases and prejudices commonly found in this country, is to be congratulated for having successfully established in his book three very important points relating to the present problem of world peace.

Based upon his own experiences and field studies for 4 years in the Philippines, and also critically drawing from the publications of authors in the same

field of southeast Asia, notably Russell Andrus, Rupert Emerson, Pierre Gourou, L. S. Furnivall, Karl Peizer and Carle C. Zimmerman, Jacoby has systematically explained the agrarian situation in no less than six countries.

He has particularly emphasized the land tenure, the crop system and the peasant indebtedness in Java and the Philippines, the two countries of the tropical archipelagoes in Asia, as well as in Siam, Burma, Indochina and Malaya, all in the subtropical mainland.

The second point is brought out in the first and last chapters, namely, the close relation between agrarian unrest and the ardent desire for national independence, the interplay between economics and politics, or to be more concrete, the peasantry as bearer of the national idea in Asia.

Mr. Jacoby says in his preface: "As far as the national movements in southeast Asia are concerned, I have tried to show that, to a considerable degree, they are movements for land and for the reasonable use of land." Yes, Mr. Jacoby has admirably succeeded in his scholarly endeavor. He has shown how the European and American colonial powers first allied themselves with the trading companies, then with the native princes or chieftains, and finally with the local landlord class, in order to maintain an indirect rule over the colony or semicolony. This political cooperation with the landlord "deepens the political crisis within the colonial system as the bulk of the population begins to identify colonial rule with landlord rule." (p. 32) Rizal's great novel, *The Reign of Greed* (*El Filibusterismo*) is cited as the best example of this expression.

The author's final point is that real political independence in each of these Asiatic countries must be tested by the solution of the present miserable agrarian situation, or the economic and social emancipation of the peasantry who constitute the majority of the people. (p. 258). For the sake of world peace, Mr. Jacoby explicitly states: "Certainly the withholding of independence from those nations might involve the most dangerous political consequences. * * * No solution, short of unrestricted political sovereignty, will be adequate for peoples that have conceived the national idea in all its aspects and are ready to develop the human and economic resources of their country in a liberal and democratic way" (p. 260). This point is now being clearly demonstrated by the dramatic events in China and the struggle of the Chinese peasantry for nationalism and democracy, which cannot but encourage all the southeast countries in Asia.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you want to see that?

Mr. CARTER. I wonder if Mr. Sourwine could get me a copy of that. Senator FERGUSON. Which is that?

Mr. CARTER. This Imprecorr, this letter that is just going in.

Mr. SOURWINE. Here is a copy for you.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to show you a reproduction of the letterhead of the Communist Party of the United States dated March 1, 1949, addressed to all sections and counties and signed, "Comradely yours, May Miller, assistant organizing secretary; Robert Thompson, chairman."

I would like to call your attention to the last paragraph. This is on the Communist Party letterhead of New York State:

Any inquiries in relation to further activities can be received by writing to the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy at 111 West Forty-second Street, New York City.

I would like you to observe it before I introduce it into the record.

Mr. CARTER. I have never seen it. I have never received a letter from the Communist Party of the United States, and it is addressed to "Dear Comrades," and dated March 1, 1949, and is a boost for the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy which, as I understand it, was started as so many organizations were, containing liberals and leftists and rightists. I shan't use the word "liberal" in Senator Ferguson's presence because you asked me the other day what I thought a liberal was and I gave a pretty weak answer.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, as long as you recognize it was weak.

Mr. CARTER. It just ran according to form. A lot of anti-Com-

munists were on the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy. When they found it was going to the left, they got off. As the nucleus left, it apparently satisfied the Communist Party of the State of New York, so I am not particularly interested.

Mr. MORRIS. I should like to introduce this into the record as a characterization of the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 8" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 8

COMMUNIST PARTY OF NEW YORK STATE,
New York, N. Y., March 1, 1949.

To All Sections and Counties

DEAR COMRADES: Enclosed please find program for action on China policy, as voted upon by a united front action conference on China, held in New York on January 29, 1949.

We are sure that you will find this material not only informative, but helpful in planning actions on China in your communities.

A special outline has also been issued by the National Education Committee on Communist Policy in China. This can be secured through orders from our district education department. The outline can be used as the basis for discussion in your sections and branches.

Any inquiries in relation to further activity can be received by writing to the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, at 111 West Forty-second Street, New York City.

Comradely yours,

MAY MILLER, *Assistant Organizing Secretary.*

PROGRAM FOR ACTION ON CHINA POLICY

As suggested by the Action Conference on China Policy, New York City, January 29, 1949

PROGRAM OBJECTIVES

1. Demand a congressional investigation—
 - A. Of the Chinese lobby in Washington—one of the largest spending foreign influences in our Capital; not registered as foreign agents.
 - B. Of the billions of dollars of private accumulation deposited in American banks and investments by Chinese officials and individuals.
2. Demand a new China policy—
 - A. An end to all forms of American intervention in China and of plans to aid any elements and remnants of the Kuomintang.
 - B. Preparation by our Government to recognize the government which the people of China are now establishing.
 - C. Planning now by our authorities for genuine and self-respecting cooperation with the people's government in China, including normal and friendly trade relations free of any political conditions.
3. Get the facts and implications of the Government's China policy to the American people.

IMMEDIATE STEPS FOR CARRYING OUT THE ACTION PROGRAM

1. Get your organization immediately to pass a resolution on China policy. (Use the enclosed January conference resolution for suggestions.) Send copies of your organization's resolution to your Senators and your Congressmen; give it publicity in your organization's publication and elsewhere; send a copy to the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy.
2. Make use of the political ammunition of facts: the American people, if they know, will act.
 - A. Make a drive to get readers and subscribers to Far East Spotlight, the committee's monthly magazine. This is the indispensable tool for every fighter for a new and friendly policy toward China. Previous sources of reliable

information about China and the Far East now have a NAM slant; only Far East Spotlight gives you the positive and encouraging facts about the Chinese people's great and successful fight against American reaction, and keeps you up-to-date about Washington's evil plans to go on backing reaction in China and the Far East. Subscription: \$2 a year; introductory offer: \$1 for 3 months. Members of the CDFEP get this free.

B. Push the sale and reading of Anna Louise Strong's Tomorrow's China—paper bound, 65 cents; cloth bound \$2. Organizational orders for five or more: 25 percent discount.

C. Have meetings on the China policy issue.

(a) The committee can furnish speakers:

In the New York City area: Telephone the speaker's bureau of the committee any afternoon, BRyant 9-6343.

In California, the San Francisco area: Contact Mr. William Kerner, 1841 Ellis Street, San Francisco. Los Angeles area: Contact Mrs. Jeannette Orel, 362 South Columbia Avenue, Los Angeles.

(b) Send your organization's own speakers to the briefing session on China; first session, Friday night, February 18, 7:30 sharp. Telephone the committee for registration blanks; BRyant 9-6343. No fee.

You can't fight without facts. Far East Spotlight is your basic source of information. Meetings on China will bring facts to hundreds of others.

3. See to it that the President and the Members of Congress hear from hundreds of individuals on China policy right now. Order prepared postcards from the committee, 1 cent each. Write your own messages. Make calls—in person and by telephone—on your Senators and Congressmen.

4. Have your organization make an immediate contribution to the work of the committee or plan to give a regular (monthly, quarterly, or yearly) contribution.

5. Support the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy—

A. By becoming members and by getting your friends to join. Membership includes subscription to Far East Spotlight.

B. By securing individual contributions for the committee. Your own; your friends; throw a party for the committee.

C. By doing volunteer work at the committee's office; 111 West Forty-second Street, fifth floor—any time, any day.

Every Tuesday night the staff is "at home" to friends who come to help.

The Chinese people are defeating the American reactionaries: So can we.

China policy reveals the over-all character of Washington's foreign policy—it harms the American people.

China policy is directly related to our domestic struggle for homes, for more consumption goods, for lower prices, for increased social security, for healthy international trade, for freedom from depression and militarism.

China shows up the weak spot in our reactionaries' program. Let's fight on China policy and take advantage of the blow the Chinese people have dealt the American reactionaries.

COMMITTEE FOR A DEMOCRATIC FAR EASTERN POLICY.

RESOLUTION ON CHINA POLICY

ACTION CONFERENCE ON CHINA POLICY, NEW YORK, JANUARY 29, 1949

This Action Conference on China Policy, meeting in New York City on January 29, 1949, and attended by 182 registered delegates and observers from 80 organizations and including 48 individual participants, voted to send to every Member of the Eighty-first Congress, through the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy under whose auspices the conference was held, the following resolution:

In view of the following facts:

1. That our Government since VJ-day has violated both the democratic objective of World War II and the Charter of the United Nations in giving support to the antidemocratic and dictatorial Kuomintang regime of Chiang Kai-shek;

2. That our Government since VJ-day has made available to the Kuomintang regime of Chiang Kai-shek over \$6 billion worth of the resources of the American people for use in civil war against the people of China who are our historic

friends and allies in the task of building a peaceful, prosperous, and democratic world;

3. That American guns, bullets, airplanes, bombs, poison gas, gasoline jelly, and flame throwers have brought suffering, death, and destruction to millions of people in China, thus threatening the alienation of the billion and a half people of Asia who are our natural allies in a democratic world;

4. That we Americans whose resources have been wasted and misused in China are still waiting for adequate and decent housing, for lower prices on consumption goods and food, for increased social security, for mutually beneficial trade relations between our two countries as a factor in preventing a depression, and for freedom from militarism and for the security which only peaceful and cooperative relations among nations can give;

5. That our Government's policy toward China is causing frictions and misunderstandings that can easily lead to conflicts and even to war;

6. That the people of China have decisively demonstrated their purposes and power to rid themselves of the callous, cruel, antidemocratic, and outworn feudal regime which for the past years has existed only with outside (American) support and have shown their power to negate all the military advice, training, and equipment given by the United States to the Kuomintang regime of Chiang Kai-shek, and are now establishing a functioning government of their own creating;

7. That there are nationally prominent American political, military, and publishing figures openly and secretly advocating and working for continued and intensified intervention in the internal affairs of China against the Chinese people;

8. That a strong Chinese lobby is at work in Washington (one of the biggest money-spending foreign influences in our Capital but not registered as a foreign agent) trying to influence our Government authorities to continue support of the antidemocratic and unpopular Kuomintang elements;

9. That the very Chinese officials and individuals who are urging more pouring out of the American people's money in China are known to have accumulated billions of dollars (wrung from the suffering people of China and stolen from the pockets of the American taxpayers) and now stowed away in American banks and investments:

Be it therefore resolved, That we go on record as demanding:

1. That there be a congressional investigation—

A. Into the activities of the Chinese lobby in this country; and

B. Into the private wealth which Chinese officials and individuals have stowed away in American banks and investments.

2. That there be an immediate end to all forms of American intervention in China including an end to any dealings with any elements or remnants of the Kuomintang regime, recognizing the right of the Chinese people to make decisions about their country free of all pressure or interference on the part of our Government.

3. That our Government prepare to recognize the government which the Chinese people are now establishing for themselves and that our authorities begin planning for genuine and self-respecting cooperation with that government, including normal and friendly trade relations free of any political conditions.

Mr. MORRIS. I think we come now to Dr. Chi and, Mr. Chairman, I think we have discussed Dr. Chi enough without going into this description of Chi again.

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Morris, with the approval of the Chairman, you mentioned this afternoon this letter of Lattimore's about my being cagey, and so on. Are you going to come back to that?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

You mentioned Asiaticus, Chen Han-seng, and Chi. I wanted the record to show there are Communists writings for Asiaticus Han-seng and Chi. Now that I have done that, I am going to address your attention to the latter. Do you have a comment on it?

The CHAIRMAN. To what letter?

Mr. MORRIS. This is the letter of July 10, 1938, from Mr. Lattimore to Mr. Carter, in which Mr. Latimore commends Mr. Carter for thinking he was pretty cagey in turning over so much of the China section of the inquiry to Asiaticus, Chen Han-seng, and Chi.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your question, then?

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have a comment to make on that?

Mr. CARTER. Yes, just to repeat what I said this morning, that contrary to Mr. Lattimore's impression, I did not turn over the inquiry stuff to be written by Asiaticus, Han-seng, and Chi.

Second, on the next page where reference is made to "back the international policy of the U. S. S. R.," in general our policy was in 1938 to back the international policy as we knew it of the Soviet Union in Asia because they and we and the Chinese were desperately concerned with Japanese aggression which was developing from '31, '37, '38 finally on to Marco Polo Bridge at Pearl Harbor.

The CHAIRMAN. When you say "they" and "we" did you mean the institute when you say "we"?

Mr. CARTER. No; I meant the Russian Government, or the Chinese Government, the British Government, and our Government thought the Japanese were going much too far. And the principal element of Soviet far-eastern policy as we understood it vis-à-vis Japan, was to stop Japan. We felt that it was highly desirable to make it perfectly clear without propagandizing or carrying on political education to give the publics of the democracy and of the world chapter and verse on the implication of Japanese aggressions, Manchuria, China, and so forth.

Senator FERGUSON. When you used the word "we" you meant our Government?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You were backing it up?

Mr. CARTER. I was in sympathy with it as an individual.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that paragraph read to you was the policy of our Government where they talk to you about being pretty cagey to turn it over to these two people, that they will bring out absolutely essential radical aspects, but can be depended on to do it with the right touch? Is that the American policy?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Senator FERGUSON. How are you going to carry out the American policy.

Mr. CARTER. I was referring here——

Senator FERGUSON. I know what you are referring to, but the paragraph before that is the one I read. Were you carrying out the American policy when Lattimore wrote to you that sentence, and then do you think Lattimore was carrying out the American policy with that philosophy? The paragraph before, I mean, where in the same letter he said:

The U. S. S. R.—back up their international policy in general, but without using their slogans and, above all, without giving them or anybody else an impression of subservience.

Wasn't that exactly what he was doing when he said you were hiring these people to do that very thing and you were cagey about it, you were smart? Doesn't that tie in with the exact sentence that you were doing it and you never objected to that expression?

Mr. CARTER. I objected in that I didn't carry out the employment of these three men.

Senator FERGUSON. Were they in your employ at that time?

Mr. CARTER. Not in the context that Lattimore said.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever write him a letter and say you were not cagey, you didn't know those people were carrying it out underhanded as to funds?

Mr. CARTER. I haven't a copy of my reply to this letter.

The CHAIRMAN. The question could have been answered "yes" or "no."

Senator FERGUSON. Did you?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

Senator SMITH. What contacts do you have with these three men? Did you employ them?

Mr. CARTER. I am glad you raised that. Chi was earlier employed for a short time on a job for the institute. Chen Han-seng was employed to write a monograph on China's agrarian problems and one or two other monographs.

Asiaticus was invited by someone on the staff—I don't remember who—to write an article from time to time.

As I said this morning, I have no memory of ever having met Asiaticus. I didn't know what his nom de plumes were. I knew there appeared articles or an article signed by Asiaticus, who clearly, as Lattimore makes out here, had a more radical view or fundamental view than few of the writers in the Far East at that time who thought the status quo in China could continue indefinitely when many of us saw that it was crumbling and a totally different situation was inevitably coming about and it was in the American and world interest to know what the forces were that on the one side were causing the crumbling of the old Chinese regime and what the forces for good or evil were that were in reaction to building up from the point of view of power.

Senator SMITH. In what capacity did you employ those three men?

Mr. CARTER. In different capacities—one on land problems, one on economics and the institute, but not I personally employed Asiaticus for contemporary comment from the point of view of a radical on the China coast as to how the Western World looks at China. One of the things that we felt was that all of the time we were looking at things from the American point of view.

Senator SMITH. I am thinking now you did employ these three men as Mr. Lattimore suggested, although not on the specific item that he mentioned here. Is that the point?

Mr. CARTER. That is quite true.

The CHAIRMAN. From the last paragraph of that letter of July 10, I take it there had been correspondence between you and Lattimore that led up to his remark in that last paragraph; is that true.

Mr. CARTER. Yes; I was in constant contact with Lattimore throughout the times he was on the staff. I hadn't known him before. I am quite frank to say that I regarded him as a good American, a great scholar, and one of the best authorities on Asia.

The CHAIRMAN. From what he stated "I think you are pretty cagey in turning over so much of the China section of the inquiry to Asiaticus, Han-seng, and Chi," he must have been advised by you that it must have been turned over?

Mr. CARTER. Not necessarily; I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. Where did he get the information?

Mr. CARTER. You will have to ask him. I don't know. I know his information was wrong.

The CHAIRMAN. He did not get it from you?

Mr. CARTER. Well, as I send out—

The CHAIRMAN. Answer my question. He did not get that information from you? The information that is found in his statement, "I think you are pretty cagey in turning so much of the China section of the inquiry to Asiaticus, Han-seng, and Chi"?

Mr. CARTER. I just don't remember. In building up that inquiry which involved 30 or 40 scholars, we made a list of many scholars from all over the world on trade, on tariffs, on foreign ships in Chinese waters, and so on, and sent these around. We said to people: "Who do you think are the best people?"

The CHAIRMAN. This question he had been advised you turned the matter over to these three so you were not inquiring any further there, were you?

Mr. CARTER. He may have seen the list. I can't answer that. I am sorry.

The CHAIRMAN. He says, "They will bring out the absolutely radical aspects, but can be depended on to do it with the right touch."

Did you afterward advise him you had not turned the matter over to these three so he would not be misled?

Mr. CARTER. He must have known it.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you afterward advise him?

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember.

The CHAIRMAN. In the next paragraph the letter reads—

For the general purposes of this inquiry, it seems to me that the good scoring position for the IPR differs with different countries. For China, my hunch is that it will pay to keep behind the official Chinese Communist position—far enough not to be covered by the same label—but enough ahead of the active Chinese liberals to be noticeable. For Japan, on the other hand, hang back so as not to be inconveniently ahead of the Japanese liberals who cannot keep up, whereas the Chinese liberals can. So the chief thing is to oppose the military wing of Japanese aggression in China, counting on the check there to take care of both the military and the civilian components of aggression and Japan. For the British—scare the hell out of them. Always in a polite way but usually in a way that looks as if it might turn impolite. The British liberal groups are badly flustered, and being British, the way to encourage them to pull themselves together is to fluster the Tories.

For the U. S. S. R.—back their international policy in general, but without using their slogans and, above all, without giving them or anybody else an impression of subservience.

So he was giving you pretty general advice. Did you tell him afterward you were not following his advice?

Mr. CARTER. I would hope you would—

The CHAIRMAN. You can answer my question, yes or no. Did you tell him or did you write to him that you were not going to follow his advice?

Mr. CARTER. I cannot prove it, but I am certain we talked over these general issues—

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ask him what his meaning of radicalism was?

Mr. CARTER. Why, no. Yes; I knew what it was, which was very different from what—you know you can be a radical and not be a Red.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you tell him you were not going to follow his advice?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. How did you tell him, by letter?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember the geography and dates.

Senator FERGUSON. I think now we ought to ask you this question, and you say that radical aspects were entirely different than being a Red. In the next paragraph he shows you that Red was the philosophy or the radical aspect was the philosophy of Red Communist Russia because he told you to follow it. Is that not true?

Mr. CARTER. He told me he thought I was cagey in following it. I have said I have not followed it.

Senator FERGUSON. It is very significant to me and I wish you would make an explanation of it. After the words that the chairman read:

My hunch is that it will pay to keep behind the official Chinese Communist position—far enough not to be covered by the label—but enough ahead of the active Chinese liberals to be noticeable.

Did he not really tell you to follow—didn't Lattimore tell you to follow the Communists of China?

Mr. CARTER. If he was telling me what line to follow, he was telling someone who was not responsive to that line.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you write and tell him you did not want his advice and that you had no—

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember, but I know when I had disagreements with him I told him so, and forcefully. In a case like that on a balance between the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang, both sides purported to be anti-Japanese and to stop the Japanese, and far more influential people than I believed that everything that would unite the Chinese Reds and the Chinese Kuomintang in stopping Japanese aggression was in the Chinese interest and American interest.

Senator FERGUSON. Don't you think that Lattimore told you in those two paragraphs that have been read that he was wanting you to follow the "Commie" line?

Mr. CARTER. It would seem to me that he was assuming that I was, and I denied it.

Senator FERGUSON. And wanted you to continue; is that right?

Mr. CARTER. He was giving me a bouquet.

The CHAIRMAN. He was approving of it?

Mr. CARTER. Yes; I would prefer to address these questions to Lattimore, because he would remember what was in it.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Carter, when he said you were cagey, he was approving of it, was he not?

Mr. CARTER. It was a bouquet.

Senator EASTLAND. Why did not that letter raise a grave question in your mind at the very least as to whether or not Lattimore was a Communist?

Mr. CARTER. My conviction was, and is, he was not and never has been, and, second, this should be remembered: In the context of 1938 where the political pattern of the world and the tensions were totally different from what they are now. We are feeling out to find out who were our allies. We didn't care very much who they were, so long as they pasted the Japs and got us ready to beat the Germans.

Senator EASTLAND. You say we followed the U. S. S. R. line without the appearance of being subservient. That statement was not noticed to you he was a Communist?

Mr. CARTER. I don't think I can add anything that will help.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Watkins.

Senator WATKINS. On the second paragraph of the letter dated July 10, 1938, it reads:

The letter from Wellington about the "paper bombs" was illuminating. I was interested to hear about Mr. Kuo, who had spent 20 years in Japan. The Japanese have some first-class experts whose finesse in dealing with war lords and crooked politicians is extraordinary. Their weakness is that they do not know the young China that is growing up from under all the rotten debris; and what they do know they underrate.

What was he talking about when he spoke of the young China growing up? He was not speaking of the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. CARTER. No; in 1938—along from 1931 on when things were really booming and China was getting organized and under way under the superb efforts of the generalissimo there was a wholly fresh clan among the young Chinese who felt at least we are getting unified, we are going to resist Japan. We are going to get reforms. And anyone who was in China over those years was aware right from 1931 on—the railroads were being built, airfields were being built, the currency was getting into a better position, trade was moving, and so forth. The universities were prospering; there was new blood and within the Kuomintang, and one of the reasons that the Japanese struck when they did was because they saw if this process of advance went on under Chiang it would be too late for Japan to take China.

Senator WATKINS. In 1938 the war with Japan had been on for many years.

Mr. CARTER. There was the Manchurian incident in 1931. The Japanese moved into Tientsin and Peking in the summer of 1937, but they didn't go very far south. This new life under Chiang Kai-shek and the threat of a militant Japan was causing unity, hope, progress in the use of the young intelligentsia who had never been used by the old war lords. They saw a bright future ahead.

Senator WATKINS. This does not refer to the Communist movement that was coming up in China?

Mr. CARTER. That you would have to ask Lattimore. I think it was primarily the Kuomintang.

Senator WATKINS. What was the rotten debris he had in mind? Wasn't that the Chiang Kai-shek regime he was talking about?

Mr. CARTER. I happened to be out there about that time. There was quite a little rotten debris around Chiang Kai-shek's regime. Some other governments have a little rotten debris around them, and Americans notice it more for a foreign country than we do at home.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Carter, do you say now you did or did not answer a letter Lattimore wrote dated July 10, 1938?

Mr. CARTER. I don't know whether it is in writing or orally.

Senator SMITH. Have you examined your own personal file since you were subpoenaed to come here?

Mr. CARTER. I had not seen this letter—I mean, I have——

Senator SMITH. Have you examined the files?

Mr. CARTER. I have turned the pages of some, although it has been very difficult to look at them systematically because they were taken out of the barn and I have not had access to them here.

Senator SMITH. I am not asking about the papers taken out of the barn; I am asking you about correspondence now in your personal possession.

Have you examined any of that correspondence with reference to this hearing?

Mr. CARTER. Sure.

Senator SMITH. You do have some other papers in your personal possession?

Mr. CARTER. I have nothing as much as you have.

Senator SMITH. I did not ask that question. I am asking whether or not you now have in your possession, your personal possession, any correspondence or copies of correspondence that you were having with Mr. Lattimore and others about this whole activity.

Mr. CARTER. No.

Senator SMITH. You have no personal files at all then?

Mr. CARTER. I have personal files. Well, there, again, as I stated in executive session, the Senate committee not only took IPR files but took four drawers of my own personal files. I have not got those back yet.

Senator SMITH. Do you now have any personal files with any letters or copies of letters or correspondence bearing on this subject about which we are examining you?

Mr. CARTER. I have photostatic copies of a number of letters which the FBI took out of the IPR files thinking they were pertinent to the question of the IPR loyalty and the FBI, though they made this investigation a long time ago, has never seen fit to render any charges whatsoever against the IPR.

Senator SMITH. I am not asking you about that; I am asking whether now you have in your possession any correspondence, copies of letters, bearing on the subject of this inquiry?

Mr. CARTER. I repeat; I have photostat copies.

Senator SMITH. Outside of that. You have told us about the photostats. Do you have any other correspondence?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember any.

Senator SMITH. Where do you keep your personal files? In the barn? In New York? Or where?

Mr. CARTER. Most of them are somewhere in this building, but my current stuff may be in my home, my house or barn, at Lee, or in my New York apartment.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you maintain an office?

Mr. CARTER. I do not at the present time.

Senator SMITH. Have you discussed this letter of July 10 with Mr. Lattimore recently?

Mr. CARTER. Oh, no.

Senator SMITH. You have not?

Mr. CARTER. No. Until I saw it this morning I hadn't seen it. I hadn't seen it for a long time.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I think somebody ought to ask whether or not there is a copy of any letter to Lattimore in reply to this.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what Senator Smith was trying to get at.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean in this file.

Mr. Mandel, did you find any copy?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to go back to one point, Mr. Chairman, that may be clear in the record but which remains unclear to me.

Did you testify, sir, that Mr. Chi had nothing to do with the inquiry or the so-called inquiry series?

Mr. CARTER. He was asked—Mr. Holland, who was in executive charge—

The CHAIRMAN. The question is: Did you testify he had nothing to do with it? Answer that "Yes" or "No." Then you can explain. The question is calling on your recollection as to whether you testified.

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall his was one of three names mentioned in Mr. Lattimore's letter?

Mr. CARTER. I recall it from this morning's statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that you stated, when questioned about it, that you had not done what Mr. Lattimore had presumed you had done?

Mr. CARTER. I so testify.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you mean by that you had not employed Mr. Chi in connection with that matter?

Mr. CARTER. It meant that the end result was that he did not produce a book in the inquiry series.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all you meant?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not mean you had not approached him?

Mr. CARTER. I didn't mean to imply one way or the other.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, in fact, approach him in that connection?

Mr. CARTER. I think I was undoubtedly consulted when one of my colleagues approached him for a volume which he never completed.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is: Did you approach him? That is easily answered.

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember doing so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether he did, in fact, write anything in connection with that inquiry series?

Mr. CARTER. I think, in executive session, Mr. Holland reported that he wrote a manuscript which was not ever printed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Don't you recall in connection with this exhibit 1-A, which was put in the record earlier at today's session, we had the letter of Mr. Holland and the final paragraph of which spoke of Mr. Chi, and included this sentence:

You may remember that Chi was attached to the IPR international secretariat in 1940 and wrote one of the inquiry reports on China's economic development, distributed only in brief form because it was incomplete.

Didn't you recall that?

Mr. CARTER. I remember that. I thought what I just said supported it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Doesn't that seem to indicate that actually Mr. Chi did write something and that it was actually distributed to the membership of the IPR?

Mr. CARTER. One hundred copies were mimeographed. It wasn't felt substantial enough to print it in larger edition.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was substantial enough that many years later, in 1950, it was recalled as a portion of his contribution to the inquiry; was it not?

(No response.)

The CHAIRMAN. What is your answer?

Mr. CARTER. I am affirming Mr. Sourwine's knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN. You meant by waving your hands you affirmed what he said?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't want this committee to believe that Mr. Chi wrote whatever it was that he did write which was ultimately circulated as a voluntary matter and without having been asked to write anything, do you?

Mr. CARTER. Oh, no.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was asked by the institute or someone representing the institute to take part in that inquiry, and you are shaking your head again.

Mr. CARTER. I am affirming; I think you are right.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. There is one thing I would like to ask in response to Senator Eastland's question in relation to the writer of this letter.

Do you know of anyone who was not a Communist and/or following the Communist line that was advocating what these two paragraphs advocate in this letter; that is, paragraph 1 and paragraph 2? They have been read a number of times. That is the paragraph which says that you were cagey and the paragraph that contains the Russian and Chinese foreign policy. Do you know of anyone who is not a Communist and/or following the Commie line that was advocating that philosophy?

Mr. CARTER. I know a good many people who felt that insofar as the Soviet Government was opposing Japanese or German aggression that it was in the interest of the IPR to get as much as we could out of that situation.

With reference to my being cagey—

Senator FERGUSON. No; the part about following the Communists of China.

Do you know anybody that was not a Communist and/or following the line that was advocating following the Communists of China?

Mr. CARTER. The testimony that has come out in this city in the past—

The CHAIRMAN. The question is, do you know anybody?

Mr. CARTER. Sure.

Senator FERGUSON. How many?

Mr. CARTER. I think of one.

Senator FERGUSON. Who is it?

Mr. CARTER. General Marshall.

Senator FERGUSON. You think General Marshall was following that line?

Mr. CARTER. He was following the line of getting as much of the Chinese Communists, to woo them away from Moscow.

Senator FERGUSON. This was for China. It says, "For China, my hunch is that it will pay to keep behind the official Chinese Communist position."

You say that General Marshall was following that? If so, I have never heard it. It is news to me, and you are supposed to be an expert in this field.

Senator O'CONOR. At or about the time of this exchange in correspondence, to your knowledge was Mr. Lattimore in touch with representatives of the State Department?

Mr. CARTER. I would think on any scale it wholly unlikely. I don't know.

Senator O'CONOR. Was he subsequently?

Mr. CARTER. Very tenuously. He wasn't in and out of the State Department all the time.

Senator O'CONOR. Was he sometimes?

Mr. CARTER. I can't say.

Senator O'CONOR. I have a letter before me written to you by Owen Lattimore on the stationery of Pacific Affairs of June 7, 1940, which was the next month to that which has already been referred to.

Mr. CARTER. 1940?

Senator O'CONOR. Yes.

Mr. CARTER. This is July, 1938.

Senator O'CONOR. There is one of July 1940.

Senator FERGUSON. The one with two paragraphs, the 10th of July.

Mr. CARTER. That is 1938.

Senator O'CONOR. There was another one of 1940.

We will omit that part of the question. This is 1940, in which he refers to John Carter Vincent. Had he been in touch with Mr. Vincent very frequently, do you know?

Mr. CARTER. I can't say.

Senator O'CONOR. I read this paragraph in which he is referring to the possible engagement of some one outside of the institute to do some extra work and he said:

I am pretty sure that John Carter Vincent is not back from Geneva or we should have heard. Moreover, as a member of the State Department, he would probably have to pussyfoot in commenting on political parts of the book—

Et cetera.

I ask you whether or not that would indicate he was in pretty close touch with members of the State Department?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, that letter should be identified. Is that the Lattimore letter?

Senator O'CONOR. Yes, sir. It is a letter from Lattimore to the witness.

The CHAIRMAN. And the date is what?

Mr. CARTER. June 7, 1940. It concerns the geology of China. He wanted criticism of a book.

The CHAIRMAN. Go to the question, please.

Mr. CARTER. This was a matter of getting a review for the quarterly Pacific Affairs, of a book by Lattimore entitled "Inner Asian Frontiers of China."

The question was whether Gaus, who had been United States Ambassador in China, could review it. Lattimore says that he is pretty sure that Vincent isn't back from Geneva, or, as a member of the State Department, he would probably have pussyfooted. This was quite the usual routine in that members of the British Foreign Office or the Canadian External Affairs of the State Department really felt free to write a hard-hitting review of a book by a nonofficial.

Senator O'CONOR. But my point was whether it was indicative of the fact that Lattimore was in close touch with John Carter Vincent or other representatives of the State Department.

Mr. CARTER. You could interpret that either way. At that time, anyone working in the Far Eastern field knew that John Carter Vincent was an important man in the State Department. We would read in the newspapers about his movements. Personally, I wouldn't take it that he was close, a close day-by-day friend. He may have been, but I don't know.

Senator O'CONOR. If not day-by-day, would you say he was in very close association with him on numerous occasions?

Mr. CARTER. I can't tell you; no.

Senator O'CONOR. I asked you previously whether, to your knowledge, Owen Lattimore was identified closely with the State Department?

Mr. CARTER. And I said I didn't think so.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he connected with Lauchlin Currie?

Mr. CARTER. I testified this morning that, in connection with Lattimore's going out to Chungking, to Chiang Kai-shek, that some of the dealings on the passage and reservations were handled——

Senator FERGUSON. I am familiar with the Pearl Harbor hearings on that.

Senator O'CONOR. But is it not a fact that Mr. Lattimore had an office in the White House or in the State Department?

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Lattimore never had an office in the State Department or the White House.

Senator O'CONOR. Are you sure of that?

Senator FERGUSON. Are you sure of that?

Senator EASTLAND. Did he use Lauchlin Currie's office, which was in the Old State Department Building, while he was an Assistant to the President?

Mr. CARTER. Let me qualify that. On the State Department, I am prepared to take Lattimore's testimony on the Old State Building. I should assume that a man who is going out on the nomination of Mr. Roosevelt to be political adviser to the head of the Chinese Government, Chiang Kai-shek, would naturally spend several days in close contact with Mr. Currie, because he was going on a special relationship, nominated by Roosevelt.

Senator EASTLAND. At the suggestion of Currie, was it not? He was promoted for that job by Currie, was he not?

Mr. CARTER. I assume so; yes.

Senator O'CONOR. And in connection with that, he maintained the office in the White House or in an annex adjoining it.

Mr. CARTER. Old State.

Senator O'CONOR. Well, that put him in direct touch with both the White House and the State Department, did it not?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you get any nearer to the State Department than in the Old State between the White House and the State Department?

Mr. CARTER. Well, I have been accused of looking like Mr. Hull, when walking through the corridors.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was it that accused you of that? I would like to have a photograph of him.

Mr. CARTER. He was slightly tipsy.

The CHAIRMAN. He must have been.

Senator FERGUSON. But you are not going to quibble over whether or not he had it in the White House or the State Department, if he had it in the annex; would you?

Mr. CARTER. I want to state, as firmly as I can, that he must have had a desk for several days adjoining one of the offices of one of the President's executive assistants on an operation which, organizationally, on a chart of organization, was totally different from having an office in the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that your analysis of what you think or what you know? Do you know that he had an office?

Mr. CARTER. That is what I think. I never saw him in the office. I have seen Currie in his office in the Old State Building, and was informed that it was an office of an assistant, executive assistant, and that for convenience's sake it was in that building, but it was not a part of the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Now you are talking about Owen Lattimore's office?

Mr. CARTER. I am talking about Mr. Currie.

Senator EASTLAND. Lattimore was in that office; was he not?

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Lattimore in that office?

Mr. CARTER. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore got his mail through Mr. Currie's office; did he not?

Mr. CARTER. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. He used the White House telephones, got telephone calls through the White House exchange, which was connected with Currie's office; did he not?

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember whether it was the State Department exchange or the White House exchange when I once or twice phoned Mr. Currie.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to ask you this question: Did you ever attempt to send Mr. Lattimore to Moscow? Did you ever attempt to get Mr. Lattimore sent to Moscow?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. When was that?

Mr. CARTER. I can't tell you. It is in the record from the executive hearing. He was in Sweden carrying on a research, and I thought it would be a good idea, since he was so near Moscow, to go to Moscow. I sent him a telegram as to whether he would be interested in going.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; you telegraphed him the day after the Hitler-Stalin pact; did you not?

Mr. CARTER. I did. But I am not satisfied on the date when the telegram was received.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you want him to go to Moscow the day after the Hitler-Stalin pact?

Mr. CARTER. I can't tell you, but I do not think it was in connection with the pact, but in connection with his research.

Whenever possible, whenever one of the principal officers of the IPR was in Europe, visiting our branches in London, the Hague, and Paris, I urged them, if possible, to also visit the Moscow office which then was affiliated to the International Secretariat. It was just the same as before Pearl Harbor when one of our men was in the Far

East. I said, "If you go to China, you have to go to Japan and you have to go to the Philippines," because they were all members, and I was trying to play fair. We had fewer opportunities to go to Moscow, and we desired to get everything we could out of the Bolsheviks.

I learned that Lattimore was in Sweden. It is only a few hours away, and I inquired whether he could go, and hoped he could go.

Senator EASTLAND. Then it was not for him to see if he could get permission to enter one of the Chinese provinces that Russia occupied?

Mr. CARTER. For a great many years, he was a specialist on Mongolia. He knew the Mongolian language and the Chinese language perfectly. Very few Americans or British had the opportunity of going to Mongolia. He wanted to supplement his book knowledge and his knowledge of it, a history, by going into that part of Mongolia which was definitely under Russian influence.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your question, Senator Eastland? I missed it.

Senator EASTLAND. I asked him if his testimony was, by Lattimore, that Mr. Carter was sending him, wanted him to go into a Chinese province that Russia controlled.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it has been answered.

Mr. CARTER. That was my hope, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. You have previously indicated, Mr. Carter, your belief as to the Communist leanings of Lattimore and others.

Mr. CARTER. Not of Lattimore, please.

Senator O'CONOR. I said one way or the other.

Mr. CARTER. All right.

Senator O'CONOR. You expressed an opinion. I did not say what the opinion was.

What have you to say with regard to Lauchlin Currie?

Mr. CARTER. He was Canadian-born, a Harvard economist.

Senator O'CONOR. No; I do not mean his life history. I am referring to his identification or his espousal of Communist principles or his leanings to the Communist line.

Mr. CARTER. I never saw any.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator O'CONOR. There was no evidence to your knowledge?

Mr. CARTER. I haven't seen it.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Morris, you may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. I am going to read to you a list of names, which names turn up with great frequency in the files. This list has been compiled by the staff here as a condensation of many people, of the many names, who are interested in the institute.

I am going to read a name, and, for the sake of time, I will ask you, in your opinion, yes or no, in your recollection, if they were connected with the institute in any way.

Mr. CARTER. Well, do you mean if I wrote a letter to John Smith in Timbuctu?

Mr. MORRIS. No. The standard is this, Mr. Carter: They are either members of the staff, they were contributors to IPR publications, they were members of the executive board of trustees, or they performed substantial services in addition to their membership in the IPR.

Solomon Adler—yes or no?

Mr. CARTER. I can't answer.

Mr. MORRIS. James S. Allen?

Mr. CARTER. I think he wrote one article.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, I mean, on these cases, we will not go into the details, Mr. Carter. Just answer yes or no.

Asiaticus?

Mr. CARTER. We have covered him.

Mr. MORRIS. Hilda Austern?

Mr. CARTER. She was a bookkeeper; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Joseph Fels Barnes?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Betty Barnes?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Kathleen Barnes?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Robert W. Barnett?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. T. A. Bisson?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Esther Brunauer? She was one of the incorporators. When you incorporated, she was one of the three incorporators, Mr. Carter?

The CHAIRMAN. Your answer to that would be "Yes"?

Mr. CARTER. Yes, for the time.

Mr. MORRIS. Angus Cameron?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Evans Carlson?

Mr. CARTER. Lecturer; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Abraham Chapman?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Han-seng Chen?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Ch'ao-ting Chi?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Elsie Cholmeley?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. O. Edmund Clubb?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Frank V. Coe?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Lauchlin Currie?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. John P. Davies?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Hugh Deane?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. A member of the D. C. Council, the Washington Council.

Len De Caux?

Mr. CARTER. Might have, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. A member of the board of trustees, was she not?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Len DeCaux?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

- Mr. MORRIS. Emile Despres?
- Mr. CARTER. I don't remember.
- Mr. MORRIS. Lawrence Duggan?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes.
- Mr. MORRIS. Dolly Eltenton?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes.
- Mr. MORRIS. Israel Epstein?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes.
- Mr. MORRIS. John K. Fairbank?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes.
- Mr. MORRIS. Frederick V. Field?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes.
- Mr. MORRIS. Theodore Draper?
- Mr. CARTER. Dromedary Dates, was he, or Federal Reserve? Yes, I had lunch with him one day.
- Mr. MORRIS. Was he connected with the IPR, Mr. Carter?
- Mr. CARTER. I don't think so.
- Mr. MORRIS. Edith Field?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes.
- Mr. MORRIS. Julian Friedman?
- Mr. CARTER. We had a Friedman whose name was Irving. I don't place Julian.
- Mr. MORRIS. Did he attend the Ninth IPR conference as a delegate.
- Mr. CARTER. May have.
- Mr. MORRIS. Mark J. Gayn?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes, slight.
- Mr. MORRIS. Randall Gould?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes.
- Mr. MORRIS. Andrew Grajdanzev?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes.
- Mr. MORRIS. He is now known as Andrew Grad?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes.
- Mr. MORRIS. Michael Greenberg?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes.
- Mr. MORRIS. Haldore Hanson?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes.
- Mr. MORRIS. John Hersey?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes.
- Mr. MORRIS. Alger Hiss?
- Mr. CARTER. He was a member of our board for a short time.
- Mr. MORRIS. And an adviser, was he not?
- Mr. CARTER. Consultant.
- Mr. MORRIS. Y. Y. Hsu?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes.
- Mr. MORRIS. Joy Hume?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes.
- Mr. MORRIS. Philip J. Jaffe?
- Mr. CARTER. Contributing member.
- The CHAIRMAN. Answer the question.
- Mr. CARTER. Yes.
- Mr. MORRIS. Anthony Jenkinson?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes.
- Mr. MORRIS. Sergei Kournakoff?
- Mr. CARTER. Don't remember.

- Mr. MORRIS. Was he a writer for your Pacific Affairs?
- Mr. CARTER. Don't remember.
- Mr. MORRIS. Corliss Lamont?
- Mr. CARTER. Contributor, yes.
- Mr. MORRIS. Olga Lang?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes.
- Mr. MORRIS. Eleanor Lattimore?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes.
- Mr. MORRIS. Owen Lattimore?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes.
- Mr. MORRIS. W. J. Leaning?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes.
- Mr. MORRIS. Duncan C. Lee?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes, sir.
- Mr. MORRIS. Michael Lee?
- Mr. CARTER. Attended a conference; yes.
- Mr. MORRIS. A member of the secretariat?
- Mr. CARTER. At the conference.
- Mr. MORRIS. Michael Lindsay?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes.
- Mr. MORRIS. Lewis Lorwin?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes.
- Mr. MORRIS. William Mandel?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes.
- Mr. MORRIS. Kate Mitchell?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes.
- Mr. MORRIS. Harriet Moore?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes.
- Mr. MORRIS. Hozumi Ozaki?
- Mr. CARTER. Ex-mayor of Tokyo. Maybe, I don't know.
- Mr. MORRIS. Was he not a delegate to your Yosemite Conference in 1936?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes.
- Mr. MORRIS. Fred Poland?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes.
- Mr. MORRIS. Catherine Porter?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes.
- Mr. MORRIS. Mildred Price?
- Mr. CARTER. I don't know.
- Mr. MORRIS. Ludwig Rajchman?
- Mr. CARTER. I don't remember. I remember him. I don't remember his IPR connections to be known, I suppose.
- Mr. MORRIS. Jefferson Franklin Ray?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes.
- Mr. MORRIS. Lawrence Rosinger?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes.
- Mr. MORRIS. Andrew Roth?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes.
- Mr. MORRIS. Kuikazu Saionji?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes.
- Mr. MORRIS. Helen Schneider?
- Mr. CARTER. Don't remember.
- Mr. MORRIS. Was she not a staff worker?
- Mr. CARTER. I don't remember.
- Mr. MORRIS. John S. Service?

- Mr. CARTER. Yes.
- Mr. MORRIS. Agnes Smedley?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes, she was a member for 2 years.
- Mr. MORRIS. Edgar Snow?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes.
- Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Edgar Snow?
- Mr. CARTER. I don't remember.
- Mr. MORRIS. That is Nym Wales.
- Mr. CARTER. I don't remember as an extensive correspondent.
- Mr. MORRIS. Guenther Stein?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes.
- Mr. MORRIS. Marguerite Stewart?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes, sir.
- Mr. MORRIS. Maxwell S. Stewart?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes.
- Mr. MORRIS. William T. Stone?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes, sir.
- Mr. MORRIS. And Anna Louise Strong?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes.
- Mr. MORRIS. Mary Van Kleeck?
- Mr. CARTER. I don't know. I know her, but I don't remember her in an IPR connection.
- Mr. MORRIS. Did she not write for your publication?
- Mr. CARTER. I don't remember.
- Mr. MORRIS. John Carter Vincent?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes.
- Mr. MORRIS. Adam Von Trott?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes.
- Mr. MORRIS. Harry Dexter White?
- Mr. CARTER. Very limited, yes.
- Mr. MORRIS. Ella Winter?
- Mr. CARTER. I don't remember.
- Mr. MORRIS. Victor Yakhontoff?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes.
- Mr. MORRIS. Rose Yardumian?
- Mr. CARTER. Yes, sir.
- May I make one short comment?
- The CHAIRMAN. Proceed.
- Mr. CARTER. It is said that this represents the greater volume of the correspondence. I see a great many important omissions of people with whom I was in constant correspondence, like Ray Lyman Wilbur, Robert Gordon Sproul, Lord Hailsham.
- I think there is a long list of people not mentioned with whom it was my obligation and pleasure to be in correspondence. I would hope, if I may make a suggestion, that this list would not be used as a sample of the personnel connections of the IPR, because it is at all levels—stenographers, accountants, people who wrote one article, and so on—whereas, the framework of the institute was the wise leadership of men like Sproul, and Wilbur, and Newton Baker, and Dafoe, and a very large number of people who, by long distance phone, by interview, and by extensive correspondence, I was in touch with.
- You said at the beginning that you wanted me to give the whole picture.
- The CHAIRMAN. That is correct. That is all right.

Mr. MORRIS. That is perfectly all right, and we understand that that is not the complete list. But we are going to be addressing ourselves to these names, and we want an affirmation or denial of whether they were connected with the institute.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, before you go to another subject, I asked a question about investigations within the IPR itself.

You indicated that prior to the Amerasia exposure, that there had been an investigation on the so-called Kohlberg charges.

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to read just a line or two of testimony, not giving you the name of the party who testified to it.

Do you think there was an investigation made by IPR of the Kohlberg charges?

The answer is:

No; I would say that there was an answer prepared by a staff member of the Kohlberg charges which were accepted by the executive committee.

Now, there was no investigation, but only a member of the staff prepared an answer. Is that what happened?

Mr. CARTER. It is part of what happened. The Kohlberg charges came in, they were analyzed by a large number of members of the staff, in consultation with members of the board. They were then given to the members of the board with the complete text of the Kohlberg charges, the complete text of the proposed staff analysis that was made by the board's committee.

The board's committee took a great deal of time to read both documents and to study afresh a great many of the publications. The board finally accepted that as a voice of the board.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you would say that the witness that testified that there was not—

I would say that there was an answer prepared by the staff members of the Kohlberg charges which was accepted by the executive committee—

is not a correct statement?

Mr. CARTER. I think it is a little thin.

Senator FERGUSON. You think it is a little thin. That is all I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Carter, you have been on the stand now from this morning until nearly 1 o'clock, and now it is 20 minutes after 4. We are going to ask you to be here tomorrow.

You have been a ready witness, and the committee is grateful for the information you have given us.

Tomorrow, we will have before this committee Mr. Field. We have been advised by the district attorney of New York that Mr. Field will be here tomorrow at 10:30.

The district attorney of New York has put off the hearings that he was to conduct so that Mr. Field might be here.

We will ask you, also, please, to be present at 2:30 tomorrow afternoon.

Mr. CARTER. Will both of those be public or executive hearings?

The CHAIRMAN. They will both be public.

Mr. CROSSMAN. May I ask you if you will want Mr. Carter to testify further? I gathered you did, but I was not quite sure.

The CHAIRMAN. I told him we wanted him for a few questions at 2:30. Just how long it will take, I am not certain.

The committee will stand at recess until tomorrow at 10:30.

(Whereupon, at 4:24 p. m., Wednesday, July 25, 1951, the hearing was recessed until 10:30 a. m., Thursday, July 26, 1951.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

THURSDAY, JULY 26, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10:30 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424 Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Eastland, O'Connor, Smith, Wiley, Ferguson, and Watkins.

Also present: Senator McCarthy.

J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Ladies and gentlemen and members of the press, the room is a bit congested. We are sorry we have not more accommodations. Will you kindly aid us in keeping as quiet as you can because even a low voice when audible seems to be distracting. So, if possible, please refrain from speaking at least above a whisper and try to keep your whispers down so that we may proceed.

We will swear the witness. You do solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. FIELD. I do.

TESTIMONY OF FREDERICK V. FIELD, NEW YORK CITY; ACCOMPANIED BY VICTOR RABINOWITZ, ATTORNEY AT LAW, NEW YORK CITY

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Field, when you appeared before his committee in executive session you refused to answer many questions on the ground that to do so might incriminate you. In no case, when you made such a claim, did the committee require or compel you to answer the question.

I think you should know that the committee has carefully examined and studied the record of the executive hearings with a view to determining, so far as possible on the basis of information available to the committee, what your rights may have been with regard to the questions which you refused to answer.

Today, the committee does not intend to adopt a harsh attitude toward you. Where you deem it necessary to claim your privilege

against self-incrimination, in good faith, the committee will not seek to compel you to answer unless, first, the committee believes your privilege does not apply to that particular question and, second, the information sought to be elicited through your answer is of particular importance to the committee.

It may be that in no instance, where you claim your privilege, will the committee demand that you answer. But I wish to caution you that if and when such a demand is made, it will be a demand backed by the committee's studied judgment that the committee does have a right to compel your answer. You should have that information so that you may guide yourself accordingly.

I think it might be well if the record at this point contained a brief discussion of the privilege of a witness to decline to give evidence incriminating himself. Let me say, Mr. Field, that in this connection I am not attempting specifically to give you legal advice. I am stating certain tenets of the law as I understand it, for the guidance of any witness before this committee who may benefit thereby.

The privilege of a witness to decline to give evidence incriminating himself is not confined to the right to refuse to answer a direct question as to the commission of a crime, but includes the right to refuse to testify to a fact which would be a necessary link in a chain of evidence to prove the commission of a crime by the witness, or would be the source from which evidence of his commission of a crime might be obtained.

Whether an answer to a question would tend to incriminate the witness depends on whether, if he gave a true and responsive answer to the question asked, that answer would form part of a chain of evidence which might tend to convict him.

In the case of a series of questions, the true and responsive answers to all of which would establish the criminality of the witness, an examiner may not pick out a particular question from the series and say that if that particular question shall be asked, the answer will not incriminate the witness. If the question is one link in a chain having a tendency to incriminate the witness, he is not compelled to answer.

Where, from the evidence and the nature of the question, it can be definitely determined that the question, if answered in a particular way, will form a link in the chain of evidence to establish the commission of a crime by the witness, then we may not inquire whether the witness claimed his privilege in good faith or otherwise. It is only where the incriminating effect of the question is doubtful that the witnesses' motive may be considered; for in such case his bad faith would tend to show that his answer would not subject him to any danger.

But the good faith of a refusal to answer questions because the witness fears the answers would tend to incriminate him may properly be inquired into.

Where it is not manifest, so as to preclude all reasonable doubt, that the answer called for cannot incriminate the witness, the privilege must be protected. But the privilege against self-incrimination is confined to real danger, and does not extend to remote possibilities out of the ordinary course of law. Furthermore, in determining whether the answer to a particular question will incriminate the wit-

ness, previous testimony by the witness may properly be taken into consideration. A matter which the witness has already admitted, though it might, being admitted for the first time, have a tendency to incriminate the witness, is not privileged when the witness is asked to make the disclosure for a second or subsequent time.

At witness before a congressional committee always may exercise his privilege of refusing to answer questions, and submit to a court the correctness of his judgment in doing so; but in the event that he is mistaken as to the law it is no defense, for he is bound rightly to construe the statute.

I think that is all I have to say on the subject, excepting one other matter, if I may.

Mr. Field, I think those of us who come from the West are especially appreciative of the wonderful name that has been made in the history of America by your family. It is a regrettable thing to me, and to many others, that for some reason or other, best known to yourself, you seem to have perhaps for the time being forgotten the great achievements that were worked out by your ancestors and forebears. Your country is today at the cross-roads of its existence. Never was it challenged by a more dangerous enemy, both at home and abroad. It behooves every American, every man who has the red blood of America in his veins to come to the aid of his country now with everything he knows that will protect this country from its most dangerous enemies. The history of your fine family, the history of your forbears indicates to me, and I hope I will be pardoned for my expression, that we must have a certain high degree of sorrow at the attitude which seems to be assumed by you which I think, hope, and pray is only a momentary attitude and that you may aid the Congress of the United States and the courts and the people of this country in their most trying hour by giving to us frankly and fairly everything that you know. I hope that may be your attitude and I assure you this committee is your friend. They want to get the information. They want to put you with your family in the fine history of your forebears indicates to me, and I hope I will be pardoned which it is intended.

You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give your name and address to the reporter.

Mr. FIELD. Frederick V. Field, 16 West Twelfth Street, New York City.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation?

Mr. FIELD. My present occupation is a prisoner.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you are a prisoner?

Mr. FIELD. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Before you became a prisoner what was your occupation?

Mr. FIELD. I identified myself as a writer.

Mr. MORRIS. Who is your present wife?

Mr. FIELD. My present wife is Anita Boyer Field.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was her former husband?

Mr. FIELD. Her former husband is Raymond Boyer.

Mr. MORRIS. What is he doing now?

Mr. FIELD. I don't know what he is doing now.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he recently serve a prison sentence?

Mr. FIELD. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. On what charges?

Mr. FIELD. I don't remember the technical charges. It had something to do with information regarding explosives as I remember. I am not familiar with it.

Mr. MORRIS. Did it have to do with espionage? Was he a Canadian involved in espionage trials?

Mr. FIELD. I don't really know. I don't know about that case.

The CHAIRMAN. State what you do know.

Mr. MORRIS. To what extent can you tell us about the sentence which Mr. Boyer served in Canada?

Mr. FIELD. I can tell you almost nothing whatsoever.

Mr. MORRIS. You know it involved espionage?

Mr. FIELD. I believe so. The reason I hesitate is only the legal technicalities in identifying the charges.

The CHAIRMAN. That is your understanding?

Mr. FIELD. Yes; I am frankly not familiar.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the name of your first wife?

Mr. FIELD. Elizabeth Brown.

Mr. MORRIS. Was she active in IPR?

Mr. FIELD. She was associated with the staff of an organization that was housed in the same group of rooms—offices of the IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. What organization was that?

Mr. FIELD. An organization called the Inquiry. I am just trying to remember whether she also actually became a staff member of the IPR. There was a rather close relationship at that time.

I think it would be correct to say "Yes"; she has been associated with at least one of the conferences—one of those international conferences where she probably served as a staff secretary, or something of that sort.

Mr. MORRIS. Who is she presently married to?

Mr. FIELD. Joseph Barnes.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he active in IPR?

Mr. FIELD. Yes; he was.

The CHAIRMAN. When you used the letters "IPR" in the first instance I respectfully suggest you spell it out as to what it is.

Mr. MORRIS. In reference to IPR, you meant the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. FIELD. Yes. May I also say, in connection with Mr. Barnes, I would have been referring to the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the name of your second wife?

Mr. FIELD. Edith Chamberlin.

Mr. MORRIS. Was she active in IPR?

Mr. FIELD. Only in this sense: She went to one of the IPR conferences—one of the international conferences as secretary to her uncle, Prof. Joseph Chamberlin, of Columbia. He recently died.

Perhaps at another conference she was a staff secretary. She was not a staff member—only served at a couple of conferences.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you presently serving a jail sentence?

Mr. FIELD. Yes; I am.

Mr. MORRIS. For what?

Mr. FIELD. Well, it is for the matter contained in the last sentence of Senator McCarran's memorandum that apparently according to the

courts at present I have misinterpreted the use of the privilege; that is, against self-incrimination.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you recently posted bond for Communists?

Mr. FIELD. I think under the circumstances I must ask leave to employ the privilege of refusing to answer that question. I do so on the grounds that the answer might be self-incriminating under the circumstances. I hope the privilege is available to me in this instance under the fifth amendment.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you recently posted bail for anyone?

Mr. FIELD. In my opinion, Mr. Morris, I speak with hesitancy here on this point because of what the chairman has said and because of my own recent experience; but in my opinion that is a question which tends or does lead me into an area, into perhaps a chain of questions which I do believe might be self-incriminating. It is a question which in itself is awfully hard to decide. I feel that because of my present circumstances I must also decline to answer that on the grounds that the answer might be self-incriminating.

Mr. Chairman, may I, on some of these questions that may be puzzling to me, consult my counsel?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; you may consult with him in confidence, not aloud, if you please.

I stated yesterday, Mr. Counsel, that the propounding of questions would not be permitted. We will not deprive the witness of the right of his counsel by his side so long as it does not interfere with the proceeding.

Mr. RABINOWITZ. Thank you.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Field, will you relate to the committee your associations with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. FIELD. Yes; I will.

Do you wish me to repeat what I gave in executive session?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right; it was very well done in that session.

Mr. FIELD. You wish me to give a full and lengthy answer?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, a full expression of your association with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. FIELD. The association began in 1928 when I was invited by Mr. Carter to become secretary to a committee in this country which was raising money for a well-known Chinese educator, Dr. Y. C. James Yen, who headed up a movement in China against illiteracy.

I accepted the job and spent perhaps 8 or 10 months, something like that, traveling throughout this country with Dr. Yen raising funds for this purpose.

Mr. MORRIS. This was in 1928?

Mr. FIELD. This would be 1928, probably lapping over into '29. I forget how the months fell at the time. It surely fell over into '29.

This was not directly an Institute of Pacific Relations project, but Dr. Yen was given the hospitality of the institute offices in New York. Mr. Carter was a member of chairmen of the American committee aiding him. There was an obvious link between work and personnel in that effort and the institute. I think almost perhaps imperceptibly at the end of that period of work on behalf of Dr. Yen, I found myself a staff member of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

I became—I think my first title was assistant secretary, but as I explained to the committee in executive session, there were then only

two people in the office. So the assistant secretary was the bottom man. Mr. Carter was then secretary.

I retained this association as a staff member of the American Council with one or two interludes I will refer to, until the fall of 1940.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you have the title of research secretary?

Mr. FIELD. That is one of the interludes I wish to point to.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you become national secretary?

Mr. FIELD. I am not sure about the exact dates, but in the early thirties there was a period of 8 or 10 months—I think it was under a year—when Mr. Holland, who had been research secretary of the international organization, the international part of the institute, was on leave of absence. I forget for what purpose, whether it was to take a degree, to write a book, or something of the sort. I pinch-hit for him for that period. I believe it was at that time that I established my quarters in Honolulu and served—

Mr. MORRIS. That is for a period of about 8 months?

Mr. FIELD. Eight or ten months, something like that.

Mr. MORRIS. In approximately what year was that?

Mr. FIELD. Approximately '32 or '33. I am not positive about that. It was the early thirties. I then reverted back to the staff of the American Council of the IPR. I became secretary of the American branch. I haven't got any records with me.

Mr. MORRIS. Does the date 1934 seem right to you?

Mr. FIELD. I think that is early. I would say probably '35. I think you probably have the records. I would agree with anything that is available to you on that subject.

Mr. MORRIS. You were national secretary for how long?

Mr. FIELD. About 5 or 6 years.

Mr. MORRIS. You terminated approximately in 1940?

Mr. FIELD. In the fall of 1940 I resigned as secretary.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you remain on as a member of executive board of trustees?

Mr. FIELD. I remained both as a trustee and as a member of the executive committee board. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you remain as a member of the executive committee of the board?

Mr. FIELD. The record will show that. I certainly would agree with it. I think until the summer of 1947.

Mr. MORRIS. Would it be 1948?

Mr. FIELD. I think it is very probably correct.

Mr. MORRIS. You still are a member of the Institute of Public Relations?

Mr. FIELD. I am simply a dues-paying member at \$10 or \$15 a year, whatever it is.

Mr. MORRIS. You have been that since 1948?

Mr. FIELD. I have continued that. May I say in that connection that as I am sure you are aware, the privilege of membership is to obtain certain publications. It is almost synonymous with being a subscriber to the publication the Far Eastern Survey and a few other things.

Mr. MORRIS. We had a witness yesterday who testified that you contributed approximately \$60,000 to the institute during the years that you were associated with it. Does that seem like a reasonable figure?

Mr. FIELD. As I said to you in executive session, Mr. Morris, I am perfectly willing if it were possible for me to check any records and verify anything.

Mr. MORRIS. You said you were going to do that.

Mr. FIELD. I have not been able to since I saw you. I have not been able to check them. I don't know who testified.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter testified yesterday that the total of your contribution to the institute through the years that you were associated with it approximated \$60,000.

Mr. FIELD. I am perfectly willing to accept that. I really have very little idea myself. That would be over a period of what, perhaps 15 years?

Mr. MORRIS. That is approximately correct.

Mr. Field, he also testified that for a certain period of time you made up the deficit of the institute. Does that square with your recollection?

Mr. FIELD. You asked me that before. I am still a little unclear what you mean. You mean on December 31, plugging the gap?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right. I am using the language that appeared in the files of the institute; namely, that the records did seem to show you made up the deficits for a period of time. Mr. Carter conceded that that was the case.

Mr. FIELD. I have no argument about that. Of course I made contributions. It is just the exact meaning of making up the deficit that puzzles me a bit.

Mr. MORRIS. You cannot recall, Mr. Field, that the problem was ever put to you: "We are here with a deficit, will you make up this deficit?"

Mr. FIELD. On the contrary, that is the kind of situation I can't recall vividly because it is exactly what you say to anyone. That is, anyone you go to to raise money for an organization. I went out myself to raise money for the institute and I would put it that way. We have got a deficit.

Senator EASTLAND. Was it put to you that way.

Mr. FIELD. Certainly it was. I was one of the contributors. I assume it was.

Senator EASTLAND. You made up the deficit?

Mr. FIELD. I certainly made contributions toward the deficit each year.

Mr. MORRIS. You also wrote for IPR publications?

Mr. FIELD. Yes, I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe in general what your writings in the Institute of Pacific Relations publications have been?

Mr. FIELD. I wrote two books which were published under the auspices of the institute. The first was published by the University of Chicago Press I think in 1931. It was called American Participation in the China Consortiums. You don't want me to describe it?

Mr. MORRIS. No.

Mr. FIELD. The second book was one which I edited called Economic Handbook of the Pacific Area, fairly large parts of which I wrote myself. That was published about 1934 by Doubleday Doran.

I wrote a number of articles for the Far Eastern Survey, which is the American council's fortnightly publication and for its predecessor, which was a more informal kind of publication.

First we put it out in mimeographed form. I think it was called IPR Memorandum. I am not certain about that. The articles in the survey, as I recall, all appear under authors' names. I believe those in the memorandum were put forth as a staff job.

I wrote certain articles for Pacific Affairs and——

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe approximately how many you wrote?

Mr. FIELD. I was also going to add I did several book reviews for them.

I just from memory couldn't. I am sure you agree with any record you have of that. Not very many, I believe.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you write pamphlets issued by the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. FIELD. I remember Mr. Barnes and I coauthored——

Mr. MORRIS. That is Joseph Barnes?

Mr. FIELD. That is correct. Coauthored two, I think, that I can recall. There may be more.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Field, could you tell us whether you registered as a foreign agent with the Department of Justice for the Chinese Postal Remittances and Savings Bank of Hong Kong on September 19, 1950?

Mr. FIELD. I did so register. The date I will accept from you.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Field, did you register as an agent for the directorate general of the Postal Remittances and Savings Bank of Peking on September 19, 1950, again with the Department of Justice?

Mr. FIELD. Yes. It is my impression they are both one in principle.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you register as a foreign agent for the Bank of China in Peking on September 19, 1950?

Mr. FIELD. Again as to the date I am not certain, but as to the fact, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Field, did you register as a foreign agent for the China National Aviation Corp. of Peking with the Department of Justice on September 19, 1950?

Mr. FIELD. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it not true that these four foreign principals were controlled by the Chinese Communist Government?

Mr. FIELD. No; I would not accept that. As a matter of fact, the issue that was fought, and successively fought in court in the first case related to the Bank of China established that there was sufficient independence and autonomy of the Bank of China as apart from the Chinese Government to warrant the funds being frozen. There is an appeal being argued, I believe, at this very moment on this case.

Mr. MORRIS. I am about to show you exhibit C of your registration statement. I call your attention to paragraph (d) which reads:

My information is to the effect——

This is now about the Bank of China——

that two-thirds of the stock is owned by the Peoples Republic of China; that the owner of these shares exercises the usual prerogatives consistent with such ownership.

I ask you if that is not your statement.

The CHAIRMAN. That instrument you have just shown the witness is signed by the witness?

Mr. MORRIS. It is exhibit C of his registration statement, Senator, which is signed.

At this point I will introduce the whole registration statement which bears the signature of Frederick V. Field, and ask him to authenticate his signature.

Mr. FIELD. You want me to reply to that?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. FIELD. That is perfectly true, I am afraid I can't adequately describe to you the argument in the court which resulted favorably—

Mr. MORRIS. At the time you registered, it was your understanding—

Mr. FIELD. It is more complicated than that, because a registration filed does not reveal more information than is called for.

As I recall, one of the important things in the trial itself was the fact that the majority of the board of directors of the Bank of China were not Government appointees. In any case, whatever the evidence was, the judges in San Francisco decided in favor of the autonomy.

Mr. MORRIS. We don't care to go into the particular legal controversy involved, but it was your understanding at the time that you registered, according to your own words—I am quoting them again:

My information is to the effect that two-thirds of the stock is owned by the Peoples Republic of China.

That is your own statement.

Mr. FIELD. I am not denying the statement.

The CHAIRMAN. That is an answer.

What about these other documents?

Mr. MORRIS. I have not finished them.

The CHAIRMAN. You are going to identify them.

Mr. MORRIS. I offer the photostat of the statement, Mr. Field—

The CHAIRMAN. As to your signature.

Mr. FIELD. That is my signature.

Mr. MORRIS. You also acknowledge these exhibit C's are part of that registration statement?

Mr. FIELD. I think they are. I am willing to accept that.

Mr. MORRIS. I am reading from exhibit C of the registration statement on the China National Aviation Corp., again subdivision (d):

According to my information the Peoples Republic of China—

And that is the name of the Communist Chinese Government; is it not?

Mr. FIELD. The present Chinese Government.

The CHAIRMAN. Chinese Communist government.

Mr. FIELD. Chinese Communist government.

Mr. MORRIS. That is not recognized by the United States or the United Nations as the Government of China.

The CHAIRMAN. Listen to the questions because there is a little confusion there, I think. Please clear that up.

Counsel asked you, "And that is the present Chinese Communist government?"

You said "The present government."

Mr. FIELD. I wanted to make a distinction there, Mr. Chairman, but I don't want to labor the point.

The CHAIRMAN. It is the Communist Government of China at the present time; is that correct?

Mr. FIELD. My own opinion is that it is a coalition government in which Communists participate.

Mr. MORRIS (reading) :

According to my information the Peoples Republic of China owns 80 percent of the stock of the corporation and exercises the usual prerogatives consistent with such ownership.

Mr. FIELD. That is true.

Mr. MORRIS. Therefore, it was your understanding at the time you registered.

Mr. FIELD. You are now referring to the Chinese National Aviation Corp.?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. FIELD. I see.

Mr. MORRIS. So it was your understanding they were controlled by the Chinese Communists?

Mr. FIELD. Certainly. Again may I just make that amendment in the same way I did before about the Chinese Peoples Government.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you relate to us the circumstances leading up to your registration as an agent for these four foreign principals?

Mr. FIELD. I think I covered this before, did I not?

Mr. MORRIS. You did. I would like you to bring in that portion which shows your association with Dr. Chi.

Mr. FIELD. I will bring that in immediately if you wish. Dr. Chi is the—I am not certain of his title, the document would show it—assistant general manager, is he not, of the Bank of China?

Mr. MORRIS. On your exhibit C on the Bank of China you referred to Chao-ting Chi as the assistant general manager of the Bank of China?

Mr. FIELD. He had formerly been a student in New York City. He took his doctorate degree at Columbia in the late thirties. I am not going to say this with absolute certainty as to dates and the position, but he was associated with the international organization of the IPR for some period of time as a research person.

Mr. MORRIS. You met him as such with the institute?

Mr. FIELD. That is correct. I met him in connection with the preparation of his doctorate thesis through whoever it was he was working with at Columbia.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know he was working on the Inquiry series?

Mr. FIELD. I believe he wrote one of the books in connection with it.

Mr. MORRIS. It is your testimony that you recall he wrote one of the books in the inquiry series?

Mr. FIELD. It is my recollection that he did, but I am not going to—I may be incorrect here.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you explain the relationship?

Mr. FIELD. Yes. You asked me to bring out that relationship and I have.

Presumably it was through this connection I had with Dr. Chi and I had lost track of him for a number of years and was surprised when he emerged in this particular position.

Mr. MORRIS. How did you first hear from Dr. Chi?

Mr. FIELD. By cable.

Mr. MORRIS. He cabled you?

Mr. FIELD. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What did he ask you to do?

Mr. FIELD. He asked me—I think the cable is probably—I am not sure whether it was submitted here or not, but the gist of it was he asked me if I would accept being attorney in fact for the Bank of China in this country in specific connection with a suit which had been brought by Wells-Fargo Bank in California against another bank with respect to determining correct ownership of funds which would then be claimed by another group of Bank of China representatives, H. H. Kung and others. The bank itself brought the dispute to court, the Wells-Fargo Bank where these funds were deposited, in order to have the court determine the true owner.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the date of that?

Mr. FIELD. It was some time before the registration. It must have been several months before because I think the case was first argued in the spring of 1950, something like that.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you know anything about the nature of the China National Aviation Corp.?

Mr. FIELD. This followed—I forget the date—after the Bank of China.

Mr. MORRIS. The registration was dated September 19.

Mr. FIELD. All the registrations had the same date. There was a prolonged period of time with respect to the question of registration.

Mr. MORRIS. Before you received that cable from Dr. Chi, had anyone broached the subject with you, Mr. Field?

Mr. FIELD. No one had broached it, not that I remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Your first knowledge came at the time you received this cable from Dr. Chi?

Mr. FIELD. I believe so. I want to answer this accurately. I don't want to—What I am trying to recall is the possibility as to whether I had sent some communication or not. I cannot recall it. I don't know if the record shows it. If I did—

Mr. MORRIS. When did you last communicate with Dr. Chi prior to that time?

Mr. FIELD. I had been out of touch for, well, a good many years.

Mr. MORRIS. I wish you would concentrate on that point because it is important.

Will you try to recall what steps you took prior to your receiving the cable from Dr. Chi bearing on this whole question of registration?

Mr. FIELD. I had not—I do not recall having seen Dr. Chi. I really find it impossible to tell you a date. Let me put it this way and perhaps we can work it out: I know he came to this country at least once, and perhaps twice, and I did not see him.

Mr. MORRIS. When was that, approximately?

Mr. FIELD. I worked out these dates. They will appear—I am afraid I can't give this from memory, but I can tell you where the information is available.

In filing the original papers with the court in San Francisco it was necessary to establish this relationship between Dr. Chi and myself. I can't remember why, but I was called upon to do it. I then did work out the chronology. Those papers are public records of the court. I cannot right now do it in justice to myself from memory.

Mr. MORRIS. Give us your best recollection.

Mr. FIELD. I don't remember—my best recollection—please don't hold me to this because it is only a recollection—would be the—I was going to say the late thirties, but I am trying to think.

Mr. MORRIS. You didn't see him at San Francisco at the UN conference?

Mr. FIELD. He wasn't there; to my knowledge he wasn't.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you there?

Mr. FIELD. Yes, sir; I was there.

What I am trying to do is to work back in terms of the international conferences of the IPR to think whether or not he attended them.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you roughly, within 2 or 3 years, give us the date?

Mr. FIELD. I would say—I can't at the moment think of any time after 1940 having seen him. I must say I may be mistaken.

Mr. MORRIS. Who sent the cable to you preliminary to your registering as an agent for China National Aviation Corp.?

Mr. FIELD. I think the cable is here. I will stand by it. It was either the president or general manager of the CNAC and I believe from Hong Kong. I think you have got it. Because it was submitted.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your relation to that particular man?

Mr. FIELD. I had none. I had never known and didn't know his name.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you presume he was acting on the suggestion of Dr. Chi?

Mr. FIELD. The cable apparently said so. As I recall, it did. Isn't it in these documents? Have you got those, Senator? Those may be the termination cables. Are they?

In any case, I am quite sure all the cables are on file.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the role of Mr. Martin Popper in this transaction?

Mr. FIELD. I asked him—I had appointed attorney in fact. I asked Mr. Popper to become attorney at law.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Popper is associated with the American-China Export Co.?

Mr. FIELD. May I speak to my counsel on that?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. FIELD. Mr. Morris, again I think this is a question drawing me into an area which I feel might be self-incriminating. I would respectfully decline to answer on that ground and I would also invoke my privilege under the fifth amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the question, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. Read the question back, please.

(The following question was read by the reporter:)

Mr. Popper is associated with the American-China Export Co.?

The CHAIRMAN. To that you refused to answer, invoking your privilege?

Mr. FIELD. I would like to invoke the privilege on that.

The CHAIRMAN. You must do it or not do it.

Mr. FIELD. I have done so.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you resign as agent for the aforesaid foreign principals?

Mr. FIELD. The cancellation of the agency was effective some date in January of this year.

Mr. MORRIS. 1951?

Mr. FIELD. Some date in January of this year, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Why did you resign as agent for those foreign principals?

Mr. FIELD. I resigned—I remember I began the negotiation toward resignation perhaps the end of November, early November of 1950. I resigned on the ground that the changes in the international situation made it undesirable and impossible to continue these agencies or made it impossible for me certainly to continue playing the role as I had up to that period.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you effectively were blocked from carrying out the function which you thought you were going to carry out?

Mr. FIELD. Yes; and I was also unwilling to continue for personal reasons. I didn't wish to continue as agent at that period.

Mr. MORRIS. It was not because you disagreed with the policy of the Chinese Government in waging war against the American troops in Korea?

Mr. FIELD. Mr. MORRIS, I have answered this chain up to this question, and at this point I would like to invoke the privilege and decline to answer on the grounds that the answer might tend to incriminate me.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Field, I hope you are keeping in mind the expressions that the chairman made. I hope you are keeping in mind everything that pertains to these hearings and to the value that may be placed upon your testimony.

Again I bring to your attention the country that is your country that needs the help of every red-blooded American today and if you have information that would be of assistance to your country in her trying hours, the chairman can only say to you that it behooves every American to come forward because of the blood of Americans is spilled all over Asia today, and it behooves us to try to see that our country is protected internally.

Senator O'CONOR. There is a question there that I would like to ask.

Mr. Field, what specific development caused you to set into motion the cancellation or withdrawal from that representation?

Mr. FIELD. The events which took place in the latter part of last fall, Senator, which were the new situation in the Korea, the developing policies in this country, the embargo, the freezing of funds, and other measures being undertaken in China in retaliation.

My own personal situation in which I did not wish to continue in the light of such developments also. It was something I did not wish to do, as I stated before.

These things led me to initiate the cancellation of the four agencies.

Senator O'CONOR. Was the intervention of the Chinese Communists in the Korean conflict a major consideration?

Mr. FIELD. Well, I have just described it as certainly a factor which was part of the complex events which took place at that time.

Senator O'CONOR. I was taking it up from the standpoint of the timing.

Mr. FIELD. It was the direct relation.

Senator O'CONOR. In other words, it was quite in point of time related to that?

Mr. FIELD. Yes.

Senator O'CONOR. Are there any other specific developments which led up to your decision to withdraw your associations, any other major ones?

Mr. FIELD. I think the ones I have mentioned are sort of general. I can't think of any further way to express it.

Senator O'CONOR. You have mentioned the embargo which went on during the early days of December, about December 9, if my memory serves me correctly. That had a decided bearing upon your decision?

Mr. FIELD. In the case of the agencies, to be on the practical side, the freezing of funds of course was decisive.

Senator O'CONOR. That is the third thing I wanted to ask you.

Mr. FIELD. That was decisive. The embargo did not affect it.

Senator O'CONOR. These two things were interrelated?

Mr. FIELD. Yes.

Senator O'CONOR. They occurred at or about the same day or week?

Mr. FIELD. Yes.

Senator O'CONOR. I was going to ask you whether the freezing of the funds did have a very definite bearing on your decision.

Mr. FIELD. Yes; and I think I mentioned that in my original testimony.

Senator O'CONOR. As the result of that action by the United States Government it was virtually impossible for you to carry on the representation as it had been carried on by you previously?

Mr. FIELD. I said it was both impracticable and impossible in that period. I said also it was undesirable from my point of view to continue in that capacity.

Senator O'CONOR. The point I was directing attention to was whether or not the developments by others than yourself and including the United States Government forced your decision, or whether it was by reason of a change of attitude upon your part as to your willingness to be the accredited representative of these four institutions.

Mr. FIELD. Senator, I could put it this way: That inevitably changes in international relations such as I think did take place last fall impinge on any individual's point of view.

This certainly did have an effect on me. I tried to give some expression to it now in replying to your question.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Field, I have before me a booklet which is captioned "China's Greatest Crisis," by Frederick V. Field. You are familiar with it since you are the author of it, is that not true?

Mr. FIELD. Senator, with respect to that question I may say that I would like to invoke the privilege on the grounds that the answer might tend to incriminate me.

Senator O'CONOR. At the outset I was merely intending to identify the Frederick V. Field as to whether or not that was you or another person, to your knowledge.

Mr. FIELD. I think I must invoke the privilege on that question.

The CHAIRMAN. You deny you were the author of it?

Mr. FIELD. I invoke the privilege. I decline to answer on the grounds that the answer might tend to incriminate me.

Senator O'CONOR. I read two passages on the back page of the publication for the specific purpose of having you tell us, if you will, whether or not in your withdrawal of representation you departed from these views, or were adhering to them still. The first is a quotation from Earl Browder which is imprinted on the back page of the booklet just over your name. That is your name at the bottom of the second of the two pages. I will hand it to you when I have read it.

The text is as follows:

China's new democracy by Mao Tse-tung, outstanding spokesman for the Chinese Communist, is a work of historical importance, one of the essential documents for evaluating the current Chinese crisis proclaiming the Chinese Communist long-time program and perspective for the liberation and development of that great nation.

That is signed "Earl Browder."

I ask you whether or not you caused that to be imprinted on the back of this booklet?

Mr. FIELD. Senator, I did mean to suggest that if I may I feel I must use the privilege on that whole chain of questions with reference to this document. I do so in this connection and decline to answer on the grounds that the answer might tend to incriminate me.

Senator O'CONOR. Then the one which I read and the name Frederick V. Field is attached to the bottom, is as follows:

China's new democracy reaches the English-speaking public just as the Chinese Nation faces the sharpest test of its history. If we thoroughly comprehend the lessons which Mao Tse-tung here teaches, our efforts to support those policies which will result in a regeneration of China will be immeasurably strengthened.

That is signed "Frederick V. Field."

It is published by New Century, January 1945. You will notice that at the bottom.

Mr. FIELD. If I may, I would like to refuse to answer on the ground that the reply might tend to incriminate me.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Field, is there anything concerning this publication which you would tell us about, anything which you feel you can elaborate upon without incriminating yourself?

Mr. FIELD. Senator, my understanding of my use of the privilege, and I do believe it is the understanding I derived from the chairman's introductory remarks, is that this is an area of questioning or chain of questioning which might incriminate me, and therefore, I am entitled to invoke the fifth amendment and decline to answer.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that you invoke the privilege?

Mr. FIELD. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. On the ground that it might tend to incriminate you; is that right?

Mr. FIELD. Yes.

Senator O'CONOR. Without giving support to the views expressed herein or without reaffirming them or in any sense taking any responsibility for the views, will you tell us whether or not this booklet was in fact published and distributed? I am not asking you for any connection you may have had with it other than just the fact of whether or not this booklet was in fact distributed. That is without asking you for a reaffirmation of the views or anything else relating to it, just as to the mere fact.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is, Does he know whether or not it was printed?

Mr. FIELD. You have shown me a document. It has clearly been published and exists. I must acknowledge that.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you seen it before?

Mr. MORRIS. Have you seen it before?

Mr. FIELD. Mr. Chairman, I must respectfully decline to answer that question on the grounds the answer may tend to incriminate me.

Senator O'CONOR. The negative answer when you started to answer, you do not mean to say you did not see it before?

Mr. FIELD. No; I meant I must decline to answer.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you find this article is such that it could be incriminating? Is it of such a nature?

Senator O'CONOR. That, Senator Ferguson, is a matter of opinion. There is contained in the publication a series of statements in respect to the present Chinese Government.

Senator FERGUSON. You think it is possible the writer could be indicted and convicted for writing it?

Senator O'CONOR. I have an opinion of my own on that and I do think so.

Senator FERGUSON. I wanted to ask that; otherwise I don't see how a claim could be made on the refusal to answer, Mr. Chairman.

Senator O'CONOR. I do not think the witness would have the right to refuse to testify concerning certain facts of it. That is why I distinguished between the reaffirmance of the views expressed in it.

Just one last question: Is there nothing further that you care to say?

Mr. FIELD. I don't think so.

Senator EASTLAND. What were your duties as attorney in fact for the Bank of China?

Mr. FIELD. I would say my primary function had been to secure an attorney at law and to keep in touch with his work.

Senator EASTLAND. Attorney at law for what purpose?

Mr. FIELD. To carry out the interest of the principals.

Mr. EASTLAND. What were those interests?

Mr. FIELD. They were primarily—I say “primarily”; I think they were exclusively the question of the funds deposited in a large number of banks in this country under the name of these three corporations.

Senator EASTLAND. How much money was involved?

Mr. FIELD. I am afraid I couldn't answer.

The CHAIRMAN. Approximately.

Mr. FIELD. Let me think just a moment. A great deal of money was and still is hidden. The Wells-Fargo case involved—well, I hate to use a figure and have it turn out entirely inaccurate.

Senator EASTLAND. What is your best judgment?

Mr. FIELD. Several million dollars involved, not in the Wells-Fargo case. I will say there were \$600,000 in that case.

Senator EASTLAND. All of several million dollars involved?

Mr. FIELD. In the Bank of China's deposits in various banks in this country. In connection with the Chinese National Aviation Corporation—

Senator EASTLAND. Do you mean to testify that you received a cablegram out of the clear sky from a man, Dr. Chi, whom you hadn't seen since approximately 1940, that you had lost track of—received

a cablegram appointing you attorney in fact for the Bank of China and when he didn't know whether you would accept it or not?

Mr. FIELD. No; because there is more to be said on that and I have said something about it before, but not drawing its full implications.

The Wells-Fargo Bank of San Francisco itself started this whole procedure in court. It invited—it refused to honor a withdrawal, I believe, signed by H. H. Kung, but it might have been one of the old officials of the Bank of China—it refused to honor a withdrawal. It took it to a court and determined the true ownership. In the course of the litigation the Wells-Fargo Bank sent the papers and documents over to China to get their side of the story and it was in that way that the new Bank of China—

Senator EASTLAND. It was your duty to arrange to represent the legal interests of the Bank of China in litigation involving several million dollars. That is true, is it not?

Mr. FIELD. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. Is it your testimony—and I want you to answer “yes” or “no”—that you received a cablegram from Dr. Chi, a man you had not seen since approximately 1940, that appointed you attorney in fact?

Mr. FIELD. Inviting me.

Senator EASTLAND. To represent that bank.

Well, he named you agent in fact to represent that bank?

Mr. FIELD. No.

Senator EASTLAND. When no one had previously contacted you but to see if you would act, or whether or not you would accept? Is that true?

Mr. FIELD. No, Senator. I think the way you put it does not give quite the correct impression. The first cable asked me whether I would accept. Upon my cabled reply I would, then came a cable of more definitive nature.

Senator EASTLAND. Who first contacted you? Who in this country discussed the matter with you before you received a cablegram?

Mr. FIELD. No one. I did also testify earlier in this session that I am not sure whether it was in this case or in another that I had sent a cable or a letter, some kind of communication to China, with respect to the situation of these funds. I can't identify this and I don't know whether it is available in the record. Presumably it is.

Senator EASTLAND. Did any official of the Communist Party of the United States discuss this matter with you before you received Dr. Chi's—

Mr. FIELD. No; they didn't. I do want, if I may, Mr. Chairman, just to finish that one link I was trying to point out, that the Wells-Fargo Bank started this; that the whole matter was called to the attention of the people in China by the Wells-Fargo Bank. It was through that that it finally came back.

Senator EASTLAND. Here is a cablegram:

We hereby appoint you attorney in fact in connection with * * *.

The CHAIRMAN. Signed by whom?

Senator EASTLAND. The Director General of Posts, Su Yu Nung.

Mr. FIELD. That is a different principal.

Senator EASTLAND (reading) :

We hereby revoke all previous powers of attorney and appoint you as attorney in fact representing our interests in the lawsuit of the Bank of China, New York, against the Wells-Fargo.

Signed, "Chi Chao-ting." That is the cablegram in question; is it not?

Mr. FIELD. That would be the cablegram following the previous exchange which would not have been filed because all that the Bureau requires is the instrument effecting the formal appointment of the agency.

There would have been cables prior to any one of those, preparatory, introductory cables, leading up to the ones here submitted.

Senator EASTLAND. Where are those cables?

Mr. FIELD. I have them.

Senator EASTLAND. With you?

Mr. FIELD. No.

Senator EASTLAND. Will you make those cables available to the committee?

Mr. RABINOWITZ. If I may—

Senator EASTLAND. Wait a minute.

Mr. FIELD. If I may consult my counsel.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly, but he is not going to answer for you.

Mr. RABINOWITZ. I did not intend to answer. I wanted to refer to a perfectly obvious fact that the witness does not at the moment have access, physical access, to his records.

The CHAIRMAN. He will have to answer that for himself, please.

Mr. RABINOWITZ. I wasn't trying to answer the question.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all right. Propound your question, please.

Mr. FIELD. I have no objections. I have a practical problem.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have the record cleared up as to the cablegrams read by Senator Eastland. They should be marked as an exhibit in this case, or some identifying mark put on them.

Senator EASTLAND. I thought they had already been put in.

The CHAIRMAN. We had just connected them up.

Senator EASTLAND. I thought they were in the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you therefore testify you will make available to this committee all pertinent correspondence, telegrams, and everything else relating thereto in connection with that registration?

Mr. FIELD. I thought the question was to complete the file of cables prior to these—this I agreed to do. I am in no position to fulfil this now.

Mr. MORRIS. As soon as you are in a position?

Mr. FIELD. I will do so as soon as I am.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to offer in evidence the registration, No. 640, with exhibit C in connection with the foreign principals—the China National Aviation, the Bank of China, the Directorate General of the Postal Remittances and Savings Banks.

Mr. FIELD. The Chinese National Aviation Corp.

Mr. MORRIS. And the Postal Remittances and Savings Bank of Peking. There are four registrations with exhibit C's in four cases.

The CHAIRMAN. They will be admitted in the record.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 9" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 9

[Radiogram]

MARCH 23, 1940.

FREDERICK V. FIELD,
Care Amchipo, New York:

We hereby appoint you attorney in fact in connection Chase Bank lawsuit.

SU YU NUNG,
Director General of Posts.

(Exhibit B, registration No. 640.)

[Radiogram]

PEKING, December 24.

FREDERICK V. FIELD,
Care AMCHIPO, New York:

We hereby revoke all previous powers attorney and appoint you as attorney in fact representing our interest in lawsuit Bank of China, New York, against Wells Fargo.

KUNG YIN-PIN.
 CHI CHAO-TING.
 CHAN WU.

Head office, Bank of China.
 (Exhibit B, registration No. 640.)

[Radiogram]

PEKING, February 16.

FREDERICK V. FIELD,
Care AMCHIPO, New York:

Replying yours third, we hereby appoint you attorney in fact representing all Bank of China interests in United States.

KUNG YIN-PIN,
General Manager.
 CHI CHAO-TING,
 CHAN WU,
Assistant General Managers.

Head office, Bank of China.
 (Exhibit B, registration No. 640.)

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That the CHINA NATIONAL AVIATION CORPORATION organized and existing under and by virtue of the Laws of China, having its principal place of business in Tientsin, China, pursuant to a resolution duly adopted by its Board of Directors and hereto annexed and forming a part hereof, has made, constituted and appointed and by these presents does make, constitute and appoint, Frederick V. Field, a citizen of the United States of America, residing at 23 West 26th Street, City of New York, United States of America, its true and lawful attorney to represent the China National Aviation Corporation in the United States of America and with board authority to manage and conduct the business, property and affairs of China National Aviation Corporation in the United States of America, and without limiting the generality of such powers, and by way of enumerating some of the powers which it is intended to repose in said Attorney, to do and perform the following in the United States of America:

1. To manage and control the funds and assets of China National Aviation Corporation, and without limiting this general power, to invest and reinvest the same, to purchase, arrange for the purchase of, or otherwise acquire, sell, arrange for the sale of, or otherwise dispose of, own, hold, exchange, transfer, deliver, pledge, or otherwise deal in and with bonds, stocks, bills of exchange, acceptances, notes, and other securities or property, including, but not limited to, all such securities and property, at any time held or controlled by any bank, Government or person, either as collateral, in custody, or otherwise; to receive

the delivery of any securities or other property, and if conditionally released by any bank, Government or person, to execute conditional or trust receipts therefor.

2. To accept for payment at a future date, drafts, bills of exchange and any other instruments for the payment of money, whether expressed in United States dollars or in any other currency, negotiable or non-negotiable, drawn upon the China National Aviation Corporation by its head office, branches, correspondents, customers, or others, and to issue letters of credit, including commercial letters of credit and travelers letters of credit, authorizing the holder thereof to draw drafts upon China National Aviation Corporation or its correspondents at sight, on time or otherwise in United States dollars or in any other currency.

3. To purchase, or otherwise, acquire, own, hold, sell, endorse, negotiate, assign, transfer, exchange, deliver or otherwise dispose of, make, draw, sign, issue, open, accept, pay, renew, guarantee, discount, collect, transmit, protest, mortgage, pledge, hypothecate, and otherwise deal in and with, notes, drafts, bills of exchange, or other evidences of debt, acceptances, letters of credit, including commercial letters of credit and travelers letters of credit, checks, orders for the payment of money, stocks, bonds, securities, bills of lading or other shipping documents, insurance policies, warehouse receipts, trust receipts, and other instruments, negotiable or non-negotiable of every kind and description; to waive presentment, notice of nonpayment and protest of any and all negotiable or other instruments.

4. To open, maintain, adjust, settle and close any deposit account, foreign currency account, or other account in the United States of America, for the deposit or collection of funds belonging to China National Aviation Corporation, or to others with any bank, and to make any agreements or arrangements and to issue any instructions relative to such accounts; to designate one or more depositories for said accounts; to deposit such funds in said deposit accounts. All said funds shall be subject to withdrawal or charge at any time and from time to time, upon checks, notes, drafts, bills of exchange, acceptances, undertakings or other instruments or orders for the payment of money, when made, signed, drawn, accepted or endorsed by said Attorney or his substitute or substitutes. Each depository be and it hereby is authorized to pay cash, certify, give credit for, accept, or purchase the same, or make any such charge without limit as to amount, and without inquiry as to the circumstances of issue or the disposition of the proceeds, even if drawn, made or endorsed to said Attorney or his substitute or substitutes, or tendered in payment of his individual obligation or for his credit, or for deposit to his personal account. Any and all endorsements for or on account of China National Aviation Corporation upon such checks, notes, drafts, bills of exchange, acceptances, undertakings and other instruments or orders for the payment of money, tendered for deposit or collection to any said bank, may be by written or stamped endorsements of China National Aviation Corporation without any designation of the party making such endorsement.

5. To open, maintain, adjust, settle and close, custody, safekeeping, collection, or other accounts with any bank or person, in the United States of America; to deliver to, transfer to, and deposit with any such bank or person for custody and safekeeping, and to withdraw any securities or other property belonging to China National Aviation Corporation, its customers or others, and to execute any agreements or other instruments and instructions relative thereto or relative to any custody or safekeeping account or the securities and property therein; to have securities of China National Aviation Corporation, its customers or others, placed on registered in the name of the depository's nominee. The said Attorney may authorize each such bank or person to receive and hold in any such custody or safekeeping account as depository, and to sell or arrange for the sale of, or otherwise dispose of, checks, notes, drafts, bills of exchange, acceptances, or other instruments for the payment of money, negotiable or non-negotiable, stocks, bonds, coupons and other securities and funds not subject to check or other property, to collect all interest, dividends and other income which may become due and to credit the same to any account of China National Aviation Corporation, to execute on behalf of China National Aviation all necessary ownership certificates or other instruments that may be required under any income tax or other laws of regulations of any Government now or hereafter in effect.

6. To hire deposit boxes, safes or other space in any vault or any safe deposit company or bank in the United States of America, or in any warehouse or other premises, subject to the terms, conditions, rules and regulations of any such safe deposit company or bank, warehouse or owners of any other premises, and to execute any and all agreements and instruments required therefor.

7. To execute deeds, conveyances, mortgages, bills of sale, conditional bills of sale, assignments, transfers or other instruments of assignment or transfer.

8. To the extent permitted by law, to accept, receive, maintain and manage deposit account, savings accounts, safekeeping or custody accounts, or other accounts, from any bank, person or Government.

9. To receive personal property, both tangible or intangible, of every kind and description for safekeeping or management, and to lease to customers for hire, safe deposit boxes, receptacles or other space for the safekeeping of such personal property.

10. To receive goods, wares and merchandise, which may be shipped to or consigned to China National Aviation Corporation by or for the account of customers or others or for its own account, or in which China National Aviation Corporation may be interested, and to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of, or deal with the same, or any part thereof; to transport, store or warehouse the same or any part thereof in the name of China National Aviation Corporation or otherwise. To do and perform any act or thing necessary or proper, in order to obtain clearance through customs of goods, wares and merchandise or other property, for the account of China National Aviation Corporation or its customers or others including but not limited to the following: to make customs entries; to pay customs duties; to challenge and contest any duty or tax; to make delivery or other disposition of such property, to obtain proper dutiable valuation and proper tariff classification for any such property; to settle and determine all claims, disputes and matters; and to execute bonds, reports and other instruments in connection with the foregoing matters.

11. To place or effect insurance of any kind upon any property or assets of China National Aviation Corporation or of its customers or others, including but not limited to fire, compensation, fidelity, theft, credit, liability, and public liability; to obtain binders for, contract for, renew, cancel or make other disposition of, such insurance; in connection therewith and in case of loss, to execute proofs of loss, statements, affidavits, agreements or other documents, and to collect, receive and acquit for any such insurance, or any sum or sums which may be due to the China National Aviation Corporation, its customers or others in connection therewith.

12. To purchase or otherwise acquire, own, hold, sell, convey, exchange, manage, alter, remodel, repair, lease, rent, invest in and make loans upon, act as broker with respect to mortgage, or otherwise deal in and with real estate, both improved and unimproved, and wheresoever located, or any interest therein, and to construct, erect, build, alter, improve, demolish buildings and structures of every kind, necessary in the transaction of China National Aviation Corporation's business or for account of customers or others.

13. To retain attorneys; to appoint, engage, employ, make contracts with, manage and control agents and subagents, assistants, accountants, representatives, and other employees in any agency, branch or other office of China National Aviation Corporation wherever located, as the said Attorney may deem necessary or advisable. Without limiting the foregoing general powers, to fix their terms, conditions and agreements of retainer or employment and salaries or other compensation; to prescribe their duties; to terminate their employment and to dismiss, discharge or suspend any of them in the absolute discretion of said Attorney, with or without cause, and solely upon such grounds as the said Attorney may deem sufficient in the best interest of China National Aviation Corporation; to fill vacancies and to increase or decrease the number of all such employees; to assemble and maintain an adequate and proper staff; and to establish, alter or amend rules and regulations for the control of such staff, agents and employees.

14. To execute such leases, extensions, and renewals of leases, options, service contracts, and such other instruments as may be necessary or proper in the establishment and maintenance of offices for China National Aviation Corporation anywhere in the United States; to purchase, acquire, sell, exchange, or otherwise dispose of such furniture, fixtures, supplies, and other personal property as may be necessary or convenient in connection with the business of China National Aviation Corporation in the United States of America.

15. To ask, demand, sue for, recover, receive, and give acquittances for any and all moneys, debts and demands, bonds, stocks, securities, and other property due or payable to, belonging to, or deliverable to China National Aviation Corporation, or which may hereafter become due, or payable or deliverable to China National Aviation Corporation, or to which the China National Aviation Corporation may have the right of immediate possession, either as principal, interest,

dividend, or otherwise, and from any bank, person, or Government; to compromise, adjust, settle, compound, or otherwise dispose of all claims, demands, disputes, and controversies; to execute any composition, agreement, or other debtor or creditor agreement, or to make any arrangement with debtors to refer any dispute, controversy or matter to arbitration and to appoint or consent to the appointment of arbitrators or an umpire, either before or subsequent to the commencement of legal proceedings; without limiting to any extent the various rights and remedies which are or might be available to China National Aviation Corporation to accept, take possession of, hold, or store any goods, wares, or merchandise, or other personal property whether belonging to China National Aviation Corporation or held by China National Aviation Corporation as security or in trust, or held by any bank or person as security or in trust or for the account of China National Aviation Corporation, or otherwise, and to hold, manage, sell, assign, transfer, lease, mortgage, pledge, or otherwise deal with the same, or any part thereof.

16. To commence, prosecute, enforce, appear in, intervene in, accept service of process in, defend, settle, adjust, compromise, or discontinue any action, suit, proceeding, or litigation at law or in equity, in any court, or before any Government; to apply for or consent to the appointment, removal, or substitution of any Receiver, Trustee, Referee, Master, or Arbitrator.

17. To appear in and participate in any bankruptcy, insolvency, equity, or receivership proceeding or suit, or in any matter relating to the assets, estate, or effects, or the winding up of the affairs of any person, intended to the China National Aviation Corporation or its customers; to execute proofs of claim, and powers of attorney; to attend at and participate in any and all meetings of creditors, either prior to the commencement of or in connection with any such proceeding or suit; to vote in respect of any claim or other matter at any such meeting; to appoint proxies; to withdraw, compromise, settle, satisfy, and deal with any claim; to execute petitions in bankruptcy or applications for the appointment of receivers in any court and under insolvency, bankruptcy, or other laws; and to execute any and all other petitions, answers, proofs of claim, pleadings, or other papers which may be necessary or proper.

18. To attend and vote at, or to appoint proxies or other representatives to attend or vote at any and all meetings of creditors.

19. To execute applications, affidavits, petitions, and other instruments in order to obtain licenses, permits, franchises, and rights from the Government of the United States of America, the several states, territories, and dependencies thereof, the District of Columbia, or any other Government or representatives of any of the foregoing with reference to importing, exporting, selling, exchanging, storing, transshipping, trucking, moving, and matters relating to the performance of any act or thing or the exercise of any power granted by this power of attorney.

20. To execute all such tax returns, information returns, schedules, affidavits, waivers, petitions, applications for refunds, and other instruments and documents as may be required by or permitted under any tax law, income-tax law, or other law, rule, regulation, or requirement of any Government.

21. To do and perform any and all of the foregoing acts and things and to exercise the broad general powers herein granted as well as the specific powers mentioned in this instrument within and throughout the State of New York, the District of Columbia, and the several states, territories, and dependencies of the United States of America and within any other country except as herein otherwise stated, provided only that the same be not inconsistent with the laws, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations of any Government having valid jurisdiction in the premises.

22. To transact generally, any and all business on behalf of the China National Aviation Corporation, with full power and authority to do and perform all acts and things incidental to the exercise of, or requisite, necessary, or proper to be done under and by virtue of the broad general powers hereby granted as well as the specific powers herein enumerated, and in and about the premises, as fully to all intents and purposes as the China National Aviation Corporation might or could do if personally present in its corporate capacity, or as the Board of Directors of the China National Aviation Corporation could do if present in person and acting directly therein; to have and possess a seal of the China National Aviation Corporation and to affix the seal to any instrument and to attest the same: *provided, however*, that at no time shall the seal of the China National Aviation Corporation be or constitute a requirement for the validity of any instrument which said Attorney is authorized to execute and that the right herein granted to use such seal as aforesaid shall not be construed to require the use thereof on any instrument.

23. To do and perform any and all of the acts and things, and to exercise all of the powers herein granted, to the extent that the same shall be in accordance with the laws, rules, or regulations of the Government of the United States of America, the several states, territories, and dependencies thereof, the District of Columbia, or any of the governments or representatives of any of the foregoing. Should the performance of any act or thing or the exercise of any power herein granted, be determined to be illegal or contrary to the laws, rules, and regulations of any such Government as aforesaid, by any Court of competent jurisdiction, or pursuant to the opinion of counsel, or otherwise, it is the intention of the China National Aviation Corporation that this Power of Attorney and all the powers herein granted, nevertheless, shall be and continue at all times in full force and effect as to all acts, things, and powers the performance and exercise of which shall not have been held or determined, specifically, as aforesaid to be illegal or violative of such laws, rules, and regulations.

24. In the interpretation and construction of this power of attorney, the several terms hereinafter mentioned shall be defined to include the meanings indicated, but these definitions shall not be deemed to limit in any way the broader definitions or meanings that would otherwise be given to them in law. The term "bank" shall be defined to include any government bank, central bank, correspondent bank, agency bank, branch bank, private banker, banking partnership or firm, or any other banking or financial organization or institution, public or private. The term "person" shall be defined to include any individual, firm, partnership, corporation, public or private, or association, and also any Government or bank as herein defined. The term "execute" or "make" shall be defined to include make, draw, sign, swear to, verify, acknowledge, certify, deliver, deposit, send, file, and record.

25. To nominate, constitute and appoint from time to time, a substitute or substitutes to act in the name, place, and stead of said Attorney who at all times shall have full power of revocation.

26. The China National Aviation Corporation for itself, its successors and assigns does hereby ratify, confirm, and approve all acts and transactions which said Attorney or any lawfully appointed substitute or substitutes shall do or cause to be done by virtue of this Power of Attorney. All acts and transactions of said Attorney and of his substitutes, shall, notwithstanding any prior revocation of any substitution thereunder, be valid, effectual and binding upon the China National Aviation Corporation, unless notice in writing of such revocation of this Power of Attorney shall have been previously delivered to the China National Aviation Corporation or person to whom a copy of this Power of Attorney shall have been delivered.

27. The China National Aviation Corporation does hereby annul, cancel, revoke, and terminate any and all previous Powers of Attorney heretofore granted and does hereby annul, cancel, revoke and terminate all rights, powers, authorities, privileges, and immunities granted therein and thereby vested in or given to any and all such previous attorneys-in-fact.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the China National Aviation Corporation has caused this Power of Attorney to be executed, and its corporate seal to be hereunto affixed by being thereunto duly authorized by the resolution hereinabove referred at to this day aforesaid.

Sealed with the Common Seal of The China National Aviation Corporation and signed by Liu Ching Yi, its Managing Director, in the presence of—

[SEAL]

CHINA NATIONAL AVIATION CORPORATION,
By C. Y. LIU, *Managing Director*.

Notary Public, Hong Kong.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

REGISTRATION STATEMENT

Registration No. 640

PURSUANT TO SECTION 2 OF THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT OF 1938, AS AMENDED

1. (a) Name of Registrant: Frederick V. Field.

(b) All other names ever used by Registrant and when used: In exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, I decline to answer this question.

- (c) All present business addresses: 23 West 26th St., New York City (personal business office); 51 Pine Street, New York City (office as President of American-Chinese Export Corporation).
- (d) All present residence addresses: 16 West 12th St., New York 11, N. Y.; New Hartford, Connecticut.
2. (a) Date and place of Registrant's birth: April 14, 1905.
(b) Present citizenship or nationality: American.
3. All visits to or residence in foreign countries during the past 5 years: Numerous visits to Canada, skiing, motor trips, other vacations, personal visits to friends.
4. (a) All clubs, societies, committees, and other nonbusiness organizations, in the United States or elsewhere, of which Registrant is or has been during the past 5 years a member, director, officer, or employee: The answer to this question is attached.
(b) All membership or service during the past 10 years in the active reserve, military, naval, or other armed forces of any foreign government or foreign political party: None.
5. Name and principal address of each foreign principal of Registrant: The answer to this question is attached.
6. State the nature and purpose of Registrant's representation of each foreign principal named under item 5 and describe fully all activities of Registrant for or in the interests of each such foreign principal: The answer to this question is attached.
7. Describe briefly all other businesses, occupations, and public activities in which Registrant is presently engaged. President, American-Chinese Export Corporation—engaged in export-import trade. Member of the Board of Directors of Trade Union Service, Inc. Owner of office building located at 23 W. 26th St., N. Y. C. Vice President S & 10 W. 37th Street Corporation. As to all other businesses, occupations and public activities, I decline to answer this question in exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
8. All employees and other individuals who render any services or assistance to Registrant, with or without compensation, for or in the interests of each foreign principal named under item 5. I had in the past retained attorneys at law to render legal services but these services now are and have for some time been rendered directly to and by agreement with the principals named under Item 5.
9. Furnish the following information as to Registrant's receipts and expenditures during the 3 months proceeding the filing of this statement. The information may, if Registrant desires, be furnished for Registrant's latest fiscal quarter or other latest fiscal period of not less than 3 months.
 - (a) All amounts received during the period directly or indirectly from each foreign principal named under item 5, itemized as follows: ¹ None.
 - (b) All amounts received during the period from other sources to be used directly or indirectly for or in the interests of any foreign principal named under item 5, itemized as follows: ¹ None.
 - (c) All expenditures made during the period directly or indirectly for or in the interests of each foreign principal named under item 5, itemized as follows: ² None.
10. (a) Speeches, lectures, talks, and radio broadcasts arranged, sponsored or delivered by Registrant during the past 3 months: In exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, I decline to answer this question.
(b) Publications prepared or distributed by Registrant, or by others for Registrant, or in the preparation or distribution of which Registrant rendered any services or assistance, during the past 6 months: In exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, I decline to answer (b) and (c) of this question.

¹ Include all amounts so received, whether received as compensation, loans, contributions, subscriptions, fees, dues, subsidies, or otherwise.

² Include all transfers of funds to any foreign principal.

- (d) Distribution of publications referred to in answer to (b) above: In exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, I decline to answer this question.
11. (a) Registrant's connections, not fully described above, with foreign governments, foreign political parties, or officials of agencies thereof: None.
- (b) Registrant's pecuniary interest in or control over partnerships, corporations, associations, or other organizations or combinations of individuals, not fully described above: The answer to this question is attached.
- (c) If the Registrant is subject to the supervision, direction, or control of any individual or organization, except as hereinabove fully described in this statement, explain fully. In exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, I decline to answer this question.

12. File the following exhibits with this statement:

Exhibit A.—File an Exhibit A, on the printed form provided therefor, for each person named under item 8.

Exhibit B.—File a copy of the agreement, arrangement, or authorization (or if not in writing, a written description thereof) pursuant to which Registrant is acting for, or receiving funds from, each foreign principal named under item 5.

Exhibit C.—File an Exhibit C, on the printed form provided therefor, for each principal named under item 5.

Exhibit D.—File copies of all printed matter referred to under item 10 (b), except photographs and moving pictures.

Exhibit E.—File a copy of the agreement or arrangement (or if not in writing, a written description thereof) between the Registrant and each business firm or other organization named under item 10 (c) or (d).

The undersigned swears or affirms that he has read the information set forth in this statement and the attached exhibits, that he is familiar with the contents thereof, and that such contents are in their entirety true and accurate to the best of his knowledge and belief, except that the undersigned makes no representation as to the truth or accuracy of the information contained in Exhibit A insofar as such information is not within his personal knowledge.

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

Subscribed and sworn to before me at New York, N. Y., this 18 day of September 1950.

ESTHER BURTON,

Notary Public, State of New York; qualified in New York County.

My commission expires March 30, 1951.

4. (a).

Name and address of organization	Nature of connection with organization	Date connection began	Date connection ended, if ended
Harvard Club of New York	Member	Approximately 1928	
Century Association	do	Approximately early 1930's.	
Foreign Policy Association	do	Approximately 1928	
American Institute of Pacific Relations	Formerly an officer, presently a member.	do	

Numerous academic associations, including American Academy of Political Science, American Economic Association, American Sociological Society, American Geographical Society, of which I have been a member since the late 1920's or early 1930's.

As to all other clubs, societies, committees, and other nonbusiness organizations, I decline to answer this question in exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

5. Bank of China, Peking, China; China National Aviation Corporation, Peking, China; Directorate General of Postal Remittances and Savings Bank, Peking, China; Chinese Postal Remittances and Savings Bank, Hong Kong.

6. (1) Attorney in fact for the Bank of China to represent all Bank of China interests in the United States.

Registrant's authority has been used in connection with several lawsuits in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Southern Division. In the first of those actions (*Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co.*, No. 29287-G), there is a contest between two groups, each of whom claim to have authority to act on behalf of the Bank of China for control of several deposits in the Wells Fargo Bank in San Francisco. Registrant, pursuant to appointment as attorney in fact for the present management of the Bank of China, authorized the filing of certain motions in the actions. The suits had previously been commenced by persons who alleged that they were authorized to act on behalf of the Bank of China. Their purported authority was first questioned by the Wells Fargo Bank and later contested by the registrant.

A decision has been rendered in this case by the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Southern Division, and the matter is now on appeal.

Registrant has also been designated attorney at law to make claim on behalf of the present management of the Bank of China to deposits in several other American banks. No litigation is pending involving those deposits.

(a) Attorney in fact of China National Aviation Corporation with broad authority to manage and conduct the business affairs of this corporation in the United States.

Registrant has used his authority as attorney-in-fact in connection with a number of pending lawsuits in the Federal Court in California initiated by Civil Air Transport, Inc., a Delaware corporation, in which the question to be determined is the ownership of the deposits in various banks as well as to certain property in California. Civil Air Transport, Inc., claims that the stock and assets of China National Aviation Corporation were sold to it. The California banks in which the deposits are held are acting merely as stakeholders and China National Aviation Corporation, a defendant in the suits, is opposing the claims of Civil Air Transport, Inc., on the ground that the purported sale of the stock and assets of China National Aviation Corporation was fraudulent and wholly invalid.

(3) Attorney-in-fact for Directorate General of Postal Remittances and Savings Bank, Peking.

(4) Attorney-in-fact for Chinese Postal Remittances and Savings Bank, Hong Kong. In both (3) and (4) Registrant's power-of-attorney is limited to the protection of the interests of these banks in an interpleader action started in the New York Supreme Court by the Chase National Bank of the City of New York. The question involved in that lawsuit, since removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, is which of several adverse claimants have authority to act on behalf of the banks. Registrant's power-of-attorney comes from the present management of the banks.

11. (b) Ownership of stocks

	Shares
American Smelting & Refining-----	100
Anaconda Copper-----	50
Curtis Wright A-----	100
Eastern Air Lines-----	100
Hoving Corp., \$1.00 Com-----	100
Louisville & Nashville-----	100
Northwest Airlines-----	150
Northwest Airlines, conv. pfd-----	125
Pennsylvania R. R-----	150
United Aircraft-----	6
United Airlines, Inc-----	125
U. S. Rubber-----	100
Beryllium Corp-----	40
Kennecott Copper-----	66
Northern States Power Co., pfd-----	25
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co-----	25
Sears, Roebuck & Co-----	100
Great Northern Rlwy Co., pfd-----	50
Boston Edison Co-----	50
Commonwealth Edison Co-----	54
Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y-----	100

11. (b) Ownership of stocks—Continued

	<i>Shares</i>
Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y., pfd.....	25
8 & 10 West 37th Street Corp.....	100
Chase National Bank of N. Y.....	25
Chemical Bank & Trust Co.....	50
Insurance Co. of North America.....	30
American Can Co., pfd.....	18
International Harvester Co.....	100
International Harvester Co., pfd.....	12
U. S. Steel Corp., pfd.....	15
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., pfd.....	25
Timken Roller Bearing Co.....	25
W. & J. Sloane.....	973
W. & J. Sloane, pfd.....	418
W. & J. Sloane, prior pfd.....	13

Interest, governed by an agreement of sale by installments, in 2,280 shares of a Brazilian corporation known as Companhia de Importacoes Industrial e Construtora, S. A. and in 60 share of a New York corporation known as CIIC, Inc. The agreement provides that these shares or a portion of them, will revert to me in case of total or partial default of the sales price.

S. R. T. Publications, Inc.....	1
S. R. T. Publications, Inc., pfd.....	200
Boni & Gaer, Inc.....	30
Boni & Gaer, Inc., pfd.....	50
International Insulating Corp.....	10
World Reports, Inc.....	25
American Chinese Export Corp. (preferred and common) (approximate)---	500
Trade Union Service, Inc.....	90

Pecuniary interest in oil leases and/or royalties

My records as well as those kept by my accountant show only original cost and current income. They identify the leases or royalties, moreover, only by the name of the remitter. In other words I do not presently have on hand the exact identity or location of each royalty or lease nor the exact fraction of my holdings in each of these properties.

The latter information can be secured, and will be secured if desired, by keeping track of incoming checks from these properties, for the fractional interest and lease number are usually indicated thereon. As all properties do not regularly pay on a monthly basis such information would take several months to accumulate.

It should further be noted that I have a few other investments in royalties and leases which, not having furnished income for a number of years, I regard as washed out. I do not carry such holdings in my records. Again, however, should a list of these washed-out investments be desired it would be possible, with considerable effort, to identify them by scrutinizing my accounts for earlier years.

The list of investments in oil royalties and leases, identified by the name of the remitter and the original cost follows:

<i>Remitter</i>	<i>Cost</i>
Anderson-Pritchard Ref. Corp.....	\$3, 535. 00
Do.....	2, 700. 00
Sunray Oil Corp.....	}
Anderson-Pritchard Ref. Corp.....	
Do.....	
Do.....	
Do.....	4, 020. 00
Champlin Refining Co.....	}
Sohio Petroleum Co.....	
The Ohio Oil Co.....	0
Champlin Refining Co.....	}
Continental Oil Co.....	
Do.....	
Duval Gasoline Co.....	3, 150. 00
Continental Oil Co.....	

<i>Remitter</i>	<i>Cost</i>
Gulf Oil Corp-----	\$450. 00
Do-----	600. 00
Do-----	900. 00
Humble Oil & Refining Co-----	5, 950. 00
Stanolind Oil Purchasing Co-----	1, 900. 00
Helmerich & Payne, Inc-----	
Shell Oil Co-----	
Investors Service Co-----	300. 00
Magnolia Petroleum Co-----	894. 90
Gulf Refining Co-----	
Phillips Petroleum Co-----	3, 150. 00
The Pure Oil Co-----	3, 607. 24
Republic Oil Refining Co-----	2, 275. 00
Shell Oil Co-----	416. 12
Do-----	4, 200. 00
Sinclair Prairie Oil Co-----	1, 665. 00
Esso Standard Oil Co-----	1, 625. 00
Do-----	
Standard Oil Co. of Indiana-----	280. 00
The Texas Co-----	1. 00
Magnolia Petroleum Co-----	1. 00
The Derby Oil Co-----	2, 950. 00
Shell Oil Co-----	
Deep Rock Oil Corp-----	150. 00
Do-----	
Union Producing Co-----	1, 170. 00
Globe Petroleum Corp-----	24, 056. 10
Forrest Parrott-----	1, 829. 42
Globe Petroleum Corp-----	12, 907. 50
Forrest Parrott-----	31, 643. 81
Globe Petroleum Corp-----	12, 308. 95
Do-----	22, 643. 62
Do-----	1
Phillips Petroleum Corp-----	1
Do-----	1
Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp-----	1

¹ No information on costs available. The income derived from these four properties for the year 1949 was, respectively : Zero, \$57.54, \$21.78, and \$7.25.

Beneficiary of the Frederick V. Field Trust established under the will of Lila V. Field of which the Guaranty Trust Company of New York is executor.

Secretary and Director of Soviet Russia Today Publications, Inc.

Miscellaneous United States Government as well as State and Municipal bonds a listing of which I assume is not called for by this question but which information I am ready to make available if called upon to do so.

As to all other partnerships, corporations, associations, or other organizations or combinations of individuals covered by this question, I decline to answer in exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

(Exhibit B, registration No. 640.)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Registration No. 640

EXHIBIT C TO REGISTRATION STATEMENTS

Under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended

Furnish this exhibit for each foreign principal of the registrant.

This exhibit will not be accepted for filing unless it is reasonably complete and accurate.

- (a) Name of Foreign Principal: Directorate General of Postal Remittances and Savings Bank.
- (b) Principal address of Foreign Principal: Peking, China.

2. Nature of all businesses, occupations, or functions of Foreign Principal: Postal savings bank and commercial banking activities.
3. If the Foreign Principal is an individual (natural person) state—
 - (a) All present business and residence addresses not given under item 1 (b).
 - (b) Citizenship or nationality.
 - (c) If an officer, employee, or agent of a foreign government, foreign political party, or any official or agency thereof, state name of such government, political party, official, or agency; nature of Foreign Principal's office, employment, or agency; nature of any subsidy or other financial arrangement.
4. If Foreign Principal is not an individual (natural person) state—
 - (a) Type of Foreign Principal's organization: Corporate entity under Chinese law.
 - (b) All partners, officers, directors, and similar officials of the Foreign Principal: According to my information the persons in charge of the affairs of the principal are Su Yu Nung and Koh Tsung Fei, both of Peking, China.
 - (c) Unless the Foreign Principal is a business organization or a government list all of its branches and local units and all other component or affiliated groups or organizations in the United States and elsewhere.
 - (d) If the Foreign Principal is supervised, directed, or controlled by any foreign government, foreign political party, or any official or agency thereof, or by any other person or persons, state name of such government, political party, or other persons; nature and extent of supervision, direction, or control: According to my information the principal was created in 1930 by legislation enacted by the National Legislature of China and functions under its own charter and bylaws. The charter of the Bank provides that the affairs of the Bank are to be managed by an executive officer called the Director General, appointed by the Minister of Communications, and by a Control Committee of nine persons—five of whom are appointed by the executive and four by the legislative branch of government.
 - (e) If the Foreign Principal is financed or subsidized in any way by any foreign government, foreign political party, or any official or agency thereof, or by any other person or persons, state name of such government, political party, or other persons; nature and extent of such financing or subsidization: According to my information the principal has received no moneys or other capital from the government.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Registration No. 640

EXHIBIT C TO REGISTRATION STATEMENTS

Under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as Amended

Furnish this exhibit for each foreign principal of the Registrant.

This exhibit will not be accepted for filing unless it is reasonably complete and accurate.

1. (a) Name of Foreign Principal: Chinese Postal Remittances And Savings Bank.
(b) Principal address of Foreign Principal: Hong Kong.
2. Nature of all businesses, occupations, or functions of Foreign Principal: Organized as overseas branch of Directorate General of Postal Remittances and Savings Bank, Peking, China, it is a separate entity engaged in the business of private banking in Hong Kong.
3. If the Foreign Principal is an individual (natural person) state—
 - (a) All present business and residence addresses not given under item 1 (b).
 - (b) Citizenship or nationality.
 - (c) If an officer, employee, or agent of a foreign government, foreign political party, or any official or agency thereof, state—name of such government, political party, official, or agency; nature of Foreign Principal's office, employment, or agency; nature of any subsidy or other financial arrangement.

4. If the Foreign Principal is not an individual (natural person) state—
 - (a) Type of Foreign Principal's organization: Corporation.
 - (b) All partners, officers, directors, and similar officials of the Foreign Principal: According to my information K. C. Tseng is Manager of the principal, acting under the supervision of the persons in charge of the Directorate General of Postal Remittances and Savings Bank, Peking, China.
 - (c) Unless the Foreign Principal is a business organization or a government, list all of its branches and local units and all other component or affiliated groups or organizations in the United States and elsewhere.
 - (d) If the Foreign Principal is supervised, directed, or controlled by any foreign government, foreign political party, or any official or agency thereof, or by any other person or persons, state—name of such government, political party, or other persons; nature and extent of supervision, direction, or control: Affairs of this principal are conducted by its own manager under the supervision of the Directorate General of Postal Remittances and Savings Bank, Peking, China.
 - (e) If the Foreign Principal is financed or subsidized in any way by any foreign government, foreign political party, or any official or agency thereof, or by any other person or persons, state—name of such government, political party, or other persons; nature and extent of such financing or subsidization: I have no further information other than stated in 4(d) above.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Registration No. 640

EXHIBIT C. TO REGISTRATION STATEMENTS

Under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as Amended

Furnish this exhibit for each foreign principal of the Registrant.

This exhibit will not be accepted for filing unless it is reasonably complete and accurate.

1. (a) Name of Foreign Principal: Bank of China.
 (b) Principal address of Foreign Principal: Peking, China.
2. Nature of all businesses, occupations, or functions of Foreign Principal: Commercial Banking Business.
3. If the Foreign Principal is an individual (natural person) state—
 - (a) All present business and residence addresses not given under item 1 (b).
 - (b) Citizenship or nationality.
 - (c) If an officer, employee, or agent of a foreign government, foreign political party, or any official or agency thereof, state name of such government, political party, official, or agency; nature of Foreign Principal's office, employment, or agency; nature of any subsidy or other financial arrangement.
4. If the Foreign Principal is not an individual (natural person) state—
 - (a) Type of Foreign Principal's organization: Corporation.
 - (b) All partners, officers, directors, and similar officials of the Foreign Principal: I have knowledge that Kun Yin-Pin, Peking, is General Manager, and that Chi Chao-Ting and Chan Wu of Peking are Assistant General Managers.
 - (c) Unless the Foreign Principal is a business organization or a government list all of its branches and local units and all other component or affiliated groups or organizations in the United States and elsewhere.
 - (d) If the Foreign Principal is supervised, directed, or controlled by any foreign government, foreign political party, or any official or agency thereof, or by any other person or persons, state name of such government, political party, or other persons; nature and extent of supervision, direction, or control: My information is to the effect that two-thirds of the stock is owned by the People's Republic of China and that the owner of these shares exercises the usual prerogatives consistent with such ownership.
 - (e) If the Foreign Principal is financed or subsidized in any way by any foreign government, foreign political party, or any official or agency thereof, or by any other person or persons, state name of such govern-

ment, political party, or other persons; nature and extent of such financing or subsidization: I have no knowledge upon which I can answer this question other than what has already been stated in 4 (d) above.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Registration No. 640

EXHIBIT C TO REGISTRATION STATEMENTS

Under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as Amended

Furnish this exhibit for each foreign principal of the Registrant.

This exhibit will not be accepted for filing unless it is reasonably complete and accurate.

1. (a) Name of Foreign Principal. China National Aviation Corporation.
- (b) Principal address of Foreign Principal: Peking, China.
2. Nature of all businesses, occupations, or functions of Foreign Principal: Commercial Aviation.
3. If the Foreign Principal is an individual (natural person) state—
 - (a) All present business and residence addresses not given under item 1 (b).
 - (b) Citizenship or nationality.
 - (c) If an officer, employee, or agent of a foreign government, foreign political party, or any official or agency thereof, state—name of such government, political party, official, or agency; nature of Foreign Principal's office, employment, or agency; nature of any subsidy or other financial arrangement.
4. If the Foreign Principal is not an individual (natural person) state—
 - (a) Type of Foreign Principal's organization: Corporation.
 - (b) All partners, officers, directors, and similar officials of the Foreign Principal: I have knowledge that C. Y. Liu, Hong Kong, is Managing Director.
 - (c) Unless the Foreign Principal is a business organization or a government list all of its branches and local units and all other component or affiliated groups or organizations in the United States and elsewhere.
 - (d) If the Foreign Principal is supervised, directed, or controlled by any foreign government, foreign political party, or any official or agency thereof, or by any other person or persons, state—name of such government, political party, or other persons; nature and extent of supervision, direction, or control: According to my information the People's Republic of China owns 80% of the stock of the corporation and exercises the usual prerogatives consistent with such ownership.
 - (e) If the Foreign Principal is financed or subsidized in any way by any foreign government, foreign political party, or any official or agency thereof, or by any other person or persons, state—name of such government, political party, or other persons; nature and extent of such financing or subsidization: I have no information other than already stated in 4 (d) above.

Mr. MORRIS. I would also like to introduce the document referred to—

The CHAIRMAN. To these instruments, I think you have already answered that your signature is attached?

Mr. FIELD. Yes; I have.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to identify the pamphlet and introduce it into the record, the one that was subject of a conference between Mr. Field and Senator O'Connor. It is a booklet entitled "China's Greatest Crisis." It is published by the New Century Publishers, Inc., 832 Broadway.

On page 1 it has a statement here about the author, Frederick V. Field. [Reading:]

The author of this pamphlet is a member of the executive committee of the American council, Institute of Pacific Relations, an author on far eastern problems. He is also executive vice president of the Council for Pan American Democracy and member of the editorial board of New Masses.

The publishing date is January 1945. I would like to introduce this into the record as exhibit No. 10.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 10" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 10

CHINA'S GREATEST CRISIS

(By Frederick V. Field)

New Century Publishers, New York

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Frederick V. Field, the author of this pamphlet, is a member of the executive committee of the American council, Institute of Pacific Relations, and an authority on far-eastern problems. He is also executive vice president of the Council for Pan-American Democracy, and a member of the editorial board of New Masses.

Published by New Century Publishers, Inc.

832 Broadway, New York 3, N. Y., January 1945. Printed in U. S. A.

CHINA'S NEW DEMOCRACY

(By Mao Tse-tung)

"China's New Democracy by Mao Tse-tung, outstanding spokesman for the Chinese Communists, is a work of historical importance * * * one of the essential documents for evaluating the current Chinese crisis * * * containing the Chinese Communists' long-time program and perspective for the liberation and development of that great nation."—Earl Browder.

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Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Chairman, on that point, Mr. Field, what was the time or the date when you first undertook to make application for a commission in the Army Intelligence of the United States?

Mr. FIELD. The origin was the other way around. I was asked if I would accept a commission.

Mr. MORRIS. Who asked you?

Senator O'CONOR. I was going to bring that out. I wanted to get the time first.

Mr. FIELD. It began very early in January of 1942.

Senator O'CONOR. It extended over quite a period, did it not, Mr. Field?

Mr. FIELD. At least 2 months.

Senator O'CONOR. By whom were you asked to join the Intelligence Corps of the United States Army?

Mr. FIELD. I have been trying to think since I read this coming down on the train yesterday who it was. I cannot recall the name. I remember it was an officer who had established emergency headquarters in New York. He was apparently engaged in recruiting people for specialized jobs of one sort or another.

Senator O'CONOR. Why did he single you out?

Mr. FIELD. Among a great many others, obviously. I had worked for a great many years on American far eastern policy and didn't consider myself a great expert, but presumably I had some slight reputation in the field, and I suppose they were looking for these people.

Senator O'CONOR. Who else assisted, or who assisted you in your efforts to secure the commission, or who was interested in regard to the pending matter as to whether or not it initiated with you or came to you by way of an offer?

Mr. FIELD. I would like to answer as fully as my recollection permits on this. At that time I was—everybody was interested—so there is a general answer to that—anybody I knew. After conversation with this officer whose name I cannot recall—there may be some correspondence with him; I am not sure—I was asked to come here to Washington to go through a series of rather prolonged interviews with the officers who were heading up, or under whom this particular section, which was to be a research staff on certain problems that they were facing, was organized. I spent some time down here and had long individual discussions with the various officers. The subject of the discussions was the question of my political views and whether they could be reconciled with the task which they wished me to undertake. We had very long talks, very full and frank talks on both sides. Finally, I was definitely offered a commission by this particular branch.

Senator FERGUSON. I wondered whether or not from the witness when he was being questioned on his political views by these officers, whether he refused to answer on the grounds it would tend to incriminate him. Did you?

Mr. FIELD. I have just said we had a very full and frank discussion.

Senator O'CONOR. Did you reveal to them fully your views?

Mr. FIELD. Yes; I did.

Senator O'CONOR. In connection with that, and I will come back to that, were you endorsed for the commission by Edward C. Carter, Owen Lattimore, and William T. Stone among others?

Mr. FIELD. Could I come to that in just a moment?

Senator O'CONOR. If you would be good enough to give me the answer categorically.

Mr. FIELD. At one point I was.

Senator O'CONOR. You were endorsed by each of those three?

Mr. FIELD. Maybe I answered too hastily. Could I make just one remark introductory to that?

Senator O'CONOR. Yes.

Mr. FIELD. The whole thing was cleared in this particular Army set-up. It then was blocked at some point, some undeterminable point outside the Army. I meant—

The CHAIRMAN. Speak up, please. The reporter is behind you.

Mr. FIELD. The commission was blocked elsewhere. I was notified of it, and asked to come back to Washington, which I did.

At the time it was suggested that it was impossible for the officers in question themselves to initiate any investigation as to what had gone wrong. They did suggest that I do so myself and see if I could eliminate the problem. It was at that point that I went to everybody I knew whom I thought might be in a position to help me, and Mr. Carter was one of them. I remember that he did offer to help me. I believe he did take certain steps.

Senator O'CONOR. How about Owen Lattimore?

Mr. FIELD. I am not sure whether I went to him or not. I would have. I do remember distinctly going to Mr. Carter. I don't have a real recollection of going to Mr. Lattimore. If he were there, I doubtless did go to him.

Senator O'CONOR. If I were to state to you there was certain correspondence that indicates, in which reference is made to Owen Lattimore as being interested in the—

Mr. FIELD. I definitely—either I or somebody went on my behalf.

Senator O'CONOR. And William T. Stone?

Mr. FIELD. I suppose he would have been one of the persons. I noticed his name in the paper. My recollection is I didn't go to him.

Senator O'CONOR. Did he come to you?

Mr. FIELD. No; I imagine he was interested indirectly through someone else, but I am not sure about that.

Senator EASTLAND. Did Lauchlin Currie endorse you for a commission?

Mr. FIELD. I didn't recall he had. I didn't go to him myself.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you understand he endorsed you?

Mr. FIELD. No, I hadn't until I heard this. I think it was quite possible he was reached through one of these other people.

Senator EASTLAND. It is quite possible he did endorse you for a commission?

Mr. FIELD. I think it is quite possible.

Senator O'CONOR. Who is William T. Stone? What is his position?

Mr. FIELD. I had known him for many years when he worked for the Foreign Policy Association.

Senator O'CONOR. Was he not a member of the board of Amerasia?

Mr. FIELD. The letter helped—

Senator O'CONOR. The letter showed you were chairman of the board, and among its members were Owen Lattimore and William T. Stone?

Mr. FIELD. Then he was.

Senator O'CONOR. Was he connected with any agency of the United States Government?

Mr. FIELD. At that time in 1942?

Senator O'CONOR. Or subsequently.

Mr. FIELD. Subsequently I know he has been.

Senator O'CONOR. In what?

Mr. FIELD. I haven't seen him but I know—wasn't he with OWI during the war, or OSS? Then he, perhaps, when they were taken over by the State Department, went over too.

Senator O'CONOR. You state, Mr. Field, that the reason for the effort to receive a commission was that there was a certain problem that was under consideration. Did I understand you correctly to use that expression?

Mr. FIELD. Yes; I did.

Senator O'CONOR. What was the certain problem?

Mr. FIELD. I have no idea what the rules were about this kind of question. I am perfectly willing to answer.

Senator O'CONOR. All right, answer.

Mr. FIELD. This problem of the strategic bombing of Japan.

Senator O'CONOR. You were consulted as to the strategic bombing of Japan, or rather, you were consulted as to taking a job which would have direct relationship with that problem?

Mr. FIELD. That is the way I understood it, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. Were these persons with whom you consulted, including Mr. Carter, Owen Lattimore, William T. Stone, Lauchlin Currie, aware of the nature of the problems that were then under consideration, about which you were being considered for a commission?

Mr. FIELD. That I am certain of, as to the specific nature; as to the general nature, they certainly would have. It would have depended, and I don't now recall what the rules were with regard to the confidential nature of that—

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Field, did you apply for a commission yourself?

Mr. FIELD. I went through down here in Washington—whatever one does. I imagine I signed the documents.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the Army investigate you?

Mr. FIELD. All I am aware of, Mr. Chairman, were these prolonged interviews which I referred to.

The CHAIRMAN. Did they investigate you before you applied for that, or afterward? Do you remember?

Mr. FIELD. They initiated this.

The CHAIRMAN. The investigation?

Mr. FIELD. No, they initiated the question of my coming into this work.

The CHAIRMAN. Who initiated that?

Mr. FIELD. The Army.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you made the application pursuant to their initiation?

Mr. FIELD. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Before that or after that did they investigate you, to your knowledge?

Mr. FIELD. All I am aware of is the investigation that took place through these long interviews.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. I want to ask Mr. Field, when did you first learn that the Senate was going to make an investigation of IPR?

Mr. FIELD. I am not—I mean I was down here last year, Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. It was last fall?

Mr. FIELD. I testified in May of 1950 before Senator Tydings' committee, April or May or something like that. Do you remember that?

Senator SMITH. No, I am referring to after that investigation was closed, when did you next hear that the Senate was going to investigate this matter further in regard to IPR?

Mr. FIELD. I don't believe I can identify this. I remember there was a great deal carried in columnists' political gossip columns to the effect that such an investigation was going to proceed.

Senator SMITH. Was it after that time you resigned your agency with the four institutions mentioned here this morning?

Mr. FIELD. Senator, there was no connection whatsoever between knowledge of such an investigation and such agency, the proof of which there is no secrecy about, in regard to my agency. I have testified fully as to it.

Senator SMITH. Did you have any instructions from those institutions as to what disposition was made of the funds recovered for them as attorney in fact?

Mr. FIELD. The litigation never went to the point of recovering funds.

Senator SMITH. I am not asking that. I am asking whether you had any instructions ahead of time as to any disposition of funds, the several million dollars.

Mr. FIELD. None.

Senator SMITH. May I ask you also what was to be your compensation and what compensation in fact did you receive, if any, from those institutions for acting as attorney in fact?

Mr. FIELD. That is declared in the report that we submitted to the Bureau. None.

Senator SMITH. You understood to start with you would not receive any compensation?

Mr. FIELD. What is that?

Senator SMITH. You understood when you accepted the agencies you were not to receive any compensation?

Mr. FIELD. I either understood it or stipulated it myself; the conditions.

Senator SMITH. The reason you did that was because you were trying to assist these institutions in getting these funds?

Mr. FIELD. I was interested in that purpose; yes.

Senator SMITH. Why were you interested in that purpose?

Mr. FIELD. Senator, again I think this is a question which leads into an area in which I must invoke the fifth amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Field, let me just give you a little word of advice, if I may. You have answered the question to which you could have raised the question. The reason for it does not incriminate you and never will, in any sense of the word. You may claim your privilege if you want to, but I am just giving you that advice.

Mr. FIELD. Could the question be repeated?

The CHAIRMAN. Will you state the question again, please?

The reason I make that observation, on two or three occasions I have refrained from making it, but you have raised the question and invoked the privilege when in reality it was not worthy of the invocation.

Mr. FIELD. Mr. Chairman, may I say on my behalf I endeavor to us the privilege as little as possible?

The CHAIRMAN. I compliment you on that. I hope you will not invoke the privilege.

Mr. FIELD. Please read the question.

Senator SMITH. Read the question.

(The following question was read by the reporter:)

Why were you interested in that purpose?

Senator SMITH. The purpose of recovering funds for these institutions.

Mr. FIELD. Senator, the thought that occurred to me originally in declining to answer is that that is a question which asks for my political views and leads into this area. This is an area which, because of certain legislation in this country, may lead me to self-incrimination. It is on these grounds, in spite of the chairman's warning, which I appreciate, I must decline to answer the question.

Senator SMITH. About the matter of his commission, at the time you discussed with someone in connection with the Army a proposed commission for you in the Intelligence Department, can you tell us with whom you talked?

Mr. FIELD. Down here in the Army?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Mr. FIELD. I don't recall the names. I have been trying to think of them. There was some correspondence at the time. It is possible I retained some of it.

Senator SMITH. You do have some of that now?

Mr. FIELD. I am not sure I do, but I remember running across it a few years ago.

Senator SMITH. You don't recall a single one of the men in the Army or the military service you discussed this with?

Mr. FIELD. Senator, what makes me hesitate is to throw out a name that might turn out to be inaccurate might be doing an injustice to someone. I think I could suggest a couple of names but I am not sure they would be correct. I would only have their last names.

Senator SMITH. Why do you think it would be doing an injustice to any Army officer to throw out his name that you were the man he met?

Mr. FIELD. It is possible it is doing someone an injustice to be associated unfavorably with me as far back as 1942.

Senator SMITH. Regardless of who the officers who you talked to were, did you disclose to that officer or those officers any connection with the Communist Party you may have had?

Mr. FIELD. I am sure this type of question came up. We had a full and frank discussion. I have no hesitancy whatsoever, if the letters were available, to inform you the names of these—there were two people in particular. I have no hesitancy in giving those names if I can identify them.

Senator SMITH. You say whatever you told the Army officers at that time about your connections was true?

Mr. FIELD. Unquestionably.

Senator SMITH. Do you recall acquainting them with any connection you may have had with the Communist Party?

Mr. FIELD. At this point I would have to decline to answer on the grounds the answer might tend to incriminate me.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Field, you said you do not remember the names of the people in Intelligence. Didn't you write a letter to Carter giving him the name of Merian Cooper, "Our friend John Cooper's brother," as very high in the Army Air Intelligence, telling him you had taken this matter up, the letter being dated February 18, 1942? Does that refresh your memory?

Mr. FIELD. The name Cooper refreshes my memory. I have no wish to conceal or deny these names. If you have the documents, I am glad to answer.

Senator EASTLAND. If we have the documents you will admit it.

Mr. FIELD. I have offered before to supply the documents myself. I would like to make it clear I offered to supply the documents myself.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to ask you this question about Owen Lattimore and about Currie, that you don't remember going to, whether in this same letter you didn't say this:

I am enclosing a confidential account of my attempt to get into the Army to serve as sort of an aide memoire to anyone looking into it. I am also enclosing a copy of my original Who's Who on the basis of which I was regarded as sufficiently qualified for the job.

By the way, I might wonder why anybody thought his Who's Who would put him in the Navy or Army Intelligence.

Mr. FIELD. I was asked for it.

Senator FERGUSON (continuing):

Nothing new to report. I have had a good talk with Justine Wise Polier and her husband. Both are working on the matter. Presumably Currie is taking it up with Owen.

Mr. FIELD. That is unquestionably Owen Lattimore.

Senator FERGUSON. Who is Currie?

Mr. FIELD. That would be Lauchlin Currie. It carries out exactly the testimony that I gave recently that Mr. Currie had probably been reached indirectly.

Senator FERGUSON. Not only probably but was; he was reached by Lattimore.

Mr. FIELD. There isn't any question about it.

Senator FERGUSON. There is no doubt, is there?

Mr. FIELD. I never entertained or suggested any doubt.

Senator FERGUSON. Let's get a copy of the letter.

Mr. FIELD. I acknowledge the truth of it if it is here in the letter.

Senator FERGUSON. I can show you here the original written on your own stationery. There is no doubt about it is there?

Mr. FIELD. No, sir; I have no doubt.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there anybody else in the Army Intelligence you took it up with?

Mr. FIELD. As I say—I am sorry, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there anybody else in Army Intelligence you took this matter up with?

Mr. FIELD. I testified to Senator Smith there were others to whom I talked. You probably have references to them in those letters.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you have any objections to Army Intelligence turning over to this committee all that you told them and the recommendations and all the matters they have before them?

Mr. FIELD. None whatsoever.

Senator FERGUSON. There is nothing in that file you know of you would not want turned over?

Mr. FIELD. No.

Senator FERGUSON. I will have further questions later, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Eastland.

Senator EASTLAND. Mr. Field, you testified for many years you worked in far eastern affairs? That is correct, that is your testimony?

Mr. FIELD. That is correct.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you ever have dealings with the United States State Department in our Far Eastern policies or affairs?

Mr. FIELD. I knew people in the State Department.

Senator EASTLAND. Whom did you know in the State Department?

Mr. FIELD. This question of what you meant by dealings—

Senator EASTLAND. Whom did you know in the State Department?

Mr. FIELD. One of the people that I recall very vividly knowing in the early time was Dr. Hornbeck, Stanley Hornbeck.

Senator EASTLAND. Who else?

Mr. FIELD. Over this whole period?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes.

Mr. FIELD. I knew a great many of them.

Senator EASTLAND. Name them. Did you know Alger Hiss?

Mr. FIELD. No; I did not.

The CHAIRMAN. You knew he was Hornbeck's assistant, did you not?

Mr. FIELD. He wasn't at the time; at least I didn't believe he was at the time. I knew Dr. Hornbeck. Dr. Hornbeck was the Chief of the Far Eastern Division at the time I knew him. I am trying to think who succeeded Dr. Hornbeck as head of the Division.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it John Carter Vincent?

Mr. FIELD. I think that is possible.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it John Carter Vincent?

Mr. FIELD. I am not sure. I met John Carter Vincent at an IPR conference.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you ever discuss our Far Eastern policy with John Carter Vincent?

Mr. FIELD. No, I don't remember ever having any discussion with him.

Senator EASTLAND. What dealings did you have with the State Department relative to our Far Eastern affairs or Far Eastern policy?

Mr. FIELD. Personally I had very few dealings with them. I just had to, as part of trying to carry out the job of the institute, the research job of the institute. One would try to keep as well informed as possible, keep coming down and checking on whether things were accurate or not.

Senator EASTLAND. Tell me with whom you had dealings.

Mr. FIELD. If you want to ask me certain names and refresh my memory—

Senator EASTLAND. I don't want to refresh your memory, and you are bound to remember whom you had dealings with.

Mr. FIELD. I have given you some names.

Senator EASTLAND. Who else? You have given two names.

Mr. FIELD. I met on several occasions. The name I was trying to think of before was Nelson Johnson, who was later Ambassador to China. I am sorry, I am more than willing to think about this. I happen to be extremely tired and I am not recalling names very rapidly.

I went to China a couple of times. I met most of the officials of the Embassy on both those trips. I certainly acknowledge knowing the people who were in the Far Eastern Division during most of this period, let us say, at least up to 1940.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you discuss our China policy with them?

Mr. FIELD. I wouldn't put it in terms of discussing. I was at the time a very inexperienced person in the field and I was trying to learn. I would come down to learn from them.

Senator EASTLAND. How long have you known Lauchlin Currie?

Mr. FIELD. I only met him once. That was in Canada at a conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations during the war.

Senator EASTLAND. You never had a conference with him in Washington?

Mr. FIELD. No; I did not.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you explain your relationship with the publication Amerasia?

Mr. FIELD. Yes; I testified on this at your executive session.

Mr. RABINOWITZ. Mr. Chairman, may I—

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute. I beg your pardon, but I have laid down the rule. You may confer with the gentleman.

Mr. RABINOWITZ. I wanted to address a question to you with respect to the procedure here, merely with this in view: I note they are opening a new subject here. The witness came down from New York last night, got in very late and was up in accordance with the routine at the District jail at 5 o'clock this morning, which is when he last had something to eat. If we are going to open a new subject and go on for some time, I wonder whether it would be possible to take a luncheon recess now? I know it is a trifle early, but the witness is very much fatigued, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. If he can carry on for 20 or 25 minutes more, that will be all.

Mr. FIELD. Do you want me to testify as I did in your executive session on this subject?

Mr. MORRIS. Were you the owner of 50 percent of the shares of the corporation?

Mr. FIELD. Your information was accurate. If you will repeat it—

Mr. MORRIS. That you were the owner of 50 percent of the stock?

Mr. FIELD. I don't think that was it. Yes, Jaffe had 49 percent of the stock of Amerasia. Somebody had 1 percent.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you chairman of the editorial board of Amerasia?

Mr. FIELD. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Was this during the time when you were national secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. FIELD. There was an overlapping, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You were national secretary from 1934 to 1940?

Mr. FIELD. Yes, and this started in 1937.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you resign from Amerasia?

Mr. FIELD. I think it was the very end of 1943, but I am not absolutely certain. I testified as to the exact date before Senator Tydings. At that time I know my testimony because I looked it up.

Mr. MORRIS. It is your testimony, therefore, from 1937 to 1943 you were half owner of the publication Amerasia, the corporation?

Mr. FIELD. I don't think there was any change in the ownership.

Mr. MORRIS. When you resigned, who took over control of Amerasia?

Mr. FIELD. Mr. Jaffe.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you discuss with your associates in the Institute of Pacific Relations the workings of Amerasia during that period?

Mr. FIELD. Yes, we did have discussions. I think I touched on some of those in the executive sessions. I remember your drawing

me out on a development that took place with respect to it. In what manner do you want me to proceed here?

Mr. MORRIS. Would you just relate in general what were your relations with the institute people? They knew full well you were half owner of Amerasia?

Mr. FIELD. Yes. There were discussions prior to the establishment of Amerasia as to whether or not it was proper and suitable for a responsible staff person to undertake this outside activity. I believe from the very beginning certain people in the institute had grave doubts about it which came to the surface some years later and were more vigorously expressed.

I recall testifying in executive session that my argument for starting the magazine and one which I think did carry considerable weight at the time, was a number of us in our several years of work in the institute had developed certain ideas. We were interested in conclusions to be drawn from research as well as the research itself. One of the best ways to insure the institute itself, to insure it remained in the research field and avoided becoming political, was to establish an organization, and where we could blow our steam off outside the institute. This was one of the prevailing arguments which I think persuaded somewhat doubtful people in the institute about the advisability of undertaking this.

Mr. MORRIS. A good many of your associates of IPR were on the editorial board of Amerasia, were they?

Mr. FIELD. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you tell us who some of those were?

Mr. FIELD. If you have the masthead—Mr. Lattimore was.

Mr. MORRIS. Kate Mitchell?

Mr. FIELD. Is that an early masthead?

Mr. MORRIS. This is 1943.

Mr. FIELD. 1937 or 1938 would be more accurate.

Mr. MORRIS. Kate Mitchell?

Mr. FIELD. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Harriet Moore?

Mr. FIELD. If the masthead shows it.

Mr. MORRIS. T. A. Bisson.

Mr. FIELD. He was not in the IPR at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Benjamin Kizer?

Mr. FIELD. He was a trustee.

Mr. MORRIS. And of course Philip Jaffee?

Mr. FIELD. He was not an IPR staff person.

Mr. MORRIS. He was associated with the IPR?

Mr. FIELD. Only as a member. He wasn't a trustee or an officer in any capacity, or a staff person.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Field, were you ever known as Comrade Frederick Spencer?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that question on the ground the answer might tend to incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. When I used "comrade," I meant a member of the Communist Party and you have given your answer.

Did you contribute an article in the publication China Today under the name of Frederick Spencer in March 1935?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that question on the ground the answer might tend to incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you contribute an article in China Today in April 1935?

Mr. FIELD. I also decline to answer that question.

Mr. MORRIS. Also under the name of Frederick Spencer?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer on the ground the answer might tend to incriminate me.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ever write under the name of Frederick Spencer?

Mr. FIELD. Mr. Chairman, I must decline to answer that question on the ground the answer might tend to incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like Mr. Mandel, who was previously sworn, to introduce into the record articles by Frederick Spencer in the March and April issues of China Today.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed. Mr. Mandel is under oath.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, how many other articles have appeared in China Today under the name of Frederick Spencer?

Mr. MANDEL. Under the pseudonym of Frederick Spencer?

Mr. MORRIS. How many times did Frederick Spencer contribute articles to China Today?

Mr. MANDEL. Nine.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel's testimony is that nine articles by Frederick Spencer appeared in China Today.

Will you give the dates, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. March 1935 and April 1935 (2); May 1935; October 1935; November 1935 (2); June 1936 and October 1936.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, do any articles appear in the publication China Today under the name of Frederick V. Field?

(List appears on p. 125 as part of exhibit No. 15.)

Mr. MORRIS. Were you executive secretary of American Peace Mobilization in 1940 and 1941, Mr. Field?

Mr. FIELD. I respectfully decline to answer on the ground that to answer might tend to incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you active in any way with the American Peace Mobilization in 1940 and 1941?

Mr. FIELD. I must give the same declination on the ground that the answer might tend to incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you picket the White House in connection with the demonstrations conducted by the American Peace Mobilization in 1941?

Mr. FIELD. I must also decline to answer that question on the ground the answer might tend to incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you remain executive secretary of the American Peace Mobilization after June 2, 1941, when the Germany Army invaded the Soviet Union?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer on the ground the answer may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. The Daily Worker of January 10, 1941, lists you as a speaker at a defense rally for convicted Oklahoma Communists. Did you take part in such a defense rally?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer on the ground the answer might tend to incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you contribute to the New Masses on December 16, 1941?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer on the ground the answer might tend to incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you contribute on April 14, 1942?

Mr. FIELD. I also decline to answer on the same ground.

Mr. MORRIS. During the period July 22, 1947, or during the period April 14, 1942, which is the last date, up until July 22, 1947, did you contribute 37 articles to the New Masses?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to reply on the grounds that the answer may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you at any time editor of the New Masses?

Mr. FIELD. I also decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you write an article in the Communist, which was the official monthly publication of the Communist Party, and was later known as Political Affairs, in September of 1944, entitled "China's Real Destiny"?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that on the ground the answer may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you write 14 articles in this same publication up to December 1950?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you write an article on April 25, 1944, in the Daily Worker?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that question on the ground the answer may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you thereafter contribute 54 articles, published with your bylines, up until October 9, 1949, in the Daily Worker?

Mr. FIELD. I also decline to answer that question for the same reasons.

Mr. MORRIS. While you were in the Institute of Pacific Relations, were the publications China Today, the New Masses, the Communist, and the Daily Worker in the institute library?

Mr. FIELD. I don't recall. Would you name them again?

Mr. MORRIS. Once again: China Today, do you recall whether that was in the IPR library?

Mr. FIELD. It probably was.

Mr. MORRIS. It should have been?

Mr. FIELD. I imagine it was, and I would say "Yes" to that.

Mr. MORRIS. The articles there, under the name of Frederick Spencer, should have been in the IPR library?

Mr. FIELD. You would have to rephrase that question. I am not sure how you are asking the question.

Mr. MORRIS. Should not the articles there by Frederick Spencer have been in the IPR library?

Mr. FIELD. Presumably all of the contents of China Today were in the library, if the magazine was.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the publication New Masses in the library?

Mr. FIELD. That I don't recall.

Mr. MORRIS. As national secretary, you do not recall whether or not the library of the IPR will contain New Masses?

Mr. FIELD. We were building a fairly substantial library, and I don't recall that.

Mr. MORRIS. You were specializing in publications particularly on the Far East, were you not, and the New Masses frequently wrote on the far eastern policies?

Mr. FIELD. I really must answer I cannot recall whether it was there or not.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the publication *The Communist* in the library?

Mr. FIELD. I do not recall that, either.

Mr. MORRIS. Should it have been there?

Mr. FIELD. I would not have thought so, in the far eastern library. I don't know whether it was there or not.

Mr. MORRIS. Are the articles on far eastern problems?

Mr. FIELD. I imagine occasionally that there are such articles.

Mr. MORRIS. How about the *Daily Worker*; was that in the files of the library of the IPR?

Mr. FIELD. In that case, I should say almost definitely it was not, and I can see no reason why it should have been.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you a speaker at a Communist Political Association at San Francisco in the Palace Hotel on May 17, 1945?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that question on the ground the answer may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. I show you a photostatic copy of an invitation called for a United Nations Conference presented by the Communist Political Association of San Francisco, Thursday, March 17, 1945, 8 p. m., concert room, Palace Hotel, and the speakers listed and the program listed here is Frederick V. Field, member of the executive committee of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and correspondent for the *New York Daily Worker*. The other speaker is William Schneiderman, national vice president of the Communist Political Association, and also president of the California Chinese Political Association.

I offer that, Mr. Field, and ask you if you have ever seen it before?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer, Mr. Morris, on the ground the answer may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce that into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It is inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 11" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 11

You are invited to hear a panel of speakers on the United Nations Conference, presented by the Communist Political Association of San Francisco, Thursday, May 17, 1945, 8 p.m., at concert room, Palace Hotel.

Communist Political Association of San Francisco.

Offices: Suite 701, Garfield Building, 942 Market Street, San Francisco 2, Calif.
Phone EXbrook 2996.

PROGRAM

Frederick V. Field, member, executive committee, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, correspondent, *New York Daily Worker*.

A. Simones, editor, *Nord Rouge*, Northern France Industrial Area Daily.

William Schneiderman, national vice president, Communist Political Association. President, California Communist Political Association.

Chairman, Oleta Yates, president, Communist Political Association of San Francisco.

This panel of distinguished speakers is presented by the Communist Political Association of San Francisco to contribute to public information and understanding of world security.

They will discuss various aspects of the United Nations Conference for International Organization, its progress, problems, and perspectives.

There will be opportunity for the audience to ask questions from the floor.

Admission is by invitation only.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Field, I would like to show you a photostatic reproduction of an article, and I am going to ask you if you will look at it.

Mr. FIELD. Do you want me to read it?

Mr. MORRIS. Read it and tell us what it is.

Mr. FIELD. It is a photostat of an article.

Mr. MORRIS. In what publication?

Mr. FIELD. It is not indicated—yes, it is, Political Affairs.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the last sentence, and who wrote the article, commencing on page 60?

Mr. FIELD. Would you clarify that question, Mr. Morris? Do you want to know what name appears here?

Mr. MORRIS. What name appears on that article as the author of that article?

Mr. FIELD. The name is Frederick V. Field.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the last sentence?

Mr. FIELD (reading):

It is our task as American Communists to help mobilize the forces of labor and all anti-imperialists in our country, and deal further blows at Wall Street, so that the Chinese new democracy may consolidate its victories and move firmly and powerfully on the road toward socialism.

Mr. MORRIS. That is all.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 12" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 12

This is the concluding page of an article by Frederick V. Field, published in the January 1949 issue of Political Affairs and entitled "The Meaning of the Chinese Revolutionary Victories":

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POLITICAL AFFAIRS

union movement destroyed by Chiang Kai-shek. Already, in Harbin, in August 1948, an All-China Trade Union Conference laid the foundation for such a development. From this conference its chairman, Liu Ning-Yi, spoke out to the organized working people of America. He said:

Let there be greater solidarity between the Chinese and American working class. Support the war of liberation of the Chinese people. Oppose the aggressive policy and the antilabor, antipeople policy of American imperialism. Oppose the reviving of Japanese fascism by the American Government. Oppose the American policy of helping the slaughter of the Chinese people. Let the workers and people of China and the United States unite! Let us hold fast to our posts and defend democracy and world peace!¹

A special responsibility devolves upon American Communists. The China issue presents a signal opportunity to deal a mighty blow at the fortress of world reaction. The opportunity and the power exist to smash American imperialist plans for China. Under the leadership of the great Communist Party of China and its renowned chairman, Mao Tse-tung, the heroic Chinese people are discharging their duties with honor. The imperialists are being decisively beaten back in China. It is our task, as American Communists, to help mobilize the forces of labor and all anti-imperialists in our country, to deal such further blows at Wall Street, that the Chinese new democracy may consolidate its victories and move firmly and powerfully on the road toward socialism!

¹ Liu Ning-Yi, chairman, in a letter from the All-American Trade Union Conference in answer to greetings from 130 American trade-unionists. Harbin, August 1948, received November 1948.

The magazine Political Affairs was formerly known as the Communist.

Senator O'CONOR. Could I ask a question?

Mr. Field, in view of this series of questions, there is just one fact regarding the knowledge on the part of others concerning your views and philosophies.

For example, you have stated that from 1928, Mr. Edward C. Carter was in close association with you. If you recall, you mentioned the invitation to become the Assistant Secretary at the time that Dr. Yen, on the subject of the discussion of illiteracy—was Mr. Carter in close association with you continuously from that time until 1942, when you were invited or under consideration for a commission in the Army?

Mr. FIELD. If I may put it the other way around, I was in close association with Mr. Carter, that would be correct.

Senator O'CONOR. Yes, that probably is more nearly correct.

Mr. FIELD. Except the terminal point would be earlier; it would be the fall of 1940.

Senator O'CONOR. 1940?

Mr. FIELD. Yes.

Senator O'CONOR. It is a fair assumption, then, for one to draw, that he was quite familiar with your views and ideologies?

Mr. FIELD. I would think so.

Senator O'CONOR. Would the same be true of Owen Lattimore?

Mr. FIELD. To a much less extent.

Senator O'CONOR. But, nevertheless, to some degree?

Mr. FIELD. To some degree. We were colleagues in the same organization.

Senator O'CONOR. Colleagues in the same organization?

Mr. FIELD. Yes.

Senator O'CONOR. So that when he endorsed or took steps concerning your obtention of the commission, he was familiar with your views?

Mr. FIELD. To some extent; yes.

Senator O'CONOR. And would the same be true, to a lesser extent, possibly, of Lauchlin Currie?

Mr. FIELD. No. As I think I testified, to the best of my recollection I had never met Lauchlin Currie at that time.

Senator O'CONOR. Was Mr. William T. Stone familiar with your views and philosophies?

Mr. FIELD. Well, as I believe I testified, our association had been through his being a staff member of the Foreign Policy Association, and I in the IPR, and the two organizations working in somewhat similar fields, and I would see him occasionally, and we weren't particularly close.

Senator O'CONOR. Now, the only other question, Mr. Field, I would like to ask you, is this: You have previously testified that at one point during the consideration of the application for the Army commission, it was blocked or it was stopped, or some impediment occurred.

Mr. FIELD. Yes.

Senator O'CONOR. Did Mr. Carter or Mr. Lattimore or Mr. Field learn of that development, of the fact that there had been——

Mr. FIELD. The last name——

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Stone, I meant.

Mr. FIELD. Mr. Carter and Mr. Stone and Mr. Lattimore, you mean, did they learn of this?

Senator O'CONOR. Yes.

Mr. FIELD. It is my recollection that I went immediately to Mr. Carter, to inform him of it; and I think, and I am almost certain, to ask him to do anything he possibly could to break the jam.

Senator O'CONOR. And similarly, according to the correspondence, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. FIELD. Presumably so.

Senator O'CONOR. Did they, upon learning of that development, still persist in their efforts to have you appointed or be given a commission by the Army, in Intelligence?

I would advise, if you would, you answer me.

Mr. FIELD. I wanted to put it differently. I would put it they were all interested in seeing if the jam could be broken.

Senator O'CONOR. In other words, my point is, did they continue their efforts?

Mr. FIELD. I can speak with certainty about Mr. Carter, because I remember he did; and the evidence is Mr. Lattimore did; and I can't speak about the others.

Senator EASTLAND. I want to ask a question. Do you know Dr. Philip Jessup?

Mr. FIELD. Yes; I do.

Senator EASTLAND. How long have you known Dr. Jessup?

Mr. FIELD. I met him through the Institute of Pacific Relations, and I believe I went into it before he did, and I am not perfectly certain of that, and let me say roughly, Senator, it would be the early thirties, or maybe 1930, or something like that. I am not perfectly certain as to the date.

Senator EASTLAND. You have been closely associated with him, have you not?

Mr. FIELD. No. I was associated with him in the sense of a staff member, of the association between a staff member and an officer of the organization with whom you are only in occasional contact.

Senator EASTLAND. When did you resign from your position in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. FIELD. It was in the fall, as I said, of 1940.

Senator EASTLAND. Did Dr. Jessup attempt to get you to remain in that position?

Mr. FIELD. I think it is quite possible. I am not sure whether he was chairman of the council or not, and I think it is very possible that he did try, and I think that there were several people that tried to persuade me to change my mind.

Senator EASTLAND. Now, Dr. Jessup was acquainted with your political background and political affiliations, was he not?

Mr. FIELD. I don't know what the implications of your remarks are, Senator, and it is hard to answer. He knew me as a staff member in an organization of which he was an officer.

Senator EASTLAND. But now, he knew your political affiliations, did he not?

Mr. FIELD. I don't know what political affiliations you refer to, Senator, so it is hard for me to answer.

Senator EASTLAND. You know your political affiliations, Mr. Field.

Mr. FIELD. What Mr. Jessup knew about me is something that I find it very difficult to testify to, and I can testify to the relationship we had.

Senator EASTLAND. Well, in your judgment, now, he knew your political affiliations, did he not?

Mr. FIELD. I imagine he made his own judgment.

Senator EASTLAND. You would say, in your judgment, now, in your judgment he knew your political affiliations?

Mr. FIELD. I find it impossible to give an intelligent answer to that question, Senator.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to offer into evidence a statement signed by Phillip C. Jessup, chairman of the board of trustees of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, dated June 28, 1940, and this is a memorandum to the board of trustees, and I would like to read the last paragraph, because I think that this is Senator Eastland's point.

At this time the staff wish to express their appreciation of the leadership which Mr. Field has given to the American Council in the past. We consider that it is in the best interest of the American Council that Mr. Field should remain as closely associated with it as possible. We therefore should like to see him continue as secretary of the council, exercising the maximum amount of guidance and determination of policy consistent with his desire to be relieved of the burden of administrative work and financial promotion.

I would like to introduce that into evidence and mark it as exhibit No. 13.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted in the record and so marked.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 13" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 13

AMERICAN COUNCIL,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.,
New York City, June 28, 1940.

OFFICERS

Philip C. Jessup, chairman	Ray Lyman Wilbur, vice chairman
Miss Ada L. Comstock, vice chairman	Frederick V. Field, secretary
Benjamin H. Kizer, vice chairman	Francis S. Harmon, treasurer
Philo W. Parker, vice chairman	Miss Hilda Austern, assistant treasurer
Robert Gordon Sproul, vice chairman	

To the Board of Trustees:

In transmitting Mr. Field's report of the reorganization of the American Council, involving a drastic reduction of its budget, I should like to let you know that Mr. Field's tactful and sincere handling of the problem has carried us through a crisis with less damage than an outsider would have believed possible. The staff's cooperation in this most unfortunate contraction which the financial situation made unavoidable is a tribute to it and to the unusual abilities of Mr. Field. He and the staff built up a spirit in the organization which has proved that it can withstand a hard blow. The spirit is still there and the job of the American Council is still to be done with your help.

It is not possible, in my opinion, to refuse Mr. Field's request that he be freed from the administrative and financial routine of the office. But, since I share the view of the staff as expressed in a letter from Miss Farley of the staff to the executive committee, I cannot acquiesce in his complete separation from the direction of the affairs of the American Council. I have, therefore, appointed him staff adviser with the understanding that he is to be on leave without salary for the next 6 months. Miss Farley's letter included the following resolution of the entire staff:

"At this time the staff wishes to express their appreciation of the leadership which Mr. Field has given to the American Council in the past. We consider that it is in the best interests of the American Council that Mr.

Field should remain as closely associated with it as possible. We should therefore like to see him continue as secretary of the council, exercising the maximum amount of guidance in the determination of policy consistent with his desire to be relieved of the burden of administrative work and financial promotion."

Sincerely yours,

PHILIP C. JESSUP, *Chairman.*

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce into the record the minutes of the executive committee of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, 5 p. m., September 18, 1940; present: Philip C. Jessup, chairman, Philo Parker, Francis Harmon, and Edward C. Carter; together with a telegram from Frederick V. Field, from Chicago, dated September 1, 1940, to Philip C. Jessup. I would like to introduce both of these into the record as the next exhibit and have them so marked.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be so marked and inserted in the record.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 14" and are as follows:

EXHIBIT No. 14

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, AMERICAN COUNCIL OF THE
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Held at 5 p. m., Thursday, September 18, 1949, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City.

Present: Philip C. Jessup, chairman; Philo W. Parker; Francis E. Harmon; Edward C. Carter.

(1) Letters of comment and telegrams of regret were received from the two absent members, Prof. Joseph P. Chamberlain in Washington, and President Ada Comstock in Boston.

(2) The chairman read a long telegram which he had received from Mr. Frederick V. Field in Chicago on September 1, in which Mr. Field indicated that he had been called to the secretaryship of a new society which was being created to strengthen the forces of democracy during the coming critical years. He had a deep conviction that he was obligated to accept this new responsibility because the election of officers was taking place at that time. He felt it was necessary to accept despite his obvious personal preference to postpone decision pending consultation with Dr. Jessup and others. As he anticipated criticism and misunderstanding, his continued deep interest in the welfare of the Institute of Pacific Relations demanded, he felt, the affirmation of his immediate resignation from all IPR responsibilities. Dr. Jessup explained that he had subsequently talked at length with Mr. Field who explained in detail the reasons that had lead him to accept the new position. Mr. Parker voiced the feelings of all present when he inquired whether Dr. Jessup felt that Mr. Field could not be persuaded to resume the secretaryship of the American Council. Dr. Jessup replied that he thought Mr. Field's decision was final. Under the circumstances it was moved that a minute be drafted indicating the committee's acceptance of the resignation with great regret. The minute should include an appropriate appreciation of the distinguished service which Mr. Field had rendered during 11 years of service with the American council. The hope was to be expressed that when his new task was completed, it would be possible for him to resume active leadership in the work of the American Council.

(3) Dr. Jessup then invited the attention of the committee to the question of Mr. Field's successor. Mr. Field himself had considered a large number of names in consultation with others. He had finally informed Dr. Jessup that of all those considered, he thought Mr. Harry B. Price was the best fitted for the secretaryship of the American Council. The committee went over a long list of names, considering various possibilities from many angles. Finally the committee came to the conclusion that Mr. Price was the most promising of all.

(4) After further discussion, the committee voted to authorize Mr. Carter to offer the secretaryship of the American Council to Mr. Price (but not until hearing from Dr. Wilbur). If Dr. Wilbur strongly dissented, the matter should be referred back to the executive committee.

(5) It was voted to increase the American Council budget so as to make it possible to offer Mr. Price a salary of \$5,200 a year. Mr. Carter was to explain to Mr. Price that at the present time the finances of the American Council would not permit of a larger salary, but that when the financial situation improved the committee would recommend that the salary be fixed at \$6,000.

(6) Mr. Francis E. Harmon, the treasurer, explained that he had accepted the treasurership as a stopgap, that he felt that the position required a man of commanding leadership in business or industry, and that he hoped that the committee would shortly find a new treasurer of the required qualifications in his place. The chairman assured Mr. Harmon of the committee's appreciation of his position and also of the invaluable service he had rendered already as treasurer. The committee would, however, take Mr. Harmon at his word and would relieve him if and when a more suitable candidate became available.

(7) With reference to the date of the board of trustees meeting, Mr. Carter reported that he had asked Dr. Wilbur to suggest a time in October or November when he would be in the East and free to attend a meeting. It was hoped that Dr. Wilbur's reply would permit of the fixing of the date for the meeting of the trustees.

(8) Owing to lack of time it was proposed that other items on the agenda be postponed until the next meeting. These had to do with proposals regarding the interrelation of the Far Eastern Survey, Inparel and a proposed news bulletin, with the starting of regional groups, and with the development of a Latin-American research center.

TELEGRAM FROM FREDERICK V. FIELD FROM CHICAGO, SEPTEMBER 1, 1940, TO
PHILIP C. JESSUP

I have been attending a peace congress of some 6,000 representatives from all parts of the country, labor, farm, and middle-class organizations. This is a genuine peace movement through the interpretation of democracy. These people and our program represent what I have for long profoundly believed in. They are asking me to become the executive of a continuing organization, and I feel a deep conviction that I must accept. As the people I should be working for will meet to elect officers tomorrow, I must, despite obvious personal preference to postpone decision pending consultation with you and others, and as the executive must be presented to them, make an immediate affirmative decision. This show has been and will be smeared by the newspapers. I anticipate losing the respect of many present friends. These developments I regard as inevitable if we do the job in this country that was not done in France, etc. In view the inevitable criticism and misunderstanding, and because of my continued deep interest in the IPR welfare, I feel that I must, by this telegram, affirm my immediate resignation from all the IPR responsibilities that its officers wish to accept. Finally I must urgently hope for both personal and professional associations that you will reserve your own judgment until I can talk with you.

F. V. FIELD.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to read one particular part of it here.

I am reading now in the middle of the first paragraph:

Dr. Jessup explained that he had subsequently talked at length with Mr. Field, who explained in detail the reasons that had led him to accept the new position.

And what new position is that, Mr. Field, could you tell us?

Mr. FIELD. No; I decline to answer that on the ground that the answer may be self-incriminating.

Mr. MORRIS. That is, in connection with the previous correspondence, the previous part of the letter shows it is in connection with the American Peace Mobilization.

Mr. Parker voiced the feeling of all present when he inquired whether Dr. Jessup felt that Mr. Field could not be persuaded to resume the secretaryship of the American Council. Dr. Jessup replied that he thought Mr. Field's decision was final. Under the circumstances, it was moved that a minute be drafted, indicating the committee's acceptance of the resignation, with deep regret. The minute should include an appropriate appreciation of the distinguished

service which Mr. Field had rendered during the 11 years of service with the American Council. The hope was to be expressed, though, when his new task was completed, it would be possible for him to resume active leadership in the work of the American Council.

I would like Mr. Mandel to put into the record all those documents that I made reference to during the series of questions on Mr. Field's writings from 1935 down to 1950.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Mandel.

Let us proceed.

Mr. MANDEL. They have been compiled under my direction.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be marked as one exhibit, and then designated.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 15" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 15

FREDERICK V. FIELD

New Masses

- Editor (issue of December 15, 1943, p. 21).
- Member editorial board (issue of October 9, 1945, p. 20).
- Associate editor (issue of January 5, 1943).
- Guest of honor new Masses dinner (Daily Worker, November 18, 1942, p. 6).
- Managing editor (issue of April 30, 1946, p. 2).
- Member, board of contributing editors (Daily Worker, November 18, 1942, p. 6).
- December 16, 1941—How Strong is Japan.
- April 14, 1942—Speaker and Sponsor New Masses, Anti-Cliveden Rally.
- June 2, 1942—Letter to New Masses says, "Can defeat Axis this year."
- June 30, 1942—A Second Front Will Beat Japan.
- July 7, 1942—China After Five Years.
- October 1942—Contributing editor of New Masses.
- November 18, 1942—Member, board of contributing editor.
- January 1943—Associate editor New Masses.
- January 26, 1943—Author of Behind the Chinese Front.
- April 27, 1943—Reviews and denounces The 5th Seal by Aldenov.
- July 13, 1943—Author of Outlook in China.
- August 24, 1934—Author of The Crises in China.
- November 2, 1943—Author of China's Internal Crises.
- January 4, 1944—Nazi Bridgehead "44" Bolivian Situation.
- February 22, 1944—Chiang's Strange Book.
- November 14, 1944—Behind Stilwell's Recall.
- December 12, 1944—Key to Far Eastern Victory.
- February 20, 1945—Our Job in This Hemisphere.
- May 1, 1945—The Issue of Mandate Colonies.
- June 19, 1945—San Francisco, Words and Reality.
- July 10, 1945—Sulzberger's Sinkiang Issue.
- July 31, 1945—Appeasement of Japan.
- August 21, 1945—What is China's Future.
- August 28, 1945—Dynamite in China.
- September 4, 1945—Are We Heading for World War III—coauthor, John Stuart.
- September 11, 1945—Behind The Sino-Soviet Treaty.
- September 18, 1945—Reviews China's Crises by Rosinger.
- December 18, 1945—Will China Be Americas' India.
- February 19, 1946—New Turn in China.
- April 16, 1946—Action for Peace.
- April 30, 1946—Betrayal in China.
- August 13, 1946—Get Out of China: an Edit.
- September 10, 1946—Doublecross in China.
- June 17, 1947—Showdown in China.
- February 4, 1947—China After the Marshall Mission—by Fred V. Field.
- June 10, 1947—General Evans F. Carlson.
- July 22, 1947—Unfinished Review in China.

FREDERICK V. FIELD'S ARTICLES

1. *Daily Worker*

1944: April 25, May 6, May 13, May 20, May 27, June 3, June 10, June 17, July 15, September 2, December 16, December 17.

1945: January 13, January 20, February 10, February 17, March 17, March 24, April 7, April 16, April 22, April 27, April 28, May 12, May 14, May 17, May 26, June 6, June 9, June 13, June 18, July 2, July 28, August 11, August 15, August 25, September 1, September 8, September 15, September 24, September 29, October 6, October 13, October 27, November 3.

1946: February 8, March 26, April 5, April 23, May 4.

1948: January 10, July 25.

1949: May 22, October 9.

2. *The Communist, later known as Political Affairs*

September 1944, pages 830 to 845—China's Real Destiny.

January 1945, pages 89 to 96—For a Deeper Understanding of China. (Review of China's New Democracy, by Mao Tse-tung).

April 1945, pages 318 to 328—Mexico City—On the Road from Yalta to San Francisco.

April 1945, pages 372 to 376—An Important Work on China's Labor Movement. (Review of The Chinese Labor Movement, by Nym Wales).

August 1945, pages 675 to 687—San Francisco Balance Sheet.

September 1945, pages 843 to 850—Avert Civil War in China.

January 1946, pages 31 to 41—The Record of American Imperialism in China.

May 1946, pages 395 to 496—Exploding the Iranian Myth.

November 1946, pages 88 to 1000—American Imperialist Policy in the Far East.

January 1948, pages 51 to 64—The New China Program of the American Interventionists.

July 1948, pages 609 to 614—Some Considerations of the China Issue.

January 1949, pages 60 to 74—The Meaning of the Chinese Revolutionary Victories.

September 1950, pages 15 to 29—Wall Street's Aggression in Korea and the Struggle for Peace.

December 1950, pages 16 to 24—China, Korea, and the Struggle for Peace.

FREDERICK V. FIELD, CONTRIBUTOR, CHINA TODAY, UNDER PSEUDONYM OF FREDERICK SPENCER

Issues of

March 1935, pages 102 and 108.

April 1935, page 123.

April 1935, page 126—Japan Enters the Fascist Ranks.

May 1935, pages 143, 154, and 159.

October 1935, page 12.

November 1935, page 2—Chiang Kai-shek Licks Japan's Boots.

November 1935, page 43—The Same Old Wheeze.

June 1936, pages 167 and 178.

October 1936, page 247.

AS FREDERICK V. FIELD

These issues

April 1941, page 9—A Program for Democracy.

December 1941, page 4—No Compromise—No Appeasement.

Mr. MORRIS. It may be that we will finish with Mr. Field, and I wonder if he could come back here at 2 o'clock for a 15- or 20-minute session.

The CHAIRMAN. Two-thirty.

Mr. MORRIS. We have another witness at 2:30.

Mr. RABINOWITZ. Is it possible to clear it up now? There is the problem of getting Mr. Field back to New York, and from the point of view of his physical condition.

The CHAIRMAN. I would think he would rather stay here.

Mr. RABINOWITZ. I don't know. This is more pleasant than perhaps some other places.

Mr. MORRIS. I think, Mr. Chairman, as far as I am concerned, we can let Mr. Field go until some other time when he is more free to come down here.

Mr. RABINOWITZ. We would appreciate that very much.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to make a little observation here.

Because there has been some misunderstanding about the rule laid down yesterday concerning pictures, television, radio, and so forth, it might be well to make it clear on the record that television cameramen have the same privileges as moving-picture or news photo cameramen with respect to taking pictures before or after the committee sessions, and that these privileges are subject to the important condition previously stated, namely, that pictures are not to be taken of a witness in the hearing room without the permission of the witness. No one need have his picture taken here unless he consents to it.

We will stand in recess until 2:30.

(Whereupon, at 12:45 p. m., a recess was taken until 2:30 p. m., of the same day.)

AFTER RECESS

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF EDWARD C. CARTER, NEW YORK, N. Y.—Resumed

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Mr. Morris. Mr. Carter is on the stand, and he has been sworn. You may proceed with your examination.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Vladimir Rogov?

Mr. CARTER. Yes; I have known him for a number of years, as a Tass correspondent, formerly as a student in Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that he was the Soviet writer who wrote the article in a Communist publication in Moscow, the War and the Working Class, that signalized a change in Communist policy from support of Chiang Kai-shek to that of opposition to Chiang Kai-shek in August of 1943?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember it.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall that article?

Mr. CARTER. I do not.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall, Mr. Carter, that at that time the Communist Party line called for all-out support of Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. CARTER. That I remember very definitely.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall some time after August of 1943, the Communist Party line changed; instead of supporting Chiang Kai-shek, they began to undermine him?

Mr. CARTER. That I didn't know. My impression was they supported him for a much longer period, but I don't read Communist documents, and there is always the possibility that they might announce one policy but continue another.

Mr. MORRIS. Wasn't that your function as a far eastern expert, Mr. Carter, to have observed these changes?

Mr. CARTER. As I have said, Senator, my impression was, wholly apart from what may have been written, that the Soviet Government continued support of Chiang Kai-shek for considerably longer.

Mr. MORRIS. For how much longer?

Mr. CARTER. And with more suspicion of Mao Tse-tung and Communists than of Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was more suspicious?

Mr. CARTER. The Kremlin.

Mr. MORRIS. It is your testimony that the Kremlin was suspicious of Mao Tse-tung?

Mr. CARTER. They certainly were, and I think they thought he was getting too strong.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there anything ever written to that effect, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember when Vladimir Rogov, as I said, who did write this article, in the War and the Working Class, signaling the change in policy of the Soviet policy toward Chiang Kai-shek from one of support to one of undermining, do you remember he came to the United States early in 1944?

Mr. CARTER. I do. I have forgotten the year, and I know he came during the year on his way to London to join the London office of Tass.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, I would like to introduce into the record, or show you at this time, this article by Vladimir Rogov, and it is reprinted from the Soviet trade-union periodical, The War and the Working Class, and I am showing you a photostatic copy of the editorial page of the Daily Worker of Thursday, August 12, 1943.

I offer that to you, Mr. Carter.

Mr. CARTER. Not being a subscriber or a reader of the Daily Worker, this is the first time I have seen this.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you at all acquainted with that particular article?

Mr. CARTER. I was not.

Mr. MORRIS. You see, the article, even though it is reprinted in the Daily Worker, did appear in the War and the Working Class.

Mr. CARTER. That is apparent from the authenticity of the photostat.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to offer that into evidence as the next exhibit and have it properly marked.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record and properly marked.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 16" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 16

[From Daily Worker, New York, August 12, 1943]

EDITORIALS and COMMENT—SOVIET EXPERT WARNS OF APPEASERS in CHINA

(By Vladimir Rogov)

(Reprinted from the Soviet trade union periodical The War and the Working Class)

(By wireless to Inter-Continent News)

Moscow, August 11.—During the 6 years of war the Chinese command at the cost of considerable territorial losses, succeeded in saving its troops from defeat. Despite the numerous odds the Chinese Army preserved its capacity for resistance.

The Japanese militarists failed in their plan for a rapid conquest of China. The Japanese proved incapable of breaking the resistance of the Chinese people and bringing them to their knees. The war against China became clearly drawn out, threatening Japan with ever-growing complications.

In defensive battles on an extremely long front the Chinese Army, weakening the Japanese troops, gained the necessary time for reorganizing its troops and strengthening their fighting capacity. Soon after the fall of Wuhan (Hankow) in October, 1938, Chiang Kai-shek outlined a program for the reorganization of the country's armed forces, whose principal points were as follows:

Firstly, China's national policy must become the policy of a long, defensive war.

Secondly, the necessity to develop the guerrilla movement.

Thirdly, for conducting a general counteroffensive it is necessary to create a new, many millions strong army, trained in the use of the most up-to-date war equipment.

COVERT OPPOSITION

However, from the outset the intentions of the commander in chief of the Chinese Army, Chiang Kai-shek, met with covert resistance.

Three years have passed since then. The reforms in the army with the aim of training new cadres, reorganizing control and strengthening discipline were not completed, and the task of the creation of their own war economic base was not accomplished. The main reason for this is the diverse work of the appeasers, the defeatists and capitulators.

The war economy resources of National China (Free China) are tremendous and afford an adequate base for the rearmament and supply of the massed army. On its territory National China has all the strategic war materials necessary for the conduct of a prolonged war.

Nevertheless, large-scale construction has not been undertaken since the industrial and financial circles prefer to engage in profiteering rather than invest their capital in the armaments industry.

The unrestrained profiteers advanced the "theories" that the people are weary of war and that it is primarily necessary to satisfy the demand of the population for goods, etc.

This situation leads to the weakening of the army's fighting capacity and greater dependence on the supply of armaments from the United States and Great Britain, which however has encountered serious difficulties since the beginning of the Japanese war against the United States and Great Britain.

The elements favoring capitulation have sabotaged the measures for mobilizing the internal resources with the object of creating their own war economy base, as well as the measures for extending economic warfare against the Japanese invaders.

NO REGULAR REINFORCEMENTS

China has no lack of human reserves, but the Chinese Army nevertheless receives no regular reinforcements. There are insufficient trained reserves. There is not even an organized military registration of the population. To this day the law on universal military service is not fully carried out. The army receives a large percentage of men unfit for service.

The main defect of the Chinese Army is the shortage of trained commanding personnel. All foreign military observers who have visited the Chinese Army agree that the Chinese soldier is tenacious and enduring in the field and is unpretentious as far as food and uniforms are concerned; whereas the commanding personnel is extremely weak and backward in military and technical training.

The army's equipment is still at low level. The organization and control of troops are far from perfect. One of the defects of the Chinese Army is the lack of an effective united command and of coordinated operations on the separate fronts. The internal friction and suspicion among the generals could not but affect the fighting capacity of the troops and their discipline.

In Chungking, of course, there are no open advocates of surrender, but this does not mean that there is a lack of capitulators and defeatists there.

The capitulators and defeatists who occupy important positions in the Kuomintang weaken the strength of China by their harmful political intrigues and constitute a serious danger at present.

Since December 1941 the Japanese have centered their attention on the war in the Pacific. The war in China has receded to the background. This has led to the appearance among Chinese military and political leaders of a certain

complacency of which the Japanese imperialists took advantage to intensify their "peace offensive."

JAPANESE MACHINATIONS

The Japanese conquerors are now concentrating on deepening and sharpening the internal contradictions in China and are trying in every way to utilize these contradictions to weaken China and strengthen their positions in the struggle against China.

These Japanese plans profit from the maneuvers of the Chinese appeasers, who provoke conflicts and incidents up to armed clashes, do their utmost to undermine the military collaboration of Kuomintang circles with the Communist Party and incite the persecution and rout of the Eighth and Fourth Armies, which as units of China's united national army have inscribed many heroic pages in the history of the resistance of the Chinese people to the Japanese invaders.

These armies consist of the most progressive, tenacious and selfless people of China. They are led by the Chinese Communist Party which enjoys merited prestige among the broad masses of the working people as the organizer of their struggle for national freedom and independence.

Today by direct military pressure new attempts are being made to bring about the dissolution of the Chinese Communist Party and the liquidation of the Eighth and Fourth Armies. The Chinese command has transferred new divisions to the districts where these armies are stationed, with tremendous supplies of munitions and food, obviously in preparation for an attack on the Eighth and Fourth Armies with the aim of liquidating them even at the price of unleashing civil war.

Such an attack of the Chungking generals on the Eighth and Fourth Armies which, moreover, is completely unprovoked by these armies, would be a treacherous stabbing in the back of the Chinese people and play into the hands of the Japanese imperialists who could hope for nothing better.

A number of outstanding Kuomintang leaders oppose such treacherous activities of all sorts of appeasers, capitulators and provocateurs. The Chinese Government, nevertheless, does not exert firmness in overcoming the activities of the capitulators designed to undermine national unity and weaken China's resistance against Japanese aggression.

EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT

In the last few years I have had occasion to visit more than 15 provinces of China. Both on the front and in the deep rear, in occupied Shanghai and Manchukuo, representatives of various circles of China watch with grave concern the criminal activity of the traitors, turncoats, defeatists and saboteurs. Nevertheless they are unanimous in their confidence that all the plans to provoke civil war are doomed to failure since National China, in hard fighting, has accumulated much strength and will not permit the great national liberation cause of the Chinese people to die.

With inexhaustible strategic raw material resources and tremendous manpower reserves at its disposal, China has every possibility for victory over the enemy. The necessary conditions for this victory are the realization of radical measures for reorganizing the entire economy on a war footing, subordinating all economic life to the needs of the front and strengthening the armed forces against capitulation and defeatist moods, and most important, the genuine unity of all national forces in the struggle for freedom and national independence.

On the extent to which Chiang Kai-shek and the Chungking leading circles will understand the importance of this principal condition and succeed in averting the danger of internal struggle in China, tortured by the enemies of the Chinese people—the inevitable consequence of which would be measures directed against the eighth and fourth armies and the Communist Party—rests whether the exhausting war forced upon the Chinese people by Japanese imperialism will be brought to a successful conclusion in the interests of the whole Chinese people.

Mr. CARTER. If I may, Mr. Chairman, if there is an extra copy of that, I would like to read it so as to get up to date on Communist writings, as Mr. Morris has implied I should have.

Mr. MORRIS. We will see an extra copy is made for you, Mr. Carter.

Now, you can recall that Mr. Rogov came to the United States in 1944?

Mr. CARTER. Oh, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you take him to introduce him to important Government officials in Washington?

Mr. CARTER. Yes, I did. I introduced him to some of my colleagues in the IPR, from Canada and the United States and China, and so on, and I had a feeling, Senator——

The CHAIRMAN. Now, listen to the question. It says "important public officials in Washington."

Mr. CARTER. I did.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to show you a photostatic copy of a telegram that you sent to Alger Hiss, Department of State, dated January 17, 1944, and ask you if you can recall sending that telegram to Mr. Hiss?

Mr. CARTER. I take it that it isn't a very good photostatic job, and I can't read what it says, but just give me a minute, if I may.

The CHAIRMAN. Take your time.

Mr. MORRIS. This may be easier to read, Mr. Carter.

Mr. CARTER. That recalls that I sent the telegram.

Mr. MORRIS. This telegram, Mr. Chairman, reads:

My friend Vladimir Rogoff, Tass correspondent, en route Moscow to London. Will be Washington Wednesday, Thursday, Friday. Knows Chinese language, been China 5 years, was in Shanghai following Pearl Harbor until last March. Perhaps you, Hornbeck, would enjoy meeting him. If so please communicate Tass, Washington.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the date, and who was the addressee?

Mr. MORRIS. January 17, 1944, to Alger Hiss, State Department, Washington, D. C.

I would like to offer that into evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. As to what the word "Tass" means, I think might be explained.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you explain to us what "Tass" was?

Mr. CARTER. I think Tass is the official news, or international news agency at least, of the Soviet Government, and it represents Soviet policy, and it is even more a government press agency than Reuters in England or Havas in France.

Mr. MORRIS. Anyone representing Tass would be a reliable Communist, in your opinion?

Mr. CARTER. So long as he held his job, the Kremlin would think he was reliable.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 17" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 17

[Western Union]

JANUARY 17, 1944.

ALGER HISS,

Department of State,

Washington, D. C.:

My friend, Vladimir Rogoff, Tass correspondent, en route Moscow to London. Will be Washington Wednesday, Thursday, Friday. Knows Chinese language; been China 5 years; was in Shanghai following Pearl Harbor until last March. Perhaps you, Hornbeck, would enjoy meeting him. If so please communicate Tass, Washington.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to offer you a similar telegram, Mr. Carter, this one being addressed to Lauchlin Currie, Foreign Economic Administration, Temporary T Building, Washington, D. C., January 17, 1944, and I will ask you if you can recall sending that telegram?

Mr. CARTER. It is practically identical with the other telegram, and it has hand scratchings on it that makes me quite sure that I sent it.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to have that introduced into the record and properly marked as the next exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, these markings on here, you do not place any significance on that, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. I don't mean to place any significance on that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The witness called them hand scratchings, and so I wanted to get them designated.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 18" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 18

JANUARY 17, 1944

LAUCHLIN CURRIE,

*Foreign Economic Administration,
Temporary T Building, Washington, D. C.:*

My friend, Vladimir Rogoff, Tass correspondent en route Moscow to London. Will be Washington Wednesday, Thursday, Friday. Knows Chinese language; been China 5 years; was in Shanghai following Pearl Harbor until last March. Perhaps you would enjoy meeting him. If so please communicate Tass, Washington.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Why did you select Alger Hiss and Lauchlin Currie to introduce Rogov around Washington?

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Alger Hiss was at that time, I think, secretary to Stanley Hornbeck, the Chief of the Far Eastern Division, and as Hornbeck undoubtedly was interested, not only in the total China situation but the impact of Russian views on the situation, I thought it would be helpful, if Hornbeck desired it, to get from Rogov a definitely 100 percent Soviet Communist reaction to what was going on.

I ought to add that in my view, Rogov had a particular qualification in that (1) his English was perfect, and (2) his son had been at the American school in Shanghai, and he knew a good deal about American psychology; and also, he had a sense of humor like a good newspaperman, and you could josh him and say, "Now, you know that doesn't strike foreigners very well." And I thought as the Government was trying to get information and different points of view, that it would be useful for Rogov to see Hornbeck.

Mr. MORRIS. May I break in for a minute? May I ask why you sent him to Alger Hiss, if you wanted him to see Hornbeck?

Mr. CARTER. Because Hiss, as Hornbeck's secretary, sat in his outer office and made appointments for him, and I don't know whether he determined who Hornbeck should see; and in the event that Hornbeck had to be out of Washington at that time, I thought probably Hornbeck's assistant secretary, Hiss, would be the best channel in case Hornbeck should want a memorandum on what Rogov had to say.

Mr. MORRIS. Didn't you testify, Mr. Carter, that Hornbeck was a friend of yours, and you knew him very well?

Mr. CARTER. I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Why didn't you send him to Hornbeck?

Mr. CARTER. I thought this was the most courteous way for a humble private citizen to approach really a very important figure, the Chief of the Far Eastern Division.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Alger Hiss very well at that time, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. Not nearly as well as I knew Hornbeck.

Mr. MORRIS. And yet you chose to send this telegram to Hiss to have Rogov meet Hornbeck, rather than to send Hiss down directly to your good friend Hornbeck?

Mr. CARTER. You mean send Rogov?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. CARTER. I chose it, and I don't suppose I debated it for hours, and I thought it was a natural approach to Hornbeck.

Mr. MORRIS. What position did Lauchlin Currie have at that time?

Mr. CARTER. I feel quite certain, as I said yesterday, that he was executive secretary to the President; and as I said yesterday, he was handling a certain amount of Chinese affairs for the President, and he was a man who traveled all over China, and he was—

The CHAIRMAN. He was in the White House at that time, was he not, as one of the assistants to the President?

Mr. CARTER. He was executive assistant to the President, on the White House telephone, in the White House offices.

Mr. MORRIS. At the same time, you knew Mr. Currie was also active in IPR, is that right, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Currie, I think—I am not certain—my impression is—

The CHAIRMAN. I think the question calls for a "Yes" or "No" answer, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. You understood that Mr. Currie had been active with IPR up until that time?

Mr. CARTER. I didn't understand it, because I don't believe it is a fact.

Mr. MORRIS. Had Mr. Currie been a member of the IPR conference in 1942?

Mr. CARTER. He had.

Mr. MORRIS. Didn't he have the chairmanship of one of the groups at that conference?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your recollection?

Mr. CARTER. My recollection is that he was a member of the American group, and I do not remember that he had any special status, and I could not remember that he was a member of the IPR. Some people went to conferences as members of the group without being members of the institute, and that I would have to look up.

Mr. MORRIS. You know he was a member of the board of trustees?

Mr. CARTER. Much later, and not all after he left Government service.

Mr. MORRIS. You do know he had an official position at the Mont Tremblant conference?

Mr. CARTER. He was one of 40 Americans, mostly non-Government officials, with the exception of Senator J. A. Thomas, who was a member of the group.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Alger Hiss active in IPR affairs?

Mr. CARTER. Never during his position in the State Department. After he joined the Carnegie Endowment, he became a member of the board of trustees.

Mr. MORRIS. You say he never while he was in the State Department?

Mr. CARTER. He was never on the board when he was in the State Department.

Mr. MORRIS. He was active in IPR affairs?

Mr. CARTER. No. He cooperated, as scores of Washington officials and Congressmen and Senators cooperated.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to show you, Mr. Carter, a letter that you wrote to Alger Hiss, dated February 5, 1947. You wrote to him at the Carnegie Endowment, and you say here:

DEAR ALGER: Yesterday at your suggestion I had a delightful and illuminating talk with Robert T. Miller, whom I hope to see again. He brought me the good news that you had succeeded Dr. Butler as president of the endowment. I hope this will mean frequent visits to New York, if not permanent residence.

I do hope that Columbia University will be as eminently successful in getting a successor for Dr. Butler as the endowment has been.

The next time you are in New York, I hope you will telephone me, for I would like to have you come along and see our shop. You have done so much for the IPR in cooperation and wise advice that I am hoping this fine relationship can continue in your new post where we have so many common interests and problems.

If you are to be in New York on the evening of February 24, I hope you can accept the enclosed invitation.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

I offer you that, and I will see if you can remember.

Mr. CARTER. I recall it without looking at it, and if I may have the privilege, I will say a word of comment at the appropriate time.

Mr. MORRIS. May I ask a few questions, please. Who was Robert T. Miller?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall that Robert T. Miller was associated with the State Department?

Mr. CARTER. I don't.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember Robert T. Miller has, since February 5, 1947, been identified before a Senate congressional committee as a member of an espionage ring?

Mr. CARTER. I didn't know that, and when you read the letter, the only thing in the letter that I couldn't remember was who the dickens Robert Miller was.

Mr. MORRIS. You do not recall who Robert Miller was?

Mr. CARTER. If your files would show what was the subject of the conversation, the whole thing might come racing back.

Mr. MORRIS. I was going to ask you about it. You said that you had a "delightful and illuminating talk with Robert T. Miller, whom I hope to see again," and I am reading your letter.

Did you ever write a letter like that?

Mr. CARTER. I think that I would remember—

The CHAIRMAN. Now, wait a minute. Did you have this meeting with Mr. Miller?

Mr. CARTER. I say so, and I did.

The CHAIRMAN. You were undoubtedly stating a fact when you wrote that letter.

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. By my recalling Robert Miller was in the State Department at that time, can you recall now that conversation?

Mr. CARTER. No; it is just a blank, I am sorry.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that Robert Miller has been identified before a congressional committee as a member of an espionage ring?

Mr. CARTER. I never remember hearing it until 2 minutes ago when you stated it.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, you say also in this letter: "You have done so much for the IPR in cooperation and wise advice," and will you tell us the extent of that cooperation and wise advice?

Mr. CARTER. Wasn't there another sentence, that "I wish you could come and visit our shop, our office"?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Mr. CARTER. He never had been to the office, and he wasn't active enough to have come to the office. Repeatedly when I wanted to discuss with Dr. Hornbeck something, I would go along to the State Department office, and Hornbeck was behind on his schedule, and the receptionist would say, "Well, here is Mr. Hiss," and I would chat with him, and at that time he was, as you will remember, Senator, widely accepted as an efficient Government agent, and I would talk with him, whatever was to be my subject with Hornbeck, and then go in and see Hornbeck.

The CHAIRMAN. You were a frequent visitor at Hornbeck's office?

Mr. CARTER. I suppose I was a more frequent visitor at Hornbeck's office than any other official in State, War, Navy, or Treasury.

The CHAIRMAN. And you were a frequent visitor to Hiss' office, naturally?

Mr. CARTER. To the anteroom feature of it, and I saw Hornbeck much oftener than Hiss, because frequently Hiss would be somewhere away, and I would go in direct to Hornbeck.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony, again, that you cannot recall a conversation with Mr. Miller, or any other dealings with Mr. Miller?

Mr. CARTER. I can't recall it, and I would be interested in finding out what it was about, and whether I brushed him off or whether he had some serious thing.

Mr. MORRIS. You say that you had a long and "illuminating" talk with him, and so you obviously didn't brush him off.

Mr. CARTER. I may have brushed him off, but I give him——

The CHAIRMAN. You illuminatingly brushed him off?

Mr. CARTER. I doubt if I would have brushed off a man whom the new president of the Carnegie Endowment sent to me, whether it was with reference to a building—there was talk of taking a site over at the United Nations for the Foreign Policy Association and the IPR, and the Council of Foreign Relations, and so on, and it may have been real estate, and I haven't any idea.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, Mr. Mandel, will you at this point——

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment.

Mr. Carter, was not Mr. Hiss assistant to Mr. Hornbeck, and you designate him as a secretary, and he was assistant on the Far Eastern desk, is that not true?

Mr. CARTER. Without looking up the State Department register, I couldn't give a "yes" or "no," and he wasn't more than a stenographer.

The CHAIRMAN. He was not more than a stenographer?

Mr. CARTER. He clearly wasn't much more than a stenographer.

The CHAIRMAN. He was an assistant to Mr. Hornbeck, and is it not true that he had an office of his own, separate and apart from Mr. Hornbeck?

Mr. CARTER. You went in and there were two or three lady secretaries, and receptionists, and so on, and to the right was one of those old State Department lattice doors, and you went in to Hornbeck; and at the left you went in to Hiss, and it was a much smaller office, and as I remember it there was not a lattice door; and that was the geography of it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would identify or introduce into evidence an excerpt from the testimony concerning Mr. Miller.

Mr. MANDEL. Excerpts from testimony in hearings regarding Communist espionage in the United States Government, before the Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, as follows:

Miss BENTLEY—Elizabeth

This is the testimony of Miss Bentley—

Besides—

Mr. MORRIS. What is the date of that?

Mr. MANDEL. (continuing):

Besides which we have two other people in the same office, so he did not carry on with him very long.

Mr. MUNDT. Who were the other two people?

Miss BENTLEY. One was Robert Miller, who was the head of the Research Division of the CIAA, and the other was Joseph Gregg, who was one of his assistants.

Mr. MUNDT. Was Mr. Miller a Communist?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Did you collect dues from him?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes.

That is page 531 of those hearings.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that refresh your memory at all?

Mr. CARTER. No. I am also a little vague as to what the CIAA is.

Mr. MORRIS. That is Central Intelligence—we will have that in just a moment.

Mr. CARTER. Don't bother. There is an organization called the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, and I couldn't conceive of that. Don't bother to look it up. I am not so sure.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, to get back to Mr. Hiss, Mr. Carter, Did you consult with Alger Hiss on the selection of delegates for the Mont Tremblant Conference?

Mr. CARTER. I would be likely—I couldn't say definitely—I would be likely to, because, for the first time at IPR conferences, because so many businessmen, journalists, and professors were in Government service, we made an exception and invited a number of Government servants from different countries to attend that conference in a private capacity, and Mr. Currie was one of those, and undoubtedly I would have run over with Hornbeck or—

The CHAIRMAN. The question was: Did you confer with Mr. Hiss?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember, but it is likely.

Mr. MORRIS. I offer you a telegram sent by Robert W. Barnett to you, Mr. E. C. Carter. The date is November 17, 1942, and it reads:

Hiss expresses admiration of Rajchman's incisive mind. Sees no objection his participating conference.

ROBERT W. BARNETT

I offer that, and ask you if you can recall having received that?

Mr. CARTER. It is not fully addressed, and I am willing to say I received it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I offer that into evidence, and ask it be marked as the next exhibit.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 19" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 19

[Western Union]

WASHINGTON, D. C., November 17, 1942.

E. C. CARTER,

Institute of Pacific Relations:

Hiss expresses admiration Rajchman's incisive mind sees no objection his participating conference.

ROBERT W. BARNETT.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have a word of explanation here, and who is R-a-j-c-h-m-a-n?

Mr. MORRIS. Would you identify Mr. Rajchman?

Mr. CARTER. I am glad you can spell his name. He is a Polish doctor, a health officer in the Secretariat of the League of Nations for many years, and he was invited by Chiang Kai-shek and T. V. Soong to make a public health survey in China, and I have forgotten whether it was in reference to plague or one of the great floods and the fevers that followed; and then, because of his very intimate association with T. V. Soong at the time of the Manchurian business, he lived in Soong's house and he became a friend, and when T. V. Soong was over in this country trying to get maximum aid for Chiang Kai-shek of a military character, T. V. Soong had a purchasing agency, and I don't know the name of it, and he invited several Americans and this Pole, or ex-Pole, Rajchman, to assist him in getting the maximum amount of purchases or lend-lease or military aid.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he a Communist, to your knowledge, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. He is just about the last man in the world I would picture as a Communist, but in the executive hearing you told me that he was now a member of the Polish Communist Party, and I accept it, but it seemed to me as incredible as if the chairman of this meeting joined the brethren.

The CHAIRMAN. That is rather incredible.

Mr. MORRIS. I don't know whether I described him as a Polish Communist, now, but I would like Mr. Mandel to read into the record—

Mr. CARTER. You said he was.

Mr. MORRIS. I said he was an official of the Polish Communist Government, which is virtually the same thing, but I am being very careful with you, Mr. Carter.

Mr. CARTER. He is in the front door, anyhow.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read—

Mr. MANDEL. May I first establish the date of the Bentley testimony. It was July 31, 1948.

This is a letter dated July 24, 1951, addressed to the Honorable Pat McCarran, chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee, United States Senate; addressed from the Department of State, from H. J. L'Heureux, Chief of the Visa Division:

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: "With reference to Mr. Mandel's inquiry of July 18, 1951, the records of the Department show that a passport visa as a nonimmigrant under section 3 (7) of the Immigration Act of 1924, as amended, was granted at the American Embassy at Warsaw, on October 17, 1950, to Ludwig Rajchman, bearer of Polish Passport No. S-000613, issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with a validity from October 14, 1950, to October 14, 1951, and the bearer of the passport was described as "Polish Government delegate to and Chairman of the Children's Emergency Fund of the United Nations."

Sincerely yours,

H. J. L'HEUREUX.

Mr. CARTER. May I ask, Mr. Mandel, does it state that the visa was granted, or that it was refused?

Mr. MANDEL. It does not state.

Mr. MORRIS. The purpose of that, Mr. Carter, is to show that he is an official of the present Polish Communist Government.

Mr. CARTER. I don't think it is terribly important, from my point of view, but I know for a considerable time he was, I think, the Chairman or the executive officer of the UN Children's Emergency Fund, and I heard of his doing a good deal of work in raising money for that.

Mr. MORRIS. He was the Polish Government delegate to that, wasn't he?

Mr. CARTER. I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, I mean the official record we have just made is that Mr. Rajchman was the Polish Government delegate to and Chairman of the Children's Emergency Fund of the United Nations.

Mr. CARTER. Then he was both a Polish Government official, and an official of a United Nations committee.

Mr. MORRIS. He is the official Polish Communist—

Mr. CARTER. This establishes also that he was a Pole, and I thought he might have become a Chinese or American citizen.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was Robert W. Barnett, to get back to the other telegram?

Mr. CARTER. He is the son of Eugene Barnett, the national head of the American YMCA, and he was born in China and knew Chinese, and worked for a short time at the Institute of Pacific Relations, and then went out to General Chennault's staff, with the Eighth Air Force, in Kunming.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we had that yesterday, as I recall.

Mr. CARTER. I didn't like to tell Mr. Morris he was asking a second question.

Now he holds some position in the State Department; and I have heard, but I couldn't swear to this, he sits up nights trying to prevent munitions getting to Communist China.

Mr. MORRIS. Now I would like to offer you a memorandum dated November 20, 1942, and the initials are R. W. B., obviously Mr. Barnett, and from you, Mr. Carter, and it reads:

We extended the Mont Tremblant invitation to Rajchman and he was very much pleased. He called to see me today to say that he believes it would be unwise for him to accept. His immigration status is such that he would have to get a reentry permit, and it might take him an unduly long time to get this, and he fears that there might be some embarrassment, because apparently someone in Mr. Breckinridge Long's office is not terribly keen on Rajchman and there might be complications.

Mr. CARTER. That I remember.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the difficulty in Long's office, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. Well, I don't know whether this is for the record, but I suppose it is, because the gentleman of the press are here, and it is ancient history. And I described earlier, Senator, Dr. Rajchman's close association with T. V. Soong. T. V. Soong is a terribly dynamic man, as you know, a real American go-getter, and some of the people in lease-lend, or whatever the agency he was working with, sort of thought he worked things with a little too much high pressure, and they felt that Rajchman was sort of his intelligence officer, finding out what was going on in Senate committees.

The appropriate person in the State Department didn't think that that was, as the English say, "cricket," and so I think they were rather annoyed, slightly, with Soong, and slightly with Dr. Rajchman, who was non-Chinese and non-American, for being T. V. Soong's handyman.

Mr. MORRIS. It wasn't because of his Communist record?

Mr. CARTER. Personally, I am quite sure that there wasn't a breath of that. T. V. Soong would have him out on his ear if he suspected him of being a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. He had Dr. Chi around, didn't he?

Mr. CARTER. That was H. H. Kung, also of the Nationalist Government.

Mr. MORRIS. They could be fooled, couldn't they?

Mr. CARTER. And the other thing was, as you remember, there was quite a complicated thing—

The CHAIRMAN. You were asked a question, Mr. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. They could be fooled, couldn't they?

Mr. CARTER. Well, I won't say anybody couldn't be fooled, but none of us are infallible all of the time.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that that is the answer.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, the last line of this memorandum reads:

You might pass this message on informally and orally to Hiss.

Now, why was it necessary that the message be passed on informally and orally to Hiss, that someone in Breckinridge Long's office was not terribly keen on Rajchman?

Mr. CARTER. I happened to know that Hiss' chief, Hornbeck, was not particularly happy over a remark of Rajchman that T. V. Soong knew within 15 minutes everything that happened in a confidential Senate committee, and that didn't sit very nicely, and I thought that Hornbeck would want to know it.

The CHAIRMAN. This is to go in evidence. We will accept this document in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 20" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 20

NOVEMBER 20, 1942.

RWB from ECC.

We extended the Mont Tremblant invitation to Rajchman and he was very much pleased. He called to see me today to say that he believes that it would be unwise for him to accept.

His immigration status is such that he would have to get a reentry permit. It might take an unduly long time to get this, and he fears there might be some embarrassment because apparently someone in Mr. Breckenridge Long's office is not terribly keen on Rajchman and there might be complications.

You might pass this message on informally and orally to Hiss.

Mr. MORRIS. At this point, this CIAA means Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs.

Mr. CARTER. It wasn't Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. MORRIS. Why was it necessary to send this message to Mr. Hiss through Barnett?

Mr. CARTER. May I see it again?

Mr. MORRIS. Why was it necessary to send it through Barnett?

Mr. CARTER. Barnett was in Washington, and I was in New York, and Barnett had talked, apparently, about this Rajchman man, and so it went to Hiss just as, frequently, if I had a communication from Mr. Hull, I would send it through Mr. Sumner Welles.

I will say, Senator, that Rajchman never came to the Mont Tremblant Conference. He was not a citizen of a country which was a member of the IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. And, of course, Mont Tremblant was in Canada, and it would require a reentry permit to go up there.

Mr. CARTER. And it would take a lot of time.

Mr. MORRIS. That series of questions was to bring out or in response to the question of Alger Hiss' associations with the IPR, and you recall this all started when we were discussing Vladimir Rogov, and your sending two telegrams to Alger Hiss and Lauchlin Currie to introduce him to certain people in Washington.

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, I show you a letter dated January 17, 1944, and it is addressed to Miss Rose Yardumian, Institute of Pacific Relations, 744 Jackson Place NW., Washington 6.

Would you identify Rose Yardumian?

Mr. CARTER. She was a Radcliffe graduate who for a short time served as a secretary in the Washington office of the IPR, which was maintained for the brief period during the war, because so many members of the IPR from China, Canada, Britain, France, and so on, were in Washington, and we wanted an opportunity to bring them up to date as to contact.

Mr. MORRIS. She was the secretary there in January of 1944, was she not, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. She was, and that was during the war.

Mr. MORRIS. And she was also the secretary in June of 1945, at the time that the Amerasia case broke, was she not?

Mr. CARTER. In June of 1945, the war was still on; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. So when you say a brief period of time, I wish you would elaborate on that.

Mr. CARTER. I can't tell you.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you approximate it?

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember what year during the war it was opened, and I know it was not opened at the very outbreak of the war.

Mr. MORRIS. Was she a Communist?

Mr. CARTER. I never suspected her of it, and I haven't seen her for many years.

Mr. MORRIS. Where is she now?

Mr. CARTER. I can't testify on that. She went out to UNRRA in China, and I think transferred there to the Chinese Industrial—

Mr. MORRIS. Did IPR help her to get a job with UNRRA?

Mr. CARTER. I very likely would have commended her for it if she asked me to.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, she worked with UNRRA in 1946, and in all likelihood she went from your office to UNRRA in 1946?

Mr. CARTER. I couldn't be sure, and if you have got testimony to that effect or evidence to that effect, I would gladly accept it.

Mr. MORRIS. I am taking this from one of your own publications here, Biannual Report of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1944-46, and on page 11 you say:

Early in 1946, Rose Yardumian, former Washington representative of the IPR, joined the staff of UNRRA in China, as did several other people.

So I am accepting your authority on that one, Mr. Carter.

Mr. CARTER. I still think, Senator, that IPR publications are reasonably accurate, and I accept that.

Mr. MORRIS. You don't know where Rose Yardumian is now?

Mr. CARTER. Only by hearsay. She was in UNRRA, and she joined one of the agencies that Mr. Lewis and Paul Hoffman had maintained under United China relief, called Indusco, getting handicrafts going, and it is only hearsay, and I understand she married an Englishman and is now living in England, but I couldn't swear to that.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter, I would like to introduce into the evidence at this time, and first offer it to you, photostats of two publications, both of them are published in Communist China, and they are the same publications, but you will see the difference in a minute. One is the China Weekly Review, January 14, 1950, published in Shanghai, which was at that time Communist China, and I call your attention to the fact that one of the editors there, one of the three editors there is listed as Rose Yardumian. I offer that, and ask you to make any observation you would like to make on it.

Mr. CARTER. This is the first time I have seen this; and second, it is the first time I have heard that she was on the China Weekly Review; and third, the China Weekly Review, as you know, for many years was edited by a heroic newspaperman, J. B. Powell, and he lost a leg or a heel owing to Japanese torture, and he was pro-democratic.

Mr. MORRIS. Anti-Communist, wasn't he?

Mr. CARTER. Yes. And after his death, or after he left China, his son took over, and I understand his son has gone or left, and this would seem to indicate it. But I do remember a somewhat parallel case, in that the American-owned and edited Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury continued for some time in Shanghai after the Communists took over, and finally the Communists made it impossible for them to operate, and ultimately the American staff got out.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to offer Mr. Carter the China Weekly Review of December 1950, and the China Monthly Review of December 1950, late in the same year.

Mr. CARTER. Is that something different from the China Weekly Review?

Mr. MORRIS. Apparently the difference is in the time.. One is the China Monthly Review and the other is the China Weekly Review, and the editorial board is much the same.

I call your attention to the list of contributing editors, and here we have the name Rose Yardumian, and this is now December of 1950.

I think, just to describe the character of the publication, I have here in the Letters to the Editor column, under a headline "Brutal invasion," apparently the communication there to the editor:

America's invasion of Korea is many times more brutal and Fascist than Hitler's and Tojo's adventures, judging from the broadcasts by the American captives.

Now, I think that will dispel any doubt that you may have that that is a Communist publication, don't you think, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. It is following the Communist line, and I haven't studied it.

Mr. MORRIS. In a rather strident way.

Mr. CARTER. It seems to me going it whole hog and a little further.

The CHAIRMAN. I think at this time we will have to suspend for a few minutes. I have to go over and cast a vote, and I will be right back.

(Brief recess.)

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce both the photostat of the China Weekly Review of January 14, 1950, showing Rose Yardumian as one of the three editors as of that time, as well as a photostatic copy of the editorial page of the China Monthly Review of December 1950, showing Rose Yardumian as one of the contributing editors.

Now, before doing so, I would like to point out to Mr. Carter, you will notice among the contributing editors there the name of Hugh Deane. Is that the same Mr. Hugh Deane who was a member of the Washington chapter of IPR?

Mr. CARTER. He may have been, and I don't remember.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be that he is the same, or he may have been a member of the Washington chapter.

Mr. CARTER. Both.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to have both of those introduced into the record and have them so marked as the next exhibits.

The CHAIRMAN. They will be inserted in the record and so marked.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 21 and 22" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 21

[From the China Weekly Review, January 14, 1950]

THE CHINA WEEKLY REVIEW

J. B. Powell (Editor & Publisher, 1918-47)

John W. Powell, Editor & Publisher

Editors—Mary Barrett, Rose Yardumian, Alun Falconer.

Contributing Editors—William Berges, Tong Chun-cho, Chen Fu-sheng, Mark M. Lu, Galahad Wood, Julian Schuman, C. Y. W. Meng, Chiang Pi-hou, Lin Wo-chiang, Ngiam Tong Fatt, Hugh Deane, Duncan C. Lee, T. P. King, Shen Chien-tu, Betty C. Chang.

Fang Fu-an, Financial Editor

F. K. Chao, Business Manager

Chen Pang-cheng, Circulation Manager

EXHIBIT No. 22

CHINA MONTHLY REVIEW

J. B. Powell (Editor & Publisher, 1948-49)

John W. Powell, Editor & Publisher

Associate editor: Julian Schuman.

Contributing editors: Yen Chung-fah, Chen Fu-sheng, Mark M. Lu, Mary Barrett, Alun Falconer, C. Y. W. Meng, Rose Yardumian, Chiang Pi-hou, Lin Wo-chiang, Hugh Deane, Duncan C. Lee, T. P. King, Shen Chien-tu, Betty C. Chang, Wang Tsung-yen, Margaret Turner.

Fang Fu-an, Financial Editor

Chen Pang-cheng, Circulation Manager

Mr. MORRIS. Was it surprising to you that Rose Yardumian should have turned up as one of the editors for a paper published in Communist China?

Mr. CARTER. Yes, very. She left the IPR, I would say, over 5 years ago, and maybe six.

Mr. MORRIS. Is she related to Guenther Stein?

Mr. CARTER. You reminded me in executive session that her sister married Guenther Stein.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was Guenther Stein?

Mr. CARTER. Well, I don't think you want me to repeat all of the biographical sketch.

Mr. MORRIS. Just tell what Guenther Stein's connections with the IPR have been.

Mr. CARTER. He wrote a number of articles, 6, 9, or 10, for IPR publications, at the time when he was also working for T. V. Soong. He was at one time regarded as one of the top economic journalists, having been on the Berlin Agis Verlag; and, not liking Hitler, went to London, and went to the Far East; and the Japanese militarists didn't like him, and he went to work for T. V. Soong in China. And later he was cited by the illustrious Sorge—a mystery and devilish spy who was shot or hung—and mentioned, Sorge mentioned that Guenther Stein accommodated him, and I think Guenther Stein denied it. And it was mentioned by spokesmen for MacArthur as though Guenther Stein had worked for Sorge. But then an officer at the Pentagon, of our United States Army, apparently withdrew or dis-sented from the statement.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you recall that Guenther Stein was mentioned by General MacArthur's headquarters as one identified by Richard Sorge as a participant in his espionage ring?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you also recall Guenther Stein was the IPR Chungking correspondent?

Mr. CARTER. He corresponded for us at Chungking, and whether he was labeled "correspondent," or not, I don't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall he was a delegate of British IPR to your Hot Springs convention?

Mr. CARTER. I remember that. The British had a very high regard for him, and I think he became a British citizen.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your impression of Guenther Stein today?

Mr. CARTER. The last time I saw him, he was anti-Nazi, and anti-Japanese and anti-Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you last see him?

Mr. CARTER. Oh, I should say very soon after the war, he came to this country. And he was asked to do a study—

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think that that goes to the question. Let us confine this, if we can.

Mr. CARTER. I am trying to recall, through the project that he was asked to undertake, about what the date was, and I would say roughly 1946 or 1947.

Mr. MORRIS. This all started again with this letter to Rose Yardumian, and now I would like to read this letter, and first I offer it to you, Mr. Carter, and I would like to read it:

Here is a copy of a telegram—

The CHAIRMAN. Let us identify this for the record.

Mr. CARTER. It is from Carter to Rose Yardumian, dated January 17, 1944.

Mr. MORRIS (continuing):

Here is a copy of a telegram I have just sent to Alger Hiss. Would you telephone him that I think Hornbeck and he would greatly appreciate a private talk with Rogoff.

I also enclose a copy of a telegram I have sent to Currie. You might phone Currie, too, telling him I think he would like to talk with Rogoff.

Will you telephone Rogoff at Tass Wednesday morning and ask him whether he would like you to arrange for him to visit the Library of Congress, the Mellon Gallery, or the IPR?

Will you also phone Colonel Faymonville in the Ordnance Department of the War Department, to say that I thought he would want to know Rogoff was in Washington. You could explain to Faymonville that Rogoff can be reached at the Tass office in Washington, and that he would be there on Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday.

Why did you think that Colonel Faymonville should want to see Rogoff?

Mr. CARTER. Faymonville had been United States military attaché in the United States Embassy in Moscow for a number of years, and he knew the Russian language, and he was always eager to meet Russians of all points of view, and he later became head of a military assistance program to Russia during the war, in the Embassy in Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to offer that in evidence as the next exhibit and have it properly marked.

The CHAIRMAN. It is inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 23" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 23

NEW YORK 22, N. Y., January 17, 1944.

Miss ROSE YARDUMIAN,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
744 Jackson Place N.W., Washington 6, D. C.

DEAR ROSE: Here is a copy of a telegram I have just sent to Alger Hiss. Would you telephone him that I think Hornbeck and he would greatly appreciate a private talk with Rogoff. I also enclose a copy of a telegram I have sent to Currie. You might phone Currie, too, telling him I think he would like to talk with Rogoff.

Will you telephone Rogoff at Tass Wednesday morning and ask him whether he would like you to arrange for him to visit the Library of Congress, the Mellon Gallery, or the IPR.

Will you also phone Colonel Faymonville in the Ordnance Department of the War Department to say that I thought he would want to know Rogoff was in Washington. You could explain to Faymonville that Rogoff can be reached at the Tass office in Washington and that he will be there on Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday.

It may be that you would like to find out from Rogoff whether he would like to meet at the office four or five Congressmen like Judd and Fulbright. But don't make this suggestion if it clutters up the time which you may want to give to more urgent matters.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. I now offer you a reply letter from Miss Yardumian dated January 20, 1944, and I will ask you if you if you will look at that, Mr. Carter, and ask if you can recall receiving that letter from Rose Yardumian?

Mr. CARTER. I now remember the letter, and it converts, slightly alters something that I said earlier about the article in War and the Working Class, and—

Mr. MORRIS. May I ask you a few questions on it? I want to call your attention to the opening paragraph:

I received your letter of January 17 with copies of the telegrams you sent Mr. Hiss and Mr. Currie. I called Alger Hiss yesterday morning and he told me that he had received your wire but was sure that I would understand that he could not make the first advance in arranging a private talk with Rogoff.

Will you tell us why Alger Hiss thought that she would understand that he could not be the first to make the advance in arranging a private talk with Rogoff?

Mr. CARTER. Because the State Department had received this article of Rogoff's that you introduced earlier, from War and the Working Class, and they didn't like it, and they didn't think it was appropriate for them to go out of their way to receive a guy who had written something that they considered inaccurate.

Mr. MORRIS. You notice that you do recall that there was an article.

Mr. CARTER. This reminds me, and I had completely forgotten about it, because I had never seen it.

Mr. MORRIS. You also recall that the reason why Hiss was disturbed about this was because of the article?

Mr. CARTER. I now recall it, and compliment Hiss for thinking that it was not quite appropriate to run after a fellow who had written this kind of an article.

Mr. MORRIS. How can you so testify, Mr. Carter, when, after prompting your recollection four or five times, you had no recollection whatever of that particular article in *War and the Working Class*?

Mr. CARTER. What is the date of this?

Mr. MORRIS. January 20, 1944.

Mr. CARTER. I haven't a perfect memory, and I have thought of a good many things since, and I wasn't evading there, Senator. My mind is not an encyclopedia.

Mr. MORRIS. Why would Alger Hiss want not to be the first to make the advance in arranging this private talk?

Mr. CARTER. Well, Hornbeck's principal assistant, and therefore the spokesman for the Department.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the purpose of this meeting?

Mr. CARTER. I thought I indicated that earlier, that I thought—and this was not an initiative on the part of Hornbeck or anyone else in the State Department—I thought it was helpful to know what people who disagree with you think.

Mr. MORRIS. If that were the case, why wouldn't Hiss want it known that he was going to be the first to introduce him? I don't understand that at all, and why should Hiss be afraid to be the first one in bringing Rogoff in to see Stanley Hornbeck?

Mr. CARTER. He was a subordinate, and you would have to ask him, and I can't reconstruct Alger Hiss' mind.

Mr. MORRIS. It does give you a wrong impression when you read a letter like this, or maybe the right impression, doesn't it, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. Well, it gave me the impression that Hiss was being correct and didn't want to involve the United States Government in a conversation with a man who technically, in the Russian sense, was not a representative of the Russian Foreign Office or of the Soviet Embassy here.

Now, you and I recognize Tass as part and parcel of the Soviet Government, but from—

Mr. MORRIS. Who would know if he brought him in to see Hornbeck?

Mr. CARTER. Well, I frequently meet alert men of the press who would coast down the aisles of the old Senate Building, or the old State Department Building, looking for something the American public could be interested in, and they were doing their job.

Mr. MORRIS. If Hiss was doing his job with Hornbeck and really out to get information out of Rogoff, why should he be so ashamed of that fact?

Mr. CARTER. I don't know that he was. He thought it was inappropriate, and it may have been simply the diplomatic thing of making an appointment to see a Soviet citizen who wasn't accredited as representing the Soviet Embassy.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Alger Hiss always, to your knowledge, as correct in all of his dealings as you claim on that occasion?

Mr. CARTER. Personally, I never remember his doing a diplomatically incorrect thing, and I thought he was pretty well trained in State Department poise.

Mr. MORRIS. You see in the next sentence:

He mentioned the Rogoff articles in *War and the Working Class* and that Rogoff's material had caused considerable controversy in circles here.

Mr. CARTER. Naturally.

Mr. MORRIS (continuing) :

He said that if Larry Todd wanted to bring Rogoff to Hornbeck's office, they would not refuse to see him.

Will you explain that, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. Well, certainly most State Department people in those days received foreign newspapermen from any country if they asked to see them.

Mr. MORRIS. I see in the next sentence Miss Yardumian said :

I am not sure that I understand the machinations of our State Department.

Mr. CARTER. I think that there have been other people in this room who take that same position.

The CHAIRMAN. You could have heard that on television last night.

Mr. MORRIS. In the next paragraph you have :

Mr. Currie has arranged to see Rogoff at 12 o'clock today.

Do you know what happened at that particular conversation?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. MORRIS (continuing) :

Colonel Faymonville is returning to Washington from New York this morning and is supposed to get in touch with our office then.

Do you remember what happened at the conversation with Faymonville?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, I would like to turn over to the next page, Mr. Carter, and I draw your attention to the P. P. S. on this :

Rogoff and Bill have been at the Cosmos Club for the last 2½ hours talking with Lattimore, Remer, and Vincent.

Will you identify the people mentioned in that postscript?

Mr. CARTER. I don't know who the "Bill" was, but something may reveal it; and Lattimore has been mentioned once or twice, and I think this committee has seen him in executive session; and Remer is a high-ranking professor of economics at the University of Michigan.

Mr. MORRIS. What was he at that time, do you know, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. I think probably he was in some Government agency, and I haven't any idea.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he the head of the Far Eastern Section of OSS?

Mr. CARTER. He might have been. I should think he would be more in an economic job, but OSS tried to do everything.

Mr. MORRIS. That was January 20, 1944. What was Mr. Lattimore's assignment, do you know?

Mr. CARTER. I have quite forgotten the dates.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was "Vincent" mentioned there?

Mr. CARTER. Presumably Mr. John Carter Vincent, who has a middle name like mine, no blood relation.

Mr. MORRIS. What was his position in early 1944? Was he head of the China Desk then?

Mr. CARTER. I should think so, and the record would show, and at one time he was head of the China Desk succeeding Max Hamilton, who immediately succeeded Stanley Hornbeck.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, could "Bill" there be Bill Johnstone, who is mentioned in another part of the letter?

Mr. CARTER. It might very well be, because Johnstone then, who was at the university here, was quite active in the Washington branch of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and I think a member of our national board.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know what transpired at that particular meeting, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. I don't think that I was ever sent any report.

Mr. MORRIS. Even after you had sent Rogoff down there to arrange for all of these conferences?

Mr. CARTER. No. I was not interested in the outcome. I thought it was a useful opportunity for people to meet a Russian who spoke good English and who knew China thoroughly well, and who had a sense of humor and could crack little jokes in the American vernacular, and he never stood on a high horse the way most of the Soviet diplomats did.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Chairman, do you have any questions on that particular thing?

The CHAIRMAN. I have no questions at this time, no.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to offer you a letter dated June 20, 1941, and it is from you to Owen Lattimore, and it reads here:

If you have time while in San Francisco, you and Bill Holland may want to arrange a private talk with Col. Philip R. Faymonville, whose present address is Headquarters of the Fourth Army, Presidio of San Francisco, Calif. He would, I think, have been thoroughly at home and at ease if he had lunched with us at the Mayflower on Wednesday. I think you get the idea. It may be that if you get the same favorable impression of him which Harriette Moore and I have, he might be someone who could be exceptionally useful to you and the Generalissimo at some future time in Chungking.

If you wish me to, I will wire him for an appointment.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

And I offer you that, and ask you if you can recall that particular letter?

The CHAIRMAN. The question is, Do you recall that letter?

Mr. CARTER. I recall the letter.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you comment on it?

Mr. CARTER. I would be delighted.

As indicated, Philip Faymonville became Brigadier General Faymonville, and was a very highly rated ordnance officer who was then in the Presidio in California.

As I indicated earlier, he had unusually wide knowledge of the Russian language, the Russian people.

As I did not indicate earlier, he had been our attaché in Japan and had learned Japanese and thus knew a good deal of the Far Eastern complex.

Would this, Mr. Morris, have been just before Lattimore went to Chungking for Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, that was before that time.

Mr. CARTER. When it was under consideration, presumably?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Mr. CARTER. Here I say that I think Faymonville might be exceptionally useful to Lattimore and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek at some future time in Chungking.

What I had in mind then was that the Generalissimo's two question marks—one was Japan, and the other was Russia—Chiang Kai-shek was in quite intimate relations with the Soviet authorities.

Mr. MORRIS. I have identified Colonel Faymonville here. You say:

He would, I think, have been thoroughly at home and at ease if he had lunched with us at the Mayflower on Wednesday.

Can you remember what luncheon that was?

Mr. CARTER. I think the luncheon we had with a number of our Kuomintang friends.

Mr. MORRIS. This is June 1941. Perhaps I might help your recollection by pointing out this is 2 days before the Hitler invasion of the Soviet Union. Can you remember whom you had lunch with at that particular time?

Mr. CARTER. I remember talking with a number of Chinese friends, Nationalist Chinese friends, and the latter part makes me wonder whether it wasn't at a time when all Americans wanted to help Chiang Kai-shek in being as strong as possible and having as many allies as possible in withstanding aggression.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was Harriet Moore?

Mr. CARTER. Harriette Moore had been, or was, at that time, a member of the IPR staff, a graduate of Bryn Mawr, who worked competently on our staff for some time.

Mr. MORRIS. Was she a Communist?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. MORRIS. You were associated with Russian War Relief?

Mr. CARTER. I was.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember if she was secretary of Russian War Relief?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember David Dubinsky, the head of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union who refused to make any contributions to that as long as Harriet Moore remained as secretary?

Mr. CARTER. I remember. I remember he was photographed with me, handing me a check of \$25,000 or \$50,000 for Russian relief.

Miss Moore was still on the board.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Moore was no longer secretary?

Mr. CARTER. No. She insisted if Dubinsky did not like it, or he wanted to get her to resign that she remain on the board, even though members of the board thought she was invaluable and she wasn't a Communist. She insisted for the good of the organization to resign as secretary.

Allen Wardwell, a very distinguished New York lawyer, succeeded her. She remained on the board until the end. She was mixed up with another Harriette Moore.

Mr. MORRIS. Not by Mr. Dubinsky?

Mr. CARTER. Oh, yes. I had several hours with Mr. Dubinsky later after he made his protest. He conceded there must have been another Harriet Moore. That Harriet Moore was 10 years older and 6 inches shorter than the other Harriet Moore.

I have in the other room a statement from the Garment Workers in warm support of what we were aiming to do in cooperating with our Soviet allies.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I do not think we should take a break at this time to introduce any testimony on Harriet Moore. We will come to that later.

Let us go back to this letter.

Harriette Moore and you had a favorable impression of Colonel Faymonville. What was that impression?

Mr. CARTER. Very competent as an ordnance officer in which we were not experts; a man who knew Japan and Russia and was an American.

Mr. MORRIS. It is your recollection that the occasion that you had lunch on the previous Wednesday was that you had it with some Chinese officials?

Mr. CARTER. That is my memory, but I couldn't swear to it, Senator.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce another letter at this time, into the record. I would like to offer that, a letter dated June 23, 1941. This is a letter to Philip Jessup, care of American Express, Santiago, Chile. It is sent by Edward C. Carter. The date is June 23, 1941. The last paragraph reads (and in the meantime this same week end Hitler has invaded the Soviet Union):

I wonder whether you happened to hear Churchill's speech yesterday.

That is Churchill's speech announcing that the British people, or, rather, the British Empire, was going to support the Soviet Union against Hitler.

Mr. CARTER. It was one of the greatest offerings in English literature and democratic statesmanship.

Mr. MORRIS (reading):

Hitler, Stalin, and Churchill managed quite a spectacular week end. It so happened that last week I had lunch with Oumansky in Washington on Wednesday. We talked for a couple of hours.

That is the same date, is it not?

Mr. CARTER. (Nodding affirmatively.)

Mr. MORRIS (continuing):

We talked for a couple of hours. I was fortunate in getting Lattimore over from Baltimore, as I thought it was pretty important for him to have a long talk with Oumansky, in view of his job and the evolving world situation. It was a most illuminating 2 hours.

Will you concede that was the same luncheon?

Mr. CARTER. I would want to look at the record a little further. If you have got things that will refresh my mind——

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have a copy of that second letter in front of you?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you look at the dates of both letters—June 23, 1941, and June 20, 1941?

Mr. CARTER. Yes. Apparently quite clearly I wrote that letter.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you concede that the Wednesday preceding both of those dates was June 18?

Mr. CARTER. I would say it is likely. I can't prove it.

Mr. MORRIS. You are talking about the same luncheon in both cases, are you not?

Mr. CARTER. Occasionally in Washington I happened to have two luncheons.

Mr. MORRIS. This lunch lasted 2 hours.

Mr. CARTER. I think you are pretty sure that it was the same luncheon. I am willing to take your view.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, it wasn't a luncheon you had with some Communists, Chinese Communist officials?

Mr. CARTER. Chinese nationalists.

Mr. MORRIS. I am sorry. It was a luncheon you had with Mr. Oumansky.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the record show the witness nodded his head affirmatively to that last question.

You cannot get that into the record.

Mr. MORRIS. I notice you say:

He would, I think, have been thoroughly at home and at ease if he had lunched with us at the Mayflower on Wednesday.

Will you describe the atmosphere that prevailed at the luncheon with Mr. Oumansky in Washington on the previous Wednesday?

Mr. CARTER. Which paragraph is that "at home" business?

Mr. MORRIS. This is on the June 20 letter.

Mr. CARTER. Faymonville had a principal interest on the part of the United States Government for several years. His interest was Russia. He was eager to meet all sorts of Russians who could bring him up to date. He was particularly interested because Oumansky at that time, if I remember rightly, saw little chance of America going to war with Japan, and I was, myself, certain that Japan was going to take the initiative and we would be in a state of war with Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to call your attention to the time of this. It is June 20, 1941. This is during the Hitler-Stalin pact. That was not at a time when the Soviet Union was friendly with the United States.

Mr. CARTER. Quite the opposite.

Mr. MORRIS. Yet, you say at luncheon the political atmosphere was one that you would say that you were at ease with Mr. Oumansky?

Mr. CARTER. Because Mr. Lattimore and I were telling Oumansky that we thought that he was all wet in thinking that a state of war between Japan and the United States was not imminent. We thought it was.

Faymonville, having been in Japan, knew a great deal about the Japanese military expansion movement, and Oumansky at that time and all times was a persona non grata, to say the least, with most American correspondents.

Mr. MORRIS. He wasn't persona non grata with you?

Mr. CARTER. He wasn't a very useful contact.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he at ease at luncheon?

Mr. CARTER. He is always at ease.

The CHAIRMAN. Was he at ease at luncheon?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Why do you use the expression "he would have been thoroughly at home and at ease if he had lunched with us at the Mayflower on Wednesday. I think you get the idea"?

What do you mean by that?

Mr. CARTER. There would be a scrap on, and Oumansky in his very dogmatic self-assured way would take one position that Lattimore and I would consider in a different vein and would take a diametrically opposite position.

Mr. MORRIS. Why would Colonel Faymonville be at home?

Mr. CARTER. Because it was two Americans against a Russian, and the two American happened to be right, and the Russian was wrong.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall that very well now?

Mr. CARTER. It comes back to me.

Mr. MORRIS. At the time you had no recollection?

Mr. CARTER. I thought it was another luncheon. I nearly always try to break all the hygienic rules by using the luncheon time to see people.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was Mr. Oumansky? Tell us who he was at that time.

Mr. CARTER. Some people at the press table could give a better picture.

The CHAIRMAN. Never mind. Tell us.

Mr. CARTER. Oumansky was a Russian Communist, a militant Communist. He had been, I think, press officer for the Russian Foreign Office in Moscow. Later he came as Ambassador to this country.

It so happened in one of my several visits to Moscow, trying to get the Soviet scholars interested in the Orient to form a Soviet chapter of the IPR, I was finally channeled to Oumansky's office. I had a long talk with him.

The Soviet officials had been negative before Oumansky listened, asked for IPR documents; said that he thought the IPR had proved itself as a scholarly and useful organization and that he had no power to say whether or not a decision would be made to form a Soviet IPR, but he would take it up with the highest quarters.

You can guess who that was.

That I might never hear from him again, or I might be called back, he said.

A few months later I was called back and the Soviet IPR was organized.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it organized in the highest quarters at that time when you were called back?

Mr. CARTER. Apparently high quarters approved the idea. The people I met were so-called researchers on Asia and the Pacific.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you realize at the same time that Mr. Oumansky was an important intelligence agent for the Soviet Union?

Mr. CARTER. He was in the Foreign Office. I think his contact with the foreign press was not only to give hand-outs to the Times and the Tribune and Writers, et cetera, but to get as much dope as he could from them.

They were always working on a two-way proposition.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, do you have any more questions?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Sourwine?

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to have the record made clear on a very small point.

Have you been here describing what you meant by your reference "being at home" in the letter that has been discussed at some length, or have you been only describing what you might have meant?

Mr. CARTER. It is a darn good question.

What year was this?

Mr. MORRIS. This is 3 days before the Soviet invasion by Hitler, during the Hitler-Stalin pact, June 20, 1941.

Mr. CARTER. My memory is pretty accurate on that thing. It was a big historic moment. Some of us saw the Japs were all ready. I had so much contact with the Japanese to know what their time table was.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think you are answering the question at all. I think you had better get to the question.

Mr. SOURWINE. I thought he was getting around to it, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We do not want to be here all afternoon.

Mr. CARTER. I am speaking from memory, not hypotheses.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have now testified as to what you did mean by your reference to the fact that Colonel Faymonville would have been very much at home at this luncheon?

Mr. CARTER. Correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you were a moment or so earlier testifying on the theory that the luncheon had been with a group of Chinese nationalists, that was testimony as to what you might have meant?

Mr. CARTER. Yes. I gave that provisionally. I said I am not sure, but I thought it might have been that.

Mr. MORRIS. The two statements, one that you have a very vivid recollection of what happened in view of the particular crisis in history does not square with your statement earlier when it was recognized you had luncheon with some Chinese officials at that time.

Mr. CARTER. I think the human mind remembers some things very much more vividly than others. It is a sort of automatic psychological process.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you mean by that? Follow that through, please.

Awhile ago you demonstrated you did not recall what had happened at that particular occasion.

Mr. CARTER. You remember when you married your wife, but you cannot always remember the birthday of your ninth child.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that your answer?

Mr. CARTER. I have not nine children; I wish I had.

The CHAIRMAN. Let's go ahead.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us what your relations have been with Harry Dexter White?

Mr. CARTER. Very slight.

At a time when it looked to some that Mr. Hull, to prevent war between the United States and Japan, might concede certain Japanese demands, Mr. White—

Mr. MORRIS. This must be November 1941; is it not?

Mr. CARTER. I should imagine so. That was when, I think, Nomura was here following Horiunuchi as Japanese Ambassador.

I got an urgent telegram from Harry White asking me to come to Washington. I had no idea what he wanted.

Mr. MORRIS. How well did you know him at that time?

Mr. CARTER. As I remember, he was only a name of a financier who was influential in the office of the Secretary of the Treasury.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not want to get to that again. I want you to answer that question fully.

Mr. CARTER. I didn't know him well.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you continue, please?

Mr. CARTER. I got down and saw him. He apologized. He said that the situation was such that every friend of China could be satisfied. They were not going to concede China to the Japs and they were telling or had told the Japanese that they could not accept the Japanese terms by which Japan would have a predominant influence in China.

I also met him after the war. I was returning from a trip to the Far East and to the Near East and the Soviet Union on Mr. Harri-man's plane with Donald Nelson and Colonel Kessler and John Hazard. We stopped to refuel and rest in Cairo.

We dined at the American Embassy or Legation in Cairo. Mr. White was coming or going on some Government mission. We had dinner at the Embassy with 20 guests. I may have had 5 minutes' conversation with him. I may have seen him once or twice since.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was this?

Mr. CARTER. The Cairo dinner must have been shortly after VE-day and VJ-day.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. White had asked you to come to Washington to help persuade Mr. Hull from making this proposal, or accepting this proposal?

Mr. CARTER. To talk it over to see if there was anything that private citizens or Government servants could do to make certain we did not sell out China to Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you making reference now to the proposed *modus vivendi* which was widely discussed at that time? I think you recall that was a proposition that there be a truce effected between Japan and the United States. It was first advanced by the American military authorities on the grounds they wanted more time to prepare for what they thought was the impending attack by the Japanese?

Mr. CARTER. I don't at the moment remember that aspect of it.

There were rumors that Mr. Hull, who had been playing golf with, I think, Admiral Nomura, or the top Japanese representative in this country, playing golf week ends, that he was being persuaded by the Japanese that by right of conquest and because Japan was so much more civilized they should really be in China as the British were in India; they had a God-given mission of civilization to give to the poor Chinese.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter, what did you do to dissuade Mr. Hull from accepting that?

Mr. CARTER. I did nothing, because when I arrived the next morning, after getting the telegram, Mr. White assured me that everything was all right and there was going to be no sell-out of China through Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you discuss this with Mr. Currie at that time in Washington?

Mr. CARTER. I haven't the faintest memory. I may have, and may not.

Mr. MORRIS. That is a crucial time.

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You had testified awhile ago you have a short memory when it comes to great events in history. It is a few days before the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Did you discuss this with Mr. Currie?

Mr. CARTER. I can't answer "yes" or "no." It would be very likely because Currie was worried as a friend of China.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know he was worried?

Mr. CARTER. I talked with him long before.

Mr. MORRIS. How long before?

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. So, you did discuss this?

The CHAIRMAN. Of whom are you speaking?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Currie.

You did discuss this with Mr. Currie?

Mr. CARTER. Not necessarily the White-Hull business, but the trend in certain sections of the American public was "let's wash our hands of the whole Far East and let the Japs run China."

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to show you a letter you sent to Mr. Tarr on November 29, 1941.

Who was Mr. Tarr?

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Tarr at various times had been governor of the Bank of Canada in Ottawa. He is head of the second- or third-largest insurance company—I have forgotten its name—with headquarters in Winnipeg. He had been for many years chairman of the Canadian affiliate of the IPR and for some years chairman of the Pacific Council, one of the wisest, most intelligently conservative of Canadians consulted constantly by Canadian Prime Ministers of different political parties.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to read a paragraph from this letter. This is November 29, 1941, and the second paragraph reads:

Yesterday Elmhirst and I saw Currie who, as I wired you—

The CHAIRMAN. By whom is this letter written?

Mr. MORRIS. This is Mr. Carter's letter.

Yesterday Elmhirst and I saw Currie who, as I wired you, has not yet been able to see the President. I should think that Currie probably had a terribly anxious time for the past week. For a few days it looked as though Hull was in danger of selling China and America and Britain down the river. Currie did not say this, but I learned it from other high sources. Currie was a little apologetic for not having pressed our idea further, but I knew something of his difficulties and they are not due to lack of interest.

Does that refresh your recollection, Mr. Carter? I offer you this.

Mr. CARTER. He was my chief at that time; at least an old friend.

Do you want me to identify Elmhirst?

Mr. MORRIS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the question now?

Mr. MORRIS. Does that refresh your recollection, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. Yes. I mentioned a lot of friends—General McCoy, Whitney Shepardson—

Mr. MORRIS. I don't mean those names. You recall you did discuss this matter with Currie?

Mr. CARTER. Clearly, because I say so.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall what you discussed with Currie?

Mr. CARTER. That is a little more difficult in spite of this.

Mr. MORRIS. Try to recall without reading the rest of the letter, Mr. Carter.

You are not responsive. Mr. Holland does not need that, Mr. Carter. I am asking you for your recollection of that particular occasion. I wish you would not look at the rest of the letter.

Please recall what you can at this juncture without looking at the rest of the letter.

Mr. Chairman, the witness is being unresponsive.

The CHAIRMAN. He is trying to get his recollection.

Mr. MORRIS. I am asking for his reaction without his reading the letter.

Mr. CARTER. Could I react to the letter if I don't know what is in it?

The CHAIRMAN. The human mind is rather peculiar. A man can remember whether he dined in Cairo and who was present, but he might not remember some other great event. So we have to be patient on this.

Mr. CARTER. I think at that time we were being urged by a certain Frenchman and some other British and some Dutch to hold a North Atlantic conference. People in Europe who knew the IPR believed that the IPR rendered as an unofficial organization very real service to the public in its research and conferences on the Pacific.

Mr. MORRIS. Without breaking in, this question concerns your conversation with Mr. Currie about the possible sell-out, as you put it, of China on that particular occasion?

The CHAIRMAN. I think you ought to address your answer to the question, Mr. Carter.

Mr. CARTER. The British and French were concerned with the sell-out in China, as well as ourselves. The British and French at the same time thought that unofficial gatherings of people in the Atlantic would be helpful as they had been in the Pacific. They were talking with a number of people.

Currie himself was originally a Canadian.

Mr. St. Laurent, the present Prime Minister of Canada, attended that meeting, though he was not in office at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that Owen Lattimore was strongly urging the rejection of the *modus vivendi* that had been proposed by the American military authorities?

Mr. CARTER. I don't, because I don't remember that 90-day proposal.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce into the record at this time, Mr. Chairman, a dispatch to Lauchlin Currie from Chungking on November 25, 1941.¹

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 24," and is as follows:)

CHUNGKING, November 25, 1941.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE: After discussing with the Generalissimo the Chinese Ambassador's conference with the Secretary of State, I feel you should urgently advise the President of the Generalissimo's very strong reaction. I have never seen him really agitated before. Loosening of economic pressure or unfreezing would dangerously increase Japan's military advantage in China. A relaxation of American pressure while Japan has its forces in China would dismay the Chinese. Any *modus vivendi* now arrived at with China would be disastrous to Chinese belief in America and analogous to the closing of the Burma Road, which permanently destroyed British prestige. Japan and Chinese defeatists would instantly exploit the resulting disillusionment and urge oriental solidarity against occidental treachery. It is doubtful whether either past assistance or increasing aid could compensate for the feeling of being deserted at this hour. The Generalissimo has deep confidence in the President's fidelity to his consistent policy but I must warn you that even the Generalissimo questions his ability to hold the situation together if the Chinese national trust in America is undermined by reports of Japan's escaping military defeat by diplomatic victory.

LATTIMORE.

¹ Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, pts. 13-14, 1945, p. 1160.

Mr. MORRIS. What was Mr. Lattimore's position at that time, November 25, 1941?

Mr. CARTER. Was he political adviser to Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. MORRIS. I am asking you.

Mr. CARTER. If you understand it that way, it is my understanding.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was Lauchlin Currie? What position did he have at that time?

Mr. CARTER. I am quite sure he was executive assistant to the President of the United States.

Mr. MORRIS. Here is a dispatch dated Chungking, November 25, 1941, and it reads:

After discussing with the Generalissimo the Chinese Ambassador's conference with the Secretary of State, I feel you should urgently advise the President of the Generalissimo's very strong reaction. I have never seen him really agitated before. The loosening of economic pressure or unfreezing would dangerously increase Japan's military advantage in China. A relaxation of American pressure while Japan had its forces in China would dismay the Chinese. Any *modus vivendi* now arrived at with China would be disastrous to Chinese belief in America and analogous to the closing of the Burma Road which permanently destroyed British prestige.

I would like to offer this dispatch if I have not already done so.

The CHAIRMAN. It has been received.

Is that the dispatch from Mr. Currie?

Mr. MORRIS. From Lattimore to Lauchlin Currie, who was then executive assistant to the President. It is dated November 25, 1941. I introduced it in connection with Mr. Carter's testimony that he did have a discussion with Mr. Currie; also in connection with this letter which I now introduce into evidence from Mr. Carter to Mr. Tarr to the effect that Mr. Currie was very much disturbed and had been taking action against the *modus vivendi*, and connected with the fact that Harry Dexter White called you to Washington from New York and asked you in your representative capacity if you would go down and use your influence to prevent the *modus vivendi* from being accepted, at least prevent any truce with Japan to be accepted.

The CHAIRMAN. That letter will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 25" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 25

NEW YORK, N. Y., November 29, 1941.

EDGAR J. TARR, ESQ.,

Monarch Life Assurance Co.,

Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada.

DEAR TARR: Lockwood has talked to Shepardson and McCoy, who seemed favorable but not yet enthusiastic. I imagine a reenactment of the Gladstone meeting is essential to get them to see the significance of the proposed conference.

Yesterday Elmhirst and I saw Currie who, as I wired you, has not yet been able to see the President. I should think that Currie probably had a terribly anxious time for the past week. For a few days it looked as though Hull was in danger of selling China and America and Britain down the river. Currie did not say this but I learned it from other high sources. Currie was a little apologetic for not having pressed our idea further, but I knew something of his difficulties and they are not due to lack of interest.

In order to keep the matter alive I asked Currie whether he would be willing to spend a couple of hours some evening with a few of us, examining the whole problem, and he said he would be delighted to do this. Now your letter of

November 27 has come indicating that you could be here on the morning of the 5th. If I did not have to go to Cleveland I would propose immediately to Currie that we have the little meeting I proposed to him in Washington on the 5th, but as Holland and I are committed to the week-end conference in Cleveland that seems to be ruled out. As a substitute I have suggested to Emeny that he invite Currie and you to the IPR week-end conference in Cleveland on the sixth and seventh in the hope that the Washington meeting might be arranged between sessions there. I might be able to get Currie for an evening meeting on December 8 in Washington, if you could stay in the East that long. Won't you wire me on receipt of this letter?

Wherever the meeting is held, I would hope that you and Lockwood and Holland and Elmhirst could be present, and if in Washington we would make every effort to have Shepardson and McCoy present. Perhaps the best plan would be to take it in two jumps, namely to call a long luncheon meeting for Friday, December 5, here in New York to be attended by McCoy, Shepardson, Elmhirst, Lockwood, Holland, and Tirana and myself. I think we might get Dellard and Willite to come to such a meeting, though personally I am not at all worried about getting the meeting financed so long as it is agreed that the meeting is desirable.

I am asking Lockwood to see whether he can get McCoy and Shepardson for lunch on Friday provided you can join us. Will you wire me as to whether you could come to New York for such a luncheon discussion as I have just proposed?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. CARTER. I did not say that. I did not recall the details of this trust, but apparently I was following the Chiang Kai-shek-Lattimore-Currie line that any concession to Japan was hostile to the best interest of either the United States or Nationalist China and that we ought to continue to aid Chiang to the maximum of our ability.

Mr. MORRIS. You had known Owen Lattimore for a long time?

Mr. CARTER. Since 1933.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever since 1943 noticed any concern on Mr. Owen Lattimore's part or the generalissimo?

Mr. CARTER. Oh, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean he is well disposed?

Mr. CARTER. Since 1933, you mean?

Mr. MORRIS. 1943.

Hasn't Owen Lattimore been one of the principal opponents of the generalissimo since 1943?

Mr. CARTER. Well, I would have to look up the record, or ask you to refresh me. I know that since the war he has expressed doubt as to whether Chiang Kai-shek has the ability to keep the businessmen, the bankers, and intellectuals and masses of China behind him.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know what Harry Dexter White's attitude toward Chiang Kai-shek was since 1943?

Mr. CARTER. I have never read or heard anything one way or the other on that.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Mr. Currie's attitude toward Chiang Kai-shek after 1943?

Mr. CARTER. You would have to ask him, unless you have something I have read, which I don't remember having done.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you read the congressional disclosures and testimony before the congressional committees that Harry Dexter White was a Communist?

Mr. CARTER. I have not read the original text. I read some of the newspaper summaries and, personally, it was inconceivable to me that Harry Dexter White should be a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you heard the testimony before congressional committees that Lauchlin Currie gave information to an espionage ring in Washington?

Mr. CARTER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Your telegram was to be inserted in the record?

Mr. MORRIS. That has been introduced, Mr. Chairman.

If necessary, Mr. Chairman, we have Mr. Mandel, who can read the testimony about Mr. Harry Dexter White.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think so.

Mr. MORRIS. I might say, Mr. Chairman, on these issues, we are going to have testimony later on. I do not think we should break in at this time.

I would like to ask you, inasmuch as you mentioned J. B. Powell in a favorable vein, as anti——

Mr. CARTER. Anti-Japanese, anti-Communist. That is the father, the senior.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall an article that J. B. Powell and Max Eastman wrote in the Reader's Digest in 1945?

Mr. CARTER. You have got a copy.

Mr. MORRIS. No. I am asking you to go back to your often vivid recollection.

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember it specifically. I would have to see it. It probably might flash back to me.

Mr. MORRIS. I am going to offer you a letter. It is from you, Edward C. Carter, to Owen Lattimore. The date is June 19, 1945. It reads:

DEAR OWEN: Here is a typed copy of the draft you handed me yesterday. Late last evening I went up to the One Hundred and sixty-sixth Street and saw the son. I discovered that, alas, his father left yesterday for Maine and probably will be gone all summer. I explained the general situation to the son, and said that I would like his advice as to who would be the best single person or group of three or four to sign such a letter. He made some academic suggestions and finally suggested the possibility of his father. He thought it would be better for me to approach him than for him to do so, so he said the chances weren't very good because his father is fatigued and doesn't usually like to take on extra burdens during his holiday.

He also confirmed what I suspected, that the father likes to do his own writing. I am, however, prepared in 2 or 3 days to send the draft to him with as strong and tactful letter as I can write on the off chance that he might be willing to do something.

Does that now recall anything to you?

Mr. CARTER. I remember considering a letter that might conceivably be signed by Thomas W. Lamont of J. P. Morgan & Co. He occasionally writes a rather thoughtful letter to the New York Times. He found I was not in North Haven, Maine. I found his banker son, Thomas S. Lamont, was away and so I went to the third string, his other son, who is a professor at Columbia, his first name being Corliss.

This is the report on that.

Mr. MORRIS. What particular letter did you want written at this time?

Mr. CARTER. What is the date of this?

Mr. MORRIS. This is June 19, 1945. I have already refreshed your recollection, Mr. Carter, to the extent we are talking about J. B. Powell and Max Eastman.

Mr. CARTER. Undoubtedly it was some possible trend in American Government policy that I didn't think was in the American interest. At the moment I can't recall what the issue was.

Mr. MORRIS. Why is it necessary for you to write to Owen Lattimore in this fashion?

Here is a typed copy of the draft you handed me yesterday. Late last evening I went up to One Hundred Sixty Sixth Street and saw the son.

Why is it necessary to use that language? That is an extraordinary way to address a letter.

Mr. CARTER. I don't think so. Ghost writing isn't always publicized. I mean the ghost isn't.

Mr. MORRIS. You are writing to an old friend of yours, Owen Lattimore. Why should it be necessary for you to call Lamont as the son? Were you doing something you didn't want anyone else to know about?

Mr. CARTER. I didn't make it confidential.

Mr. MORRIS. No, it is not marked confidential.

The CHAIRMAN. You might answer that question: Were you doing something you didn't want anyone else to know about?

Mr. CARTER. I think undoubtedly someone in our shop was to do some ghost writing for another person—I have never known it was good etiquette to advertise that very usual American procedure.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Corliss Lamont?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you spoken on the same platform with him?

Mr. CARTER. I think once in a war relief—I think on one occasion, something that used to be Mecca Temple where I spoke on the same platform, but under what auspices I think I would say it was Russian relief, but it may have been some other organization.

Mr. MORRIS. Is Corliss Lamont a Communist?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. MORRIS. How can you be so sure of that?

Mr. CARTER. I think he has done a great deal to put certain aspects of Russian policy in a good light before the American people, but it would take a long time to build up piece by piece why I do not think he is a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. You were fooled on Dr. Chi, were you not?

Mr. CARTER. I will not admit that I was fooled, that Dr. Chi was a Communist while he was working for the IPR. Many years later, like hundreds of Chinese Nationalists, he went over to the Communists.

I think the fact that a man eventually becomes a Communist does not prove that he was always a Communist any more than it proves that a person who has been a Communist is always a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you any comment to make on the articles we introduced under the pseudonym of Han-Seng Chen? I mean in a Communist publication by Dr. Chi.

Mr. CARTER. I have not read the article, so I wouldn't like to comment.

Mr. MORRIS. I also would like to introduce at this time an additional letter. I might say, Mr. Chairman, that this letter from Rose Yardumian as well as the one from Mr. Carter, may have been properly introduced, but if not, may I introduce them now?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 26" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 26

AMERICAN COUNCIL,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS,
Washington, January 20, 1944.

MR. EDWARD C. CARTER,
*International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York 22, New York.*

DEAR MR. CARTER: I received your letter of January 17 with copies of the telegrams you sent Mr. Hiss and Mr. Currie. I called Alger Hiss yesterday morning and he told me that he had received your wire but was sure that I would understand that he could not make the first advance in arranging a private talk with Rogoff. He mentioned the Rogoff articles in War and the Working Class and that Rogoff's material had caused considerable controversy in circles here. He said that if Larry Todd wanted to bring Rogoff to Hornbeck's office, they would not refuse to see him. I am not sure that I understand the machinations of our State Department. Bill Johnstone saw no point in my trying to get in touch with Mr. Hornbeck directly, since presumably Hiss had consulted with Hornbeck.

Mr. Currie has arranged to see Rogoff at 12 o'clock today. Colonel Faymonville is returning to Washington from New York this morning and is supposed to get on touch with our office then.

Rogoff visited our offices yesterday afternoon and Bill and I had a little talk with him about the small meeting which we had hoped to hold Thursday at 5:30. Rogoff said that he thought that it was unwise for us to hold the meeting; that certain Chinese groups in Washington were very distressed at the fact that he was talking so much. He thinks that it would be bad for the Institute of Pacific Relations to have him speak under its auspices. Bill and Anne Johnstone had hoped to get a small group of people together at their home this evening—the Hornbecks, Remers, Blakeslees, and a few others—but time is very short and many of these people have already made plans for this evening, so the Johnstone idea will probably not come off. However, Rogoff is coming in to our office at 2 o'clock today; Bill is planning to take him to the Cosmos Club to talk with Owen Lattimore, Carl Remer, and John Carter Vincent. After he talks with these people, we are making arrangements to take him to the Library of Congress and a few other places.

I am sorry that our meeting did not work out for him as I know that there are many people here who would have enjoyed hearing him.

Sincerely yours,

Rose,
ROSE YARDUMIAN.

P. S.—I am enclosing a list of the Army-Navy people who have accepted to date.

P. P. S.—Rogoff and Bill have been at the Cosmos Club for the last 2½ hours talking with Lattimore, Remer, and Vincent.

BALLARD LITTLE.

MR. MORRIS. I would like to introduce by reference one more document, and that is a photostat from the Workers Monthly. This has an early date on it. This is December 1925.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 27" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 27

Positive print of workers monthly with picture of C. T. Chi.
(Filed in biographical folder.)

MR. MORRIS. This is a picture of C. T. Chi, according to this.

I offer that picture and ask you if you can identify this man here. Is that your friend, Dr. Chi?

MR. CARTER. It is a damn poor picture. I wouldn't want to stand up and swear that is Chi.

Mr. MORRIS. That is 1925.

Mr. CARTER. Yes; but it is quite a different head, hair cut and avoirdupois, et cetera.

Mr. MORRIS. That is an unusual name, C. T. Chi.

Mr. CARTER. Oh, no.

Is Smith an unusual name?

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to read the inscription with this caption here:

The world of imperialism is passing. Let us join hands with all enemies of imperialism, disregarding race, creed, or nationality—C. T. Chi of the Chinese students alliance who addressed the Congress on anti-imperialism.

Mr. Mandel, would you testify as to the nature of this publication we are discussing?

Mr. MANDEL. The Worker's Monthly, a copy of which I have here, on its masthead, states that it is published by the Daily Worker Society.

At that time that was a Communist publication. The picture was published in connection with an article on the first Negro Workers Congress by Robert Minor, a leader of the Communist Party at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. If I may interrupt, please, Mr. Mandel has stated that he has the original there. If Mr. Carter could look at the picture in the original which would be black on white instead of white on black, he might make the identification.

Mr. CARTER. This is even more unlike him, in my view. To satisfy me, which is not your business, I would want a little more documentary evidence.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have a witness who will testify on this particular score, but I prefer not to introduce this testimony at this time.

May I get back to this letter of June 1945. This is the second paragraph.

There is just one section of your draft that I question slightly, and this is at the bottom of page 3 and top of page 4. This possibility is precisely what your critics are always advancing. They say that the Soviet Union is definitely going to annex Manchuria, etc. While you put it in reverse, I would hate to have your critics pounce on this and announce that even Lattimore admits that Manchuria is to become a part of the Soviet Union. Do you see any way of avoiding this?

Does that refresh your recollection?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You now recall the article in question?

Mr. CARTER. Yes; I have already.

Mr. MORRIS. To what extent?

Mr. CARTER. I have not been able to remember the contents of the Reader's Digest article, or whether I saw it or not.

Mr. MORRIS. Whom did you see in this matter? Who worked on this project? Isn't it so this is a joint effort between you and Mr. Lattimore to draft a reply that you were hoping Thomas Lamont was going to insert in the New York Times?

Mr. CARTER. That was the proposal. It was never carried through. It was never accepted by Mr. Lamont, and, therefore, never published.

Mr. MORRIS. Whom else did you work with on this matter?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember, except as I indicated earlier, I consulted Corliss Lamont, the second son.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know a man named T. A. Bisson?

Mr. CARTER. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you take this matter up with Mr. Bisson?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember, but if you have got something that will refresh my mind, I will be glad to comment.

Mr. MORRIS. I have here a memorandum "TAB from ECC." That is Mr. T. A. Bisson and that is your nomenclature?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS (reading) :

What would you think of one of us writing to the Times some such letter as the enclosed first draft? If we should send such a letter I think a final paragraph should be added putting in a plea for a strong united independent China, a China which would inspire the confidence of the world in general and a China which would give confidence to those businessmen who seek mutually advantageous trade between their country and China.

Mr. CARTER. That is a splendid objective.

Mr. MORRIS. I offer this letter to you and ask you to make a comment on that.

Mr. CARTER. I wrote some pretty good stuff.

Mr. MORRIS. Whose reply is on there? Do you recognize the handwriting there?

Mr. CARTER. It is in pencil. I can't make out the initial.

Mr. MORRIS. "TAB."

Mr. CARTER. That is Bisson.

Mr. MORRIS. He thought it was a beautiful piece.

Mr. CARTER. Yes. Clear, objective, uncompromising.

Mr. MORRIS. Is Mr. Bisson a Communist?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. The same way I know my wife is a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean the same way your wife is not?

Mr. CARTER. Is not a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like the record straight on that.

Mr. CARTER. Thank you very much.

Mr. MORRIS. I don't quite understand the remark, but I would like you to explain it.

Mr. CARTER. I have known Bisson for a great many years, naturally not as well as I know my wife. I think he is a 100 percent American, very conscientious, very honest, and apparently was so considered.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Mr. Bisson one of the editors of China Today?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember. You may refresh my memory on that by showing me the masthead of China Today at the time when it was more inclusive than you would expect; I mean in its editorial staff when it included people who were non-Communists quite definitely.

Mr. MORRIS. If you saw T. A. Bisson's name on this publication China Today, you would say that China Today at that time also included non-Communists? Was that your answer?

Mr. CARTER. If his name was on China Today in the early days of that magazine, I would conclude that they were doing perhaps the usual game of including non-Communists as a sort of front.

But whether it was Communist controlled, or not, I don't happen to know because I didn't subscribe to the paper and wasn't intimately familiar with it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter, you do remember Mr. T. A. Bisson's very controversial article published by IPR in 1943, which divided China into two Chinas—one Mr. Bisson called feudal China and one democratic China?

Feudal China he identified as Nationalist China and democratic China he identified as Communist China?

Mr. CARTER. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you think that is the writing of a man who you could be so sure is not a Communist?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you think that is the division of China, or was the division of China in 1943?

Mr. CARTER. Certainly not today.

Mr. MORRIS. In 1943, was it?

Mr. CARTER. In 1943 Nationalist China because of the war and other causes was pretty feudal. Chiang Kai-shek admitted a little later that China was feudal and had to modernize.

At that time in 1943 Chinese Communists were not carrying on the rough dirty stuff they are today. They were getting in the villages and the counties something more like a democratic pattern than anything that was happening in Kuomintang China.

I told Bisson I thought that was too much a black and white division; that it was more gray, but I didn't see the article until after it was published.

So my disagreement with him on that terminology had no influence because it was over the dam.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record at this point the article, China's Part in a Coalition War, by T. A. Bisson, wherein he describes the two Chinas, one as feudal China and one as Communist China.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 28" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 28

[From Far Eastern Survey, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, July 14, 1943, vol. XII, No. 14]

CHINA'S PART IN A COALITION WAR (By T. A. Bisson)

Article starts by recognizing how long China fought alone; then strongly reprimands the China Nationalist Government for demanding that Japan, not Germany, be defeated first. Says this demand plays into the hands of American isolationists. Also reproves China for saying she is near to collapse. Then proceeds (pp. 138-141):

"Still more, it left questions in the minds of many Americans as to what lay behind the ineptness of the political tactics applied to Chinese relations with this country. The answers to these questions must be sought, in large part, in the changes which have occurred in China's political and economic life during the past few years.

"TWO CHINAS

"At the outset of such an analysis, it is necessary to repeat an important generalization stressed by many commentators on Chinese affairs—that the early promise held out by the war for the broadening and deepening of Chinese national unity through the achievement of liberal political and economic reforms, has not been fulfilled.¹ This promise, in fact, died early in the war.

¹ See, for a recent example, Pearl Buck, A Warning About China, Life, May 10, 1943, pp. 53-56.

"It received its best documentary expression in The Program of National Resistance and Reconstruction adopted by an emergency session of the Kuomintang Congress at Hankow, on March 29, 1938.² The democratic provisions even of this program, which was not without shortcomings, were not carried out, and this high point of the first year of the war soon became a melancholy landmark.

"Early in 1939 the Kuomintang conservatives became alarmed at the rapid reconquest and reorganization of territories behind the Japanese lines by the Eighth Route and New Fourth, Communist-led armies.³

"Clashes, at first sporadic, soon became more frequent. Early in 1941, the New Fourth Army was outlawed by the Chungking military authorities, following an abortive effort to destroy its headquarters corps and crush its leadership. Central Government aid to the Eighth Route Army had meanwhile lapsed; and the blockade of the Shen-Kan-Ning border region by Kuomintang forces, numbering some 500,000 and commanded by Gen. Hu Tsung-nan, has since continued.

"A year or more before Pearl Harbor, therefore, two Chinas had definitely emerged. Each had its own government, its own military forces, its own territories. More significant, each had its own characteristic set of political and economic institutions. One is now generally called Kuomintang China; the other is called Communist China.

"However, these are only party labels. To be more descriptive, the one might be called feudal China; the other, democratic China.⁴ These terms express the actualities as they exist today, the real institutional distinctions between the two Chinas.

"COMPARISON OF CASUALTIES INFLICTED

"In an attempt to analyze these differences, it should be recognized at once that one is not dealing with irrelevant abstractions. The institutions which characterize one China as feudal and the other as democratic have the most practical relevance to the leading problems of the day. They are, in fact, the determinants of all policies, domestic and international, espoused by the two Chinas. They explain, as will be indicated, why Kuomintang China is compelled to demand immediate aid on a scale so great as to necessitate reversal of United Nations' global military strategy. They also explain the declining rate of casualties inflicted on the Japanese by the Kuomintang Armies, as contrasted with the increasing rate of casualties inflicted by the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies.

"According to official reports, the Kuomintang Armies have inflicted on the Japanese average annual casualties (in a total of 66 months) of 354,935, while the combined annual average for the Eighth Route (58 months' total) and the New Fourth (48 months' total) amounted to 113,338. For the last comparable year (July 1941-June 1942), however, the absolute figures are respectively 182,094 and 130,010. In other words, the Kuomintang Armies show an average annual record of 76 percent of total casualties inflicted, but in 1941-42 their achievement falls to only 58 percent of the total. On the other hand, the record of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies was lifted to 42 percent of the total in 1941-42, as against an annual average of 24 percent.

"The significance of this comparison is that it excludes the problems of blockade and foreign aid. Indeed, in these respects, the advantage lies entirely on the side of the Kuomintang Armies. They are supported by incomparably larger populations and richer territories. They have enjoyed the benefit of virtually all the military and economic aid rendered China by foreign nations. Since before Pearl Harbor, the Eighth Route and New Fourth armies have been doubly blockaded, by the Japanese on one side and by the Kuomintang Armies on the other.

"The differences indicated by the casualty figures must therefore be explained solely on the basis of efficiency or lack of efficiency in the mobilization of the human and material resources of the two Chinas. This question forces one back to an examination of the institutions which differentiate the two regions.

² For text, see Amerasia, April 25, 1943, pp. 118-120.

³ It is important to note that the "reorganization"—involving land reforms and electoral procedures in local government—was as much opposed as the "reconquest." For the emergence of effective political unity in China required, on the part of the Kuomintang, the acceptance of at least these minimal land and electoral reforms.

⁴ The term "feudal," as here used, is intended to define a society in which the landlord-peasant relationship is dominant and autocracy in government centers around this relationship.

"DEMOCRATIC CHINA"

"The key to the successful mobilization of the war potential of so-called Communist China lies in the extent to which its leaders have thrown off the feudal incubus which has weighed China down for centuries. No single measure can be pointed to as the open sesame which has increasingly achieved this objective. Economic reforms have been intertwined with political reforms, the one supporting the other. Basic to the whole program has been the land reform which has freed the peasant—the primary producer in these areas, and, indeed, over most of China—from the crushing weight of rent, taxes, and usurious interest charges as levied by a feudal economy.

"But the ingenuity of this reform, without which it could hardly be made to work, is that the newly introduced procedures of local democracy serve as the final sanction. The landlord and entrepreneur are not excluded from this process, but neither are they permitted to dominate it. Tax assessment committees, for example, are controlled by a majority of local members and exercise a strictly local jurisdiction. Farmers know well what their neighbors own.

"Over wide areas of this new China, elected councils—village, town, and district—and elected executive officials have completely supplanted the old autocratic system of feudal agrarian China. These councils and officials are either unpaid or receive mere pittance which leave them no better off economically than their fellow citizens.

"It is this democratic process, finally, which permits a large measure of free competition to operate over the whole of the economy. Bureaucratic price controls are not attempted. They are as unnecessary in this society as they would be in a New England town meeting. No landlord or merchant, with the watchful eyes of his neighbors upon him, can engage in hoarding or speculation. Within limits set mainly by local democratic checks, the individual landlord or entrepreneur is free, and is even encouraged, to expand his operations, and many are doing so.

"By no stretch of the imagination can this be termed 'communism'; it is, in fact, the essence of bourgeois democracy, applied mainly to agrarian conditions. The leaders in Yenan see in this program more than the answer to China's immediate problem of efficiently mobilizing her resources for the war against Japan. They see in it also the means of throwing off China's feudal shackles, the transition to modern nationhood.

"FEUDAL CHINA"

"The declining curve of military achievement by the Kuomintang Armies is correlated with a progressive decrease in the economic strength of Kuomintang China. While this decrease is notable, there is no need to adopt the alarmist view that collapse is inevitable. The human and material resources of Kuomintang China are large. Its economic reserves are still considerable. So also are its military reserves and potentialities.

"General Ch'en Ch'eng's use of the term 'negligence' clearly implied that more could be done with the military resources at hand than was being done. Concentration on the demand for more planes and guns from abroad, in other words, was getting in the way of full utilization of the weapons and forces at hand. General Ch'en Ch'eng has since given a specific illustration of this situation by pointing out that the American planes were based too far from the fighting fronts to be fully effective in the Hupeh campaign.⁵ An attitude of military passivity is revealed by this failure to develop facilities for air action near the front. The alert, active seizure of opportunities open even to limited means is evidently lacking.

"These considerations also apply to the economic sphere, although the problem is far more complicated and difficult. Here, too, General Ch'en Ch'eng's comments go straight to the nub of the issue. He states that 'there should be unrelenting vigilance and intensified preparations for counterattacks through military, political, and economic coordination.'⁶

"This is a demand for more vigorous action on the home front, with an emphasis sharply different from pleas for help from outside. As has already been seen, questions of blockade and outside aid are not necessarily decisive for effective military resistance, providing an efficient economic mobilization is accomplished.

⁵ New York Times, June 28, 1943. The same paper on June 29 carried Ch'en Ch'eng's statement that China needed "guns and equipment of all kinds," and would welcome "even one-thousandth part of 1 percent" of United States production.

⁶ China Daily News, June 19, 1943.

"In Kuomintang China, such a mobilization is severely handicapped by the leaders' unwillingness to challenge the basic postulates of the feudal system. No serious effort has been made to uproot the landlord-usurer system. With the port cities and their nascent bourgeois class removed, the landlords have become the economic mainstay of the Kuomintang regime.

"BUREAUCRACY TIGHTENS HOLD

"At the same time, the bureaucracy has taken over administration of a considerable slice of industrial production. Many industries have become government monopolies, not forced to maintain themselves in competition with private industry. Industrial development under private initiative, valuable as an offset to feudal relations, and needed in an economy of scarcity, was thus choked off at the very time when stimulation of the entrepreneur was justified. The declining numbers and strength of the industrial class weakened its challenge to the landlord-bureaucrat regime thereby putting new props under the tottering structure of Chinese feudalism.

"In these circumstances, there could be no real progress toward democratic reform or wider civil liberties. Inauguration of constitutional government, considered for a time in 1938, was eventually shelved for the duration. Non-Kuomintang representatives on the People's Political Council, which could have evolved into a national legislature, have steadily decreased. Over the new Political Councils in the provinces, Kuomintang control is carefully maintained. In the so-called 'new Hsien system,' embodying the program for instituting representative local government, candidates will be limited to those who have acceptably passed through Kuomintang training schools, while suffrage will be indirect and linked to the household units of the pao-chia system. These developments do not promise to create effective popular checks on the Kuomintang bureaucracy.

"With no effort at reform of the land system or initiation of democratic processes, the two basic prerequisites for an efficient wartime economic mobilization were lacking. As conditions deteriorated, successive measures looking toward the institution of a 'controlled economy' were introduced. The bureaucracy steadily expanded until its relative cost, measured against the limited output of the productive system, itself became a drag on the war effort.

"Even so, it could institute neither price nor commodity controls that were adequate to stay the course of inflation. Grain hoarding and speculation, the key factor in Kuomintang China's inflationary problem could be curbed by nothing less than genuine popular participation in application of the controls. This solution was barred. In a country predominately agrarian, with the landlords still entrenched in their feudal positions, no centralized government organ could send out the multitude of agents required to enforce its paper controls. Turn as it would, the bureaucracy could not solve this problem, and the economic foundations of the war effort were increasingly undermined.

"It is at this point that the true relevance of foreign aid to an economy of the Kuomintang model becomes evident. In order to conduct war on the basis of such an economy, access to the outside world is imperative. Steady injections of foreign supplies were in fact pumped into Kuomintang China up to Pearl Harbor, although in declining amounts after 1940.

"This extreme dependence on aid from the outside is a key which unlocks many mysteries. It provides an adequate explanation for the declining rate of the Kuomintang armies' military achievements. It also explains the persistent outcry in Chungking for a reversal of United Nations' strategy, as expressed in the editorials of its leading papers.⁷ The desperate need for outside assistance felt by Kuomintang China could only be met by such a reversal of strategy, since this alone would bring aid quickly on a large scale. And, finally, this appeal was logically transferred directly to the United States in the propaganda campaign conducted last winter.

"Obviously, the resources available in free China are much too limited to encompass the defeat of Japan. Large amounts of outside supplies are essential if the Chinese armies are to be equipped for successful offensives. Until then, however, the need is for the most effective utilization and development of the resources at hand.

"Elements within Kuomintang China are making efforts to achieve this end, as indicated by the forthright statements of General Che'en Ch'eng. Strong forces are working to establish greater freedom for the entrepreneur, as a means

⁷ See excerpts in article by Guenther Stein, *Far Eastern Survey*, June 14, 1943, p. 117.

to increase industrial production. The industrial cooperative movement, once freed of bureaucratic restrictions, would be able to forge ahead more rapidly. With proper encouragement, these sound elements within Kuomintang China can do much to overcome current economic weaknesses, although more thoroughgoing reforms are necessary in order to effect complete mobilization.

"A COALITION WAR—AND ITS REQUIREMENTS

"The United States, as the arsenal of democracy, bears a heavy responsibility for the war program of the United Nations. Its immense productive effort has begun to register with increasing effect on the war fronts. As the German tide in Europe recedes, the pressure on Japan will steadily increase. It is clearly essential that China, which has borne the heat and burden of the defensive in the Far East, should have a full and significant share in the victorious offensives that are now in the making. Toward this end, it would be advisable that China be given an adequate voice in framing the decisions on strategic policy. But China herself must change, if she is to make her full contribution to a coalition war.

"Realistic thinking on this problem will be stimulated if there is candid recognition that two Chinas exist at the present time. The task of statesmanship is to merge these two Chinas into one. To be sound and effective, such unification must come on the high plane of social advance and democratic reform. Until unification is achieved on this plane, China's full strength cannot be placed behind the war effort.

"It is also necessary to recognize that Kuomintang China is passing through a serious crisis. The challenge is for a renewal of the forward-looking elements in the party of Sun Yat-sen and a bold cutting loose from an archaic past. Defections of allegiance, already occurring, will tend to increase as reform is postponed, and the leadership of the China of the future may well pass to the progressive forces outside the Kuomintang.

"These issues in China pose a delicate and difficult problem for the other members of the United Nations. They are issues of such fundamental importance, however, that they cannot be ignored. Not only does the effective prosecution of the war during its final phase depend on the answers—the future status of China as a healthy and vigorous Nation, in which the people's livelihood is safeguarded by democratic processes, is at stake. Only such a China, moreover, can bring to the family of nations that level of constructive statesmanship that will be needed to guard the peace that the war has won."

Mr. CARTER. I hope you will emphasize the bouquets he gave to Chiang Kai-shek's government.

Mr. MORRIS. I would also ask Mr. Mandel if he would report to us, or testify for us, on the question of whether or not Mr. T. A. Bisson's name appeared as one of the editors of China Today.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Mandel, what does your record show?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel does not have the information on China Today with him at this time, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record the letter of E. C. Carter to Mr. Lattimore, dated June 19, 1945, and the memorandum of Mr. Bisson, and I think in all fairness to Mr. Lamont, I would like to introduce into the record his reply which he wrote on July 5, 1945, to Mr. Carter, in which he told him very strongly that he would not be willing to put his name to a draft of an article, the draft you, Mr. Bisson, and Mr. Lattimore, had worked on, Mr. Carter.

The CHAIRMAN. The documents will be received.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 29, 30, and 31," inclusive, and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 29

JUNE 19, 1945.

OWEN LATTIMORE, Esq.,

Roland View Road, Ruwton 4, Md.

DEAR OWEN: Here is a typed copy of the draft you handed me yesterday. Late last evening I went up to the One Hundred and Sixty-sixth Street and saw the son. I discovered that, alas, his father left yesterday for Maine and

probably will be gone all summer. I explained the general situation to the son and said that I would like his advice as to who would be the best single person or group of three or four to sign such a letter. He made some academic suggestions and then finally suggested the possibility of his father. He thought it would be better for me to approach him than for him to do so, though he said the chances weren't very good because his father is fatigued and doesn't usually like to take on extra burdens during his holiday. He also confirmed what I suspected, that the father likes to do his own writing. I am, however, prepared in 2 or 3 days to send the draft to him with as strong and tactful a letter as I can write on the off-chance that he might be willing to do something.

There is just one section of your draft that I question slightly and this is at the bottom of page 3 and top of page 4. This possibility is precisely what your critics are always advancing. They say that the Soviet Union is definitely going to annex Manchuria, etc. While you put it in reverse, I would hate to have your critics pounce on this and announce that even Lattimore admits that Manchuria is to become a part of the Soviet Union. Do you see any way of avoiding this?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

P. S.—May I make one more suggestion? That is, that you add a final paragraph in which the author puts in a plea for a strong, united, independent China; a China which would inspire the confidence of the American people in general and a China which would give confidence to those American businessmen who seek mutually advantageous trade between the United States and China.

EXHIBIT No. 30

JUNE 20, 1945.

T. A. B. from E. C. C.

What would you think of one of us writing to the Times some such letter as the enclosed first draft? If we should send such a letter I think a final paragraph should be added putting in a plea for a strong, united, independent China; a China which would inspire the confidence of the world in general and a China which would give confidence to those businessmen who seek mutually advantageous trade between their country and China.

At the bottom of page 3 and top of page 4, I am wondering whether Eastman and company might pick up the reference to north China's adhesion to Russia and shout that it just proves his point that Russia plans to annex Manchuria.

(The following is in pencil on same page:)

This is a beautiful piece—clear, objective, uncompromising. It should have a big effect in the Times.

I would not change the page 3-4 statement. The threat developing should be made clear in all its dimensions, as this statement does.

The end could be strengthened just along the lines you say.

In short, I agree with your whole piece, with a few changes as indicated, but these are not material, if you dislike them.

T. A. B.

EXHIBIT No. 31

NORTH HAVEN, MAINE, July 5, 1945.

EDWARD C. CARTER, Esq.,

Institute of Pacific Relations,

New York 22, N. Y.

MY DEAR CARTER: Many thanks for yours of June 29. You are too flattering about my casual letters to the New York Times. I, too, have been concerned over the steady drip against Russia by various commentators. Max Eastman has always been a weather cock, veering from pro-Trotsky to bitter anti-Soviet. Powell I had thought better of.

I have read the Reader's Digest article and have gone over with care your memorandum. In effect I think you are suggesting that I write to the Times a letter urging our Government to alter its apparent present policy, and to make available lend-lease supplies to the so-called Communist armies in northwest China. Quite aside from any question of transport to such a remote region,

the principle involved seems to be that I should assume knowledge of the situation, and of the proper policy to be drawn from same—more adequate than our Government has.

Of course, I have no such knowledge and could not justify myself in attempting to correct the policy adopted. My way would always be first to seek information from the Department at Washington. As a matter of fact, even in my letters to the Times when any possible question of current policy was involved, I have first shown the letters to the Department of State, not for approval but for clearance as to any question of crossing wires.

You know your China better than I do, for my stay there was hardly more than a month or two. But we both realize how exceedingly complicated the situation is and is bound to be. Chiang's government now loosely rules all eastern and southern China (subject to Japanese occupation). The area includes all the great cities. Now, if Chiang has his doubts as to the effectiveness of the Chinese Communist armies against the Japanese—and such question has been many times raised—and if Chiang is fearful that once Japan is ousted, then those northern armies will turn on him, perhaps he is justified in feeling that the meager supplies available for China should be furnished for his armies and not for the other boys. In your memorandum you point out that Russia has been scrupulous to send supplies to Chiang alone. Well, if that be true, why is that not additional argument for us to do the same?

I am really discussing things about which I have no first-hand information. And in reading your memorandum I may well have just been stupid. Am I all wrong?

With personal regards,
Sincerely yours,

T. W. LAMONT.

(Written but not signed by Mr. Lamont.)

The CHAIRMAN. This piece of paper I hold in my hand dated June 20, 1945, TAB from ECC, with some handwriting on the bottom, what do you want to do about that?

Mr. MORRIS. That was introduced, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. What are you going to do with the handwriting on the bottom?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter, it could be the handwritten reply of T. A. Bisson?

Mr. CARTER. I think so; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. When you use the expression that, "A former White Russian is currently pink," what do you mean?

Mr. CARTER. What year and who was the guy?

Mr. MORRIS. I am going to introduce a letter that you wrote to Harriette Moore. I think we have discussed Harriette Moore before.

On 12-10-45—that is December 10, 1945—I would like to call your attention to the last sentence on the first paragraph that ends on page 2.

Mr. CARTER. Is there a white copy of this?

The CHAIRMAN. I am informed it is in the other room.

Mr. CARTER. Do you want me to comment on it?

Mr. MORRIS. Why do you call a White Russian wholesomely pink?

Mr. CARTER. I didn't.

The Master of Balliol—that is the head of Oxford, a most ancient college. He had told me that this guy, Kovanolov, though a White Russian, was now wholesomely pink and he would have to ask the Master of Balliol and me what he meant.

Mr. MORRIS. Didn't you agree with that interpretation at the time? Will you read the preceding paragraph?

The CHAIRMAN. Was there an article by Bisson?

Mr. MORRIS. It was inserted in the record, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CARTER. Here I am reporting on varied activities in England where I sought to establish contact with Englishmen interested in Russian studies. I saw the heads of various colleges and London institutions.

Also the editor of the London Times, and several others.

A proposal was made that a full professor of Russian at Oxford now at New College, Oxford, one time was at Birmingham University, whom I saw and that he was a great pal of Samuel Cross at Harvard, who was a great Slavic scholar and highly regarded.

They asked the Academy of Science in Moscow to send a philologist for a year to Oxford.

Mr. MORRIS. The expression in the fourth paragraph of the letter is:

Kovanolov, the new full professor of Russian at Oxford, is now at New College. He is a White Russian who left the Soviet Union legitimately in the early days on the advice of Gorki.

What do you mean by that?

Mr. CARTER. I was told in Oxford he was not an emigre from the Soviet Union, as what the Bolsheviks would call a flow of the people.

Mr. MORRIS. He was in good graces with the Soviet Union?

Mr. CARTER. He was in good graces enough to get out.

Mr. MORRIS. And he had the advice of Gorki?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was the Master of Balliol?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember. I think it was——

Mr. MORRIS. Was it Michael Lindsey's father?

Mr. CARTER. Was it H. A. L. Lindsey who has a son called Michael, whom I did not meet at that time?

Mr. MORRIS. Wasn't Michael Lindsey active in IPR?

Mr. CARTER. He wrote one or two articles for the IPR. He was a member of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in England, and did a great deal of work for the British Foreign Office, bringing out information from Communists and Nationalist China to aid in the British war effort.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Michael Lindsey a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. CARTER. I never heard of it.

Mr. MORRIS. When you wrote here that the Master of Balliol: "told me that Kovanolov, though a White Russian, was now wholesomely pink," what did you understand it to mean by Kovanolov?

Mr. CARTER. I cannot speak for the most distinguished head of an Oxford College.

The CHAIRMAN. The question was what you meant when you used that language.

Mr. MORRIS. When you were writing to Harriette Moore.

Mr. CARTER. I was quoting someone else. Now I am going to do what Sourwine says I shouldn't, try to reconstruct because I don't remember. If I am allowed to reconstruct——

Mr. MORRIS. By all means.

Mr. CARTER. Several types of people come out of Russia—those who like Russia but hate the Communist system; those who are fed up and never want to go back, and those who don't like the Communist system, but want to go back when the present gang is thrown out.

This fellow is a philologist, so interested in philology, astrometry, or what not, that they spend their time on their profession instead of becoming professional anti-Soviet agitators.

I know quite a number of Russians who want to keep off of political questions and go on with their scientific job. I assume that is what the Master of Balliol meant.

Mr. SOURWINE. Since you have brought up the subject of reconstruction, I would like to go even back of that and ask you if you can recall whether the Master of Balliol actually used these precise words to you?

Mr. CARTER. I can't recall.

The CHAIRMAN. What is that?

Mr. CARTER. I cannot recall whether he used those.

This reads:

The Master of Balliol had told me that Konaolov, though a White Russian, was now wholesomely pink.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he use to you the words "wholesomely pink"?

Mr. CARTER. I can't swear to it. I don't think I would have invented it if he hadn't used it.

Mr. SOURWINE. If he didn't use the words "wholesomely pink," he used something else that meant the same thing to you?

Mr. CARTER. I was trying to recall the impression I got out of what he was driving at.

Mr. SOURWINE. Don't you usually put quotation marks around somebody else's words when you are trying to convey the fact you are quoting them?

Mr. CARTER. Not always; sorry to say.

Mr. SOURWINE. In this case you were attempting to convey your memory of the precise words that had been used by the master of Balliol to you?

Mr. CARTER. That is right. This was written from London clearly after a very recent visit to Oxford.

Senator O'CONNOR. Mr. Carter, there is another letter, a copy of which is before me, and I would be very pleased to have you read it, if you so desire, and one which I do not think has previously been examined by you during this interrogation. It is under date of April 12, 1943. It is addressed to the Honorable John H. Kerr, chairman of the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

It is regarding T. A. Bisson. If I make references, I would be glad to make it available to you.

The specific point I would like to bring out has to do with the question of the time when Dr. Jessup was in part control or sole control of the editorial policy of IPR.

Was there such a period?

Mr. CARTER. There was no period where he was editor or chairman of the research committee.

There were periods when he was chairman of the American IPR and another period when he was chairman of the Pacific Council.

He was never on the paid staff.

Senator O'CONNOR. Wasn't he chairman of the research advisory committee of the American Council?

Mr. CARTER. He was.

Senator O'CONOR. What time was that?

Mr. CARTER. I can't give you the date without looking.

Senator O'CONOR. This letter from you to Mr. Kerr contains this reference:

Dr. Philip Jessup was chairman of the institute at that time. This assignment was given to Mr. Bisson with Dr. Jessup's full approval.

Under separate cover I am sending you a copy of the book in order that you may familiarize yourself with the quality of his writing. This book has high praise from a good many American experts on the Far East.

Then you go on to attest to Mr. Bisson's 100-percent Americanism.

Does that correctly state the fact as to the time and Dr. Jessup's position?

Mr. CARTER. I don't find here in my hurried reading—the book on American policy in the Far East?

Senator O'CONOR. That is right.

Mr. CARTER (reading):

Dr. Jessup, of Columbia, was chairman of the institute at that time, and this assignment was given to Mr. Bisson with Dr. Jessup's full approval. I am sending a copy under separate cover.

I have just said I think correctly Dr. Jessup was not chairman of the research committee or a research officer.

However, in the series of inquiry volumes some 40 titles are listed that Mr. Holland and I had immediate supervision of. We had an executive committee of Dennery, a Frenchman; Angus, an eminent Canadian; and a third person I have forgotten.

But in setting up this Rockefeller finance project on the issues of the Sino-Japanese War, it was arranged that the whole operation be under the direction of whoever was chairman of the institute.

During part of that time it was Dr. Jessup.

Senator O'CONOR. Did he at any time substitute for you, or replace you when you were away?

Mr. CARTER. Jessup? No; never.

Senator O'CONOR. Was there any period during which you were away from the country and had anyone else to take your place in the current matters?

Mr. CARTER. That would have been Mr. Holland, if I remember rightly.

Mr. Jessup was a volunteer at a higher echelon. I was paid.

Senator O'CONOR. There is one other point, Mr. Carter, I would like to ask you about. That is regarding Mr. Lattimore's association with Frederick V. Field.

I have before me a letter which is dated October 17, 1940, addressed by Owen Lattimore to Mr. F. V. Field, American Peace Mobilization, 1116 Vermont Avenue NW., Washington, D. C.

DEAR FRED: Enclosed I am sending you an article submitted to me by Asiaticus. For readers of Pacific Affairs, it would read like propaganda, and rhapsodical propaganda at that.

During this period from and after October 17, was Mr. Lattimore in more or less direct contact with Mr. Field, to your knowledge?

Mr. CARTER. October 17, 1940—Lattimore, I think, was still editor of Pacific Affairs. I think he continued for a few months into 1941.

He also sent drafts of articles submitted to him to quite a variety of

people of different points of view. I would have to ask Lattimore to verify the letter.

On the surface it looks as though Lattimore wrote this letter to Field.

Senator O'CONOR. It shows a very friendly relationship, does it not?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

In 1944, yes. In 1940, yes. The break with Field intellectually came when he joined the American Peace Mobilization.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the date?

Mr. CARTER. October 17, 1940.

Senator O'CONOR. That is addressed to him at the American Peace Mobilization?

Mr. CARTER. But shortly after. Wasn't this the year?

Mr. MORRIS. It was after.

Mr. CARTER. But not much after?

Mr. MORRIS. It was after.

Mr. CARTER. Continuing on your point, when Mr. Field was pressured in Chicago to join the American Peace Mobilization, as I remember it, he phoned both Mr. Jessup and myself saying that for conscience sake he thought he ought to join this movement and, therefore, as it was an action thing, resign from the IPR. He thought it would embarrass the IPR as an action movement, but he at that time felt, as many Americans did, that we were being euchred into a Daladier-Chamberlain war.

It was the phony war period, and he was willing to fight for king and country, or for President and country, in a real war for democracy, but he did not want to fight for Chamberlain and Daladier, and eventually the French and the British decided they didn't want to fight for Chamberlain.

Changes were made. Churchill became Prime Minister of England.

In the meantime, pacifists, clergymen, and a bunch of Communists started this organization. Ultimately they took over.

Jessup and I tried to persuade Fred Field he would regret it all of his life. He is now paying a bit of the price.

Senator O'CONOR. The other topic in this general connection about which I would like to ask you had to do with a series of communications between you and Lauchlin Currie, copies of which have been introduced in evidence. I do not know whether you have read them.

Mr. CARTER. I would like to look at them.

Senator O'CONOR. I give them to you first. They show a series of telegrams from you to Lauchlin Currie at the White House, and letters.

My question is whether or not that was at or about the time that you were interested in the possible commissioning of Mr. Field as an intelligence officer in the United States Army?

The CHAIRMAN. What is the date?

Senator O'CONOR. May 1942.

Mr. CARTER. One is May 5, 1942, and one is September 17, 1941; one is January 21, 1941; one is May 4, 1941.

Is there any mention of Field in here?

Senator O'CONOR. Not in the telegrams.

What were you telegraphing him about? Or what did you wish to see him about on these occasions?

Mr. CARTER. On two or three occasions Mr. Hull and Mr. Welles thought I should inform the White House of what I was doing as president of Russian War Relief. Whenever the few times I wanted some information given to the President, I did it through Currie, one of his executive assistants.

There are so vague as to what the purport of a visit was, but I think I saw Hiss quite as much after talking with Sumner Welles about Russian relief, about the IPR.

(After the hearing was closed, witness informed the reporter that Hiss, above referred to, should be Currie.)

Senator O'CONOR. You don't recall any further representations you made to Lauchlin Currie about the possible Field commission?

Mr. CARTER. What do the records show as to the time that Field was invited by one or two people in the War Department to apply for a commission? What year?

Mr. MORRIS. It is in 1942.

Mr. CARTER. A good many of these letters are 1941, before that came up. I may or may not.

Senator O'CONOR. Yesterday we asked you as to what other places in the Government, if any, you were recommending for Mr. Field. I think you volunteered the information, although you weren't given very much time to think it over, possibly OWI and in OSS, if I recall; is that right?

Mr. CARTER. That was sort of a hunch. It was a possibility.

Senator O'CONOR. Upon further reflection of the matter, since yesterday, can you give us any more specific information as to what other places, if any?

Mr. CARTER. No. I racked my brain last night. As I said, I definitely wrote a letter when I knew that officers of the War Department asked him to apply. I wrote quite sincerely saying I thought he would be useful, but I don't remember at all when that avenue closed what, if anything; I did for other appointments.

Mr. MORRIS. I have one other question.

I would like to show you a copy of a letter that we discussed in executive session. This is a letter from you to Brooke Claxton in Montreal, dated October 31, 1938. It reads:

DEAR CLAXTON: Fred Field from San Francisco has sent me an amusing answer to my inquiry for American speakers. I should say that W. T. Stone of the Foreign Policy Association was well qualified. Raymond Leslie Buell is more forceful and more sure of his views than Stone.

If the Canadian Club can stand the general secretary of the Communist Party in the United States, Earl Browder would give you an exceedingly interesting, pleasantly provocative, but a really important statement on the Roosevelt administration either from the point of view of its internal or its foreign policy. He is really very well informed, and, contrary to the public view, is 100-percent American.

Do you remember our discussion in executive session on that?

Mr. CARTER. Yes; and you have given me more information which I welcome, because in the form I am reading, you did not give me the lead which said that this was an amusing answer to my inquiry.

I knew Claxton well. He had a wonderful sense of humor. He is now Minister of Defense in Canada. He asked me for speakers. I gave him a mixed group—a brilliant fellow, a dramatic, Leslie Buell.

I said if the Canadian Club can stand the general secretary of the Communist Party in the United States, Earl Browder would give you an exceedingly interesting, pleasantly provocative, but a really important statement on the Roosevelt administration.

Mr. MORRIS. In executive session you never claimed it was said in frolic and banter?

Mr. CARTER. Here you helped me. You hand me today—

Mr. MORRIS. If you concede it, you have said he was 100 percent American, and I do not see why it would be frolic and banter.

Mr. CARTER. Because you have given me a letter in which I refer to it as an amusing instance.

Mr. MORRIS. Was your testimony in executive session not true testimony?

Mr. CARTER. My testimony in executive session was without this document you have just handed me.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is: Was it true?

Mr. CARTER. I intended it to be true. It was true.

Mr. MORRIS. It may not have made sense.

Mr. CARTER. At that time people in Canada and the United States were inviting Soviet diplomats to make speeches. Most of them spoke poor English. They did not understand North American psychology.

Browder, in his Kansas way, had a 100-percent American look, knew our vernacular. If they wanted something amusing and provocative, they would get a better dose of the true Communist gospel, more vivid terms, from an American than from a Russian.

Mr. MORRIS. That is what you mean by 100-percent American?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

I didn't mean and Claxton wouldn't mean—

Mr. MORRIS. I would like the record to show the following documents with which in the course of the last hour we have neglected to introduce:

One is a letter from Mr. Carter to Mr. Lattimore, dated June 20, 1941, which I understand has not been introduced.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 32" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 32

Copy to WLH sent.

NEW YORK, N. Y., June 20, 1941.

OWEN LATTIMORE, Esq.,

300 Gilman Hall, Johns Hopkins University,

Baltimore, Md.

DEAR OWEN: If you have time while in San Francisco you and Bill Holland may want to arrange a private talk with Col. Philip R. Faymonville whose present address is Headquarters of the Fourth Army, Presidio of San Francisco, Calif.

He would, I think, have been thoroughly at home and at ease if he had lunched with us at the Mayflower on Wednesday. I think you get the idea. It may be that if you get the same favorable impression of him which Harriet Moore and I have, he might be someone who could be exceptionally useful to you and the Generalissimo at some future time in Chungking. If you wish me to I will wire him for an appointment.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. One is a letter that Senator O'Connor made reference to, which is a letter from Edward Carter, dated April 12, 1943, to Hon. John R. Kerr.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 33," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 33

NEW YORK CITY, April 12, 1943.

Regarding T. A. Bisson.

Hon. JOHN H. KERR,

*Chairman, Special Subcommittee on Committee on Appropriations,
House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR SIR: I have known Mr. Bisson personally for more than 10 years. He was a member of the American delegation to the IPR Conference at Yosemite National Park in 1936. The late Hon. Newton D. Baker was chairman of that delegation.

As a member of the research staff of the Foreign Policy Association, I have followed Mr. Bisson's scholarly writing on the Far East very closely. He has consistently maintained a high standard of objectivity. Indeed, his work is of such a high order that in 1938 the institute asked him to write a book on American policy in the Far East. Dr. Philip C. Jessup, of Columbia University, was chairman of the institute at that time and this assignment was given to Mr. Bisson with Dr. Jessup's full approval. Under separate cover I am sending you a copy of that book in order that you may familiarize yourself with the quality of his writing. This book has received high praise from a great many outstanding American experts on the Far East. It has consequently had a wide sale and is a standard reference book in a great many public and university libraries.

Mr. Bisson is 100 percent American. He was alert to the Japanese menace long before the general public became aware of the implications to the peace of America of Japanese aggression and in many of his writings he faithfully stated the issues that the United States must face vis-à-vis Japanese military expansion.

If you wish further information please let me know.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. The other is a letter from Mr. Carter to Harriette Moore, dated October 12, 1945.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 34," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 34

(Copy of this letter sent to Dr. Percy E. Corbett and Dr. Owen Lattimore.)

PARK LANE HOTEL,

London W. 1, October 12, 1945.

Miss HARRIETT MOORE,

American Russian Institute, 58 Park Avenue, New York, N. Y.

DEAR HARRIET: Among my rather too varied activities in England I have tried for the sake of the IPR to establish as many contacts as possible with those who are interested in Russian studies. Yesterday I visited the School of Slavonic Studies and had a long talk with Miss Dorothy Galton, whom you probably met on her recent visit to North America. She kindly gave me for our private use this copy of her report to the Rockefeller Foundation. You will notice that it has everything except her conclusions. Doubtless I can get her conclusions from Marshall when I reach New York. If Corbett has not seen her report, I think he will doubtless want to do so and eventually I want to show it to Belshaw and others. The London school is hanging on by its ears and is pretty well bereft of staff; they tried to get E. H. Carr, now of the London Times, to take Sir Bernard Pears' place, but the higher-ups in London University black-balled him. They are now intriguing with Vernadsky of Yale to lure him to London for the twilight of his life.

At Oxford on my first visit I had a useful talk on both Russian and Chinese studies with Maurice Bowra, the warden of Wadham. He spent his early days in China and at that time knew Chinese and learnt Russian and when some Red

Army men visited Oxford he surprised everyone by bursting forth into good Russian. He is going to be a useful man not only at Oxford for Chinese and Russian studies, but could ultimately be of use to the IPR.

On my second visit I saw Sumner, the new warden of All Souls. You are probably familiar with his recent book on Russia. He is intensely interested and is behind the whole new movement at Oxford to found serious schools of Arabic, Indian, Chinese, and Russian studies. Both he and Bowra would be very competent reviewers for Pacific Affairs.

Kovanalov, the new full professor of Russian at Oxford, is now at New College. He is a White Russian who left the Soviet Union legitimately in the early days on the advice of Gorki. He has been at Birmingham University where he fought with the other White Russian and is now entrenched at Oxford, I suppose for the rest of his life. He was absent on both my visits, but today on his arrival from a visit in Paris came to see me and told me in detail of his big ideas for the new Russian school at Oxford. I will share my notes with you and Corbett on my talk with him in due season. He is a pal of Sam Cross at Harvard, is very eager for American, French, and Russian collaboration. He had not heard of the big new plans at Columbia. He hopes to get Cross over to Oxford for some lectures this year. He has asked the Academy of Science in Moscow to send a philologist for a year to Oxford, thinking that that was a subject which would not cause any political complications. The master of Balliol had told me that Kovanalov, though a White Russian, was now wholesomely pink.

I will also share with you in due season my notes on people at Birmingham, Glasgow, and Cambridge. Also I will give you the reasons for Kovanalov's statement that Russian scholarship in France is much more broadly based than it is likely to be in England for a considerable time. At Chatham House, Dr. Lindgren is just leaving to return to Cambridge. Violet Connolley is still working for Ford but I suspect may return to Chatham House.

Carr is a tower of strength to the London Times and personally I am glad that he is there rather than at the School of Slavonic Studies.

I had a very long talk with Moseley and find that he has matured and I think has become more objective with reference to the U. S. S. R. As one of the few people who were on the inside of the London Foreign Ministers Conference, he felt that there were mistakes on both sides and that though Molotov was obstructionist, there was a considerable measure of rational thinking on his part. He agreed with me that Stalin and Molotov are following a line similar to that of Fox in his book "The Super Powers." The Kremlin clearly believes that in this interim period the Big Three have certain major responsibilities, that it would be premature to share with an ever-widening circle of middle and small powers, with always the danger that they may be forced to share responsibility with definitely fascist states.

I have had two long evenings with Gromyko who is heavy, conscientious but has not, when he is in a formal meeting, the light touch or the quick knowledge of English that is so essential in these meetings where the main thinking and speaking is in the English language.

Rogoff, as you will suspect, I have seen several times with great profit and with great delight because he has so many of the qualities that Gromyko and Molotov lack.

Alexander Werth spoke at a big meeting at Chatham House and did extraordinarily well, though much of the audience was, if not hostile, at least incredulous. The main body of his talk will appear ultimately in *International Affairs*. His big 300,000 word book will be published next spring by Hamish; I want to talk with you and Corbett as to the desirability of the Secretariat or the Yale Press, or the ARI considering a North American edition if Hamish is interested and if you think the matter should be explored. Werth is convinced that Truman's exclusiveness with the atom was one of the reasons for Molotov's doubting attitude at the London conference. Salter's Oxford speech, at least as quoted in the London press, could not have helped the situation; that is a pity because in his general attitude, when I dined with him, Sumner and others at All Souls, I found that Salter tended to endorse the Moscow insistence on certain responsibilities remaining for a further period with the Big Three.

Jo Barnes passed through London and gave me a little picture of the sag in American confidence in Russia, but wasn't sure whether it would be permanent. Moseley was very emphatic that the atrocities of the Red Army in Germany and Eastern Europe were mostly exaggerated. He has had access, I gather, to all of the American governmental reports on this matter. His long skepticism about the Soviet Union makes his remarks in this connection carry considerable weight.

Werth gave invaluable insight as to the psychology of the Red Army as they went into other countries and had considerable material on the variance in the attitude and behaviour in different areas.

I had the privilege of meeting a number of the internationally Friends at the Friends International Centre (37 Gordon Square, London W.C. 1). You will remember that the Friends rendered a very distinguished service in Russia for many years after the revolution. They would like an opportunity for further service and are very eager for intellectual and cultural contacts. They are doing their best to promote more general study of Russia as you will see from the enclosed program.

One evening I spent with Z. F. Willis, the National Secretary of the Y. M. C. A. He and his colleagues are hoping the day may come when they can render some service to youth in the U. S. S. R.

The foreign office is completing a report on Russian studies in this country. It is not yet available but I am asking Mitrany and his research secretary, Miss Ford Smith, to try and get me a copy ultimately.

Then there is a new commission, the Scarbrough, which is making a survey for the whole United Kingdom with the aid of all Government departments, and with I think Russian, Middle Eastern, Indian, Chinese, and Japanese studies in its purview. All the scholars are giving evidence, or hoping to be asked to give evidence. I imagine it will be months before a report is published, but here again I will ask Mitrany and Miss Ford Smith to follow it and send me anything that is available. Professor Dodds, who went to China for the British council about the same time as the biochemist Needham, undoubtedly contributed a report on Chinese studies in the United Kingdom and British scholarly opportunities in China. Stevens and Marshall, of the Rockefeller Foundation, had him make a study of oriental studies in the United States and I am going to try and get a copy when I reach New York. He is actively cooperating with all at Oxford who are advancing scholarship in all these fields.

Perhaps the most dynamic person at Oxford in the establishment of the schools is Gibb, of St. Johns, the Arabic scholar. He is eager ultimately to go to the Soviet Union and has made some progress in the Russian language. He gave the Haskell lectures at Chicago last summer; he will help at many points all along the way from Egypt to the Bering Straits.

I neglected to say that at Chatham House there is a temporary research staff member who has a good knowledge of the Soviet Union, her name is Mrs. J. Dogras. I am not certain what her tenure of office is to be.

Dobb, of Pembroke College, Cambridge, spent several hours with me on two occasions, reviewing Russian studies in England in general and from the economic angle in particular. He ought to be freed to do more work in the Russian economic field for he is one of the few top-ranking economists here who is generally familiar with Russian economic material.

On the social side, I had a most charming tea party with Mrs. Winston Churchill, who spent 1¼ hours telling me of her impressions of the Soviet Union during her visit in the spring.

Some of the finest, most broad-minded people in England, like Mitrany, are very eager to establish direct contacts with Soviet citizens here and correspondence with scholars in the Soviet Union. Until points of view change and personal contacts multiply in natural ways this indispensable intercourse will be slow in coming.

I sometimes feel that one ought to forget all current problems and devote the rest of one's life to stimulating basic studies of the Russian language and history, economics, and law throughout the Western World and concurrently stimulate schools in the Soviet Union for the advance study of the Western World. Maybe in 30 years the results of such foundation work would begin to have constructive results.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

(Dictated but Signed in Absence).

Mr. MORRIS. The other two are copies of a letter from Mr. Lattimore to Mr. Field, where Mr. Lattimore mentions that the writing from Asiaticus read like propaganda.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 35" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 35

BALTIMORE, MD., *October 17, 1940.*

Mr. F. V. FIELD,
American Peace Mobilization,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR FRED: Enclosed I am sending you an article submitted to me by Asiaticus. For readers of Pacific Affairs, it would read like propaganda, and rhapsodical propaganda at that. As the article is also too long, however, we might be able to shorten it, pruning out a great many adjectives but still retaining the realistic points. However, it is too late for our December issue.

I am therefore sending you the article as is, to see whether you may have any suggestions for placing it.

The sooner you can look in on us here, the better we'll be pleased.

Yours,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

Mr. MORRIS. The last one was a letter I made reference to in which Mr. Carter states that Mr. Earl Browder on October 31, 1938, is really very well informed and contrary to public view, is 100 percent American.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record at this point.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 36" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 36

NEW YORK CITY, *October 31, 1938.*

BROOKE CLAXTON, Esq.,
Montreal, Canada.

DEAR CLAXTON: Fred Field from San Francisco has sent me an amusing answer to my inquiry for American speakers. I should say that W. T. Stone of the Foreign Policy Association was well qualified. Raymond Leslie Buell is more forceful and more sure of his views than Stone.

If the Canadian Club can stand the general secretary of the Communist Party in the United States, Earl Browder would give you an exceedingly interesting, pleasantly provocative, but a really important statement on the Roosevelt administration either from the point of view of its internal or its foreign policy. He is really very well informed and, contrary to the public view, is 100 percent American.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we had better pause here.

Are you through with Mr. Carter?

Mr. MORRIS. I think for the time being, Mr. Chairman, we are.

Mr. CARTER. For this afternoon, anyhow?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. CARTER. And probably for this next week?

Mr. MORRIS. At least the next couple of weeks.

The CHAIRMAN. You will be advised.

Mr. CARTER. Thank you very much.

Mr. MORRIS. We have not covered everything, but we are not likely to come to you within the next 3 or 4 weeks.

Mr. CARTER. In 20 or 25 years you cannot compress in 2 or 3 days, even the sins.

Mr. MORRIS. Yet sometimes you do it very rapidly.

The CHAIRMAN. We will recess until Tuesday at 10:30.

(Whereupon, at 5:35 p. m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 10:30 a. m., Tuesday, July 31, 1951.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

TUESDAY, JULY 31, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10:30 a. m., pursuant to recess, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Eastland, O'Connor, Smith, Ferguson, and Jenner.

Also present: Senators McCarthy and Mundt; J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Again I draw the attention of those who are with us today, and I do not want to say especially the press but the press as well, we are unable to accommodate all who would like to sit in here. But the acoustics in this room are such that any audible expressions are confusing and a little bit annoying. If possible be as easy with your chairs as you possibly can because they make the most noise. Let me say to the members of the committee the witness today is here under subpoena and it is the judgment of the chairman of this committee he is rendering a great patriotic service to the country of his adoption. We rejoice in the fact that he has the courage to come forward with the truth.

I want to say to you, General, that this committee and the Senate of the United States is not going to tolerate any reprisal of any kind. Any witness, including yourself, who comes before this committee is invited and urged under oath to tell the truth and the whole truth. You need be in nowise fearful of any reprisal being made on you by any agency of the Government or outside the Government. This committee is going to see to it that its witnesses who come here under oath or voluntarily are protected in telling the Congress of the United States the truth and all of it.

The witness will be sworn. You do solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

TESTIMONY OF ALEXANDER GREGORY BARMINE, NEW YORK, N. Y.

Mr. BARMINE. I do.

Senator O'CONOR. Before the examination commences might I say a word?

I want to bring up a question concerning the previous testimony taken and to just make this very brief statement. Sworn testimony previously taken is to the effect that Frederick Vanderbilt Field was assisted by Owen Lattimore, Lauchlin Currie, and others in an effort to obtain a commission in the United States Army Intelligence. It has been reported in the press since our last meeting that Lauchlin Currie denies any such assistance. So far as I have noted Owen Lattimore has made no such denial. It would appear that the matter is of such importance that this committee should hear directly from these individuals who should welcome an opportunity to appear if the accusations against them are not well founded.

Accordingly, I respectfully suggest that Owen Lattimore and Lauchlin Currie be informed of the readiness of this subcommittee to have them appear and testify in open hearings.

I would also suggest that the committee cause to be brought before it detailed information as to what the Department of Defense files show as to the recommendation submitted in favor of the proposed Frederick V. Field Army Intelligence commission.

Mr. Chairman, I merely submit that for the consideration of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. I may say, Senator, that the presentation of evidence before this committee has been a matter of careful study as to the order in which the testimony would be presented. The respective counsel for the committee have been in conference with committee members. We are not able to present everything at once. We must present it in the order in which we think it will have proper sequence. With that in mind, what you have said now is in the mind of the committee and the mind of the chairman and counsel for the committee.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, might I say I anticipated that this should be done. I asked the question from Field whether he had any objections to the military disclosing all that he had said in that file and to the people at that time. I do not see how this comes under the rule of a loyalty file of any individual because it is the contention of the Government that Field was not hired.

It is also, as I understand it, the contention that Lattimore was not an employee. So it would not come under any of those rules of not disclosing the evidence to this committee. I think the entire file should be subpoenaed or requested first and if not delivered that the whole file of all the correspondence should be supplied. Field said somebody blocked him. Let us find out who blocked him. Let's find out who recommended him and what the recommendation said about Field. I think that ought to be part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say, Senator, that is now being worked out and will in due course be presented.

Senator O'CONOR. I agree entirely with Senator Ferguson. I brought it up because it had been touched on last week and I thought it might be well to make it a matter of record.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your name, Mr. Barmine?

Mr. BARMINE. Alexander Gregory Barmine.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation?

Mr. BARMINE. I am in the Voice of America in the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. The witness says that he is with the Voice of America in the State Department.

Mr. MORRIS. What particular position do you have?

Mr. BARMINE. Chief of the Russian unit.

Mr. MORRIS. How long have you held that position?

Mr. BARMINE. About 3 years.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever testified before any other forum of Congress or any other body?

Mr. BARMINE. Except this? No.

Mr. MORRIS. This is the first time you have testified in public?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Before an executive session?

Mr. MORRIS. Other than the executive session of this committee, you have testified before no other body?

Mr. BARMINE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. How long have you been in the United States, Mr. Barmine?

Mr. BARMINE. Eleven years.

Mr. MORRIS. Where were you born?

Mr. BARMINE. In Russia, in Mohileff.

Mr. MORRIS. In what year?

Mr. BARMINE. 1899.

Mr. MORRIS. How did you become a citizen of the United States?

Mr. BARMINE. I was naturalized in the southern district of New York court July 15, 1943, after I received honorable discharge from the Army.

Mr. MORRIS. What process did you go through by way of becoming a citizen?

Mr. BARMINE. The regular process of application.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the fact that you had served in the United States Army something that accelerated the process?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes; it did, for 2 years.

Mr. MORRIS. By virtue of the fact you served in the American Army your naturalization was accelerated?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. What rank did you hold in the American Army?

Mr. BARMINE. Private.

Mr. MORRIS. Private first class?

Mr. BARMINE. No; just private.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your last connection, Mr. Barmine, with the Soviet organization?

Mr. BARMINE. I was Chargé d'Affairs of the Soviet Union in Athens, Greece.

Mr. MORRIS. You were the Soviet Chargé d'Affairs to Athens?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. You were acting ambassador?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. What year was that?

Mr. BARMINE. Until July 1937.

Mr. MORRIS. What happened to cause a termination of your relationship with the Soviet Union at that time?

Mr. BARMINE. That was a period of purges in the Red army in Moscow and most of my former classmates in the general staff school in France were accused and shot and I knew well that they were innocent of charges preferred against them.

Mr. MORRIS. At this time, Mr. Barmine, even though you were in diplomatic status, did you have military rank?

Mr. BARMINE. I was retired.

Mr. MORRIS. With what rank?

Mr. BARMINE. Brigadier general.

Mr. MORRIS. So when you make reference to your classmates, you were making reference to your military classmates?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. You were at that time a retired brigadier general of the Soviet Army?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right. I realized I couldn't serve Russia at this time by remaining in the Soviet service because I consider that was going on against the interests of the country.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, Mr. Barmine, when you realized that all your classmates were being purged, all your military classmates, and included among them was Marshal Tukachevsky?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. He had been purged?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. You realized you no longer would carry on in the Soviet service in view of the fact these people were being purged and you knew they were innocent?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Therefore, you separated yourself from the Soviet service?

Mr. BARMINE. I resigned.

Mr. MORRIS. Did the Soviet react to your resignation? Did they simply accept it?

Mr. BARMINE. Well, there were different kinds of reactions, of course. They were trying to liquidate me, to kill me in France when I went there as a refugee.

Mr. MORRIS. You were in Athens. You left Athens. Did you serve any notice on the Soviet authorities you were leaving?

Mr. BARMINE. I sent a wire to Litvinov and asked him to appoint another man in charge of the Embassy. Then I left for Paris.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you make your presence known in Paris or were you in hiding?

Mr. BARMINE. No; I was in hiding.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you think it was necessary?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes; because I learned that the Soviet secret service was given orders to liquidate me in France.

Mr. MORRIS. How did you know that?

Mr. BARMINE. I met my fiancée, who was in France. She received a letter from her mother from Greece. The Greek Communists came to her and told her that she should write her daughter not to see me and cut all relations, because I would be liquidated anyway. They insisted that the daughter should be warned. They told her, "If you want your daughter to be safe, tell her not to save him."

Mr. MORRIS. Did you see Ignatz Reiss when you were in Paris?

Mr. BARMINE. No. Then I was followed in Paris. They attempted to get me there.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your position in the Communist Party at that time, Mr. Barmine?

Mr. BARMINE. At what time?

Mr. MORRIS. At the time of your being chargé d'affaires in Greece.

Mr. BARMINE. I was a member of the party.

Mr. MORRIS. You were a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right. I resigned from the party at the same time.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us briefly what your diplomatic achievements had been up to that time? What had you accomplished in the field of diplomacy at the time of your departure from the Soviet organization?

Mr. BARMINE. What do you mean by achievements?

Mr. MORRIS. What positions did you hold in Soviet diplomacy?

Mr. BARMINE. My first assignment was in Bokhara. I was detached from the general staff school and sent as a military attaché That was between 2 years in the general staff school, in the summertime.

Then I was appointed consul general in Bokhara. Then next year after the second year in general staff school I was sent for a summer to Riga in Latvia as second secretary of the Embassy in Latvia.

Mr. MORRIS. You were second secretary there?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

After being graduated from general staff school in 1923, I was sent to Persia as consul general in northern Persia. I stayed there until 1925.

Mr. MORRIS. You were consul general in northern Persia until 1925?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

My next diplomatic assignment was Greece in 1935.

Mr. MORRIS. You were chargé d'affaires in Greece from 1935 until your termination?

Mr. BARMINE. No. I came first as a first secretary of the embassy. After the minister went to Moscow, I was appointed chargé d'affaires.

Mr. MORRIS. You held that position until 1937?

Mr. BARMINE. Until I resigned.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us briefly what your military career had been up to that time?

Mr. BARMINE. I started in 1919 in the army. Then I was sent to the officers' school, the infantry officers' school, at the end of 1919. I was graduated from the officers' school in 1920, in the spring.

Then I was assigned to the western front against Poland. I went through the Polish campaign. Late in 1920 I was sent to the general staff school in Moscow. I had the rank of commander of a regiment by then. From 1920 to 1923 I was in general staff school. I was graduated in 1923.

Mr. MORRIS. You were graduated from the general staff school in 1923?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes. During the studies in the general staff school I was assigned to the intelligence department of the army. After graduation I was sent to the intelligence department.

Mr. MORRIS. In 1923 you were assigned to the intelligence department?

Mr. BARMINE. Already in 1921. The moment when the first class in the general staff school was completed, they were going over the people who were in general staff school taking some that had to be after the graduation assigned to general staff school work. I was one among them, so I was also ordered to study oriental languages because the idea of using me and some other people for the military work in the Orient was considered. - Besides the military class in general staff school I was studying in the oriental language, the Persian language, Urdu and Arabic.

Mr. MORRIS. What was that?

Mr. BARMINE. Urdu.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you spell that, please?

Mr. BARMINE. You spell it U-r-d-u, and Arabic and also French.

Then already in 1921 in the summertime between the year of classes I would be attached to the intelligence and would be sent on an assignment by the intelligence office.

This way I was sent to Bokhara in the summer of 1921, in Latvia in 1922.

Mr. MORRIS. While you held these diplomatic positions were you actually working for the intelligence organization at that time?

Mr. BARMINE. That was a civilian assignment.

Mr. MORRIS. It was a civilian assignment—

Mr. BARMINE. Temporary assignment, but I was always at the disposal of the intelligence.

Mr. MORRIS. You were always at the disposal and under the direction of the intelligence authorities; is that right?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, might I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does that mean an assignment to a diplomatic post is regarded as an intelligence assignment?

Mr. BARMINE. No; it doesn't. I was to fulfill my diplomatic duty and complete it as it should be. There would be no difference with regular diplomatic staff members.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you had additional duties; is that right?

Mr. BARMINE. Not special additional duties. I would explain to you how it worked.

Military intelligence had several officers, maybe two dozen high-ranking officers, who were attached directly to the chief of intelligence. Besides those who worked in the regular military network underground, these people were kept in reserve in order to use them in such civilian assignments where it would be in the interest of military intelligence to have men with military knowledge and with contacts.

Before the relation was following: I could be sent by the foreign office only to the places which would be approved by the chief of military intelligence. For instance, when I was graduated and I went to the intelligence service, they needed people in Persia. The Soviet Union had there about 16 consulates in Persia. There were several important consulates in an important sensitive area in which military intelligence wanted a military man in charge. So out of the 16 consulates, about 6 of them were consul generals of my group, the general staff officers with intelligence training.

I was sent to the foreign office and the foreign office offered the job in southern Persia. Military intelligence insisted they needed me in northern Persia. According to the chief of military intelligence I was appointed to the post in Resht.

Mr. MORRIS. Spell that, please.

Mr. BARMINE. That area including the Enveli port. There was a specific situation in 1923 because according to the Soviet-Persian treaty the port had to be given back to Persia. The Persian Government insisted very much, but our policy was not to give it back. It wasn't in contradiction with the treaty. The policy decision was to keep the port, the facility, to keep the fishery concession in our hands. It was a very critical time because Persia tried to force it with army forces. We had two destroyers also contrary to the treaty, which stood in Enveli port and the possibility was of the attempt to take over the fishery concession by arms and the military office wanted the man who would be on the spot in order to make a decision on the spot who would have a military background and military training.

This group of destroyers in Enveli was under my orders and at my disposal. When there was an attempt to take, in 1924, the fishery, the Persian Governor of Resht Province sent a detachment there. I had to order the commander of the destroyers to put the guns on the shore and be ready to resist by force.

Also we had special interests in northern Persia. There was a question of people working there on military assignment and among the tribes. These were the reasons why military intelligence wanted to have military men as the consul general. That means I was under orders of the foreign office and I was fulfilling diplomatic status.

Mr. MORRIS. We are conducting an inquiry into the Institute of Pacific Relations, and we are going to be asking you certain questions in connection with this, and we wish you would give us your best recollection of events as you recall them.

I am going to offer you a translation from the Political, Social, and Economic Quarterly of the Soviet Union called, in English, The Pacific Ocean. I would like to call that to your attention and ask you if you will identify as far as you know some of the Soviet authorities who appear in the Soviet council of the Institute of Pacific Relations as it appears on this translation. I also give you a Russian copy of the same thing.

Mr. BARMINE. Out of these names I knew three people personally.

Mr. MORRIS. We have here, Mr. Chairman, the members of the Soviet council of the IPR. They are the people that the Soviet Government sent to its own particular council in the institute. Mr. Barmine has testified he knew three of them to him own knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. Were they members of the international section?

Mr. MORRIS. Just of the Soviet council. I can stress that.

Mr. BARMINE. May I say the Russian text mentions they are founders of the Pacific Institute of the Soviet Union.

Mr. MORRIS. These are listed here in this political, social, and economic quarterly as the founding members of the Pacific Institute of the USSR. The three whom you know are who?

Mr. BARMINE. Vice President Voitinski.

Mr. MORRIS. What did you know about Mr. Voitinski?

Mr. BARMINE. When I returned from Bokhara in the fall of 1921 to resume my studies in the general staff school, then the Chief Secretary and Foreign Minister of Russia, Commissar Chicherin, was my classmate. He invited me to work in my spare time, especially at nights, as secretary to Chicherin. At this time I met executives and high officials of the Foreign Office in Moscow. Among them was Voitinski who at this time was in charge of the far-eastern section of the Foreign Office.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you knew Voitinski as the man who was the head of the far-eastern section of the Foreign Office at that time?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right. He came to the Foreign Office from the Comintern and when he was also in charge of far-eastern affairs. He returned back from the Foreign Office a couple of years later again to the same work.

Mr. MORRIS. You, therefore, testify he had come from the Comintern to occupy that position as head of the far-eastern section of the Foreign Office and after he finished that assignment he went back to the Comintern?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWEIN. Did you testify also, General, in the Comintern he was in charge of far-eastern affairs?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were the other two men who you knew on that list?

Mr. BARMINE. Arosev, chairman of the Society of Cultural Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you spell that?

Mr. BARMINE. A-r-o-s-e-v.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you know about him?

Mr. BARMINE. I met him because he was my colleague in the diplomatic service. He was once Ambassador in Czechoslovakia. I knew him personally in Moscow as a friend. Then I met him on his job.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the nature of his job, political?

Mr. BARMINE. As Ambassador, yes. Arosev was an old Bolshevik. At this time he had the confidence of the central committee. He was one of the hierarchy of the party.

Mr. MORRIS. He had the confidence of the central committee of the Communist Party and shared their confidence?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. So when Arosev appears in this work, do you think he is appearing as a dutiful member of the Soviet international organization in a political capacity?

Mr. BARMINE. He was appointed as the president of the Society of Cultural Relations by the central committee of the party and, of course, he acted as such in his duties.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Barmine, do you know anybody else on that list?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes; I knew Svanidze.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you know about him?

Mr. BARMINE. He is a Georgian. He is a brother-in-law of Stalin.

Mr. MORRIS. What else do you know about him?

Mr. BARMINE. Svanidze was also high up in the hierarchy of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government. At this time he was director of the foreign trade bank, which means the organization which was in control of all financial exchange abroad.

Mr. MORRIS. In that capacity or holding that position he took a political assignment?

Mr. BARMINE. I knew about his other assignments, too, which he carried abroad besides being president of this bank.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to show you a translation of volume XII of the Soviet Encyclopedia. This is an excerpt from Mr. Voitinski, and I ask you if that squares with your recollection of Mr. Voitinski's assignments?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes. That confirms the fact that I knew he was a high executive of the Comintern.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record this translation of the "Pacific Ocean" we have just made reference to as well as the translation from the Bolshevik Soviet Encyclopedia with the biographical sketch of Mr. Voitinski. I would like to introduce both of them into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. I think they should be inserted in the record as documents with reference to which the witness is testifying. I do not know that they have been identified.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 37 and 38" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 37

[Translation from "Tikhii Okean" (The Pacific Ocean). Political, Social, and Economic Quarterly Review No. 1, July-September 1934, pp. 217-218]

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS IN THE U. S. S. R.

The International Institute of Pacific Relations, at present, consists of the national Pacific institutes of the United States of America, Japan, China, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines. At its regular conference, held at Shanghai in 1931, a unanimous decision was passed to invite the U. S. S. R. to join the institute. This invitation was repeatedly reiterated in the name of the institute by its secretary general. The scientific research and economic organizations of the U. S. S. R., which are interested in the problems of the Soviet Far East and of the Pacific Ocean, decided to accept the invitation of the international institute.

To this end, the said organizations resolved to combine their efforts directed to the study of the above-mentioned problems and to establish a special Pacific institute.

The founding meeting of the Pacific Institute of the U. S. S. R. took place on July 28, 1934, in Moscow. Present at the meeting were representatives of the NII (Institute for Scientific Research) of the Great Soviet World Atlas, the All Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, the Institute of Oceanography, the Administration of the Great Northern Sea Route, the Chamber of Commerce, the Institute of World Economics and World Politics, the Kamchatka Joint Stock Co., and the East Fish Trust.

Thus, the above-listed institutions become the founding members of the Pacific Institute of the U. S. S. R.

The following board of the institute was elected at the founding meeting:

1. President of the institute: Prof. V. E. Motylev (director of the Scientific Research Institute of the Great Soviet World Atlas).

2. Vice President: G. N. Voitinskii (chief of the Pacific "cabinet" of the Institute of World Economics and World Politics).

3. A. Ia. Arosev: (chairman of the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with foreign countries).

4. K. A. Mekhonoshin: (director of the Institute of Oceanography).

5. S. S. Ioffe: (deputy chief of the administration of the Great Northern Sea Route).

6. A. S. Svandze: (director of the Bank for Foreign Trade).

7. I. A. Adamovich: (chairman of the Kamchatka Joint-Stock Co.).

8. Ia. D. Ianson: (president of the chamber of commerce).

9. Ia. M. Berkovich: (manager of the East Fish Trust).

Mr. A. Kantorovich was appointed secretary-general of the institute.

The chairman of the new institute, Comrade Motylev, addressed a letter to the secretary general of the International Institute of Pacific Relations notifying him that the Pacific institute, which had been established in the U. S. S. R., was prepared to join the international institute as a member in response to the invitation extended by the conference of the international institute held in Shanghai in 1931.

At the beginning of September V. E. Motylev received a reply from Mr. Carter, who welcomed the U. S. S. R. as a new member of the International Institute for Pacific Relations.

The board of the institute voted to commence preparations for the coming Congress to be held in 1935 or 1936. For this purpose it is planned to publish before the Congress assembled the following monographic studies:

1. The First and Second 5-Year Plans of the Soviet Far East.
2. The Nationality Policy in the Soviet Far East.
3. The Great Northern Sea Route and the Pacific Ocean.
4. The Economic Struggle in the Pacific Ocean Area.
5. The Problem of Raw Materials in the Pacific Ocean Area.

At the same time it is planned to publish in 1935 two symposium volumes devoted to current problems on the Pacific area and on the economic activities in the Soviet Far East.

[Translation from "Tikhii Okean" (The Pacific Ocean), Political, Social, and Economic Quarterly Review, No. 1 (3), January-March 1935, pp. 268-269]

THE PACIFIC INSTITUTE

The Pacific Institute of the U. S. S. R. (a section of the International Institute of Pacific Relations) has developed its activities considerably.

The following monographs in Russian and in English will be published by the U. S. S. R. Pacific Institute prior to the International Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations to be held in 1936:

1. The First and Second 5-Year Plans in the Far East (being compiled by the staff of the Far East regional plan).
2. The U. S. S. R. National Policy.
3. The Economic and Political Struggle in the Pacific Ocean Area.

The institute is also preparing the publication in English and in Russian of a symposium volume dedicated to current political and economic problems connected with the Pacific Ocean area.

The symposium will cover approximately the following items: (1) Relations between Japan and China since 1931; (2) the repudiation of the Washington Treaty; (3) the problem of the unification of China; (4) the crisis in Japan and the sociopolitical consequences of the war in Manchuria and in China; (5) the Anglo-Japanese struggle for world markets; (6) silver and the colonial countries of the Far East; (7) the ideological preparations for the war in Japan; (8) naval armaments in the Pacific Ocean area following Japan's repudiation of the Washington Naval Treaty; (9) the colonial policy of Japan; (10) England and her dominions in the Pacific Ocean; (11) the Philippine Islands and their share of the contradictions of imperialism in the Pacific Ocean area; (12) the economic and sociopolitical development of the Soviet Far East under the first and second 5-year plans; (13) the nationality policy of the Soviet Government in the Far East and in the northern regions of Siberia; (14) the establishment of the Jewish autonomous region in Birobidzhan; (15) the significance of the great northern sea route.

This program, however, is subject to further concretization.

In accordance with the plans for scientific research adopted at the last international conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1933, the Pacific Institute of the U. S. S. R. undertook to prepare the following works: (1) a monograph on the standard of living in the U. S. S. R.; (2) a report on the status of foreigners as stipulated by the Soviet laws (prepared by Prof. M. A. Plotkin); (3) a report on the means of communication in the Soviet Far East.

The Pacific Institute of the U. S. S. R. has compiled a systematic catalog of all books which were published in the Soviet Union since 1922 on questions connected with the Far East and the Pacific Ocean, including questions pertinent to the Soviet Far East and Siberia.

The Institute of Pacific Relations of the U. S. S. R. maintains a book exchange with the American section of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The most important books published in both countries on Far East and Pacific questions come under this book exchange. There was, also, an intention by the institute to send to America a collection of selected books on the U. S. S. R. in exchange for a corresponding number of American books on the United States of America.

At the end of December Mr. E. C. Carter, the secretary general of the International Institute of Pacific Relations, visited Moscow with a group of his collaborators. During his stay in Moscow (from December 20 to December 31) Mr. Carter met representatives of a great number of Soviet scientific institutions and of public organizations. Mr. Carter had a number of conferences with the presidium of the Pacific Institute of the U. S. S. R. on questions relating to the activities of the institute as a section of the international organization. Before his departure from Moscow Mr. Carter was received by Mr. Litvinov, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

EXHIBIT No. 38

[Translation from vol. XII columns 657-658 of the Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia, Moscow, 1928 (Soviet Encyclopedia)]

VOITINSKII (Zarkhin), Grigorii Naumovich (born 1893), Communist, Comintern worker, writer. Son of a low-grade white-collar worker, Voitinskii completed only an elementary school and supplemented his further education by reading and self study. In 1913 he emigrated to America and lived in a number of places in the United States and Canada as a student and worker. In the spring of 1918 Voitinskii returned to Russia, joined the Communist Party and began to work in the Krasnoïarsk soviet of workers' delegates. After Kolchak had taken over the government Voitinskii took part in the underground work and in the uprising against Kolchak at Omsk. After the failure of the uprising he was detailed to underground work at Vladivostok. There he was arrested in May 1919 and sentenced to hard labor for life on the island of Sakhalin. In January 1920, still prior to the overthrow of the Kolchak government in the Far East, Voitinskii together with other political prisoners, and with the help of an organization of sympathizers who were free, took part in the seizure of power on the island. From 1920 on, he worked at the order of the Comintern in the Far East. He worked for a number of years in the eastern secretariat of the Comintern. In the summer of 1920 he participated in the organization of the first Communist cells at Shanghai, Peiping, and Canton; he also took an intensive part in the further work of the Chinese Communist Party and, in particular, conducted the negotiation with Sun Yat-sen concerning the collaboration of the Kuomintang and of the Chinese Communist Party.

Writer of Communist literature.

Cited in Literature on the Chinese Soviet Movement, Pacific Affairs, September 1936 (prepared by staff of American Council of Institute of Pacific Relations). British Imperialism in China, Communist International, No. 6, November 1924; The Situation in China, Communist International, No. 21, April 1925; The Errors of the Communist Party of China in the Revolution of 1925-1927.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce the original Russian translation of the same thing from which Mr. Barmine made references.

The CHAIRMAN. That will go in the files of the committee and the translation will go in the record, with its proper identification.

The translation from volume XII of the encyclopedia is dated 1928 and has been identified and testified to by this witness.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 39" and filed for the record.)

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know General Berzin?

Mr. BARMINE. I knew him for 15 years.

The CHAIRMAN. Before you go into this, I may be a bit too meticulous in this, but I think you should identify this translation if you please. I think Mr. Mandel can probably lay the foundation.

Mr. MANDEL. Both translations were submitted to the committee by the Library of Congress. Their qualified experts did the translation.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Barmine, will you describe to us what your relationship was to General Berzin?

Mr. BARMINE. In 1921 there was a decision that I was one of the General Staff officers who would be attached to intelligence after being graduated. Since this time I was on assignments by the intelligence service and put at the personal disposal of General Berzin. As I said, he had about 20 people special assistants who were always at the disposal for assignments which would be given to them. Therefore, from 1921 to 1935 he was my direct superior.

Mr. MORRIS. What military rank did you have in 1935?

Mr. BARMINE. Brigadier general.

Mr. MORRIS. How long had you held that rank?

Mr. BARMINE. Until the middle of 1935 when I was retired.

Mr. MORRIS. How long had you held it? How long had you been brigadier general when you were retired?

Mr. BARMINE. It would be for 11 years.

Mr. MORRIS. Your relationships were directly with General Berzin?

Mr. BARMINE. I was directly under his orders.

Mr. MORRIS. What were some of your assignments, some of your later assignments? What was the Auto-Motor Export Corp.?

Mr. BARMINE. In 1928 the military intelligence needed men in France because at this time the trade legation in France was placing orders for airplane models, spare parts, and some important equipment for military factories. There was a special military purchase department and there was an air force commission in France. As it was a diplomatic assignment, military intelligence asked that one of the high executives of the trade legation be a General Staff officer. In 1928 I was appointed to the trade legation in France as director general of imports. I had in charge nine import departments and I carried in full the duty of foreign trade officer, but special attention had to be given to these military purchases because the air force commission had a high officer in charge and before there was needed an authority in the trade legation who would handle any complicated matters right there.

Mr. MORRIS. So you cite that as one of your experiences in military intelligence?

Mr. BARMINE. That was my assignment. I went to France to the trade legation under orders of General Berzin.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us of some other experiences in the Soviet military intelligence you had?

Mr. BARMINE. In 1931 I was transferred to Italy as director general of imports because at this time we also had the Navy purchasing commission and the air force purchasing commission in Italy. We were buying destroyers built for us in Trieste.

Then we had orders for planes and aviation models. We had two purchasing commission there. Military intelligence decided and the war department decided to have the men in charge in Italy. I was director general of imports in Italy. I stayed there for a year until 1932.

My next assignment was in Belgium. At this time we had no diplomatic relations with Belgium, and it was the decision of the Politburo

to open the unofficial agency. So that was also with the approval of General Berzin and I was transferred to Brussels where I stayed for 1 year.

Mr. MORRIS. What year was that?

Mr. BARMINE. That was 1932. Then I was recalled back to Moscow. At this time there was carried on a very huge program of retooling of the aviation industry. There were several during the first 5-year plan, several big aviation factories built. It was very important to get the necessary machinery quickly. Most of this machinery was going, during the end of the first 5-year plan, for military industry and the most expensive and the most important part of it they had priority. In Moscow there existed the Foreign Trade Corp. called Stanko-Import, Machine Tool Import. In order to keep and speed orders for military industry, I was appointed the first executive vice president of Machine Tool Import.

Mr. MORRIS. You were the first vice president?

Mr. BARMINE. Of Stanko-Import in Russia.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you spell that last name?

Mr. BARMINE. S-t-a-n-k-o-Import. It was a corporation which was placing a very huge order in England and Germany.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your next assignment?

Mr. BARMINE. I remained 1 year on this job.

At this time for several years the Soviet Government was carrying the export of arms to the country of China. There was a huge delivery in 1925-27 to Chiang Kai-shek's government about 15 or 20 million dollars of equipment.

Mr. MORRIS. In 1925 and 1926?

Mr. BARMINE. From 1925 to 1927. Then in later years we delivered some artillery and some munitions to Afghanistan; then airplanes and aviation parts to Persia.

Then there was a huge shipment of ammunition and arms exported to western China to Sinkiang and to Mongolia.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that done during the Chinese Government?

Mr. BARMINE. No. I will come back to it. It was a completely separate project. The Soviet Government at this time was ready to grant a loan to Turkey. As I remember it, it was a loan for \$10,000,000 which ostensibly, officially in the papers, was for the industrialization of Turkey, for textile machinery. But in fact, only about 20 percent of this was given for industrial machinery; 80 percent was arms and ammunition.

It happened sporadically. Some of the things for delivery to Persia were done by the War Department, some by the Ministry of Industry, some were military intelligence. It was spread in dividends. The Politburo decision was to consolidate all of it in one organization under cover of the Foreign Trade Department. So there was the decision of the Politburo at the end of 1933 to organize a special corporation. The name of the corporation was Auto-Motor Export Corp. This is one of the corporations of the Foreign Trade Department. This corporation has an official charter approved by the Government for the export of automobiles and motors.

Mr. MORRIS. The charter was just for the export of automobiles and motors?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right, but there was a secret part of the charter which gave to this corporation full and complete control

in the execution of all of the export of arms from the Soviet Union. It was like lend-lease.

Mr. MORRIS. This was a secret clause in the charter?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes. What we had was official business in the order department of the corporation which business was to export trucks and passenger vehicles. The point was that at this time the Ford Co. built the Gorki factory, but Ford was far-sighted enough to put the clause in which prohibited the reexport of passenger cars of the Ford model. So we would have no right for our legal official business to reexport the production of passenger cars.

We signed the dealer contacts with the Ford Co. of Alexandria, Egypt, and with Vauxhall in England, together with the trucks of Russian production, heavy vehicles. We were reexporting the American automobiles. Neither Ford nor Vauxhall were completely unaware of the second part of the business of this organization.

The second part had officially the name of motor department. It was not exporting any model. It took over from the war department, from intelligence, from the Ministry of Industry all the job of the export of arms, those which were in planning and those which were in execution. This department was in charge of the military export.

When the decision of this organization was reached, the War Department and Marshal Tukachevsky who was assistant commissar of defense offered my name as president of this corporation.

Mr. MORRIS. So Marshal Tukachevsky offered your name as president of the Auto-Motor Export Corp.?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right. Rozenholz, the Trade Commissar, concurred.

Mr. MORRIS. Who concurred?

Mr. BARMINE. Rozenholz.

Mr. MORRIS. Spell his name, please.

Mr. BARMINE. R-o-z-e-n-h-o-l-z. He was also shot in 1938.

My name was submitted and the Politburo approved. I was appointed the president of this trust.

Mr. MORRIS. What year was that?

Mr. BARMINE. That was at the end of 1933.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you hold that position?

Mr. BARMINE. I held this position until the end of 1935 when I asked to be relieved. I was appointed to Greece.

Mr. MORRIS. When you held that position did you as a matter of fact show a great deal of activity in this motor division?

Mr. BARMINE. That was under my complete control.

Mr. MORRIS. That was also under your complete control?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us how you functioned in that respect?

Mr. BARMINE. As a matter of fact for a year and a half, until I was given another general staff job, I was president of the corporation and I was director of this motor department. I had to handle these things directly. With this work you had to be in daily contact with the war department and with military intelligence because of the things you had to do in a hurry and often we had to borrow the equipment from the Army.

I had to get officer instructors to accompany the arms to teach people in this country how to use them. This job kept me not only in con-

tact with the War Department but besides that that was the year of the most constant and close cooperation with General Berzin because he, from the War Department, was charged with handling this side of it.

Mr. MORRIS. So during this period you were in particularly close association with General Berzin, your superior?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes. I was seeing him several times every week.

Mr. MORRIS. In this connection did you ever hear of the organization, Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what you heard about the Institute of Pacific Relations and will you tell us who told it to you?

Mr. BARMINE. Well, in order to come to it I would like to mention the thing that brought the Institute of Pacific Relations in.

Mr. MORRIS. By all means, Mr. Barmine.

Mr. BARMINE. At the end of 1933 when I was taking over the job of the export of arms and delivery, one of the unfinished jobs we took was the export of arms in Sinkiang. That is a Province in western China. This work was completely independent. You asked me about the regulation with the Chinese Government. It was completely independent from the Chinese Government because the policy was different. In fact, when I started this job, I received a letter from the Ministry of Aviation of Nationalist China, the Chiang Kai-shek government, who was asking for delivery of aviation material and planes.

I had to report to the Chinese Commission of the Central Committee and to the Politburo about the answer. I was given the decision not to even answer this letter. It means we had no contact on this subject of export with the Chinese Government and the letter remained in our file unanswered.

The CHAIRMAN. That is with the Chiang Kai-shek government?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right. At the same time the Russian Government had a special interest in western China in Sinkiang because the problem was to secure the control of Sinkiang independently. First combat the British influence in Sinkiang and then secure it as a military base.

The governor of the Province was friendly. At this time there was a Moslem revolt in Sinkiang. We were delivering artillery, planes, ammunition, shells, and rifles for this government. In fact, the situation deteriorated so rapidly that once a lot of these things arrived at the Sinkiang border, Uramchi, the capital, was surrounded by rebels. So I was ordered to put the bombs on the planes. These bombs were delivered right on the heads of the rebels around Uramchi. Then the Chinese governor was billed later for this ammunition as delivered.

Mr. MORRIS. You billed the Chinese governor at that time?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he say "governor" or "government"?

Mr. BARMINE. Governor of the Province. We were dealing only with the Governor of west Sinkiang. At this time two brigades of the secret-police troops walked into Sinkiang. They participated and tried to liquidate the rebellion. This was never published in the press.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you speaking of Soviet troops?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes; two brigades of NVD troops crossed the border.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify NVD?

Mr. BARMINE. Ministry of Internal Affairs security police.

Mr. MORRIS. The Russian security police?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right. There were two full infantry brigades with artillery. When our artillery arrived to Sinkiang after this rebellion was dispersed, the NVD troops took over the new artillery pieces which I was delivering there and left the Chinese the old ones which they used in suppressing the rebellion.

Before the governor asked for a reduction of price because it was rather second-hand and we first insisted that they were used to help them. Then I was ordered to give a reduction and forget about it.

Senator O'CONOR. Can we have the date of that?

Mr. BARMINE. This is the end of 1933.

Senator O'CONOR. When the deliveries were made on the heads of the rebels you describe?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right. After the rebellion was suppressed, the central committee and the Chinese commission of the Politburo decided to send a commission to Sinkiang which would work up a large plan of reconstruction, of financial help, of military help, of building the roads, airdromes, the delivery of the means of transportation, and so on.

The president of this commission was appointed and he was a brother-in-law of Stalin who went to Sinkiang and remained there several months.

Mr. MORRIS. He is the man we had previously identified?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right. I got in contact with Svanidze after they returned. They returned with the proposals which were discussed in the Sinkiang commission of the Politburo. They were approved by the Politburo. We had to equip completely 10,000 troops which would be independent under the orders of the governor of the Province. The son of the governor, the young colonel, came to Moscow and stayed and worked in contact with my office.

The plan included building of hangars, airdromes, roads, completing the aviation line established there, then completely equipping and organizing and training the 10,000 troops. Of course, it was not acknowledged, this question of dismemberment or complete separation of Sinkiang. It was still part of Nationalist China. So among the equipment I had to deliver we even had to make Kuomintang stars, 10,000, which would be put on at the start of this.

Mr. MORRIS. You had to put on 10,000 Kuomintang stars even though you were going to use them for a different purpose?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right. We discussed this order, too. The Sinkiang commission was supposed to give a huge loan and silver to western China.

This military part of armed supplies by the decision of the Politburo was given to my corporation. Before I worked with the son of the governor of the Province and with close contact under control of General Berzin's office. There was a military resident, a military attaché, in Uramchi who was also my classmate in the General Staff School who participated. This affair took several months and during this affair the problem came up about China proper, about the Pacific coast of China. General Berzin inquired of me if I am doing some-

thing in the line of the automobile department and the export of cars in eastern China. I said we were only starting. At this time we sent several trucks to Shanghai as samples. But I had no branches there. We had huge deliveries to Mongolia but nothing to China proper.

Mr. MORRIS. You had a heavy delivery to Mongolia but nothing to China proper?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right. We sent a few trucks and a representative to Shanghai. He asked me if it would be possible that the war department and military intelligence would be interested in building on certain points along the China coast in eastern China the secret cache of arms and ammunition, and if it would be possible that I open branches in China proper for ostensibly or factually the export of trucks, for selling the trucks and spare parts, opening warehouses, but the military intelligence could use the warehouses for storage for the arms.

Mr. MORRIS. May I review that? In other words, Soviet military intelligence wanted you at this time to open branch offices in China which would ostensibly serve as a cover for exporting of automobile parts?

Mr. BARMINE. No. Factually it would be used for the export of automobiles, trucks and spare parts, but besides that using this branch and these warehouses we would have to store up arms and ammunition without knowledge of the Chinese Government.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you find out what percentage was motors and trucks?

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us the relationship between the two? Which was the greater?

Mr. BARMINE. You mean in the operation of my corporation?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. BARMINE. In the operation of my corporation it would be this way. About 10 percent would be automobile exports and 90 percent export of arms, because we had eight million dollars of gold, the value of the arms that were delivered in Turkey in 1935, the delivery of tanks and armored cars, ammunition, gas masks and all to fill up this loan.

Mr. MORRIS. What kind of crates did you use? Would they be ostensibly for automotive parts?

Mr. BARMINE. They went as busses. They were fully crated. Armored cars and tanks were fully crated. Officers and training personnel given to me by the general staff also went as engineers of the Auto-Motor Export Corp.

I had a special delegation which came from Turkey of five military men with a general at the head. The Turkish Ambassador in Moscow was Vasyf Chinari who was in charge of carrying this contract and the contract was signed with the Turkish Ambassador. The delegation came. They were very strict about the requirements. They were very much pleased.

So I had to go to Marshal Tukachevsky and ask to borrow tanks and armored cars from the Red Army reserve in order to fulfill the requirements.

Senator EASTLAND. Were they for the Turkish Government?

Mr. BARMINE. That was officially for the Turkish Government. Our Government gave them a loan. This loan was 20 years without interest.

Senator EASTLAND. What about the arms in China? Was that for the Chinese Government, or to promote revolution in China?

Mr. BARMINE. I didn't inquire of General Berzin. It wouldn't be proper for me to inquire the purpose of it. He was my superior.

Senator EASTLAND. What was your judgment as to what the material was used for?

Mr. BARMINE. I understand the situation in China for many years before and after was the situation which the policy of the Russian Government was to seek a decision by force of arms and before this cache of arms and ammunition would be held up until the moment when the military situation in every area would be favorable or Chinese Communists would be there and could be supplied. Of course that is my guess. I didn't discuss the purpose of it. I just discussed the fact.

Mr. MORRIS. You were there to take orders, not to speculate?

Mr. BARMINE. In a sense. This is a delicate situation. The corporation belongs to the foreign trade department. The decision about any operation was to be approved by the Politburo. I couldn't deliver any arms without special decision by the Politburo signed by Stalin himself. There would be no possibility of that. All 90 percent of the motor department operation was every time by specific approval of the Politburo. I had to receive a decision signed that I received it and I would have to carry it out.

So before the final decision on this it would be by the Politburo. This was exploratory conversation because they obviously—military intelligence had special assignments. They were looking for a way to accomplish it. Being the president of this corporation and at the same time I was a general staff officer and was still at this time, until 1935, at the disposal of General Berzin, but he wouldn't press it because—it would be only preliminary conversation about it. Was it possible to do? Would it be convenient? What are the ways?

Then we would have to go to the Chinese Commission of the Politburo and get the approval. Of course foreign trade department was rather reluctant. They considered that we would be involved in something more than official delivery of arms to the governments. That would be some kind of an entirely new operation. Rozenholz was very reluctant. In fact, he accused me of going too far along with the War Department, Tukachevsky and Berzin.

He went to the Politburo asking that I would be retired from active reserve and would remain only completely civilian as the chief of the corporation because he felt, due to my relations with Berzin, there was undue influence and I was carrying too much military side of it. I said it would be not for any relations. We couldn't get a lot of arms and ammunition from the war department if we couldn't get the training instructors to carry it out so successfully. Still he went and that was the reason why in 1935 I was put on the retirement list. Rozenholz announced this to me. I was put on the retirement list and that brought also the cooling of relations and that is why at the end of 1935 I asked to be relieved. I went to the foreign office and was sent to Greece.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us about the Institute of Pacific Relations? You have now given us the details leading up to that.

Mr. BARMINE. When the question arose about the opening of this cache of arms, there was a question of personnel, whom I could put in charge.

Senator FERGUSON. You are talking about China?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mundt, you are welcome here and will you please have a seat at the table with us.

Mr. BARMINE. At this time I had already difficulty with the personnel. I had about three or four hundred people working in Sinkiang in western China. I had to send a very huge commission to Turkey for the delivery of the arms. Then I had to get our Air Force officers and mechanics for Turkey and for Persia before I ran out of trained people whom I could have. The first of my objections to General Berzin was that this is a very delicate affair. You have to have reliable people. Then you have to have competent people in charge of those branches.

Mr. MORRIS. When you use the term "reliable" you mean people loyal to your organization?

Mr. BARMINE. No. I mean people who would be trained in carrying this kind of secret operation out, who would have military training to take care of arms and who would be responsible enough not to let these things all open.

Senator FERGUSON. That was secret, the armed part of your corporation?

Mr. BARMINE. Always top secret.

Senator FERGUSON. Putting it in the warehouse, putting the motors and the automobiles in the warehouse, was secret because, after all, they were arms and ammunition?

Mr. BARMINE. The Soviet Government didn't care about it being known we are exporting arms. So I said to him that I couldn't get any more. One man from the Air Force, one man from the tank forces, one from the artillery division of the General Staff—I got several for Turkey. I couldn't get any more. He complained they had to give me some of their best officers to carry this out. It was a conference in which Terian——

Mr. MORRIS. Spell that, please.

Mr. BARMINE. T-e-r-i-a-n.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was he?

Mr. BARMINE. General Berzin's deputy. Then Malikoff, who was the military resident in western China——

Mr. MORRIS. Spell that, please.

Mr. BARMINE. M-a-l-i-k-o-f-f.

General Berzin said, "We might give you our men."

Mr. MORRIS. "Give you some of our men" did he say?

Mr. BARMINE. For working in China or on the problems of China.

Mr. MORRIS. People who had been working in the China area on China problems?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. They would be intelligence officers?

Mr. BARMINE. These people when he mentioned "our men," talking about intelligence, that means there was a member of this apparatus of the military intelligence and working on an assignment for them.

Mr. MORRIS. They are members of the Soviet military intelligence organization?

Mr. BARMINE. When General Berzin said "I might give you our men," I assumed that is the only thing he could mean. I didn't question him more.

In this connection several names were mentioned. Now I have to state here most of the personnel, except the top supervising jobs, most of the personnel were used in underground work by military intelligence which was completely separate of what we were doing in the foreign office, and that work was carried by the foreigners, people with foreign passports, born in foreign countries, because they would not be so obvious as Russians. All the top controlling positions would be Russians and even not always that. Most of the personnel would be all professional intelligence people, recruited from the different groups, people recruited among the sympathizers of Communist causes or even men specially assigned by the foreign Communist Party for military intelligence work.

Of course, at the moment when they would be detached for the military intelligence work they would rave to break any connection, formal connection, with the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. They would have to break formal connection?

Mr. BARMINE. Not to participate in any other form of party activity. In every Communist Party in the central committee there would be a special person who would be in charge of collecting the military information from the Communist Party cells and also going through this selecting and assigning the personnel who would be completely delivered for good to the military intelligence. When the question of using military men of the intelligence apparatus came to discussion, several names were mentioned of foreign nationalities.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were they, Mr. Barmine?

Mr. BARMINE. So far as I can remember now, they were a few Russian names. Then they were French, Czechs, Germans, and Americans.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were the Americans?

Mr. BARMINE. Owen Lattimore and Joseph Barnes.

Mr. MORRIS. They were mentioned as "our people" by Berzin who could be assigned to this project you were complaining about where you did not have the personnel to staff.

Mr. BARMINE. We played with this idea. It was one of the possibilities which was discussed.

Senator EASTLAND. Just exactly what did he say about Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. BARMINE. You see, I want to emphasize that this project which finally was never realized by me was only a very small part of the preparation. I had the assignment of delivery to western China and Turkey. We spent hours in long conferences on these. This was 15 or 16 years ago.

Senator FERGUSON. Just give it to us the best you can.

Mr. BARMINE. To tell you exactly what words, I would not like to say anything I don't remember very firmly.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us your recollection of that conversation and subsequent conversations?

Mr. BARMINE. All I can recollect is subsequent conversations, the question of the personnel or reliable people who ought to organize it or put in charge or to start this business. It was because I said I had no man who could do it, I could not spare anyone for preparation. Then he talked about General Terian and that was the question of who might be suitable. Among the names was a Czech, the one whom I knew personally.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the Czech's name?

Mr. BARMINE. Creichi. I knew only about Creichi because he was in Germany.

Mr. MORRIS. That is C-r-e-i-c-h-i?

Mr. BARMINE. C-r-e-i-c-h-i, probably this way; I would not know how to spell it in English.

Mr. MORRIS. You do recall that Creichi's name, Barnes' name, and Lattimore's name were mentioned as "our people who could be assigned to you"?

Mr. BARMINE. There were French, German, there were two Russians, Mamaiev—

Mr. MORRIS. How do you spell that name?

Mr. BARMINE. M-a-m-a-i-e-v.

Mr. MORRIS. He was Russian?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes. There was Vatmanov, V-a-t-m-a-n-o-v. This one was the highest division because they were Russians and they carried all the part of the job from the military intelligence.

Senator EASTLAND. Now General Berzin was the head of Soviet military intelligence?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Senator EASTLAND. He spoke of Mr. Lattimore and Mr. Barnes as two agents of Soviet military intelligence

Mr. BARMINE. He spoke of them as "our men"?

Senator O'CONOR. He referred to them as "our men"?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Meaning Russian men?

Mr. BARMINE. It was my understanding meaning military intelligence.

Senator O'CONOR. Had you ever heard of Owen Lattimore and Joseph Barnes before that?

Mr. BARMINE. No.

Senator O'CONOR. Did you later hear of them?

Mr. MORRIS. You see, there were more conversations where those names were mentioned.

Mr. BARMINE. They were the first American names that ever came to me.

Senator O'CONOR. They were the first two Americans who were ever described to you as being identified with the Russian cause?

Mr. BARMINE. Ever mentioned in connection with any of my work for many years before that.

Senator O'CONOR. In the first conversation did General Berzin say anything further that you can recall as to what Owen Lattimore and Joseph Barnes had done or were prepared to do?

Mr. BARMINE. Now the question was that—we were talking the first time of the whole affair; the problem of personnel was not the biggest one. The problem was principally how to go about it. Would it be possible technically? How we were going to ask permission of the Politburo to do it? What would be the position of the Commissar of the Foreign Trade Department? These things were mentioned. When the practical solution would come, we would come back to it again. The question which was pushed on this conference was, "Do they have men to give me and do they have suitable men?" Later they decided most of these men they couldn't spare, they had other things

to do and more important things, and they were not suitable for this purpose.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Barmine, these names that were mentioned in the first conversation were repeated again?

Mr. BARMINE. I wouldn't recall that conversation, the first.

Mr. MORRIS. These names came up not only once but they came up more than once?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. In which they discussed the possibility of making Lattimore, Barnes, Creichi, Mamaiev and Vatmanov available to your organization?

Mr. BARMINE. It was not discussed how they would be available, what position they would take and what capacity. This was the first idea only.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was present at this first conversation where these two names were mentioned? Will you tell us who were there besides General Berzin?

Mr. BARMINE. General Terian and General Malikov.

Senator FERGUSON. This was their headquarters?

Mr. BARMINE. General Berzin's office where I usually came to talk to him.

Senator FERGUSON. An official conversation?

Mr. BARMINE. We were talking about our work.

Senator EASTLAND. Was his office the Kremlin?

Mr. BARMINE. No, it was on a small street, the intelligence office was on a small street around the corner from the main War Department building.

Senator EASTLAND. He did not speak of them as Communists but as military agents of the Soviet Union?

Mr. BARMINE. He spoke about "our men" and I assume when people work in military intelligence they usually have no more formal connections with the party at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Barmine, did he mention to you in any of those conversations what organizations they were working for, that is, Barnes and Lattimore in particular?

Mr. BARMINE. Not in that conversation.

Mr. MORRIS. In subsequent conversations did General Berzin tell you what organizations they were working with?

The CHAIRMAN. During a subsequent conversation did they tell you what organization these men were working with?

Mr. BARMINE. When it came to the second time, as I remember, that was the first time the Institute of Pacific Relations was mentioned. The question was that there were more important things and they would be more suitable with the plans in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations, the building up of the branches of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and the military using it for a cover shop for military intelligence work in the Pacific area.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you first hear the term "Institute of Pacific Relations?"

Mr. BARMINE. I first read about it—at this time when this was mentioned first in the office of General Berzin I had not the faintest idea that the Institute of Pacific Relations had anything to do with this kind of affair. All I knew about it was what I read in the news-

papers at this time in Moscow. My idea was that it was probably some kind of geographical, scientific organization, and I think that was probably correct at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. What year was that?

Mr. BARMINE. I think it was shortly before, probably in 1934 or 1935.

Mr. MORRIS. How did General Berzin describe the Institute of Pacific Relations to you from this point of view?

Mr. BARMINE. This was not describing the Institute of Pacific Relations, of course, because these things, when you spoke, they were mentioned passingly because you assumed all you know about it or you are not supposed to know more than you are told at this moment. I couldn't question my superior about what his plans are. The question was only that in this long conference when we came back again to the question of personnel he said that we had some important planning developments in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations and the men would be valuable more in connection with this, so let us forget about them.

Senator FERGUSON. What men would be valuable in that institute?

Mr. BARMINE. Lattimore and Barnes, Americans.

Senator O'CONOR. How long was that after the first conversation? About what interval of time was that?

Mr. BARMINE. I couldn't answer you exactly because I was seeing him at this time probably two or three times a week. It would certainly be within a period of 4 weeks.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Barmine, as a result of these conversations with General Berzin and the other generals in which you discussed the Institute of Pacific Relations, what was your understanding of the nature of the Institute as a result of those conversations?

Mr. BARMINE. You see, when this was mentioned, we speak, we sit in General Berzin's office, then the conference is finished. I go to Terian's office or Malikov's office and we talk about what happened because we have to carry things, and then we refer to the conversations which were held in this. Of course, I imagine I could not recollect now how I would state it, because there were hours of conversation, but certainly I am sure I expressed some surprise about the Institute of Pacific Relations brought into our affairs. I knew of the cover shop that would be put up for intelligence agents' use or some expert in a private firm of Belgium, France, or Italy, or whatever it was, but that was the first time.

Mr. MORRIS. So you understood it to be a cover shop?

Mr. BARMINE. Then we talked about it and I was explained by Terain more in detail what Berzin just mentioned, and then it was a question of what is the plan. I couldn't ask much. You are not supposed in this world to ask things that are not directly in your line of duty. Whatever my friends would volunteer me to say, and frankly, it is of big importance now here, but it was of a very secondary and small importance for me at that time. The idea was, as I was explained, that the Institute of Pacific Relations being an organization who can carry research work, who can open branches around the Pacific in the countries where we were not yet recognized—the Soviet Union at this time has no embassy all around the Pacific area—with this difficulty about contacts, the idea which I was given was that

that is the idea, under-cover work when you can have legal reasons and innocent reasons to travel to do specifically military research and reconnoitering work and gathering of information materials, because military intelligence is comprised of the gathering of printed material, classified and unclassified, of every kind. You have reason to keep the foreign members of the military network on the job, you can send them from one area to another, you can have for them a legitimate reason to have their offices to gather information, to get in contact with people who know something about geography, topography, and many other things.

So the explanation I was given was that the Intelligence Division considered this a very valuable outlet, a very valuable cover organization, they have an important plan for it, because it would be extremely convenient.

Now what I want to say is that there was no idea of any question of political work, it was purely professional, just to use the organization, develop it in a way where it could contribute for the assignment that military intelligence had.

Senator EASTLAND. In reality, it was considered an arm of the Soviet military intelligence; is that right?

Mr. BARMINE. I do not know when it was decided, how it was decided, but at this moment when I came to this picture, as I say accidentally, for a very short time, at this time this was considered important for Russia, which was developing to use this and to build within this organization the convenient apparatus which could have this very innocent and respectable cover.

Senator EASTLAND. But to make it an agent of Soviet military intelligence was the plan, was it not?

Mr. BARMINE. You see, how you come to make an agent, it is not just that you hire somebody for a job the way you hire for any organization. Some of the people who would work in the institute would not know that they were working for military intelligence. Some of them will be drafted into it gradually, first given an assignment to make an expedition for research to go to China, Manchuria, Korea, and then there would be military topography, and finally the men would be drafted in and one moment the point will come when maybe there will be disclosed whom they are working for and they consider to be reliable and willing to do this job. That is a gradual process and different with every person.

Senator EASTLAND. Whether all the people knew it or not, the Soviet military intelligence planned that this organization would be its agent?

Mr. BARMINE. I would term it not as an organization as such but the organization would be infiltrated, then the organization would be used for recruiting, for bringing people into this organization, and gradually take some of them who came to this organization with an innocent purpose or scientific purpose.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you know at that time that Mr. Lattimore was in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. BARMINE. No, I didn't.

Mr. MORRIS. You learned it in the conversations?

Mr. BARMINE. We had plans for them in the Institute of Pacific Relations. I couldn't ask who Mr. Lattimore was, what he was doing, was he on the job there or not.

I explained to you all this procedure. For me, I had by this time intelligence training. I went through special courses. For me, it was not necessary to explain me all this in detail, just mentioning the question we are going and we are planning to use this for our purpose; it would be not for me—all the rest I told you, the matter of operation would be something part of my training, I would know how it was done. It was not necessary to be explained to me in connection with the institute.

Senator EASTLAND. Later General Berzin told you to forget the plans for Lattimore and Barnes, that they had more important assignments for them?

Mr. BARMINE. In connection with the institute. Then I asked questions about the institute.

Senator FERGUSON. I wonder there whether or not he could explain the difference between a front that you set up and one that they penetrate.

The CHAIRMAN. I think, Senator, that is exactly what he was explaining a minute or so ago.

Mr. BARMINE. If you want me to, I can tell you.

Senator FERGUSON. In as short a way as you can. And which was the Institute of Pacific Relations? Was it a front or one that you would penetrate?

Mr. BARMINE. Of course you have sometimes what we call a cover shop. It was specially organized for the narrow military purpose. It was phony, it was a fake. There would be some import-export business or some kind of shop or some tourist office which would be built as a place for a rendezvous or a gathering and for giving the reason for legal residence in the area.

Now this of course was a different project to the extent they had an organization that existed already that was found to be ideally suitable for not just one local place but there was a whole Pacific area that they could give movement for people and open very large possibilities for intelligence work. So it was not especially built up from an organization which should be infiltrated, taken over at the most decided place. When the question of moving people, there would be enough people there who could report to the military network, work within the organization undisturbed for their operations for collection of material, for recruiting people and all.

Senator FERGUSON. So the Institute of Pacific Relations was the latter set-up that you were going to use and were using; is that right?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right; that is my understanding of it. Of course I have to qualify this as my conclusion on the basis of my training, because it was not considered enough to explain to me.

Senator O'CONOR. They did not have to tell you a great deal; you had had enough experience to put two and two together.

The point I would like to have you clear up for us is whether or not in their discussions about the Institute of Pacific Relations it was all as to what they planned to do or whether or not at that time or subsequently you got any information as to what they had accomplished, whether they had succeeded in getting to it.

Mr. BARMINE. At this time, as I understood it, it was already in process.

Senator O'CONOR. In other words, they had already infiltrated?

Mr. BARMINE. I don't know how much they had, but the development of this operation was in process. I couldn't ask about anything, but so far as I was told I was told it was in process. Then it came completely out of the sphere of activity. When I went to Greece I did not hear anything about it except I would see and read in the newspaper about formal activity, and I was not interested really at this time, of course.

Senator FERGUSON. It was your understanding that these Americans were already in this service or would be put in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. BARMINE. In the service generally. Whether they were at this time actively connected with the IPR and there were plans for them to do it, I wouldn't know it.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not know?

Mr. BARMINE. At this moment I wouldn't ask about it. I was told we have plans for them in connection with the institute. I couldn't tell you whether actually they were already in it or preparing something.

Mr. SOURWINE. You make a distinction there, General, do you not? You say you got the clear implication that they already were "our men," that they were already working for General Berzin.

Mr. BARMINE. It was not for me. So far as it was told by General Berzin, it was a fact.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was a question of where they were working, you did not know?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you recall the two names so that when you had a discussion with General Krivitsky some years later you asked him about those?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the time of the conversation?

Mr. BARMINE. It was in early 1938 when I was in France.

Mr. MORRIS. This is after you had separated yourself from the Soviet organization?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. In France in 1938?

Mr. BARMINE. In France in 1938.

Mr. MORRIS. Tell us of your conversation with General Krivitsky. Identify him first.

Mr. BARMINE. It happened this way: At this time after several Soviet attempts on me the French Government gave me special protection. I had two detectives day and night with me who were accompanying me wherever I would go in Paris, and also police in the night near my house. Once one of the detectives told me that the other two were guarding General Krivitsky in Paris, they kept him in the hotel room under constant guard. He told me he was very jittery and nervous, very depressed, and they were just worrying about him very much. Then my French friends who were in contact with him said that he asked if possible that I should go and see him probably to cheer him up, because I was maybe in a better mood. So it was arranged that I would go and see him in his hotel and talk.

Well, I had a personal interest in this rendezvous for other reasons because in 1937 in Paris when there was a special group assigned, sent

partly from Moscow and partly organized in France, which had an assignment to kill Ignatz Reiss and me——

Mr. MORRIS. Krivitsky told you this?

Mr. BARMINE. I knew this, because the French police blew it up and they arrested several. They succeeded to trace me already. At this time several of them were arrested. Therefore I was saved from the possibility of the same thing.

What I knew from my French friends who were in contact with Krivitsky, Krivitsky participated in this conference in which the decision to liquidate me and Reiss was discussed. I wanted to know about it, to ask Krivitsky what was talked and what was going on and his part in it.

The CHAIRMAN. You wanted to know how you were going to be liquidated?

Mr. MORRIS. He had broken with the Soviet organization also.

Mr. BARMINE. At this moment when he asked me to see him, but when this group came to Paris in 1937, in July, he was called to this conference by Spiegelglass and that was discussed because it so happened that Reiss broke from the Soviet organization in Holland almost exactly the same day as I did in Athens. Reiss was killed in Switzerland later. We almost at the same time left the respective countries and came to Paris.

I didn't know about this break at this time at all, but this group who came, was organized in Paris, and the people who came from Moscow, had an assignment to liquidate both of us. That is what Krivitsky told. So when I went to see him I was interested not only in cheering him up but finding what this was all about.

Now subsequently I saw Krivitsky two or three times more, always at his request. At one of these meetings there was talk of he was planning to go to the United States, he was trying to get a visa to the United States, and so I was planning to do the same thing.

At this time, you see, you have to understand psychologically when you are breaking you are very much feeling alone and then you expect when all these ugly things you knew were going on about Russia that you were able to persuade other people to do the same thing. Now the experience with Reiss, who was trying to persuade one of his friends and was taken into the trap and murdered, he was made to think that you should be cautious. Of course when you plan to come to the United States you try to find people who feel the same way as you do, who went through the same tragedy that you went through, and try to persuade them also to break. So we were talking about the people who would come here, who we might see, and who we can approach or who we should be careful about, too.

From the other point of view I never met Krivitsky during my intelligence work because he was in the underground network.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify his position?

Mr. BARMINE. I can identify only so far as he told me myself. As I say, he worked under different names. As I say, the group who was working within the Soviet organization, the foreign office and trade office, except when it was necessary for some particular things, were never told about people who worked in the underground. You could guess it.

I could see in passing through Berlin one of my classmates in general staff in civilian clothes. As I remember, I met one in the

railroad station. I wouldn't recognize, of course, and I would never ask him about him, but that would give me the idea that this, my friend is working also for military intelligence in the underground military network. That would be my assumption. So I could meet one accidentally or meet him at the entrance of Berzin's office at intelligence. We don't ask people where they are coming from and what they are doing, why they are here, or in Berlin, or why they are in Paris. So I wouldn't know anything about it. So I would have to believe what he told me.

Of course I was interested, to be sure, and I was checking him. In the first of my conferences with him and in the second time when I saw him we talked for hours and I was putting the question to confirm to me what he told about himself. I would ask him about people in the military intelligence, does he know this one or that one and whom he would know.

MR. MORRIS. You asked him if he knew Barnes and Lattimore?

MR. BARMINE. That is right.

MR. MORRIS. You wanted to know whom to be careful of?

MR. BARMINE. Not necessarily. I didn't know anything about this man except what I told you. I didn't know about whom I should be careful about, but I asked him what he knows. As I say, this conversation went for hours. There were many things to talk and many questions to ask about people who disappear, about people who work, about people whom we might meet, and when the two names and several others came back again then I remember I asked him about the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The thing I could only say was that he said this operation was very successful because he, who had contact with military intelligence people who worked in the United States, told me that. He was informed more than I was on what was going on in military intelligence work in the United States.

What he told me, I would be amazed how many very important contacts the people working in the institute got, they were very influential and important, and he had some high hopes when he would come here that from the one point of view, high hopes that he could not only contact them but—

MR. MORRIS. May I bring that out so it is clearly understood? In other words, when you discussed the Institute of Pacific Relations with General Krivitsky he told you that that particular Soviet operation, the cover shop in the institute, was doing very well and you would be amazed at what important contacts they were making in connection with their work?

MR. BARMINE. Yes.

MR. MORRIS. Will you develop that?

MR. BARMINE. I would say the word used in Russian was "flourishing."

MR. MORRIS. That is the word he used?

MR. BARMINE. Yes. I had no idea of American political situations and conditions. I had no questions to ask. I would not understand much, of course, what that meant. I assumed only from a purely professional point of view that they are flourishing in the sense that this operation on military lines was going successfully. That was all at this time that came to my mind.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the Russian word for "flourishing?"

Mr. BARMINE. Prozdetat.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Barmine, did he also confirm your impression of Barnes and Lattimore, your recollection of Barnes and Lattimore that is?

Mr. BARMINE. He knew about them.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he know they were members of the Soviet organization?

Mr. BARMINE. Now, at this time he told me that they were connected with the institute. So then I knew what he is telling me, because it was important for me, because very few people that I would know, that he would tell the truth that he ever had contact with the agents in the United States, that he is really covered with the person that he tells he is.

Senator FERGUSON. I do not think he answered your question.

Senator O'CONOR. He has not told us specifically what General Krivitsky told him about Barnes and Lattimore.

Mr. BARMINE. That they are working within the Institute of Pacific Relations and they are still, what he said, "they are still our men."

Mr. MORRIS. At this point, Mr. Chairman, I think it is wise if we have Mr. Mandel testify to what positions Mr. Lattimore and Mr. Barnes held in the institute during this period. Mr. Mandel has been sworn previously.

TESTIMONY OF BENJAMIN MANDEL, DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH, SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Mr. MANDEL. The literature and files of the Institute of Pacific Relations show that Joseph Barnes was secretary of the American council and served on its staff from 1931 to 1934, and Owen Lattimore was the editor of the official organ of the Institute called Pacific Affairs.

Senator EASTLAND. Is that the Joseph Barnes who was foreign editor of the New York Herald Tribune?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Was he stationed in Moscow for that paper?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How long was Lattimore in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. He began to serve approximately in 1934. I think he served in that position until 1941.

Senator O'CONOR. Editor of Pacific Affairs?

Mr. MORRIS. Editor of Pacific Affairs.

TESTIMONY OF ALEXANDER GREGORY BARMINE—Resumed

Senator JENNER. Senator McCarthy said last year that Lattimore was the top agent of the Communist Party. As a former agent of the Kremlin, would you say that that statement was true in view of what you have learned from your conversations with the chief of the Russian military intelligence, with that gentleman in Paris, or other conversations?

Mr. BARMINE. I told you exactly what I know. So I don't know enough to say anything about this statement, because what I knew about them I told you everything. I don't know anything more.

Senator JENNER. When the chief of the military intelligence says, "He is one of our men," would that leave the impression in your mind that he was a top Communist in America?

Mr. BARMINE. Not necessarily. That assumes it; that doesn't preclude it.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there a difference being a high Communist official and agent for the military intelligence of Soviet Russia?

Mr. BARMINE. Agents for military intelligence would not be necessarily, rather more as a rule, would not be high Communist officials.

Senator FERGUSON. They would not be high Communists—

Mr. BARMINE. Officials, but in the organization of the Communist Party would be a very high Communist official who would channel people for military intelligence work.

Senator EASTLAND. Of course they were made to resign from the party?

Mr. BARMINE. Take them out of party work and send them for assignment. Duclos was such a man in France at the time I was there.

Senator FERGUSON. When you were in the intelligence branch of the Russian Government you were not a high Communist Party member?

Mr. BARMINE. I was never a Communist Party official. I was just a member of the party and that was all.

Senator EASTLAND. You were not in the underground work?

Mr. BARMINE. Never.

Mr. MORRIS. You were in military intelligence?

Mr. BARMINE. I joined the Communist Party in 1919, the same day I volunteered in the army and went to the Red army. Since then I remained a member of the party of average standing, I would say, but I never held any Communist position in the party apparatus.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you testify that when you did discuss Barnes and Lattimore with Krivitsky in Paris that Krivitsky did state they were members of the Soviet organization?

That was your testimony, was it not, General?

Mr. BARMINE. That is what he told me.

Mr. MORRIS. That is what he told you. I want to bring that out because it was not understood by everyone.

Senator O'CONOR. You have been very fair in not attempting to overstate anything you do not know.

Mr. BARMINE. It is difficult for me because so many years passed and so many things happened since, before, during, and after. This was very accidental and not a substantial part of whatever I went through. So I am rather under strain trying to remember exactly and answer questions that would be truthful. I am afraid to say something that wasn't correct.

Senator O'CONOR. You did not anticipate at that time you would be in this position and it would have so much importance.

Mr. BARMINE. I did not anticipate I would be in the United States and I did not anticipate I would ever have to talk about the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator O'CONOR. Nevertheless, as a very experienced and intelligent military officer, did you not have the feeling or did you have the feeling that Lattimore and Barnes were actively engaged in work for the Soviet Union rather than just being used by them? We are trying to distinguish whether you got the impression they were just being used or whether or not they were actively identified with the Soviet intelligence.

Mr. BARMINE. Well, as I say, the process of becoming an active member is slow and gradual and different with every person, but as much as I can understand at this time, when I was told by General Berzin and repeated by Krivitsky my assumption was that they were in active and conscious participation.

Senator O'CONOR. That is what I want, active and conscious participation.

Mr. BARMINE. I can't tell you that, that is only my assumption.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you tell any agency of the United States Government what you knew about Lattimore and Barnes?

Mr. BARMINE. When I was asked by the FBI agent who came to me I told him exactly the same thing as I told you. I was asked about it several times and I told it very early. They came to me several times and it was several years ago already and then they came repeatedly. So I couldn't tell you exactly the date.

Senator FERGUSON. During this last hearing when they were having hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee last year were you approached by the FBI?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you tell them that at that time?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you ever questioned by any of the committee members or the counsel about coming in as a witness?

Mr. BARMINE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Or giving this evidence?

Mr. BARMINE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. But the FBI did have that evidence that you have told here this morning about Mr. Barnes and Mr. Lattimore; is that right?

Mr. BARMINE. Well, if you call it evidence——

Senator FERGUSON. Well, your statements that you gave here.

Mr. BARMINE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean to count that as evidence, do you not? It is what happened?

Mr. BARMINE. I have to tell you that when I got this to the FBI, I just considered in the sense that I learned to understand the evidence, I was very reluctant that this thing should be used, because I think it is a very old story and since then many things could happen, and that was all that I knew, but it was after all not my direct knowledge from the workings.

Senator EASTLAND. You just told them what you have told us?

Senator FERGUSON. You understand what you are saying here today is evidence? You have been sworn to tell the truth.

Mr. BARMINE. I know that is the truth. I am not legally qualified to weigh how much evidence is this.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Barmine, I wonder if you would tell us if you have done anything to counteract the effect of Mr. Lattimore's performances in the United States?

Mr. BARMINE. You see, when I first came to this country I did not know the English language at all. I couldn't say a word. So I started to learn English in 1940. So I had a very little idea of what was going on in America's political life. Then I was studying it very intensively and I began to read the newspapers. That was my manual for my English.

Then I was approached by several magazines for whom I worked giving advice and editorial assistance on some stories. Many times I was approached by Life or Time magazine. I published several articles and then I began to work with the Reader's Digest.

From the Army I was transferred to OSS and I remained in OSS, in the Office of Strategic Services, until the fall of 1944. At the same time I began to work as editorial adviser to Reader's Digest. In 1944 I wrote an article in the Reader's Digest about Communist infiltration in the Government apparatus in the United States.

When I was writing this article I had in mind the background of all the things I told you, but I was not considering it possible or proper to bring it out publicly. What I wanted, I wanted to warn the Government about infiltration, about the way, about the plans, and about the scope of the danger. I was discharged from the Office of Strategic Services after that.

Senator FERGUSON. After you published the Reader's Digest article?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right, in 1944. Then I remained with Reader's Digest in an editorial capacity, but this time I learned about the Chinese problem in relation with the American foreign policy, and I would say I was very much worried about the course that this development took and about the propaganda that was spread at this time on China.

Now I was asked by Reader's Digest to pass on manuscripts, articles which were connected with Soviet policy and communism. And I was asked to give my opinion about the condensation of the Lattimore book, *Solution in Asia*, in 19— I couldn't say exactly, but it was probably in the spring of 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. April 7, 1945?

Mr. BARMINE. In the spring of 1945.

Well, my opinion was asked about this book and I wrote a memorandum for Reader's Digest because I considered this book a very clever camouflage Communist propaganda.

Mr. MORRIS. You had in mind your previous conversations with General Berzin and General Krivitsky?

Mr. BARMINE. I had it in mind but I did not consider that was necessarily relevant to the point, because many years passed, I would consider this book on its merits and the position of the author. I considered this book tremendously harmful and deceiving. This was my opinion expressed to the editor of Reader's Digest.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was the author of that book?

Mr. BARMINE. Owen Lattimore. My recommendation was that if this condensation of the book would be published in many millions of copies in Reader's Digest would bring very serious harm to the interest of the United States.

A lot of pressure was put on the Director of the Reader's Digest to publish the condensation. Practically when I was writing this memo I was called every day and told the editor in chief demanded the memo because a decision must be made, they considered it very

important. So I wouldn't be sure that the memo was decisive, but as a result of the memo the decision was taken by Reader's Digest against publishing the condensation.

I reworked this memo in the form of a review of the book. I gave this review and it was printed in the New Leader.

Mr. MORRIS. At this point, Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer into evidence a copy of the book review of *Solution in Asia* by Owen Lattimore, reviewed by Alexander Barmine, which appeared in New Leader on April 7, 1945. I would like to introduce that in the record at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. This is a public issue that was put out?

Mr. MORRIS. A book review by Mr. Barmine of Lattimore's book *Solution in Asia*.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be received in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 40" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 40

[From the New Leader, April 7, 1945]

BOOKS IN REVIEW—NEW DEFENDER FOR YENAN

(By Alexander Barmine)

SOLUTION IN ASIA. By Owen Lattimore. Little, Brown & Co., New York. 214 pages. \$2.

The Chinese Communists have been particularly fortunate in the American newspaper correspondents who have written about the controversy between Chungking and Yen-an. Through such writers as Brooks Atkinson, Edgar Snow, Agnes Smedley, Harrison Forman, and Owen Lattimore, the cause of the Yen-an regime has been pleaded to the American public more effectively, persuasively, and cleverly, than any known Communist could possibly do it. Lattimore is the smoothest propagandist among them all, precisely because he gives the appearance of being objective, realistic, and factual.

Owen Lattimore, after various experiences in Asiatic affairs, including work for the Institute for Pacific Relations, was recommended by President Roosevelt as political adviser to Chiang Kai-shek and remained in that position for two years. He then occupied for several years the high post of Director of Pacific Operations for the OWI. It can be presumed that for Kuomintang leaders the conceptions and policy of Lattimore represented, or were identified with, those of the American Government. Notwithstanding his high authority, he evidently did not impress the Chinese, for Chiang Kai-shek's present policy is contrary to the appeasement of Chinese Communists—and consequently of quiet suicide—suggested to him by his former adviser in this book.

The main thesis of the book and the political philosophy of its author are exposed recklessly by the anonymous writer of the blurb on the jacket: "He (Lattimore) shows that all the Asiatic peoples are more interested in actual democratic practices, such as the ones they can see in action across the Russian border, than they are in the fine theories of Anglo-Saxon democracies which come coupled with ruthless imperialism * * * He inclines to support American newspapermen who report that the only real democracy in China is found in Communist areas."

Lattimore can hardly have known that a Little, Brown blurb writer was going to "spill the beans" in this naive way, for although this is a correct description of what he attempts to do, he does it far more subtly than that. His book follows the propaganda line of the Communists and the Soviet Union faithfully, but it dresses this propaganda up to look like a "realistic" American policy, mixing it with many interesting comments and observations on things in general.

As a point of departure for his *Solution in Asia*, Lattimore takes from the Communists their mechanical and oversimplified division of Chinese social forces into two: "The Kuomintang-landlord right wing in China and the Communist-democratic-United Front left wing." If this dichotomy is accepted, of course there is no place for democracy in China except on the side of the Communist-dominated United Front.

The idea that American democracy might have anything to teach the Chinese in contrast to the official Soviet doctrines is dismissed by Lattimore in the following remark: "We may count on seeing, over wide areas (in Asia), the partial acceptance of Marxist ideas and the adoption of one or another part of the Soviet system. What, then, will be America's primary concern with Asiatic problems? * * * We cannot assume that Americans can draw authoritative blueprints for Asia." All the light, evidently, must come from Russia!

Here is Lattimore's evaluation of the Communist regime in China: "The political structure under the Communists is more nearly democratic than it is under the Kuomintang. It is a fact that governing committees and representative committees are elected, and that the Communists limit themselves (sic!) to one-third of the representation; whereas in Kuomintang-controlled territory it is increasingly difficult to hold a public position without joining the Kuomintang and accepting its discipline."

* * * * *

Lattimore presents a picture of Soviet Russia which corresponds accurately with his picture of Communist China. As usual, he begins cautiously with what in his opinion the Soviet Union represents to Asiatic peoples: "In their eyes * * * the Soviet Union stands for strategic security, economic prosperity, technological progress, miraculous medicine, free education, equality of opportunity, and democracy: a powerful combination." And then Lattimore adds his own opinion: "The fact that the Soviet Union also stands for democracy is not to be overlooked. It stands for democracy because it stands for all the other things."

"Here in America we are in the habit of taking a narrow view of foreign claimants to the status of democracy," Lattimore argues. "If China, or Russia, or some other alien people does not measure up to the standards of the particular American modification of Anglo-Saxon democracy, we say that it is not democratic * * * The fact is that for most of the people in the world today what constitutes democracy in theory is more or less irrelevant. What moves people to act, to try to line up with one party or country and not with another, is the difference between what is more democratic and less democratic in practice."

Why this more-than-tolerant approach, which includes Stalin's Russia and Mao Tse-tung's Communist China in the circle of democracies, is not applied by Lattimore to Kuomintang China is an unexplained mystery.

Lattimore presents a complicated and hazy plan of "reconciliation" or compromise with Communists in China. "We should advocate a reorganization of the National Army and the disbandment of superfluous troops. We should avoid isolating the problem of the Communist troops, remembering that there are also * * * regular troops which, while nominally part of the National Army, are in fact Kuomintang party troops." That is a familiar maneuver. The demand by the Eam to disband the Greek Regular Army as "proroyalist" was based on the same reasoning.

Lattimore is for liquidation of colonial empires in Asia. He has a more definite plan for defeated Japan. First, the question of ownership and management of Japan's industries: the holdings of principal Japanese capitalist families and corporations in banks, insurance, shipping, and other large corporations as well as in industry, should be taken over by the state. When it comes to the question of what social groups will constitute the state, and how the government will be formed, Lattimore says: "We must, on the other hand, not be soft with the old-school kimono 'liberals' who * * * made such a good impression on Wall Street, art collectors, and garden clubs. They were part of the liaison between predatory militarism and predatory big business."

Lattimore suggests vaguely for Japan that the leadership should be "left of center and at least liberal enough to be friendly with Russia." Does he mean a regime of the type used by Stalin in Rumania and Bulgaria, an amalgam of Fascist generals with Communists?

Lattimore disposes of Korea and both Mongolias as obviously within the sphere of Soviet influence. But what about the American policy toward China? "We do not want China to become dependent on us", i. e., on the democracies. Why? "Otherwise there would be grave danger of conflict between our China policy and that of Russia * * * Our relations with China today are getting uncomfortably close to this limit of safety."

It would seem that the opening of the Burma Road, and the prospect of enormous military help by the American armies, and our liberation of China, are a

source of anxiety to Lattimore, since they may hinder the domination of the continent by Soviet Russia. He advises: "It is essential that America should cease to be so conspicuously the main link between China and the United Nations."

"Britain and America can successfully support their legitimate capitalist interest in China, and at the same time work in cooperation with the Russians for democratic harmony in a country in which the second largest party is Communist. * * * China is but a major example of the new world situation. The world is now grouped in three major divisions. In one, the capitalist economic system and democratic political system are vigorous and unshaken. In another the Communist (or strictly speaking, the Socialist) political system is now permanently established and identified with a collectivist economic system. In the third, there is an adjustment yet to be made between capitalism and collectivism, and mixed political orders have not yet clearly taken shape."

Lattimore's "adjustment" between the first two divisions is obviously that of defeatist appeasement on the part of the capitalist democracies, which are to accept as inevitable a Soviet Communist domination of the Asiatic Continent. The third division, if his advice is followed, can be nothing but camouflaged Communist totalitarianism. That is his "Solution in Asia." He advises Americans to give in to it with a light heart, even though the Asiatic peoples, who may not like to be sold down the river so easily, continue to expect from us a vigorous assertion of democratic policy and of the principles of the Atlantic Charter.

There is in America a growing group of sophisticated intellectuals who call themselves left-wing liberals, and who are most vociferous and fanatical in demanding war to complete and crushing victory. But in reality they are complete defeatists who do not believe in the living force of democracy. They have lost faith in liberal ideals. They do not believe it possible to establish democracy in most of the liberated areas, are not willing to work for it, and instead are trying to force on the American Government the policy of selling the peoples of Asia to the Soviet form of totalitarianism.

This surrender of faith in democracy in favor of Soviet totalitarianism is permeating American public opinion. Under its influence America is in danger of adopting in Asia this same so-called realistic policy of appeasement and self-abdication which will not only abandon to totalitarianism several small nations, as in Europe, but hundreds of millions of Asiatics. This folly may ultimately spell the doom of democracy throughout the world.

The CHAIRMAN. That is an excerpt from your book?

Mr. BARMINE. This is a review of the book *Solution in Asia*. The basis of this review was my memorandum to Reader's Digest.

Mr. MORRIS. This is the second one you wrote? Once you wrote a memorandum to Reader's Digest pointing out the harm you thought was inherent in the book and in addition you wrote a book review for the *New Leader*?

Senator O'CONOR. The witness has described it as clever Communist propaganda, if I understood your description?

Mr. BARMINE. That was my impression.

Senator O'CONOR. Could you briefly elaborate on that and give us the benefit of your views as to why you described it thusly?

Mr. BARMINE. I don't think I could say it better than I put it.

Senator O'CONOR. You do give it in pretty lengthy fashion.

Mr. BARMINE. If you want a general appraisal, that would be the book which, if it could convince the people, would sell them unknowingly the Communist line in China which would be in the interest of the Soviet Union and disaster to the United States.

Senator O'CONOR. It did follow the Communist line?

Mr. BARMINE. In a very slick and smooth manner, in very devious ways. It never would be the direct statement of the author; it would be always related to people who think, people who say the other, but in fact it was telling the straight Communist line, camouflaged, I would say, very skilled.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Barmine, I point out one part of it which you have apparently taken out here, quoting your eighth paragraph. You say:

Lattimore presents a picture of Soviet Russia—

You can understand Soviet Russia, having been there all of your life—

which corresponds accurately with his picture of Communist China. As usual, he begins cautiously with what in his opinion the Soviet Union represents to Asiatic people: "In their eyes * * * the Soviet Union stands for strategic security, economic prosperity, technological progress, miraculous medicine, free education, equality of opportunity, and democracy: a powerful combination." And then Lattimore adds his own opinion: "The fact that the Soviet Union also stands for democracy is not to be overlooked. It stands for democracy because it stands for all the other things."

You in your experience with the Soviet Union did not find that to be the case, did you, Mr. Barmine?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right. It was the picture that was presented usually by the Communists, the false picture of the Soviet Union.

Senator EASTLAND. You have read Mr. Lattimore's writings, have you not?

Mr. BARMINE. That was the first of his writings I ever read.

Senator EASTLAND. Judging alone from what he writes, would you say he is a Communist?

Mr. BARMINE. Do you mean formally a member of the party?

Senator EASTLAND. No, that he follows the policy of the Soviet Union.

Mr. BARMINE. Yes, I would say that he does follow the policy of the Soviet Union to propagandize this policy and he is helping this policy. That is my assumption on the basis of his writings.

Senator EASTLAND. It would be your judgment, then, if you knew nothing else, that he is a Communist?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes, I think that would be sufficient.

Senator O'CONOR. Would you say from a review of his writings and your knowledge of what you have learned of him in recent years, that the description given him by General Berzin as to his being one of their men is accurate?

Mr. BARMINE. Those two things, not necessarily.

Senator O'CONOR. Whether that was consistent with what General Berzin described?

Mr. BARMINE. When I first read this book my impression was that Mr. Lattimore was still at it, because I didn't know his development, his evolution. In this year many people who realized what was going on, they broke with it, some of them were honest and had illusions. The others finally parted ways, but of course I think in early years little was known about what was going on in Russia. By the time the book was published I am sure every intelligent man and scholar and especially the men who were in Russia continuing this kind of deceitful job knew it would be in direct support.

Senator EASTLAND. Would you say that he is the shrewdest and cleverest Communist propagandist in the United States?

Mr. BARMINE. I would say one of them, the most.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know any others connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations that were in his class? I notice you

name some in this book. You named Smedley, Forman, and Atkinson. Was Atkinson connected with the institute, do you know?

Mr. BARMINE. No. I was just reading the writings of these people. There was one of them only that I had occasion to hear myself. That was Mr. Harrison Forman who made a report about his trip to China in the Dutch Treat Club somewhere in this same period between 1943 and 1946, I think. Mr. Forman's report impressed me also as straight Communist propaganda.

Senator FERGUSON. You figure that this book was straight Communist propaganda of Owen Lattimore?

Mr. BARMINE. It was not straight; it was a very crooked one, in my opinion.

Senator FERGUSON. It was a clever piece?

Mr. BARMINE. It was very clever.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it Communist propaganda?

Mr. BARMINE. Well, there is nothing that could better serve the Communist cause in China than the book, in my opinion, to sell this line to the American people.

Senator FERGUSON. It was, therefore, in your opinion, following the Communist line as far as the Chinese problem is concerned?

Mr. BARMINE. It was following the Communist line, how to sell to the American people the Communist policy in China.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Barmine, would this review alter your impression of Mr. Lattimore in the sense that, instead of working in a cover shop, as you call it, he was now making policy? Would you comment on that in any way, please?

Mr. BARMINE. Well, as I say, I consider this book, if it would be taken at its face value, if it would be taken at its face value by people who were connected with foreign policy and worked in China, it would be very harmful to the interest of the United States. The position I took about this book was that this book was presenting a false picture; it was giving a false line to follow, and if the policy suggested in this book, the solution suggested by Mr. Lattimore at this time, were followed, it would bring disastrous results.

I remember when I was talking about this with the editors of Reader's Digest at this time in the beginning of 1945 I told them exactly the following, I remember it well, that for the struggle between democracy and communism maybe it doesn't mean so much if 15,000,000 Yugoslavs are on this side or another, but it will be disastrous if 500,000,000 Chinese will go over to the Communist side. A book of this kind can only facilitate this process by demoralizing the foreign policy of the United States.

Mr. MORRIS. Did this indicate to you in any way that the institute was making policy, and was that your impression of it when you discussed it with General Krivitsky and Berzin in 1935 and 1938?

Mr. BARMINE. No; I didn't discuss making policy, because I didn't have the faintest idea of what policy or what part in policy the institute was playing at this time.

Senator FERGUSON. I do not understand that this book was written under the auspices of the institute?

Mr. MORRIS. No.

Mr. BARMINE. I don't connect this book with the institute.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you done anything else, Mr. Barmine, about bringing out what you know about the Soviet Union to the American people?

Mr. BARMINE. I have written several articles. I have written a book. I was advising the magazines on this subject. I made a few speeches there.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you advise the Navy during the war?

Mr. BARMINE. When they would come and ask me to, yes; I would.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you have done everything possible to impart what you know about the Soviet Union to the American people?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Senator O'CONOR. In the review, Mr. Barmine, you have this inserted:

He—

referring to Lattimore in Solution in Asia—

advises Americans to give in to it with a light heart, even though the Asiatic peoples, who may not like to be sold down the river so easily, continue to expect from us a vigorous assertion of democratic policy and of the principles of the Atlantic Charter.

Did that conform to the Communist line? I am reading at the bottom of page 2.

Mr. BARMINE. That was the position that the Soviet Union would like the Americans to take.

Senator O'CONOR. It was consistent with what had been enunciated by them?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Senator SMITH. Just slightly touching on this, has it been your observation, General, that the American people generally are much more gullible with respect to these questions of foreign affairs than the people of Europe?

Mr. BARMINE. I wouldn't say so. Fortunately, I think that the more sophisticated people, high intellectuals who profess to be liberals, are more gullible than the main mass of the American people. That is my firm belief on the basis of talking to a lot of people. I do believe that in spite of this kind of propaganda it does not go very well with the American people.

Senator SMITH. You think then that the main mass of Americans have come to understand this kind of propaganda?

Mr. BARMINE. I think they do.

Senator FERGUSON. General, I was not clear; I could not see exactly what you had in mind in this Paris conversation about the Institute of Pacific Relations. I want to ask you several questions about it. You say that it came up in conversation with a man who had broken with the Communists, General Krivitsky; that he and you were talking about whom you might contact and whom you would be compelled to avoid. Is that correct?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. The question of the activities of the Institute of Pacific Relations came up?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, will you make it clear just how it came up?

Mr. BARMINE. First of all, as I said, I wanted to be sure of his identity, who he was, and how much he knew.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the general?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes; to be sure. I was trying to find out—

Senator FERGUSON. Whether he was a former agent?

Mr. BARMINE. Former—

Senator FERGUSON. You were not quite sure but he might have been? You may have thought you had the idea he might be in on this plan to kill you?

Mr. BARMINE. Not then, but I was not sure that he was not an official of the NVD, if he had something to do with military intelligence or with the secret police, which are two different things. The only way I could be sure, I would dig out of my memory and ask him.

Senator FERGUSON. Some of the problems?

Mr. BARMINE. Not only problems; first men's names.

Senator FERGUSON. To find out whether or not he did know what was going on in military intelligence?

Mr. BARMINE. If he is what he is telling me.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you raise the question then of the institute?

Mr. BARMINE. No, but when the question comes back, then was the question in that connection, then I told him how I felt about the man.

Senator FERGUSON. What did he say?

Mr. BARMINE. He said "This is flourishing."

Senator FERGUSON. It was flourishing and had been acting for the Communists?

Mr. BARMINE. Used for the Government.

Senator FERGUSON. Who mentioned Lattimore's name with the general in Paris, you or the general?

Mr. BARMINE. I asked him if he knows of anybody in the United States.

Senator FERGUSON. What did he say?

Mr. BARMINE. He gave me those names.

Senator FERGUSON. He gave you those two names as connected with the institute?

Mr. BARMINE. No; he didn't say at this time. The first time he didn't mention the institute; but then, when he gave me names, I told him the story of Berzin. At this time I had nothing to keep secret. So, I told him how I happened to know about them. I told him the story I heard, what was planned.

Senator FERGUSON. What did he say he knew about these two men?

Mr. BARMINE. He knew that they were working for the military intelligence.

Senator FERGUSON. For the Russian military intelligence?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. He said he knew that?

Mr. BARMINE. He gave the names to me.

Senator FERGUSON. He gave the names first to you?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. There is no doubt in your mind now that he made the statement the substance of which was that these two men were working for the Russian military government?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that correct?

Mr. BARMINE. Military intelligence.

Senator FERGUSON. Of the Russian Government?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not at first the institute was merely used as an agent and then it became a policy-making branch?

Mr. BARMINE. I didn't know anything about policy making until I came to the United States and gradually learned the character of work of the institute and some facts in connection with influence.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, which would be the most beneficial to the Russian Government, a man who was in the institute and would merely get papers, like the Jaffe case, the Amerasia case, or a man who was in the institute and could make policy, talking about an agent, whether he was of the secret police or army intelligence?

Mr. BARMINE. I can only answer by an assumption that, if he then became so important or valuable or established such contacts that he could be more useful in a much wider area of activity, of course he would be relieved of any kind of small job of the military intelligence.

Senator FERGUSON. His policy-making job would be more important?

Mr. BARMINE. Enormously more important without any comparison. That would be at this time a very pure waste to use him for this kind of work.

Senator FERGUSON. When you reviewed this book back in April 1945, known as the Solution in Asia, none of the questions had been raised in our press about Owen Lattimore or his connections with communism or otherwise; is that true?

Mr. BARMINE. So far as I remember; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. So that you were writing this as a reader of the book; is that correct?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you in any way trying to put out anti-Communist propaganda by the writing of this article?

Mr. BARMINE. I was trying to neutralize the harm this kind of book would do.

Senator FERGUSON. You realized that this book could do a lot of harm in America as Communist propaganda; is that correct?

Mr. BARMINE. Not only propaganda but as practical assistance to the Soviet Union to carry out their purpose in China.

Senator FERGUSON. To carry out the Soviet Union's purpose in China?

Mr. BARMINE. And to neutralize the American position.

Senator FERGUSON. To neutralize that, then, you wrote this article?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. It was published in the New Masses?

Mr. BARMINE. New Leader. The New Masses wouldn't publish it.

Senator FERGUSON. You say you were aiding the Reader's Digest as adviser on Communist activities?

Mr. BARMINE. On Soviet affairs and Communist activities.

Senator FERGUSON. This was really prepared—

Mr. BARMINE. First, I prepared a memo advising against the condensing and publishing of this book in the Reader's Digest.

Senator FERGUSON. Do these stars indicate there was something left out?

Mr. BARMINE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. That does not mean that?

Mr. BARMINE. I probably omitted my recommendation, and I made it in the form of a review instead of inside editorial matter, but all the substance was exactly the same.

Senator FERGUSON. This book of Lattimore's was never published in the Reader's Digest?

Mr. BARMINE. I say I cannot be sure, but I assume that my memo had something to do with making the decision.

Senator FERGUSON. Keeping it out?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever find out why you were discharged from the OSS?

Mr. BARMINE. I was formally discharged because of sickness and absence on duty because of sickness. That was the formal reason.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the real reason, if you know?

Mr. BARMINE. I was never explained the real reason, but when the newspaper reporters went to OSS in New York and asked them if the reason for discharge was the writing of the article about Communist infiltration, as I remember, the spokesman for OSS answered: "It was not, but of course, Mr. Barmine, being in the Government service, should not write this kind of article."

Senator FERGUSON. When did you go to work for the Voice of America?

Mr. BARMINE. In October 1948.

Senator FERGUSON. Between the time you left OSS and October 1948, did you work for the Government?

Mr. BARMINE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. During that period you were not working?

Mr. BARMINE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did the FBI have in substance all of the matters that you have brought to our attention here this morning?

Mr. BARMINE. I believe so; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. They had that prior to the so-called Tydings hearings on the question of Communists in the Government?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did any of the lawyers for that committee question you?

Mr. BARMINE. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you sure he knows the committee to which you are referring and the hearings?

Senator FERGUSON. You are familiar with the Tydings committee?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know why this matter was not brought out at those hearings, the FBI having the evidence?

Mr. BARMINE. I was asked privately, not by any representative of the committee but by people I know, what would happen if I would be asked by the Tydings committee to testify. I said, of course, I would come and testify, I am ready to, and I was asked if I would tell the Tydings committee everything that I told now. I said yes, I would.

Senator FERGUSON. If the FBI had given aid to the Tydings committee, as I understand the Tydings committee claimed they had all the information from the FBI, I am just wondering why this was not brought out at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, can you do any more than wonder about it?

Senator FERGUSON. I am trying to find out if he knows.

Mr. BARMINE. I don't know anything about it. I can only assume that maybe these things were not considered substantial evidence.

Senator FERGUSON. That brings us back to the question of your discussion with General Berzin. That discussion was in your course of business as an intelligence agent of the Russian Army; is that right?

Mr. BARMINE. Intelligence officer.

Senator FERGUSON. And it was when you were storing or about to store goods, ammunition, and so forth, in China proper?

Mr. BARMINE. That is what was planned to do.

Senator FERGUSON. How much material was actually stored, if you know, in China proper?

Mr. BARMINE. It was not because the Politburo decision of the Chinese Commission was that they were opposed to using our corporation and the corporation was kept away from it.

Senator FERGUSON. It was finally given up?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. But you related what you did in northwest China?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. That was actually carried on?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all I have.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. That concludes the testimony of this witness.

I want to say to you, General, that I commend you for your frankness and for the way in which you have answered the questions. There were some pretty sharp questions propounded to you. Your knowledge of what is fact and what is conjecture impressed the chairman of this committee a great deal. I want to express my gratitude to you for coming before the committee of the Senate and before the American people and giving us the facts as to the dangers that are here with us at home. We are somewhat conversant with the dangers that confront us abroad but we should become more conversant with the dangers that exist here in our own home.

The committee is grateful to you, the country should be grateful to you.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I understand there is a Senator here, Senator McCarthy, who gave the name of this general to the Tydings committee. Is that right?

Senator McCARTHY. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. I think that ought to go on the record here.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will stand in recess until Thursday morning at 10 o'clock. Because on that day we have a matter on the floor that the chairman has to handle, we will have to close the committee meeting at noon. So we will reconvene Thursday at 10 o'clock.

Thank you, General.

(At 1:10 p. m. the committee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a. m., Thursday, August 2, 1951.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

THURSDAY, AUGUST 2, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT
AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS,
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Smith, and Ferguson.

Also present: Senator McCarthy, J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Let me say before commencing the hearing of today I would like to mention that the names of people now dead will figure in today's testimony. I would like to say that the introduction of such names into the record is done with reluctance because we are aware that it is not for us to pass judgment on those who have passed beyond. But a congressional committee, charged with a heavy duty, must present every possible fact to shed light on present day conspiracy. Thus an association of 5 or 10 years back involving a man or woman now dead can well illuminate a relationship of today or aid in characterizing a living conspirator. Death does not rob a man of his place in history. It is in this spirit then that reference will be made to the dead today.

The witness will stand and be sworn.

You do solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mrs. MASSING. I do.

TESTIMON OF MRS. HEDE MASSING, NEW YORK, N. Y.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you give your name and address to the stenographer?

Mrs. MASSING. I am Hede Massing. I live at 17 West Eighty-second Street, New York City.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation?

Mrs. MASSING. I am a writer.

Mr. MORRIS. Where were you born?

Mrs. MASSING. In Vienna, Austria.

Mr. MORRIS. In what year?

Mrs. MASSING. 1900.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Massing, when did you first meet Gerhart Eisler?

Mrs. MASSING. In 1917.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us briefly about the circumstances of your meeting Gerhart Eisler?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes, I will do that. I met Gerhart Eisler as people meet in Vienna, in a cafe. He was then a man who had achieved slight fame by having been against the war, having made propaganda against the war in the army. He was not a Communist then because there was no Communist Party at the time. He was, though, what I would call a Socialist. I met him and shortly after I met him I married him.

Is that sufficient?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. How long were you married to Gerhart Eisler?

Mrs. MASSING. Five years altogether.

Mr. MORRIS. During the time of your marriage to Gerhart Eisler were you a member of the Communist Party?

Mrs. MASSING. No; I was not a member of the Communist Party. First of all, during those years he didn't become a member of the party; the party was small and young. In my specific case Gerhart Eisler thought I would have to learn much more, I would have to become a Marxist first before I would be permitted to join the party.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, in what year did you leave Gerhart Eisler, were you divorced from Gerhart Eisler?

Mrs. MASSING. I left Gerhart Eisler in 1923 and I was divorced in 1924 or 1925.

Mr. MORRIS. You testified during that period you were not a member of the Communist Party?

Mrs. MASSING. I was not.

Mr. MORRIS. During that period was your loyalty and devotion to the Communist Party as strong as if you had been a member of the Communist Party?

Mrs. MASSING. Indeed it was. As a matter of fact, the party was more or less my life, as it is for people who are either party members or connected with the party. There is no question that once you are a Communist, whether you take party membership or not, you are a loyal party member and you adhere to the discipline of the party, which I did in a vague way, because, as I say, I was neither a functionary nor was I intellectually developed enough to be taken seriously by the party. I was just the wife of Gerhart Eisler and lived in the upper strata of Communist leadership with Gerhart Eisler.

Mr. MORRIS. You are now talking of your position with respect to the Communist Party during the period you were married to Gerhart Eisler?

Mrs. MASSING. Right.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, when did you first make a trip to Moscow, Mrs. Massing?

Mrs. MASSING. My first trip to Moscow was in 1929.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you stay?

Mrs. MASSING. I stayed just for 2 weeks and went back again the end of 1929 to stay until 1931.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say you went back, Mrs. Massing, what do you mean by that?

Mrs. MASSING. I went for 2 weeks in order to see whether I liked it and whether I could work there, and though I found it rather different than I expected to, I decided to go back and stay for some time in the Soviet Union, as every Communist wants to do. I mean every Communist who has a chance wants to go to the Soviet Union not only to learn but to serve, to help.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you treated as a Communist by the Communists during this period about which you are talking?

Mrs. MASSING. Of course, naturally; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Then is it your testimony that after you left Gerhart Eisler your devotion to the Communist Party did not diminish?

Mrs. MASSING. No, my way was set. Once I had met Gerhart Eisler, once I was indoctrinated, I was a Communist, and I remained a Communist until I left in 1938.

The CHAIRMAN. You distinguish, then, do you, between being an actual member and a member in spirit? You were a member in spirit?

Mrs. MASSING. Why, Senator McCarran, I would believe that even then, and of course much more today, there are many more members in spirit than actually card-holding party members, because, as I have explained very often—and I hate to do this, but I think it is rather necessary—for many party members it is an order not to take out party membership. For example, my affiliation really lasted for many years and though I was a Soviet agent and was closely connected with the German party, only for 2 weeks by mere coincidence actually was I a party member. Still my affiliation dates from 1918 or 1919 to 1938, which is quite a long time, and this goes for many people.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever pay dues?

Mrs. MASSING. I probably did during those 2 weeks.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have a card?

Mrs. MASSING. It is a book. In Germany we had a book.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you will describe for us the circumstances leading up to your joining the Communist Party and explain why it was only of 2 weeks' duration.

Mrs. MASSING. That is sort of jumping ahead very much.

I had lived in Russia from 1929 to 1931. This is a very complicated process to describe because I would have to go into many psychological factors and I do not think we have time for it here. In spite of my being rather disappointed with the Soviet Union, I joined the party because when I got back to Germany in 1931 fascism had grown terrifically. It was visible, it was obvious, and I believed that the thing to do is to fight fascism, and I was convinced that the Communist Party of Germany was the only party that was very adamant about fighting fascism. As I arrived, I thought that now I would want to partake in this actual fight and I joined the party. I hardly joined it; I mean I joined my unit.

Mr. MORRIS. What year was that?

Mrs. MASSING. 1931, as soon as I got back from Russia. I lived in the section of Berlin which was mostly populated by fellow Communists, many of them not party members either until then but at-

tending the party unit, and I hardly joined the party when my superior—I am sure I will have to speak of him later, his name is Ludwig, I knew him as Ludwig, he was Ignatz Reiss and was killed by the Russians in 1937, came from Moscow—called me, saw me when I told him I had joined the party, and he said, “You must drop out at once. Why did you do this?” “You did not tell me not to.” “Didn’t you understand enough not to? You are not the kind that joins the party.” And I dropped out and it was rather difficult.

Mr. MORRIS. At that time what was your relationship to Ignatz Reiss?

Mrs. MASSING. Do you want me to go into this, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. I would like you to explain to the committee the relationship in the Communist organization that you had at that time to Ignatz Reiss when he told you that you had made a mistake when you had joined the Communist Party for that 2 weeks’ period.

Mrs. MASSING. That of course also goes further back. I had met Ludwig. I knew him as—

Mr. MORRIS. That is Ignatz Reiss?

Mrs. MASSING. That is Ignatz Reiss, until he was killed by the Russians. I learned by the papers that this was Ignatz Reiss. I had met him in 1924 and I had known him very closely until 1926. I never knew his name. He was introduced to me as a Communist on special duty.

This is the way agents are introduced to Communist Party members that are solicited for the service, a Communist on special duty. He had observed me in 1924. I then had worked in a bookshop. I had seen him very often merely as a customer, as a man who bought books, a man with very good taste in books, a man with whom I discussed books on all levels. I never knew who he was.

In the beginning of 1929—I had been in America from 1926 to 1928—and I came back to Germany and stayed in Frankfurt-on-Main, then went to Berlin because I wanted to pass a psychology exam. I was introduced officially to Ludwig—Ignatz Reiss—by Dr. Richard Sorge. He is a famous man, now dead. He had been the most outstanding Soviet spy in Japan. I suppose we all know. It was Dr. Richard Sorge who I knew since 1922 who introduced me to Ludwig with the purpose of my working for Ludwig from then on. This was the establishment of the relationship. That means from 1929 on I was under his supervision and in cooperation with Ludwig I became an apparatchik.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you spell that?

Mrs. MASSING. A-p-p-a-r-a-t-c-h-i-k.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they use the expression “Russian agent” or “Soviet agent”?

Mrs. MASSING. No.

Senator FERGUSON. That is an American expression?

Mrs. MASSING. Exactly. I believe if I had known at the time, and so many of my coworkers, that they are Russian agents, there probably would never have been Russian agents. They were Communists, they were Communists on special duty. They were soldiers of the revolution. They were Communists that had been chosen for a particularly difficult task and they were very proud to have been chosen. I was for this special duty. No; they never considered themselves agents, of course not.

Senator FERGUSON. Both of these men were Communists?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes, of course; leading Communists. Dr. Sorge was a leading Communist, as a matter of fact one of the Communists that had written quite a bit in Germany, had a status at the University of Frankfurt-on-Main, and later on was called to Moscow in order to work at the Marx Engels Institute. In reality he had been called by the Comintern and was then a Comintern agent.

Senator FERGUSON. Did people then keep it secret that they were Communists or was it open and notorious?

Mrs. MASSING. At that time it was no secret at all.

Senator FERGUSON. It was open and notorious?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes. They would keep secret they were on special duty. That was not supposed to be talked about but was whispered about and was the topic of conversation within party circles. It was very—well, it is almost a social question, you belong to the higher strata of the Communist movement if you belong to the apparatus.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Massing, will you describe to us what an apparatchik is?

Mrs. MASSING. An apparatchik is a member of an apparatus, a member of—as I know today, and we all know—an espionage unit. The term is derived, I would assume, from the word “apparatus,” “apparat” in German, meaning a unit that functions like a mechanism or an apparatus like a very finely constructed mechanism, and a member of such a unit was called an apparatchik. “Chik” is the Russian ending.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Massing, will you generally describe the nature of the period in your life from 1931 to 1933? Fundamentally to what was it devoted?

Mrs. MASSING. 1931 to 1933 was in my life my training as an espionage agent. I want to repeat again that I did not consider myself at that time an espionage agent. I did not know that I was being trained for espionage. I did not know that I was doing espionage.

I am not saying this to defend myself. I am saying it in order to explain because I believe we must understand the development of people like myself within the movement and the function they finally achieve and the fact that they did not quite understand—and this is the intricacy of communism—what they are doing when they first begin. Once they are in it, there is absolutely no way of getting out of it, or rarely a way of getting out of it, let us say.

My training with Ludwig was really in the form of conversation, regular meetings, training in behavior, training in approach, training in understanding, political issues, personal issues. It was highly focused on psychology, how to size up people. Once you have sized them up; how to approach them for a specific function or purpose. It is a very slow process. It was also to some extent, but only to a very small extent, his trying to make me understand the necessity of socialism, of communism, of world communism, but it was merely a technical training.

After about the first year I was sent out on small missions. I was taught underground work.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mrs. Massing, at the end of the 1933 period were you then given an assignment?

Mrs. MASSING. At the end of 1933 when fascism had come to power in Germany I went to Moscow for personal reasons partly, and on

my way back from Moscow I met Ludwig in Paris and was assigned to the United States.

Mr. MORRIS. Assigned to the United States in what year?

Mrs. MASSING. In 1933.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your assignment in the United States?

Mrs. MASSING. My assignment was not clearly defined in Paris. I was briefed by Ludwig to the effect, really ideology mostly. Of course by then technically I was a well-trained agent. Ideologically the thing he told me was that fascism had succeeded, that we have failed to stem it in Europe, that now we have to fight fascism from the outside. He said, "You are going to a great country where there are many good people. You understand fascism. Bring the message of fascism to them and rally people behind the fight against fascism."

Now that sounds rather vague for an espionage agent and I do want to emphasize that I am pretty sure that during the years between 1933 and 1935 many Americans have been solicited into the services with this very idea, the fight against fascism, which was a very noble fight and which many Americans could be made to believe was the most important thing to do at this specific point during these specific years.

Mr. MORRIS. You say the Soviet organization capitalized on that feeling in order to create an atmosphere by which people would be drawn in their orbit?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes. I don't know whether they were as crude as that but the functionaries like myself, and certainly Ludwig and some of the people I later on worked with in America that belonged to my immediate unit, indeed believed that this was the thing that would do it.

It took me about a year and a half to quite realize that this was not the main focus in my work, that I was really being made to do things that had actually nothing to do with the fight against fascism.

These are slow processes, because, you see, you must understand that a person who does not willingly want to be an agent will have a resistance to recognize his own function. He will rationalize and will say, "Well, this is not really a fight against fascism fully but partly."

Mr. MORRIS. Now what was your assignment in the United States with particularity, Mrs. Massing?

Mrs. MASSING. Let me say first I was told by Ludwig I would be contacted and the contact was arranged.

Mr. MORRIS. How was that arranged?

Mrs. MASSING. It is again one of these stories that one reads and thinks so unlikely, and this is exactly how it happened. I got half of a cigarette box and I was told that the person who would contact me will have the other half of the cigarette box. Now it is a customary procedure to get half of a picture. I mean these are the technical arrangements. They seem very primitive but they have always worked quite well.

Senator FERGUSON. Your assignment was secret, of course?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes, indeed. I did not know who would contact me here. Probably the person who sent me off didn't know who the immediate contact would be, because in espionage work decentralization is predominant and you are not told, as you are never told who the person is you deal with. You know the person for 10 years but you

do not know his second name or where he lives. You know him as Bill, Fred, Ludwig, Carl, or Francis.

I was told I would be contacted. I was told already in Paris that my first and immediate function would be to go to Washington regularly. Let me just say here that my cover was that of a foreign newspaperwoman. It was not a complete cover, not only a cover, because I had been writing for a liberal weekly, I had been translating articles from English into German. I really was working for this specific liberal weekly and that gave me then an identification to come here as a foreign newspaperwoman.

My first function was to come to Washington to observe periodicals, newspapers, newspapermen, Senators, people who would be friendly or who would lean toward the fight against fascism and be friendly toward the Soviet Union. I was to write reports on this regularly.

Mr. MORRIS. Ostensibly what was the name of the publisher for which you worked?

Mrs. MASSING. Die Weltbuhne. It is the World Theatre in translation.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us how you proceeded in your operations over there?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes. I am not hesitating because I am thinking of how I proceeded. I am hesitating because I would like to say just one word that as clear as it is to me that one has to testify, it is not pleasant and it is difficult.

I lived first when I got to New York in 1933 with a friend that I had met in 1926. Her name was Helen Black, and she is or has been—I don't know what she is doing now—a registered Soviet agent. She was a representative of Soviet Photo and I had become friendly with her. As a matter of fact, I was devoted to her and she to me in 1926.

When I first got here in 1933 my husband Paul Massing was in a German concentration camp. Though I knew that I was a Communist on duty and ought to be brave, my personal situation was rather sad and this friend, Helen Black, felt I should stay with her and not alone in a strange country. She was a very good friend to me during these months that I stayed with her. It was through Helen Black and the environment around Helen Black that I made my first contact.

Mr. MORRIS. Now what was your assignment in 1933, Mrs. Massing?

Mrs. MASSING. As I said before, my assignment in 1933 was the United States.

Mr. MORRIS. What were you to do in the United States?

Mrs. MASSING. I was sent out to fight against fascism. I was an apparatchik. I was a member of an espionage outfit and my orders were to come from the boss that I was to meet here and that I had met at this point. You see, I met the superior that I had in New York only after I was contacted.

Mr. MORRIS. What did you do after you made that contact?

Mrs. MASSING. The first thing I did was to be a courier. My very first assignment when I was contacted by my superior, who was Valentine Markin—

Mr. MORRIS. Will you spell that, please?

Mrs. MASSING. V-a-l-e-n-t-i-n-e M-a-r-k-i-n. I did not know him under that name.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was he?

Mrs. MASSING. He was the first and foremost Soviet agent during those years in the United States. He was killed here. First we thought that it was an accident. In retrospect it might well be that he was killed by the Soviets because he had had deviations and he was critical and was supposed to be a Trotskyite.

Mr. MORRIS. Is he the one who had the other half of the match box?

Mrs. MASSING. No; he was the boss.

Senator FERGUSON. Who had the match box?

Mrs. MASSING. The match box was held by Bill, the man who I later learned was Berman.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the first name?

Mrs. MASSING. What was Berman's first name? I have forgotten, I am terribly sorry.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony at the time you did not know his name was Berman but you knew him only as Bill?

Mrs. MASSING. When Berman came he showed me the other half of the box.

Mr. MORRIS. You did not know his name was Berman?

Mrs. MASSING. Of course not.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you know his name was Berman?

Mrs. MASSING. Let me be logical about this. Berman came and contacted me. He was my contact. After I had seen Berman for some days and discussed with him generalities, I was introduced to the boss. The boss I knew as Walter. His name was Valentine Markin.

Mr. MORRIS. You did not know that at the time?

Mrs. MASSING. Of course not. Valentine Markin's name and Berman's name I found out for myself because I had to know him, but Markin's name I only learned when I spoke to the FBI and was shown his picture and I was told this was Valentine Markin. I did not know his name before that. Valentine Markin sent me out on my first courier job carrying microfilm from New York to Paris. This was the very first assignment Valentine Markin gave me.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know the nature of the microfilm?

Mrs. MASSING. Of course not, you never know. As a courier, first of all, you never know anything if you are an espionage agent. You are given an assignment and you do it. You don't ask; you don't want to know. That would be considered completely undoctinaire behavior and bad manners. That just isn't done.

Senator FERGUSON. You took them there secretly?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes. I was told how to go about it. The arrangement was made for me to meet a person, a Dr. so-and-so—I have forgotten his name; it is not important, because it wasn't his name—in a Paris hotel, to stay in this hotel until he would come and see me. I would hand the film, then leave the hotel, move to another hotel and live in Paris as a tourist for 10 days, 12 days, and then come back to New York. This I did for about—I am not quite sure whether it was 9 or 10 days. Altogether I made 20 trips.

Senator FERGUSON. How large film would you take?

Mrs. MASSING. About this large, sometimes two or three rolls, regular-size microfilm.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever learn where those films came from?

Mrs. MASSING. No.

Senator FERGUSON. What they were?

Mrs. MASSING. No; never.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your first assignment other than that of a courier in the United States?

Mrs. MASSING. After I had completed my assignment as a courier I came back and then I worked with Valentine Markin again. It wasn't to last very long because he died soon after I met him in this rather unusual way, and it took some time until my next superior arrived, whom I knew as Bill. His name was Grinke.

Valentine Markin assigned me to go to Washington, as I had done before I had met him, but now not merely to write about periodicals and people but focus on specific people who could be of use to us. That means I became a recruiter. I was then a recruiter. I was a courier and a recruiter. The American press uses the term "courier" rather broadly. Everybody who works in an espionage apparatus is a courier. Now it is not so. A courier is the specific function to carry things from one place to the other. Within an espionage outfit are very many functions and you wouldn't call, for example, the photographer in such a unit a courier. He is not a courier at all. He is a photographer.

I was to go to Washington and observe people and if I found them amiable and interested in the Soviet Union, in the fight against fascism, to propose to them to become a member of our unit in whatever function they could be in.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your first case?

Mrs. MASSING. Noel H. Field.

Mr. MORRIS. Where is Noel H. Field now?

Mrs. MASSING. He has disappeared behind the iron curtain, he and his wife and his brother, Herman Field, and his adopted daughter, Erika Glaser Wallart.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe to us the process by which you first had contact with Noel Field?

Mrs. MASSING. Again I will have to go a little further back. I had met through the recommendation of Helen Black, Marguerite Young. Marguerite Young in 1933 and probably some years thereafter was a Daily Worker correspondent in Washington. I am sure many of the newspapermen present here will know her. She was a young and very intelligent Communist and it was she who was my contact, not officially, because I was not to be seen with her, of course, but I saw her privately and socially and it was she who would point out people to me that she knew and thought would be interesting to me. She gave me a whole list of them. To some she introduced me. To Noel Field she introduced me. It happened this way: By then my husband, Paul Massing, had been released from the concentration camp.

Mr. MORRIS. What year was that?

Mrs. MASSING. That was the end of 1933 but he got to this country only in 1934. He was writing a book about his experiences in the concentration camp. It was called Fatherland. He wrote it under a pseudonym because his family was still in Germany. Part of this book had been published in New Masses and had created quite a sensation.

Marguerite Young knew people who had read this part of the book and who were interested to meet the wife of the man who had

written this book. Field was one of them. She said I should meet Field, I would like him, his wife was German, and I might find him very interesting. Indeed I did; I am sorry I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you succeed in recruiting Noel Field into the Communist apparatus?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did it take you?

Mrs. MASSING. It took me about three quarters of a year and it was the typical work of a recruiter in meeting the object regularly, discussing with him principal issues, issues that he was particularly interested in, leading him toward my goal, namely, to consent to be a member of my apparatus. I didn't put it in these words, of course. What I said was, in gist, that this was the thing we are up against, fascism was the menace of the world and each one of us had to fight it, that he was in a very privileged position, that he could furnish us with documents and material to help in this fight. Though he was reluctant and he had great misgivings about handing me documents, he consented to do so.

Mr. MORRIS. Now after you succeeded in recruiting him, did you have any further connection with him at that time?

Mrs. MASSING. No.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, your function was simply to recruit, and then what did you do?

Mrs. MASSING. Then I would hand this person over. The person I recruited would then be handled or worked with by another agent. I would never know who this person was. I was not supposed to know. The official situation would have been that I would sever all relationships to the person that I had recruited.

In Noel Field's case I didn't do that because I had developed quite an intensive personal friendship to him and his wife. Also, since he had this great reluctance in betraying his country, as he called it, we advised him—meaning my unit, I myself, and even my husband, Paul Massing, helped in convincing him—that he should accept a job at the League of Nations, that he was offered at the time, because there he would not feel he was betraying his country and could be of great use to Russia.

Senator FERGUSON. When you first met him what was Field's business?

Mrs. MASSING. He was a State Department official in the western division, I believe. Was it called the western division?

Mr. MANDEL. Western European.

Mrs. MASSING. Western European Division.

Senator FERGUSON. He is no relationship to this Frederick Vanderbilt Field?

Mrs. MASSING. Not that I know of.

Senator FERGUSON. He was actually employed in the State Department when you were introduced to him by Miss Young?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. As a prospect for your work?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Massing, in this connection did you ever have an encounter with Alger Hiss in connection with Noel Field?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you explain that to the committee, please?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes. It is this encounter with Alger Hiss that forced me out of my seclusion because I don't believe that ex-Communists tend to go out and talk about their experiences, and I recall so well that when Whittaker Chambers was very reluctant and low-voiced in his testimony, how well I understood him, because it is a very difficult and horrible thing to not only speak about one's own past deviations in sins but about other people's involvements.

When Noel Field and I had established a rapport to the extent that he was quite willing to help me, when I had also convinced him—and I would like to say this here—that he must not join the open party because for a man of Noel Field's status and importance it would be very unwise and useless to join the open party, and he had wanted to do so—when he had agreed to work with me, which was not something like black and white—I mean there were many ups and downs, he would say “Yes” today and “No” tomorrow, and he would say “Yes, I will only do so much, I am willing to give you verbal reports but I am not willing to show you any documents, and I don't have any documents to show”—I mean it is an involved process—one of his last reluctances or one of his last resistances toward me came up in this way:

I visited with him and his wife. As a matter of fact, I lived in their house. He said to me, “You know, Hede, I thought the whole thing over and I have come to the conclusion that it is really quite ridiculous that I should work with you where I can work with an old friend of mine who works with me in the State Department and who is a man of my kind. Not that I mean to say I don't respect you but, you see, you are a foreigner and this man is an American and we see eye to eye on all principal issues, and you understand even technically it would be so much easier for me to work with this man.” Well, this was, of course, quite a disappointment for me. I had invested very much labor and intensity to get this man. If you do a job like this you want to do a good job, as I think everybody wants to do a fairly good job, and I was an espionage agent and I tried to do a good job, and having to lose Noel Field would have been quite a shock. So I said, “Who is this man?” He said, “I don't think you know him. His name is Alger Hiss.” I said, “Well, why don't you introduce me to him? I just don't believe he has any priority over you. In reality I believe you are much better off in my apparatus.” Then I said to him, “Where does he work? Where does he really work? How do you know he is the right man?” He said, “I don't know. I don't know where you work either.”

Noel Field arranged this meeting with Alger Hiss.

Mr. MORRIS. So you did meet Alger Hiss?

Mrs. MASSING. I did meet Alger Hiss. That is a meeting that I have spoken so much about that I find it very difficult to speak about again.

My superior, Russian superior at that time, Boris, was quite distressed about this meeting because it was unorthodox and it had not gotten the O. K. from Moscow. You see, Noel Field immediately arranged this meeting. Such things are not done without an O. K. from Moscow. But Boris said since it had been arranged I should go ahead and meet him.

I came to Washington and the meeting was at the Noel Field apartment and though it was a long evening, I believe the only thing that

interests us here is that the discussion between Hiss and me ran like this:

He said, "So you are this woman that is trying to get Noel Field away from me?" I said, "No; you are the man who is trying to get Noel Field away from me, because I have worked with Noel Field for quite some time." He said, "Well, where have you worked?" I said, "Look Alger,"—you understand among Communists people call each other Hede and Alger and not Mr. Hiss and Mrs. Massing. "You know, Alger, you couldn't ask that and I wouldn't ask that either." He laughed and said, "Well, we will see who is going to win." I think I said, "Well, you know I am a woman," being very coy, and in order to break up this rather unpleasant conversation, and at the end either he or I agreed that it would not be for us to decide on whoever will get Noel Field; after all, we are working for the same boss.

Senator FERGUSON. When you say "get," what do you mean?

Mrs. MASSING. Get, meaning soliciting him into your own unit as a coworker.

Senator FERGUSON. In the apparatus?

Mrs. MASSING. In the apparatus.

Senator SMITH. What difference would that make so far as the objective is concerned?

Mrs. MASSING. That really is competition. There are always similar apparatuses in one country. There is a Comintern apparatus, a Red-army apparatus, a military-intelligence apparatus, and NKVD apparatus, and none of them have terribly much to do, I am made to believe, and getting a man as an informant is a very great thing to achieve. It is real competition. I mean you have worked on this man, you want to fulfill your job, you want to finish your job. In reality, actually, as for information, it would not probably make a great difference.

Senator SMITH. It gave you different recognition in the party by getting and holding the man?

Mrs. MASSING. Why, of course. For example, when I had achieved this and later on had achieved soliciting Laurence Duggan into my apparatus I was given honor, I was recognized as a fine comrade.

Senator SMITH. That is what I thought you meant. I wanted to bring it out.

Mr. MORRIS. You mentioned Laurence Duggan. Did you have the assignment of recruiting Laurence Duggan into the apparatus?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes; after I had met him and had reported about him.

Senator FERGUSON. Before you leave Field, did you get Field into your apparatus or did Hiss get him into his?

Mrs. MASSING. I got Field into my apparatus. Field then transferred to Geneva.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not think she was going to lose, did you, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. I wanted to get this record straight.

Mrs. MASSING. I didn't lose him then, so I couldn't lose him now. He is lost to us, though, I am afraid.

Field transferred to Geneva. In Geneva he was introduced by me to Ignatz Reiss. He was introduced also to General Krivitsky. He did not work in Geneva with Ignatz Reiss; he worked with General Krivitsky.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he then with the State Department?

Mrs. MASSING. Then he was with the United Nations.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the League of Nations?

Mrs. MASSING. The League of Nations.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us about Laurence Duggan?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes. I had met Duggan through Field.

Mr. MORRIS. What was he doing at the time?

Mrs. MASSING. He was the head of the Latin-American Department in the State Department.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you develop that for us, Mrs. Massing, please?

Mrs. MASSING. I am sure that this was Laurence Duggan to whom you were referring, Senator, when you were speaking about the dead. I want to say in one sentence that when I wrote about Laurence Duggan in my book and when I testified before the grand jury it was with the utmost reluctance, and only after I was completely convinced, had convinced myself, it was necessary if I told my story at all to tell it fully, that I had to speak about Laurence Duggan. I have been quite persecuted for it. My book has been dropped by the first publisher because I was not willing to take out the whole Duggan chapter. I understand that very great pressure was brought upon my second publisher by Duggan's friends, which are Hiss' friends, and probably the Duggan family.

Mr. MORRIS. May I say this, your feelings to the contrary are appreciated, but we have the obligation here of asking you what your relationships were with Laurence Duggan.

Mrs. MASSING. I will tell you.

Mr. MORRIS. As the chairman has stated, we are doing this not to pass judgment on someone in the past but to determine whether or not there is a present-day conspiracy. So strictly in the light of that will you tell us what your relationships have been with Laurence Duggan?

Mrs. MASSING. I will.

Senator FERGUSON. At all times, of course, you understand you are under oath?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes, I know that.

Senator FERGUSON. And the dead have no opportunity to rebut it, as the chairman has said. So you will give us just the facts?

Mrs. MASSING. Senator, I am not afraid; I am just sad.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand.

Mrs. MASSING. I met Duggan through Field. He was a close friend of the Fields. They lived together in one house at one time. Duggan has about a similar background as Field, Quaker family, well-to-do, highly intellectual, very fine, straight-thinking men at the time, as I thought.

Duggan when I met him seemed very interested in my ideas. He knew a great deal about the Soviet Union. He knew a great deal about fascism in Germany. He knew a great deal about the details and the technique of the fight against fascism. I did not need to work with Duggan as I did with Field. Duggan was much easier for me to reach. It took only a few weeks, probably not more than three or four meetings.

You understand, after my first meeting with a man like this I reported to my superior in great detail who the man was, what his position was, what his background was, and what his thoughts were at

present. Then I got an O. K. and I would go ahead and see the man again and speak to him generally.

With Laurence Duggan after a few meetings I suggested to him to be of help to us and he consented. He made very specific demands. He, too, said he would neither have nor be willing to give me secret documents but that he would be quite willing to meet a person and he was quite pleased about the decentralization of the apparatus and that the person would not be I and that I would not know who the person was that would work with him. But he was willing to meet this person regularly, probably once a week or once in 2 weeks, and give him for some time verbal reports. The man or woman would have to be a shorthand person, would have to be able to write shorthand and would have to know English well. He made it quite clear he would not have enough time to bother with translations and involvements.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there any doubt in your mind that Field and Duggan knew you were a Communist?

Mrs. MASSING. No.

Senator FERGUSON. And in an apparatus for the Communists?

Mrs. MASSING. No. That I made quite clear to both of them. I did not say I was a Soviet spy, but I said I was a member of an apparatus doing this specific work. Whether it was clear to them this was espionage I am not certain, though I would assume they must have known.

Senator FERGUSON. What was this material that you were to get from them out of the State Department?

Mrs. MASSING. That I don't know, Senator, because I never saw it.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you tell them you wanted?

Mrs. MASSING. I told them I would want to know all news, all information relating to the Soviet Union, to our attempts. I didn't say military secrets, because I wasn't told to ask that. I would just propose what I was told to propose, to give me all news, all information that would be relative—

Senator FERGUSON. To the Soviet Union?

Mrs. MASSING. To the Soviet Union.

Senator FERGUSON. Now you talked to them first about fascism?

Mrs. MASSING. The Soviet Union was fighting fascism. It was the Soviet Union who was fighting fascism and all the Communist Parties with the Soviet Union all over the world.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the way you explained it to both these men?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Go ahead.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you succeed in recruiting Laurence Duggan?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes, I succeeded.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you turn him over to the apparatus?

Mrs. MASSING. I did turn him over to the apparatus.

Mr. MORRIS. To whom did you turn him over?

Mrs. MASSING. I don't know. I made arrangements for him to meet a person.

Mr. MORRIS. You made arrangements with whom?

Mrs. MASSING. With Laurence Duggan. To be more specific, my boss Boris told me to tell Duggan that he would be met by a man who would have an identification. I think it was a flower and a

magazine, and he would be met in a car on a road which Duggan was to assign at a specific time on a specific day, that Duggan would enter the car of this man who would be standing in front of the car and be visible so as to be noticed by Duggan and Duggan would speak to this man. I did not know who the man was. All I knew was the time and the methods of identification. Then I dropped out.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, it was your function to recruit and turn over to the apparatus and to do nothing more?

Mrs. MASSING. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Chairman, at this juncture I would like to introduce into the record some letters from the institute's files which concern Laurence Duggan's connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you intend to read them first?

Mr. MORRIS. I will read excerpts.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Do you have identification of them as belonging to the files?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel will identify them as such.

First, I would like to introduce a letter dated May 8, 1940. This is a letter from Edward C. Carter to William W. Lockwood. Mr. Carter in this letter is discussing plans of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you had better identify it and lay your foundation for it through Mr. Mandel.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I offer you this letter and ask you if you will describe where that letter came from.

Mr. MANDEL. This is one of the letters in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations which were turned over to us.

Mr. MORRIS. You recognize it as such?

Mr. MANDEL. I do.

Mr. MORRIS. This is from Edward C. Carter to William W. Lockwood, dated May 8, 1940, from 129 East Fifty-second Street, which was the address at that time of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Paragraph 12 reads:

Ask Henry Allen Moe, Laurence Duggan, and others who are the one or two Latin Americans of great intellectual ability who look at Latin America from a continental and international point of view, who might establish contact with the appropriate groups in the leading countries and then come to New York to give the groups here the benefit of his study of such thinking as there is in Latin America on war aims and postwar organization.

I would like to introduce that in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record and properly identified.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 41" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 41

NEW YORK CITY, May 8, 1940.

Mr. WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD,

*American Committee for International Studies,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City.*

DEAR BILL: I have given your letter of May 2 considerable thought. Rather than limit myself to one or two suggestions, I think it is better for me to make quite a number which I regard as of great importance, or of being worthy of further investigation.

In order that you may understand my reaction to your letter, and to this highly interesting and significant statement which Earle and you have just

issued on the American Committee for International Studies, I am venturing quite informally to send you quite a number of names.

Your committee's statement, as well as the quality of its leadership and its membership are most encouraging. As would be expected of the kind of leadership that you and Earle are giving, it is encouraging to note that you are not disinterested in relating scientific research to questions of policy and that your main objective is to make new and constructive approaches to the study of international affairs.

You are, I think, familiar with Dr. Percy E. Corbett's general plan of work. He has the approval of McGill for a continuation of major work on this project after his return to McGill in 1941. In the meantime, he and I are looking for an appropriate colleague with a far eastern background comparable to Corbett's background in Europe, the Americas and the British Commonwealth, in the hope that the two of them with appropriate assistance can make a synthesis and interpretation of all that is most fundamental in the I. P. R.'s far eastern inquiry with what is basic in the studies of Chatham House, of P. E. P., of Shotwell's Committee, the New School, Buell's book and the many European studies and those that are appearing in Australia, New Zealand and elsewhere. Corbett is thinking not simply of a review of reviews or a synthesis of existing plans. He aims to carry them further, more fundamentally and courageously.

The basic work that he has in mind and much of the work of many of the groups and individuals just mentioned would in my view be aided enormously if arrangements could be made for some such international exchange fellowships as the following:

(1) Bring over R. H. Tawney so that he may appraise, criticize and interpret the Corbett project, contribute to it and at the same time make a critique of the plans of the other serious groups on this continent.

(2) Bring Ushiba, Saionji and Yokota in order that we may have someone from the very inside of Japan closely in touch with current thought in the Japanese Army, the bureaucracies and the universities.

(3) Send Harriet Moore to the U. S. S. R. to go through all government and party writing on postwar problems and supplement this by interviewing party and politburo chiefs.

(4) Bring von Trott from Berlin to be associated with Corbett, Sansom, Tawney and others, and hold him here until a week before America enters the war.

(5) Discover who is the most valuable man in the P. E. P. group, namely, the one principally responsible for the now really first-class P. E. P. memorandum (7th ed.), and bring him to the United States after a visit with Kittredge and his French colleagues in Paris.

(6) If Tamagna turns out to be as promising as he looks on paper, send him to Rome to undertake a study there on lines similar to Miss Moore's study in Moscow, returning at the end of 6 months to give 6 months to collaboration with the group under the direction of Corbett, Sansom, Holland, Alexander, and also with the A.C.I.S., Earle and yourself.

(7) Discover whether there is one wise and great man in Manila—(Would Apostol qualify?)—and have him spend 3 months on the project in Manila, a month each in Chungking and Tokyo and then bring him, preferably by way of the Trans-Siberian Railway, to collaborate with the groups here.

(8) Send Phil Jessup or Jack Shepherd for 3 months each to Batavia, Chungking, Manila, Tokyo.

(9) Discover whether Myrdal would be free 3 months after his return to Sweden to contribute an analysis of above-ground and under-ground concepts in Holland, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania on postwar organization.

(10) After he served 6 months in the French Army, if he is still alive, dig up Dennery by the roots and bring him over to collaborate with Corbett, Earle, and yourself. Failing Dennery, consider Joxe.

(11) Discover whether there is some European, African or British scholar who knows the greater part of Africa from the political and economic angle, and arrange for him to make a fresh visit to the principal African states and colonies. After a 10-months survey of war repercussions and the establishment of contact with that handful of people in each area who are thinking of postwar organization, bring him to New York for collaboration with the groups here.

(12) Ask Henry Allen Moe, Laurence Duggan and others who are the one or two Latin Americans of great intellectual ability who look at Latin America for a continental and international point of view, who might establish contact with the appropriate groups in the leading countries and then come to New York to give the groups here the benefit of his study of such thinking as there is in Latin America on war aims and postwar organization.

(13) Bring both Searle Bates and Chen Han-seng from China to collaborate both with Corbett, Tawney, Sansom, and Holland on the one hand and with such groups as the American Committee may recommend on the other.

(14) Bring either Motylev, Troyanovsky, or Voitinski, to contribute alike to the IPR inquiry, Corbett's special synthesis and to such studies by other American groups as may be recommended by the American Committee for International Studies.

(15) Discover from S. K. Datta and Jawaharlal Nehru what Indian scholar is qualified or could take time under a Rockefeller fellowship to qualify himself to come to New York to contribute to the work of the various international and national groups here.

The parochialism of even the greatest thinkers is such that unless international organization is studied in an atmosphere that is made realistic by the physical presence of people from every continent, grave errors are inevitable. You will remember that in his *A Study of History*, Arnold J. Toynbee asserts that, as a historian, he disapproves of the use to which historical information has been put. He maintains that historical scholarship has substituted the Nation for mankind and thwarted the impulse to comprehend life as a whole. To support this he examines one case and discovers that English history is unintelligible when taken by itself. The "intelligible field of study" must be in some larger unit than the Nation. "Historical thought takes a deep impression from the dominant institutions and the transient social environment in which it happens to live."

You will note that the people I envisage as fellowship holders and collaborators represent every one of the disciplines in the social sciences.

It seems to Holland and me that either your committee or your committee acting jointly with IPR or the Rockefeller Foundation itself should set up a temporary research bureau in New York for the next 3 or 4 years, devoted solely to studying the question of wartime and postwar problems.

Many of these suggestions, or perhaps the multiplicity of them, may cause you to feel that I have gone beyond your request. This I have clearly done, but I have been moved to do so by my fairly deep convictions. The ISC has done valuable work, but one of its principal limitations has been that it has been too much conditioned by its European environment. The IPR has done valuable work, but it has been too much conditioned by its Pacific environment. It seems to me that the war situation makes it more imperative than ever that a nucleus of scholars be established somewhere in the world, probably of necessity in New York, which can look at present problems of mankind from an even more inclusive point of view than that of either the ISC or the IPR.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

MAY 9, 1940.

ECC from PEC

I have been thinking about your name on the combination of fellowship holders and special collaborators in a broadly international joint study of peace terms and postwar reconstruction. It does not seem to me a bit overambitious. As you suggest at the end there is a job of unlimited importance to be done, or at least attempted, and to my way of thinking it is worth any possible concentration of brain power. The big way is indeed the only way of tackling it adequately, and I believe that by a bold initiative of this type the institute may render incalculable service. As we are working now, we are employing an occasional leisure hour of a number of scholars each very busy in his special field. The task really calls for a large team of experts devoting their whole time to it. It seems to me very fitting that the only plan I have seen which grasps the magnitude of the need and the opportunity should emanate from the IPR. Even if necessary aid should not be forthcoming you will at least escape the reproach of failing to rise to the occasion.

We know a good deal about the thought now being devoted to problems of world organization for peace in a number of countries. But, so far as I know,

only two efforts have been made to mobilize in one spot an international corps of thinkers to work on these problems. One of them is the program of the ISC, the other the League Committee under Colijn at The Hague. It seems to me inevitable that the operations of both these bodies will be greatly impeded, if not suspended, by the war. Moreover, neither has the material or geographical scope contemplated in your plan, and essential to the conception of world peace as an indivisible whole.

One or two suggestions of detail

1. In sending anyone on a mission of inquiry, I think care should be taken to select a person who, on his return, will not be so much absorbed in other work that he will not be able to participate fully in discussion here. The ideal will be someone who can give most of his time for a reasonable period.

2. For the African topics, the name of W. K. Hancock should be borne in mind. He had a great deal to do with the colonial studies conducted by Chatham House, wrote a good book on The Empire, has spent some time in the mandates and colonies, and is a man of first-rate character and ability. He is professor of history at Birmingham.

3. I know an unusually intelligent Canadian engineer who spent some years in Russia, speaks the language, and traveled from Moscow to Vladivostok and from Leningrad to Odessa, who might be induced to do some useful work on Soviet industry and commerce, and its probable importance in the postwar world.

Mr. MORRIS. Now I would also like to introduce at this time the testimony in executive session of Mr. E. C. Carter, taken before this committee June 21, 1951, pages 212 and 213 of the executive session.

The interrogation follows:

Mr. MORRIS. What relation did Laurence Duggan have to your organization, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. * * * Laurence became quite a high-ranking officer—in whatever is called the Latin-American Section in the State Department.

And I remember once when Sumner Welles was urging that we try to get an unofficial society in some Latin countries, I went along to Laurence Duggan's office and talked to him, and he seemed to be generally sympathetic and suggested that I talk to certain other Americans in the Latin-American Section of the State Department.

Mr. MORRIS. Whom did he suggest?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember. He suggested whoever was their economic adviser, on the ground that if the Latins saw that it was in their economic and business interest to become a part of the IPR, that might be more persuasive with some of the countries.

I would like to introduce this executive session testimony into today's testimony on the relation of Mr. Laurence Duggan into the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. That was taken at the time when Mr. Carter was under oath before the committee in executive session?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted in the record. This is the same Mr. Carter who testified here in open session?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, Mr. Chairman.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 42" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 42

[From hearings before the Internal Security Subcommittee in executive session June 21, 1951, pp. 212-213]

TESTIMONY OF E. C. CARTER

Mr. MORRIS. What relation did Laurence Duggan have to your organization, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. * * * Laurence became quite a high-ranking officer—in whatever is called the Latin-American Section in the State Department.

And I remember once when Sumner Welles was urging that we try to get an unofficial society in some Latin countries, I went along to Laurence Duggan's office and talked to him, and he seemed to be generally sympathetic and suggested that I talk to certain other Americans in the Latin-American Section of the State Department.

Mr. MORRIS. Whom did he suggest?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember. He suggested whoever was their economic adviser, on the ground that if the Latins saw that it was in their economic and business interest to become a part of the IPR, that might be more persuasive with some the countries.

Mr. MORRIS. I show Mr. Mandel photostats of two letters and ask him if he will identify those letters from the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Where did you get those letters, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. These were obtained from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations as turned over to us.

Mr. MORRIS. One letter is dated December 2, 1935. It is from Frederick V. Field to Laurence Duggan, Department of State:

Thank you for your quick reply to my telegram in regard to Friday evening. I look forward to meeting with you and your friends and only hope the occasion won't be too formal.

I shall be glad to have dinner with you beforehand. I shall get in touch with you Friday morning.

The preceding letter which was sent from Duggan to Field, dated November 7, 1935, reads:

Dear FRED: Every so often a group of us here in Washington gets together in the evening to discuss international matters of interest. Some time we would like to have a discussion that would center around possible developments in the Far East as a result of Europe's preoccupations, in particular in the Italian-Ethiopian dispute. For these discussions, which are very informal, we try and get someone in who is particularly well versed in the subject under discussion. I wonder whether you or Joe, or anyone like Pfeffer, is going to be in Washington in the near future and would be willing to spend an evening with this group? We will fix the date to meet your convenience.

The CHAIRMAN. Now who is the Field mentioned in that letter?

Mr. MORRIS. That is Frederick V. Field who up to that time had been secretary of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. That is Frederick Vanderbilt Field who testified in open session before the committee?

Mr. MORRIS. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. That may be inserted in the record.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 43-A; and 43-B" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 43-A

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 7, 1935.

FRED FIELD, Esq.

*Institute of Pacific Relations,
New York City.*

DEAR FRED: Every so often a group of us here in Washington gets together in the evening to discuss international matters of interest. Some time we would like to have a discussion that would center around possible developments in the Far East as a result of Europe's preoccupations, in particular in the Italian-Ethiopian dispute. For these discussions, which are very informal, we try and get someone in who is particularly well versed in the subject under dis-

cussion. I wonder whether you or Joe, or anyone like Pfeffer, is going to be in Washington in the near future and would be willing to spend an evening with this group? We will fix the date to meet your convenience.

Sincerely yours,

LARRY.

EXHIBIT No. 43-B

DECEMBER 2, 1935.

MR. LAURENCE DUGGAN,

Department of State, Washington, D. C.

DEAR LARRY: Thank you for your quick reply to my telegram in regard to Friday evening. I look forward to meeting with you and your friends and only hope the occasion won't be too formal.

I shall be glad to have dinner with you beforehand. I shall get in touch with you Friday morning.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

MR. MORRIS. I would like to introduce this other letter now, identified by Mr. Mandel, which is dated November 15, 1935, on the letter-head of the Department of State, from Laurence Duggan to Frederick V. Field of the Institute of Pacific Relations:

DEAR FRED: I am delighted to learn that you may be down here shortly and will be willing to induct us into the mysteries of the Far East. You have no idea how much we don't know!

May I say, Mr. Chairman, we had previous testimony to the effect that at that time Mr. Frederick V. Field was the secretary of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 44" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 44

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 15, 1935.

MR. FREDERICK V. FIELD,

Institute of Pacific Relations,

129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR FRED: I am delighted to learn that you may be down here shortly and will be willing to induct us into the mysteries of the Far East. You have no idea how much we don't know!

Very sincerely yours,

LARRY (Lawrence Duggan).

The CHAIRMAN. These are photostatic copies you are giving for the record?

MR. MORRIS. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. That is a photostat of an original letter?

MR. MORRIS. A photostat of a letter taken from the files.

Mrs. MASSING, did you know a man named Robert T. Miller?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes.

MR. MORRIS. Will you describe what you know about Robert T. Miller?

Mrs. MASSING. I know not too much about him really. I met him on, I believe, my second courier trip on a boat. He was on his way to the Soviet Union. I didn't know him then. I met him on the boat and we started to discuss politics. As far as I remember, he was anti-Soviet. I tried, as I tried during those years, to convince everybody that the Soviet Union was the solution to all problems in this world.

Mr. MORRIS. What year was this?

Mrs. MASSING. That was probably in 1934. I would not know exactly. It might have been 1935. It must have been 1934. We discussed at great length. He was going on a trip to the Soviet Union quite determined not to like it. I told him that he doesn't understand, that he doesn't know, and I offered to give him a letter of recommendation to Mrs. Louis Fischer, Markoosha Fischer, provided that he take chocolate to the sons of Louis Fischer, who were little boys at the time. There was no chocolate in the Soviet Union, and everybody who had a chance to send food into the Soviet Union did, and I told Miller if he would buy a lot of chocolate in Germany I would in exchange give him a letter of introduction to Markoosha Fischer, who would then show him around in Moscow and explain the Soviet Union. She, being a Russian and the wife of an American newspaperman, was the appropriate person to introduce to him the great secrets of the Soviet Union. He accepted it. He did buy chocolate, and he did meet Markoosha Fischer, who took him to the Moscow Daily News, where the doctrination was completely taken out of her hands because he married an American Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was the American Communist?

Mrs. MASSING. I don't know. I heard her name. I don't know her personally. I wasn't there. He stayed on sometime, I understand, and left as a Communist. This is all I know about him. I have never seen him since.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to make reference to the letter that was introduced into the testimony on the second day during the Carter testimony. It was a letter from Edward C. Carter to Alger Hiss which reported on a discussion with Robert T. Miller. It reads in part:

DEAR ALGER: Yesterday, at your suggestion, I had a delightful and illuminating talk with Robert T. Miller, whom I hope to see again.

I would like to make that part of the record.

Senator FERGUSON. What did Miller work at?

Mrs. MASSING. I don't know. He seemed to me to be a student at the time. He was very young.

The CHAIRMAN. That may be inserted in the record.

Mr. MORRIS. It has been inserted, Mr. Chairman. I just was making reference to it.

Now, Mrs. Massing, did you ever have any encounter with Joseph Barnes?

Mr. MASSING. Yes, if you want to call it "encounter."

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe exactly what your experience has been with Joseph Barnes?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes. In order to do that, Mr. Morris, I have to explain who Peter Zubelin is. Peter Zubelin was the second attaché at the Russian Embassy in Washington, I believe, during the years of 1943, 1944, 1945. I am not certain. I just want to say he was in Washington and was a very high official. I met Peter Zubelin in Moscow in 1937. Peter Zubelin was my main interrogator during the time I stayed in Moscow more or less against my will. The thing I refer to as "my purge" was a mild purge, because I am alive today, which does not happen to many people who go through a Russian purge. Peter Zubelin was the first man that met me in Moscow and

was for many months my interrogator. I got to know him very closely.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know him as Peter Zubelin?

Mrs. MASSING. Of course not. I knew him as Peter. As a matter of fact, I was accompanied—and this is too long to tell here, but just to say that when Ignatz Reiss was killed I was called back to Moscow. I did not want to go.

Mr. MORRIS. What year was that?

Mrs. MASSING. That was in 1937. There was a special agent assigned to bring me and my husband, Paul, to Moscow. We knew her by the name of Helen. Helen worked on us and in a way watched us for many weeks before we were ready to leave. We left on a boat, finding her on a boat, at which point I knew we were really under police escort more or less.

It was Helen who brought Peter to my house, to the hotel Metro-pole in Moscow, where my interrogation took place. It was Helen who was present the first few weeks, and though Peter and Helen were married I never knew it, and though I spent with them many nights, because the interrogation took place at night mostly, I never knew they were a couple.

Peter Zubelin, after several months of interrogation and after the measures were relaxed and we were taken into the social life of the NKVD in Moscow, went one morning with my husband, Paul, to play tennis, and I went along. Now, let me say that Peter Zubelin was a kind of NKVD official. I don't know his exact rank in Russia. It was a very high army rank. NKVD people live a very different life from the average Russian. Not only is it privileged but a very secluded life, a very guarded life. For example, they have their own living quarters, their own dachas, their own shops, and their own hospitals, their own sanatoriums, and their own tennis courts. Peter went with us to a tennis court which was, of course, a closed tennis court. As we entered he whisked out whatever identification it was—I didn't see it; I didn't ask what the card was like. It was obviously a closed and private court. As we entered, I sat down on the bench and on the other court I saw Joseph Barnes, whom I knew to be a newspaperman and of whose presence in Moscow I had heard before, because, let me say this, I was very aware of all American newspapermen in Moscow merely because I hoped that they would keep track of me so that I would not disappear. Therefore, I knew very well who Barnes was and what his function was, what his work in Moscow was. I saw on the other court Barnes playing tennis with somebody else. I don't know who it was.

I said to Peter, "You know, Peter, this is very unfortunate that you have us here being seen playing tennis by an American newspaperman, playing tennis with you." He said, "What do you mean?" I said, "Look, there is Barnes." He said, "Barnes? Oh, you needn't worry about Barnes."

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Massing, I would like to make reference at this time, unless any of the Senators want to ask a question—

Senator SMITH. I have one or two questions, Mr. Morris.

I was going to ask you whether or not you had any contacts with anybody else in the State Department other than those you have mentioned up to now.

If you are going to cover that, Mr. Morris, I will defer.

Mr. MORRIS. I think, Senator, there is a list of people that I am going to ask her about.

Senator SMITH. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it not your purpose to connect only those at the present time that had connections with the IPR?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

In answer to the Senator's question, I would like again to make reference to this list of 83 people that we introduced on the first day.

Senator FERGUSON. Who had connections with the IPR?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. We have this list and we asked Mr. Carter if they were associated with the IPR.

Senator FERGUSON. He either identified them or not.

Mr. MORRIS. We are trying to restrict, as much as possible, questions to this particular list. If another name comes up, it is only because it will bring an indirect relationship to some of these people.

Senator SMITH. We will have another chance to ask this witness about other things?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, sir.

Mrs. MASSING. I wonder if you would tell us what you know about a man named James S. Allen.

Mrs. MASSING. I never worked with James S. Allen, because James S. Allen was an open party member, but I knew James S. Allen, and his real name is Sol Auerbach. I knew him as Sol. I met him socially.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Massing, I would like to offer you a photograph that appeared in the Daily Worker of May 4, 1936. There is a picture of James S. Allen. I wonder if you will identify the man whose picture appears there as the man we are talking about now.

Mrs. MASSING. Yes, that is he.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce this into the record purely for identification purposes.

The CHAIRMAN. Whom do you refer to as the man we are now talking about

Mr. MORRIS. James S. Allen.

Mrs. MASSING. James S. Allen is the man we are talking about.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what you know about James S. Allen?

Mrs. MASSING. When I met Allen, I met him at Harry Freeman's. He belonged to the group of party intellectuals. He was a theoretician in the party.

Senator FERGUSON. When you say a party, what do you mean?

Mrs. MASSING. American party.

Senator FERGUSON. The Communist Party?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes.

I must say here that my social contact with the American party was strictly against my orders. I maintained it because Gerhart Eisler, my first husband, was in this country and we were very good friends, and the people I had met when I first was in this country in 1926—there was a circle of people that in spite of the fact that neither Gerhart was permitted to see Harry Freeman, who was a Tass representative, nor was I permitted to see Harry Freeman or Gerhart Eisler, still we would meet at Freeman's apartment.

It was there that I met James Allen or Sol Auerbach. Sol at the time was working for Trachtenberg International Publishers. He was an editor. He was also the theoretician for the party in regard to the

Negro problem. He had written one book on the Black Belt theory, as far as I remember. He was at this time writing a second book. He was a highly intelligent man, but had very great difficulties in writing the second book.

I remember he discussed it at great length with me, that he did not fully believe in the theory he was to propound for the party, and, therefore, took a great, a long time, to write this book he really did not want to write. He was rather critical, I must say, and I am sorry to go on record with this because I do not think it is going to help him very much within the Communist Party—he was critical of the Soviet Union at the time, which was true for many intellectuals. They were critical in a sort of friendly manner. He was certainly very critical of the American party, too, toward the Negro problem he was assigned to write about.

Shortly after I had met Sol and his wife, meaning James Allen and his wife, his wife went on a mission, first to China and later to the Philippines. Of course, I wasn't told this. This was just by inferences. She was in the east and she was on a mission that nobody knew what it was about. It was during this time that my husband also was in France.

Sol Auerbach and I became rather friendly. Sol's mother had a place in a suburb of New York where I spent evenings fairly frequently.

So I really know a great deal about Sol's thoughts at the time.

Sol at this time was not connected directly with the Comintern in any other way but being a theoretician for the open Communist Party. When his wife got back from her mission, I did not see them very often because she was an apparatchik and did not very much mix with this group after she came back from the mission.

I don't quite know what happened in Sol's development, but I remember very distinctly after not having seen him for several months, he called me and came to my house and again said that he was very dissatisfied with his position within the party, with his writing, and that he would very much like to join my apparatus. He was asking my advice on this. I was rather critical myself, and quite appalled at a young man who should be willing to join a group that I did not think was a very good thing to be in or be involved with. I told him I could neither help nor would I, could I. I advised him to stay out of that, that if he was dissatisfied with his work to not to do it, but make up his own mind and do what he wanted to do. This is all I know about him. I have never seen him since.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I would like to offer you four groups of letters and ask you if you will identify those four letters.

Mr. MANDEL. I identify these letters as being taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to make reference, Mr. Chairman, to a letter dated April 13, 1938, from Mr. James S. Allen to Mr. Frederick V. Field, addressed to the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations. Allen, in this letter, says:

I am contemplating a small book on the Philippines, with chief emphasis upon the internal situation in the light of the problems of the Pacific area.

I have already done much preparatory work, and expect to round out my materials by additional observation and new data during another trip to the islands. I will probably leave in July and spend 4 or 5 months there.

It has occurred to me that the institute may be interested in the project, and may be willing to extend financial aid.

Then he goes on to say:

Should the institute be unwilling to make any commitments with regard to the sponsoring or publication of the book, another alternative seems possible. In the kind of general book which I am planning, it will be impossible to use the mass of data which I already have and which I will gather during my next trip.

There is another letter in this same batch from James S. Allen, dated June 2, 1938, to Mr. Edward C. Carter, of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and reads:

DEAR MR. CARTER: I am enclosing a copy of my letter to Mr. Field with regard to my proposed book on the Philippines. Please pardon the delay in replying to your note of May 28, since I have just returned to the city.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES S. ALLEN.

Senator SMITH. I wonder if you will accept that in evidence?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, is that one of the four groups of letters that Mr. Mandel has perviously identified?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; it is.

Senator SMITH (presiding). I think it will be all right for this purpose. According to law, I guess you would have to identify it by signature. I think under the circumstances in which it was found, for the purpose of this hearing, it is all right.

Mr. MORRIS. The purpose of this is to show the relationship between James S. Allen, about whom the witness has testified, and the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator SMITH. That might not be James S. Allen's signature, but apparently it is, according to the circumstances under which it was found.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 46 and 47," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 46

APRIL 13, 1938.

MR. FREDERICK V. FIELD,

American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, San Francisco, Calif.

DEAR MR. FIELD: I am contemplating a small book on the Philippines, with chief emphasis upon the internal situation in the light of the problems of the Pacific area.

I have already done much preparatory work, and expect to round out my materials by additional observation and new data during another trip to the islands. I will probably leave in July and spend 4 or 5 months there.

It has occurred to me that the institute may be interested in the project, and may be willing to extend financial aid. Upon my return at the end of this year, I will have at hand the materials necessary for the writing of the book. But my problem will then be to assure myself 3 or 4 months of uninterrupted time for writing the book. I do not know the usual procedure of the institute in such matters, but may I take the liberty of requesting an advance grant to enable me to complete the book for publication?

Should the institute be unwilling to make any commitments with regard to the sponsoring or publication of the book, another alternative seems possible. In the kind of general book which I am planning, it will be impossible to use the mass of data which I already have and which I will gather during my next trip. The institute may be interested in taking the materials for utilization in a Philippine handbook or other form. In this case, I could arrange for the publication of my book on its completion with a commercial publisher.

If it is possible to work out some basis of aid in advance, I could plan my trip and future plans accordingly. Should it be felt that some arrangement could be worked out, I would, of course, be glad to supply further details on the plan of the book.

I am ready to consider any other suggestion you may have in the matter.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES S. ALLEN.

EXHIBIT No. 47

NEW YORK, June 2, 1938.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations, New York.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I am enclosing a copy of my letter to Mr. Field with regard to my proposed book on the Philippines. Please pardon the delay in replying to your note of May 28, since I have just returned to the city.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES S. ALLEN.

Mr. MORRIS. I would also like to introduce into evidence a copy of a letter identified by Mr. Mandel as having come from the files as a memorandum from Mr. Lockwood to Mr. Carter, dated April 14, 1938.

Reference here is made to the fact, on page 2, the second full paragraph from the top, that Lockwood is asking Carter:

Are you in touch with James Allen? I understand he is going to the islands in July to continue his investigation. His recent Pacific Affairs article on the agrarian question was most interesting and gave evidence of being a careful and scholarly piece of work. His earlier book on the Negro problem in the United States was praised by scholars as an excellent piece of research, even though his Communist ideology led him off into a proposal for "national self-determination" in the Black Belt which most people thought rather fantastic. Since the agrarian problem in the Philippines is obviously a key issue and since Allen has been short of funds, at least until recently, there may be some way in which the IPR can give him a useful boost.

I would like to introduce that in evidence in connection with Mr. Allen's association with the IPR.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 48," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 48

W. W. L. to E. C. C.

APRIL 14, 1938.

PHILIPPINE RESEARCH

Our luncheon meeting still leaves rather vague what the American council should do both as regards the secretariat inquiry and a long-term research program. Even if we follow up the suggestion and call a committee under Hayden, we should attempt meanwhile to clarify what we want done and might be in a position to do. It is unlikely that merely setting up a committee will carry us far unless we have a pretty good idea what we want and unless we are prepared to put a good deal of staff effort into pushing the thing along. I hope that Hayden will be here within a few weeks for a research committee meeting so that we can confer with him in person. Meanwhile, the situation looks to me about as follows:

SECRETARIAT INQUIRY

The bulk of the contribution to the secretariat inquiry, as I understand it, is to come from the Philippine council, with what assistance the secretariat and the American council may be able to give. The American council is to be primarily responsible, however, only for the specific American angle—the Philippines as a factor in our far eastern relations. Not only does this accord with IPR policy, but it recognizes the fact that with two possible exceptions, which I shall mention below, Americans in this country are hardly in a position to make any very useful contribution to the study of internal Philippine affairs or of Philippine relations in the Far East. Just what the general program of the Philippine study should be is for someone else to say. Perhaps the possibilities can be divided into two categories: (1) Memoranda on the general aspects of the external problems of the Commonwealth, and (2) more thorough-going research into various domestic phases of Philippine economic and political life.

Under the first category come the general subjects of international trade and international political relationships during and after the change in the political

status of the islands. From the Philippine angle this involves the problem of economic readjustment and of political security in the present and future. From the American, it involves primarily the Philippines as a factor in our policy in the Pacific. In this category the American council shares with the Philippine council the responsibility for documenting the secretariat inquiry.

It hardly seems necessary, however, for the American council to plan any extensive effort along this line. Philippine-American trade relations have been abundantly documented by the United States Government and private investigators. The facts are known and the problem is largely the political one of negotiation. So, too, the political and strategic phases of American interests are not in need of extensive research, particularly in view of Hayden's forthcoming volume (about which I have written for more specific information). The naval angle will come in for consideration in our naval study. In addition, we contemplate a data paper on American Far Eastern policy for the next conference, and meanwhile the conferences now being held may turn up a good deal of analysis and opinion on the subject.

Accordingly, I see no reason to alter our original proposal—that the American council should now plan only for a memorandum (possibly a data paper for the next conference) analyzing the place of the Philippines in American policy and the American angle of the Philippine question itself. Even this should be somewhat conditional on Hayden's present work, and on the needs of the situation as it develops next fall. It may be that the most useful thing we could do would be to assemble a small group of people next winter to prepare a brief series of recommendations on Philippine policy, comparable to that issued under the auspices of the Foreign Policy Association 2 or 3 years ago. Possibly this report might be correlated with a parallel report undertaken and issued in the Philippines by a responsible group of Filipinos.

In the second category—that of Philippine research projects bearing on the secretariat inquiry—it is not clear to me that the American council should undertake anything at the present time. Little progress can be made in any important Philippine studies except by persons on the spot. I do not know whether the secretariat is sending someone to the islands or what relationship, if any, this person might have to the American council. Presumably this matter of research on internal political, economic, and social affairs will be worked out between the secretariat and the Philippine council, although the American council would naturally do everything it could to assist.

Are you in touch with James Allen? I understand he is going to the islands in July to continue his investigation. His recent Pacific Affairs article on the agrarian question was most interesting and gave evidence of being a careful and scholarly piece of work. His earlier book on the Negro problem in the United States was praised by scholars as an excellent piece of research, even though his Communist ideology led him off into a proposal for "national self-determination" in the Black Belt which most people thought rather fantastic. Since the agrarian problem in the Philippines is obviously a key issue and since Allen has been short of funds, at least until recently, there may be some way in which the IPR can give him a useful boost. Chen Han-seng says that Allen's former hostility to Quezon has now been somewhat modified. Without knowing any more of the situation than this, I wonder if it would be desirable to investigate the possibility of hooking up Allen, Fred Howe, and others in such a way as to secure a thoroughgoing and rounded report on all phases of the agrarian problem. Perhaps this is altogether fanciful in view of personalities, etc., but in any case the sample of Allen's work is most promising.

With reference to your exchange of letters with Field on the subject of Miss Eleanor Dennison, which you passed along for comment—the subject of Philippine economic interest in the Far East deserves thoroughgoing study. The existing trade is relatively small, of course, and is a subject easily documented. The important question is rather the potentialities for the future. If the American trade tie is cut, the islands will be forced to reorient themselves in terms of Far Eastern trade relations, and this means primarily but not exclusively trade with Japan. (A study of Hong Kong trade, for example, shows that intra-regional trade has developed rapidly in this area, even excluding the Japanese share.) Someone ought to make a close study of both the competitive and complementary relationships of Philippine products and potential products with those of adjacent countries on all sides. But this is a highly technical matter and hardly to be undertaken as a doctoral thesis by some American girl in California. Unless it is already being done in the Philippines under official auspices, I should think it would constitute one important phase of the secretariat inquiry in the islands.

LONG-RANGE RESEARCH PLANS

Before setting up any committees and inviting suggestions for a program, I wonder if we should not consider rather carefully what we are actually prepared to do. In general, the need seems to be for basic studies in the social sciences in the Philippines rather than for anything that can be done from secondary materials over here. Moreover, our program, as you have pointed out, should be the stimulation of interest among American scholars, largely lacking in the past, rather than carrying through some particular research project under American council auspices. Such a research promotion campaign would presumably include a survey of these research needs, after the fashion of an SSRC committee, to be followed by a varied program including publicity for these needs, the coordination of research efforts, the provision of funds for travel and study in the islands, the encouragement of graduate study by Filipinos in the United States, the building up of library resources here and in the islands, etc.

There is only one objection to our launching such a program right away, but that is a practical one: Who is going to do it? We can get useful advice, suggestions, and contacts from a committee set up for the purpose, as proposed, but the actual execution of the program—the administrative responsibility—would fall upon us to a large extent and would be quite time consuming. There is little value in making the gesture unless we are prepared to follow it through. At present we are already rather far extended in our general program. It is questionable whether we should embark on any special effort along this line until some of our present responsibilities are liquidated.

It was this limitation of staff which was largely responsible for dropping the proposal discussed last summer for a Philippine-American council or committee. The plan which Lasker then proposed was a program to stimulate cultural relations in general with research as one of its important subdivisions. For a time it looked as though Veatch might be the man to carry out this research project, to serve as correspondent for the committee in the islands, and to carry a good deal of responsibility for organizing the thing at this end. When this scheme collapsed, owing to Veatch's decision to stay with the State Department, and when the war broke out, we went no further.

What we need is a staff person who would be our research person on the Philippines, thoroughly conversant with the subject, and who, in the remainder of his or her time, would be a Mortimer Graves in this field. It would be advantageous, although not essential, for this person to spend a period in the Philippines and return with a first-hand understanding of the situation. Until we see our way clear to some such arrangement, I am somewhat skeptical of the wisdom of making the initial splash and arousing expectations which we may not be in a position to fulfill. Is this taking a too negative view as far as the immediate possibilities are concerned?

Mr. MORRIS. I would like also to introduce into evidence a copy of a letter from Owen Lattimore to James S. Allen, dated February 27, 1939, and addressed to 508 West One Hundred and Thirty-ninth Street, apartment 42, New York City:

DEAR ALLEN. Excuse my writing to you by dictaphone, as I am away from my office and kind of crowded for time.

It was good to hear from you again and I am only sorry that your "letter to the editor" was not in time for publication in our March number. It will have to come out in June. I am returning to you herewith a copy of the letter as set up to go to the printer. I am also sending copies to the Compania and to the Philippine branch of the IPR.

What about some more on the Philippines sometime? We are really rather hard-pressed to get enough material that is not directly about the Japanese war on China. At the same time I needn't apologize for pointing out to you that we couldn't guarantee to take another article from you on the Philippines right away, if it would look to the Philippines IPR as though we only printed radical stuff on the islands. Have you done any work in French Indochina, the Malay Straits, or Netherlands India?

By the way, have you any ideas that I could use in expanding circulation in the Philippines for Pacific Affairs? I think it is a healthy thing not to depend entirely on the organizational efforts of the IPR in each area for subscriptions. The more we can widen out everywhere by getting people who are not just members or joiners to subscribe to Pacific Affairs, the better for us.

I may be in New York toward the end of March. If so I very much hope that I may be able to make your acquaintance personally.

I would like to introduce that in evidence as one of the letters identified by Mr. Mandel as being taken from the files.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 49" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 49

JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
Baltimore, Md., February 27, 1939.

Mr. JAMES S. ALLEN,
New York City.

DEAR ALLEN: Excuse my writing to you by dictaphone, as I am away from my office and kind of crowded for time.

It was good to hear from you again and I am only sorry that your "letter to the editor" was not in time for publication in our March number. It will have to come out in June. I am returning to you herewith a copy of the letter as set up to go to the printer. I am also sending copies to the Compania and to the Philippine Branch of the IPR.

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By the way, have you any ideas that I could use in expanding circulation in the Philippines for Pacific Affairs? I think it is a healthy thing not to depend entirely on the organizational efforts of the IPR in each area for subscriptions. The more we can widen out everywhere by getting people who are not just members or joiners to subscribe to Pacific Affairs, the better for us.

I may be in New York toward the end of March. If so I very much hope that I may be able to make your acquaintance personally.

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to also introduce the fourth batch of letters identified by Mr. Mandel, which is an exchange of correspondence dated May 25, 1938, from Mr. Allen to Mr. Carter and Mr. Carter's reply, dated May 28, 1938. Mr. Carter says in his reply to Mr. Allen:

DEAR ALLEN: This is to acknowledge with thanks your letter of May 25. Some time ago, Mr. Field forwarded your letter and outline for a book on the Philippines but, for some reason, I fail to find it in my files. It may have been lost in the mails.

I wonder whether it would be easy for you to send me a duplicate so that I may give it and your letter of May 25 the attention it deserves.

Whether the institute can make any grant, I cannot say at the moment. We are, however, very much interested in your proposal.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Carter's letter to Mr. Allen is dated May 28, 1938, and sent to 381 Fourth Avenue, New York City, which is the address of the International Publishers Co. and also the address of the Communist Party of the United States, New York County Committee.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits No. 50 and 51" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 50

NEW YORK, May 25, 1938.

Mr. EDWARD CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations, New York.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Mr. Frederick Field informed me some time ago that he had forwarded to you my letter outlining a short book on the Philippines and requesting assistance from the institute. He suggested that you might have something concrete to offer in this regard.

I am taking the liberty to write to you, since the time is drawing near for my departure to the Philippines and I have so little time left in which to make arrangements for the publication of the book.

If the institute is not in a position to render assistance to this project, I should like to know as soon as possible, since I would then attempt to make other arrangements. It seems to me, however, that the type of book I have in mind would especially suit the research and publication program of the institute and lend itself to your sponsorship. Professor Hayden is working on a lengthy and rather exhaustive study of all aspects of Philippine economic and social life, a book which will undoubtedly be of great value. My purpose, rather, is to write a concise book on the chief internal and international issues facing the Philippines in view of the new phase of Japanese aggression and the world alignment of the Fascist and militarist powers.

I expect to leave New York during the first week in July and will return from the Philippines at beginning of next year, when I will be ready to devote a number of months to the writing of the book.

Should you wish any further information, I will be only too glad to supply it. Any indication you can give me immediately as to the possibility of some constructive proposal from the institute would, of course, be highly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES S. ALLEN.

EXHIBIT No. 51

NEW YORK CITY, May 28, 1938.

MR. JAMES S. ALLEN,
381 Fourth Avenue, New York City.

DEAR ALLEN: This is to acknowledge with thanks your letter of May 25. Some time ago, Mr. Field forwarded your letter and outline for a book on the Philippines but, for some reason, I fail to find it in my files. It may have been lost in the mails.

I wonder whether it would be easy for you to send me a duplicate so that I may give it and your letter of May 25 the attention it deserves.

Whether the institute can make any grant, I cannot say at the moment. We are, however, very much interested in your proposal.

Sincerely yours.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

MR. MORRIS. I introduce a letter from the general directory manager of the New York Telephone Co., dated May 15, 1951. I ask you if you will take the letter from the New York Telephone Co. in evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be presented in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 52" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 52

NEW YORK TELEPHONE CO.,
New York, N. Y., May 15, 1951.

HON. PAT McCARRAN,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: Your letter of May 9, 1951, in reference to a listing in the Manhattan telephone book for 1938 of the names, International Publishers, Communist Party U.S.A., or Communist Party of New York State has been referred to me for reply.

The 1938 edition of the Manhattan alphabetical directory, corrected to November 10, 1937, contained the following listings, among others:

International Publishers Co., 381 Fourth Ave., MUryhil 5-2864.

Communist Party of the U. S. A., New York County Committee, 381 Fourth Ave., MUryhil 5-2462.

No listing appeared in this directory for a New York State Communist Party or a Communist Party of New York State.

The two listings published in the 1938 Manhattan alphabetical directory also appeared in the 1938-39 edition, corrected to May 12, 1938, and again in the 1939 issue, corrected to November 9, 1938.

If we can be of any further assistance to you or to your committee in this matter, please do not hesitate to call on us.

Sincerely yours,

L. J. JORDAN,
General Directory Manager.

The CHAIRMAN. Where does this letter come from?

Mr. MORRIS. It is from the New York Telephone Co., addressed to you.

I would like also to make part of the record two articles published in *Pacific Affairs*, the official publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations, in 1938. One is on page 52, called *The Agrarian Tendencies in the Philippines* by James S. Allen, and the other is called *The Philippine Problem Enters a New Phase*, by James S. Allen. That is on page 159.

I would like to introduce both of these articles in evidence as writings of Mr. Allen from the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you want those printed in full in the record?

Mr. MORRIS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. You want this to go in the files, then?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; in the files.

The CHAIRMAN. What about the excerpts getting into the record?

Mr. MORRIS. I think the record should show those two articles did appear.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean they will lie before the committee?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. There is a reference so if anyone wants to read the whole articles he can find them in the Library.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. There is one more letter I would like to introduce on the question of James S. Allen, Mr. Chairman. This is dated May 29, 1940. It is a letter from Edward C. Carter to W. L. Holland; it is sent from 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, which at that time was the address of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The last paragraph reads:

Last week we had a special meeting on Soviet Policy in the Pacific made up of some members of Corbett's group, but it was an ad hoc meeting. Those present were: Kathleen Barnes, Lockwood, Grajdanzev, Corbett, Muhle, Bisson, Moore, Field, James Allen, Bill Carter, E. C. Carter, and Owen Lattimore, and Leaning.

That is signed by Mr. Carter.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the origin of that letter?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel is getting the original letter.

The CHAIRMAN. Please lay the foundation for it.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you introduce this letter as a letter taken from the files of the Institute?

Mr. MANDEL. I identify this letter of May 29, 1940, as a letter from the IPR files.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 53" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 53

NEW YORK, N. Y., May 29, 1940.

W. L. HOLLAND, Esq.

Care Giannini Foundation, University of California, Berkeley, Calif.

DEAR BILL: You will, I think, wish to scan this docket of the London, Ontario, Study Meeting. Please return it at your convenience. It was really a very good show. The Canadians seemed most deeply to appreciate the presence of the Americans.

Referring to your very generous letter of May 23 and your check for the New Zealand part of the general purposes budget, I wish to thank you most sincerely for your characteristically generous help. May I have the privilege of reporting this to the New Zealand Institute?

Elizabeth has assured me that she willingly accepts the salary cut. She is eager to work harder than ever for the IPR.

By now you will have had a copy of my letter containing the letter from Switzerland regarding the latest news from Adam. I have not had anything from Boeke or Moll. I suppose I might try a letter through Geneva. Have you any special message that you would like me to send?

Corbett's group has been meeting pretty regularly. I will check with him and see what minutes are available.

Last week we had a special meeting on Soviet policy in the Pacific made up of some members of Corbett's group, but it was an ad hoc meeting. Those present were: Kathleen Barnes, Lockwood, Grajdanzev, Corbett, Muhle, Bisson, Moore, Field, James Allen, Bill Carter, E. C. Carter, and Owen Lattimore, and Leaning.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. In regard to this letter from Edward C. Carter to W. L. Holland, dated May 29, 1940, I call attention to the last paragraph which discusses a meeting held under IPR auspices in discussing Soviet policy in the Pacific.

Mrs. MASSING, will you tell us what you know about Max Granich?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes. Max Granich is the husband of Grace Maul and was a brother of Mike Gold. I know he was at one time—but this is much later than when I met him—the editor of China Today. I met Granich through Mike Gold, whom I met in 1926 in New York. I knew the Gold family very well because it was through Mike Gold that I was introduced to my first job in an orphanage working with defective children in 1936, shortly after I arrived here.

Granich was a Communist, and so was Grace Maul. I think Grace Maul had a rather high function in the central committee of the Communist Party, but I am not certain what her status was. I met Granich and Grace Maul in Moscow in 1929 or the beginning of 1930. I saw them a great deal in New York between 1926 and 1928. I knew they belonged to the Communist Party, I mean.

Mr. MORRIS. How high a position do they occupy in the Communist Party?

Mrs. MASSING. I wouldn't know about him. I know about her, Grace Maul. I think she was a member of the central committee. What her specific function was, I wouldn't know. That was as far back as 1926.

I think later on she went on many missions. I knew she was in England. I met them in Paris in the American Express Co. by mere coincidence once. They traveled a great deal. I would say they were Comintern employees, Comintern missionaries, in a way. They were sent on jobs. What their specific jobs were, I wouldn't know. China was the focus, I believe.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record at this time, and Mr. Mandel will identify it as a letter coming from the files of the institute.

Mr. MANDEL. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. It comes from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. I identify it as from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. A copy of a letter from Owen Lattimore to Mr. Max Granich, *China Today*, 168 West Twenty-third Street, New York City. In this letter, Lattimore says:

Thank you for your letter of December 11. I am afraid that my position as editor of Pacific Affairs makes it impossible for me to join the editorial board of *China Today*. I am a member of the international secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations. This means that one of my employers is the Japanese Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. There has already been a considerable kick about my being on the board of Amerasia. It is probably better for me not to invite extra kicks by going on the board of *China Today*, which is more partisan, and more obviously partisan, than Amerasia.

I have been desperately busy the last few months completing a book and, consequently, have published very little in magazines. I am expecting to write some articles in the next few months, but I think you will agree that these articles would have their maximum impact if not published in magazines which are devoted to "the cause of China."

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. I would like to introduce that letter in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 54" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 54

300 GILMAN HALL,
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
Baltimore, Md., December 13, 1939.

Mr. MAX GRANICH,

China Today, 168 West Twenty-third Street, New York City.

DEAR Mr. GRANICH: Thank you for your letter of December 11. I am afraid that my position as editor of Pacific Affairs makes it impossible for me to join the editorial board of *China Today*. I am a member of the international secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations. This means that one of my employers is the Japanese Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. There has already been a considerable kick about my being on the board of Amerasia. It is probably better for me not to invite extra kicks by going on the board of *China Today*, which is more partisan, and more obviously partisan, than Amerasia.

I have been desperately busy the last few months completing a book and, consequently, have published very little in magazines. I am expecting to write some articles in the next few months, but I think you will agree that these articles would have their maximum impact if not published in magazines which are devoted to "the cause of China."

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

Mr. MORRIS. Bearing on the testimony of this witness on Max Granich, that is.

Did you know Agnes Smedley?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes; I knew her quite well. Agnes Smedley I met in Frankfurt-am-Main when I got back from the United States in 1928. She had written her life story. I don't quite recall what the title of it in English was, but my second husband, Julian Gumperz,

who was the owner of a large publishing firm in Berlin, called the Maleek Verlag, had translated and published it in his publishing firm. She was a very close friend of his. I met her through him. I saw her rather frequently before she went off to China. She was then a correspondent for the Frankfurter Zeitung.

I believe Julian Gumperz was rather instrumental in getting her the assignment as a correspondent. I did not discuss with her at the time whether she was a Communist. As a matter of fact, it is never discussed among Communists whether you are a Communist. You take it for granted. The fact that she was a friend of Julian Gumperz, the fact that she had published in the Maleek Verlag, which was a left-wing publishing firm, made me assume that she was one of us. That is how I met her.

I saw her next in Russia in 1930. She had come back from China. She was rather sick. I am not quite sure whether it was the fall of 1930 or the winter of 1930-31, but it was during this winter that I saw her in Moscow. She lived at the Hotel International. She had with her a German girl that had been with her in Shanghai. She had written the book that made her rather famous—about the Chinese Red army.

I spoke to her about Gerhart, whom she had met in China, and whom she liked very well. I saw her rather frequently in Moscow. I believe, when she was in Moscow, she had some difficulties. I had the feeling, in retrospect I must admit—at that time I would not have quite understood the situation—that she was there in almost a similar situation as I was later in 1937. She was waiting for an exit visa. She didn't get it. She wasn't treated too well by the Russians. She had difficulties with the Russians. In fact, when I saw her again in New York in 19—either 4 or 5—I am not certain because I just saw her once socially—

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't mean 1904; do you?

Mrs. MASSING. 1934 or 1935. She referred to this time where she had seen me in Moscow as having had great difficulties with the party, with the Russians. She never referred to the party but the Russians mainly.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you try to describe her relative importance in the Communist Party?

Mrs. MASSING. She had a very high status as a foremost writer on China. When I spoke to Gerhart Eisler, who was also in China as a Comintern representative during the time Agnes Smedley was there, and I saw Gerhart when he got back from Moscow in 1931—when I asked him about Agnes Smedley, he said she was “a wonderful person” and had been of tremendous help to him.

Mr. MORRIS. When he said “wonderful,” he meant wonderful within the Communist scheme?

Mrs. MASSING. Of course. To Gerhart Eisler no person is wonderful if he is not a Communist. “Wonderful” is a good Communist, a useful Communist. He spoke very highly of her.

Later, when Dr. Richard Sorge was on his way to Germany from China before he went to Japan, he saw me in New York. I asked him about Agnes Smedley. He, too, said that Agnes—but he said it very smirkingly—that Agnes was “a very wonderful helper.” He didn't say she was working for him. Only when he went back to

Japan and saw me in New York again, he said, and this was at the time when I was ordered to go to Japan with him, he said to me, "You have a very responsible job if you go with me. You will be established like Agnes was with me in China," meaning in a rather high position, in a much higher and more responsible job than I had held in New York today in my "apparatus."

Mr. MORRIS. Do any of the Senators care to ask about Agnes Smedley?

Senator SMITH. There is one question but it may not be proper here, but it will take a minute to answer.

On all these trips you made, such as the last one, who paid you? How did you get the money?

Mrs. MASSING. I was a paid Soviet agent. I was on a party salary.

Senator SMITH. Paid by the funds that came from Moscow?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes, indeed.

Senator SMITH. How did they reach you?

Mrs. MASSING. As a matter of fact, in New York I was for some time in charge of the money for our unit. How the money came from Moscow, I wouldn't quite know had I not been once, at the very early start of my career, a courier to bring money from Moscow to the French party. I mean, the money was brought by couriers, as I was one. How it was brought to New York, I don't know, because I didn't bring it. Somebody else did.

Senator FERGUSON. Who gave it to you in New York?

Mrs. MASSING. In New York, my superior, whoever it was at the time, Bill or Boris.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it in rubles or in dollars?

Mrs. MASSING. It was in dollars. As I said once before, rubles were just used in Russia. Even there they are not worth very much and never have been. It was the currency of the country that it was used in. In France, I took French francs.

Senator SMITH. Did any of the parties you have mentioned, in connection with this group you have testified to this morning, transmit to you directly or indirectly any funds for the uses of the party for the purposes you were serving?

Mrs. MASSING. You mean any of the people that I solicited?

Senator SMITH. That you testified about this morning.

Mrs. MASSING. No, except for the members of my "apparatus" which were Russians. No, nobody did.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you any doubt in your mind that Agnes Smedley was a Communist?

Mrs. MASSING. Of course not, Senator; I couldn't have had because Agnes was referred to, and this is the round that is so very hard for us to understand—we know when somebody is a Communist. A Communist knows when a Communist is a Communist. Agnes was one of us. Agnes was referred to in our circles as one of us. Whether she had a party membership, I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. The reason I ask you this question is: Did you know that the War Department issued an order in effect clearing this woman?

Mrs. MASSING. No, indeed, and I was very much flabbergasted by it because I know very much about her role in China. I knew that she was very instrumental in helping Dr. Richard Sorge, who was one

of the most outstanding Soviet spies. She helped him in introducing to him people and help him set up his "apparatus." She was a rather high functionary in Richard Sorge's outfit. I was very amazed at the withdrawal of the War Department when she threatened to sue.

Senator FERGUSON. You had no doubt, notwithstanding the War Department's clearance, that this woman was a Communist?

Mrs. MASSING. I had no doubt that she was an outstanding Communist. I do not know whether she ever took out a party membership.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not talking about that. I am not talking about a party card, or a booklet, as you said this morning. I am talking about who is an instrumentality of the Communists.

Mrs. MASSING. Yes, Senator. After her death, she willed all her possessions and her body to the Chinese Communists. I don't think anybody can doubt any longer she was a convinced Communist and an active Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record at this time an excerpt from the New York Times of May 7, 1951, with the date line "San Francisco." It reads:

Agnes Smedley, pro-Red American writer who died in Oxford, England, exactly one year ago, was buried today in Peiping, the Chinese Red radio reported.

In accordance with her will, the Peiping broadcast said, her ashes were placed in the New Cemetery for Revolutionists at services attended by 800 Chinese Red notables.

Miss Smedley's will, probated in New York last year, bequeathed her estate to General Chu Teh, Chinese Red commander in chief.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 55" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 55

AGNES SMEDLEY BURIED—PRO-RED WRITER IS INTERRED IN PEIPING YEAR AFTER DEATH

[From the New York Times, May 7, 1951]

SAN FRANCISCO, May 6.—Agnes Smedley, pro-Red American writer who died in Oxford, England, exactly 1 year ago, was buried today in Peiping, the Chinese Red radio reported.

In accordance with her will, the Peiping broadcast said, her ashes were placed in the New Cemetery for Revolutionists at services attended by 800 Chinese Red notables.

Miss Smedley's will, probated in New York last year, bequeathed her estate to General Chu-Teh, Chinese Red commander in chief.

The Red broadcast said that Miss Smedley's personal possessions, such as typewriter, camera, radio set, and correspondence with General Chu, was placed on exhibition in the hall of the Youth Palace.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to show this letter to Mr. Mandel and ask him if he will identify it as a copy of a letter from the IPR files.

Mr. MANDEL. I identify this letter as one taken from the IPR files.

Mr. MORRIS. This is a letter signed "Agnes Smedley" and sent to the Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City.

GENTLEMEN: I understand there is a system whereby the Red Cross can secure an exchange of prisoners. I therefore appeal to you to write officially in the name of your organization, to the American Red Cross, asking that Mr. Chen Han-seng * * *.

Mr. Chairman, may I recall that Chen Han-seng was identified in the first session here as a staff member of the IPR, a man who had worked on the inquiry series of the IPR and a man about whom Mr. Carter wrote to Mr. Motylev, a member of the Soviet IPR that he was writing under the pen name of Raymond D. Brooke.

Then we introduced in evidence at that time photostatic copies of Raymond D. Brooke's articles in the Far Eastern Spotlight which is a publication of the American Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy.

Resuming the letter—

* * * asking that Mr. Chen Han-seng and his wife be placed on the exchange list, and that you do all you can to get them out of Hong Kong. Chen Han-seng was not only one of your members, but he was the chief person in charge of the industrial cooperative office in Hong Kong. His wife is very ill. I doubt very much if they were among the Chinese enabled to leave Hong Kong for China during the fighting.

Toward the end of the letter it reads:

China is our ally. Chen Han-seng and his wife are among the most important men in the Far East. Holding the position he does, he would most certainly be most in danger from the Japanese.

That is dated January 31, 1942. It is written from Ojai, Calif.

I would like to introduce that in evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 56" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 56

RURAL ROUTE 2, BOX 57, OJAI, CALIF., *January 31, 1942.*

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS,
129 East Fifty-second Street,
New York City.

GENTLEMEN: I understand there is a system whereby the Red Cross can secure an exchange of prisoners. I therefore appeal to you to write officially in the name of your organization, to the American Red Cross, asking that Mr. Chen Han-seng and his wife be placed on the exchange list, and that you do all you can to get them out of Hong Kong. Chen Han-seng was not only one of your members, but he was the chief person in charge of the industrial cooperative office in Hong Kong. His wife is very ill. I doubt very much if they were among the Chinese enabled to leave Hong Kong for China during the fighting.

Please find time to write me a line about this. I understand that John Gunther, like others, is trying to have people in Hong Kong placed on the prisoner-exchange lists. Surely, at such a moment in history, we will not let nationality alone determine our actions. China is our ally. Chen Han-seng and his wife are among the most important men in the Far East. Holding the position he does, he would most certainly, be most in danger from the Japanese.

Very sincerely yours,

AGNES SMEDLEY.

Mr. MORRIS. I would also like to introduce another letter and ask Mr. Mandel to identify this.

Mr. MANDEL. I identify this letter of January 14, 1939, as taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. By whom is that signed?

Mr. MORRIS. This is from Edward C. Carter to Frederick V. Field at the institute address. It reads:

DEAR FRED: You may care to scan these two sets of inquiries: I, material from the Chinese campaign committee in London, including a letter from Miss Smedley; and II, two circular letters from Bates, of Nanking.

After you have scanned them will you pass them on in an envelope to Chen, Liu, Holland, Sheppard, and Mitchell.

I would like to introduce that.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 57" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 57

JANUARY 14, 1939.

Mr. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
129 East Fifty-second Street,
New York City.

DEAR FRED: You may care to scan these two sets of inquiries: I, material from the Chinese campaign committee in London, including a letter from Miss Smedley; and II, two circular letter from Bates of Nanking.

After you have scanned them will you pass them on in an envelope to Chen, Liu, Holland, Sheppard, and Mitchell.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. The accompanying letter from Miss Smedley is not on that covering letter, I would like to note.

Mrs. MASSING, do you know Harriet Lucy Moore?

Mrs. MASSING. I have met her socially in Moscow, probably once or twice, I am not certain. I don't know her well at all. I know of her. I know that her name figured in Moscow and in the American party, meaning that I might have heard it from Grace Maul and from Agnes, from people concerned with China, with the Far East, and I knew where she lived in Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. Where did she live?

Mrs. MASSING. In the International Hotel.

Mr. MORRIS. Where is the International Hotel?

Mrs. MASSING. I am not absolutely certain whether she didn't live in the Hotel Lux. I went to many American parties in the Hotel Lux. It was the hotel in which only Comintern, foreign Comintern people lived, Comintern employees. The Hotel International was the hotel in which fellow travelers, or agents that were not supposed to be known as such, lived. For example, where Noel Field and Herta Field visited in Moscow in 1938 just before I left, in the spring of 1938. They lived in the Hotel International.

That meant that she was put up not where the regular Intourist people were but in the near party, the people that ought to be under cover. The Lux was the hotel for strict Comintern employees, foreign Comintern employees. For example, my sister lived in the Hotel Lux. Gerhart Eisler lived there.

Mr. MORRIS. You do not recall with particularity whether it was the International or the Lux?

Mrs. MASSING. It was one of the two; I do not.

Mr. MORRIS. When you heard discussion of Harriet Moore, was it in connection with her being a Communist?

Mrs. MASSING. Again I must say nobody said Harriet Moore is a Communist, but Harriet Moore was a name like Grace Maul. Nobody said Grace Maul was a Communist but she just was. You understand, it is difficult for me to say it in any other way. This is just how I heard her name referred to.

Mr. MORRIS. At this juncture, Mr. Chairman, may I mention, to be sure the committee understands, these names are all being intro-

duced now while this witness is on the stand as people who are associated, people on the list of those associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations and that we would like an identification of these people as testimony goes along, and then there will be further development on their association with the IPR.

The CHAIRMAN. These are the names, as I understand it, that were identified by Mr. Carter when he was on the stand.

Mr. MORRIS. At least this is the list that we presented to Mr. Carter and the list has been made available to him.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. MORRIS, it is about 12 o'clock now and the Senate will be in session. There is a very important vote to be taken this afternoon sometime.

You have gone along for 2 hours now. I do not think you can conclude with this witness from the appearance of your records here before you.

The chairman must be on the floor as soon as possible. I wonder if it is not possible to recess now and to take this witness up later.

Senator FERGUSON. I wish before we recess, for this record to show her naming her superiors in the order that she had them.

Mrs. MASSING. My Russian superiors?

Senator FERGUSON. In the United States.

Mrs. MASSING. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, if we are going to have another session, would that not be all right?

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to have it part of this record.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. MORRIS advises me that he can conclude in 10 minutes.

Senator FERGUSON. If we could get those superiors.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not wish to rush him. I want him to get the evidence in as he wants it presented.

You will answer Senator Ferguson's question, please.

Mrs. MASSING. My first superior was Valentin Markin in New York.

My next superior was Bill. I knew him as Bill. His name, not his real name, of course—the passport he lived under in New York City was Grinke, Walter Grinke, G-r-i-n-k-e. It was a German name and I am sure it was not his real name, because he was a Russian.

My next superior was Boris. I knew him here under the name of Fred. His real name was Boris Bazorof, B-a-z-o-r-o—either "v" or "f." I am not sure.

That was all, because after Bazorof, Helen Zubelin, whom I knew as Helen, her real name being Elizabeth, took me to Moscow. These were my three superiors.

I had several Russian coworkers, of course, but these were my superiors.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, in connection with the last person we asked Mrs. Massing, Harriet Moore, I would like to quickly introduce in evidence six letters, which I ask Mr. Mandel to identify, as having been taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator FERGUSON. While he is identifying them, another question: Did you have plenty of money to operate with in your work here?

Mrs. MASSING. Money for Communists is not of much concern, really. I was on what is called the part maximum. Part max, it was called, as an abbreviation. Everybody working for the party or for near-party organizations would have the same amount of money

which varied as to the country one lived in. It was enough to live on, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And to travel on?

Mrs. MASSING. Of course, I had an expense account. My travels were paid. I had an expense account. Yes, of course.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I will now ask Mr. Mandel to identify these letters.

Mr. MANDEL. I identify those six letters as having come from the institute's files.

Mr. MORRIS. I will quickly identify them. The first is a memorandum on personnel in connection with Soviet studies, dated August 10, 1934, the last paragraph of which reads:

The fourth group consists of the few people who are already familiar with the institute's record in the Soviet Union or who could be made so. Harriet Moore and Kathleen Barnes are about the only ones already familiar, and they both have the advantage of being good students who have not got the academic jitters about bolshevism. With Harriet, a further period of language study, which she may at present be contemplating, would probably be essential.

I would like to introduce that.

Senator FERGUSON. Who signs that?

Mr. MORRIS. It is unsigned. It is an IPR memorandum.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 58" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 58

(Confidential—not for distribution outside the office)

MEMORANDUM ON PERSONNEL IN CONNECTION WITH SOVIET STUDIES

AUGUST 10, 1934.

In connection with the folders on the Soviet Council and the memorandum on IPR work in the field which I am submitting to you today I would like to answer your memorandum of July 31 on the question of staff appointments in this connection.

The longer memorandum adequately states the reasons, I think, why the position should be supported jointly by the American Council and the Pacific Council. Whether it should be a full-time appointment or a part-time appointment depends on the scope of the work decided on. A really full program, such as outlined in that memorandum, would probably fill the waking hours of any one individual. A legitimate selection could be made for immediate purposes which would warrant the employment of a good research worker on a half-time basis.

There are roughly four groups of people among whom someone could be found. We have information in the office on a very large percentage of those in each class who would be available, but I see no point in listing them here.

The first group is the emigre Russians. Among them can be found some who are not politically antipathetic to the new regime, and whose knowledge of Russian is far better than you will find anywhere else. On the other hand, their knowledge of the Soviet Union is less sound, and their understanding of the American end of the problem is very often weak. On the whole, I would advise you against any Russian.

The second group consists of the academic Russian scholars of American birth and parentage. This group includes such people as Bruce Hopper, whom you know, Mulford Martin, who is recommended highly by Robinson and Alva Johnson, Merle Fainsod, of the government department at Harvard, who is extremely able, I should judge, and a trained scholar, and several others. The disadvantages of this group are chiefly too: Most of them are already embarked on academic careers which they would probably be reluctant to interrupt (this would not apply to Martin, I believe), and they have all got the fingers-crossed attitude toward the Bolsheviks which is so much de rigueur in academic circles. This can be differently described as the scientific spirit or just good scholarly

caution. It makes few friends in the Soviet Union. Moseley belongs in this group.

The third group is the graduating class at our summer school. I have no candidate from this group. Few of them are going to know Russian well enough to use it fast and accurately immediately, before they have ploughed through some graduate theses with it, and there is no single stand-out whom I have yet discovered among them.

The fourth group consists of the few people who are already familiar with the Institute's record in the Soviet Union or who could be made so. Harriet Moore and Kathleen Barnes are about the only ones already familiar, and they both have the advantage of being good students who have not got the academic jitters about bolshevism. With Harriet, a further period of language study, which she may at present be contemplating, would probably be essential. This could be arranged, however, or you could decide to start from the beginning and send some young person of promise to Moscow to train him for the job.

Mr. MORRIS. The second is a letter from Edward C. Carter to Frederick V. Field, dated August 31, 1935. It reads:

This is to invite you to participate in a secretariat staff conference that will be held at Sunset Farm, Lee, Mass., from the morning of Friday, October 18, to the evening of Monday, October 21.

I am hoping that amongst others the following can be present:* * * and among the list of the nine people is listed the name of Harriet Moore.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 59" and is as follows:

EXHIBIT No. 59

SUNSET FARM,
Lee, Mass., August 31, 1935.

FREDERICK V. FIELD, Esq.,
New York City.

DEAR FRED: This is to invite you to participate in a secretariat staff conference that will be held at Sunset Farm, Lee, Mass., from the morning of Friday, October 18, to the evening of Monday, October 21.

I am hoping that amongst others the following can be present: Escott Reid, Richard Pyke, Kate Mitchell, Leonard Wu, Kathleen Barnes, Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley, Harriet Moore, W. L. Holland, and yourself.

If there are other members of the American Council whom you would like to have invited, I am, of course, eager to ask anyone who you nominate. The principal object of this conference will be program preparation for the California conference. I am hoping that nine-tenths of the time can be spent on the agenda, completely subordinating all questions of place, physical arrangements, etc.

Would you kindly let me know whether it would be convenient for you to reserve these dates.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. I introduce a list of the officers and committees included in the annual report of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., 1940-41.

Among the board of trustees listed in that year was a Miss Harriet L. Moore.

On the executive committee for that year there is the name of Harriet L. Moore. And on the nominating committee in 1941 there appears Miss Harriet L. Moore, chairman, Edward C. Carter, ex officio, Frederick V. Field, Jerome D. Greene, and Ray Lyman Wilbur, ex officio.

In this particular year she was a member of the board of trustees, a member of the executive committee, and chairman of the nominating committee.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 60" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 60

[From annual report of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., 1940-41]

OFFICERS AND COMMITTEES

NATIONAL OFFICERS, 1941

Ray Lyman Wilbur, Chairman

Vice chairmen:

Miss Ada L. Comstock
William R. Herod
Philip C. Jessup
Benjamin M. Kizer
Philo W. Parker
Robert Gordon Sproul

Acting secretary:

Edward C. Carter

Assistant secretary:

Miss Katrine R. C. Greene

Treasurer:

Francis S. Harmon

Assistant treasurer:

Mrs. Rose W. Landres

BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 1941

Riley H. Allen, Honolulu
Frank C. Atherton, Honolulu
Carroll Binder, Chicago
*Edward C. Carter, New York
Everett Case, Cambridge
Joseph P. Chamberlain, New York
Allen E. Charles, San Francisco
Miss Ada L. Comstock, Cambridge
John C. Cooper, Jr., New York
David L. Crawford, Honolulu
Joseph S. Davis, Stanford University
W. F. Dillingham, Honolulu
Brooks Emeny, Cleveland
*Frederick V. Field, New York
Galen M. Fisher, San Francisco
Henry F. Grady, San Francisco
Jerome D. Greene, Cambridge
Francis S. Harmon, New York
Joseph R. Hayden, Ann Arbor
Mrs. Arthur Neineman, Los Angeles
Mrs. Edward H. Heller, San Francisco
William R. Herod, New York
Edward H. Hume, New York
*Philip C. Jessup, New York
Frederick P. Keppel, New York
Benjamin H. Kizer, Spokane

Mrs. Joseph Lilienthal, New York
Ira S. Lillick, San Francisco
Herbert S. Little, Seattle
Henry R. Luce, New York
Frank R. McCoy, New York
Mrs. Alfred McLaughlin, San Francisco
Frank E. Midkiff, Honolulu
*Miss Harriet L. Moore, New York
Charles Page, Jr., San Francisco
Philo W. Parker, New York
Mrs. A. W. Reinhardt, Mills College, California
W. S. Rosecrans, Los Angeles
Chester M. Rowell, San Francisco
James T. Shotwell, New York
Mrs. F. Louis Slade, New York
Robert Gordon Sproul, Los Angeles
Eugene Staley, Medford, Mass.
Jesse M. Steinhart, San Francisco
Luther Tucker, New York
Richard S. Turner, San Francisco
W. W. Waymack, Des Moines
Ray Lyman Wilbur, Stanford University
Mrs. Quiney Wright, Chicago
Harry E. Yarnell, Newport, R. I.

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, 1941

Philo W. Parker, chairman
*Edward C. Carter, ex officio
Joseph P. Chamberlain
*Frederick V. Field

William R. Herod
Francis S. Harmon
*Miss Harriet L. Moore
Ray Lyman Wilbur, ex officio

NOMINATING COMMITTEE, 1941

*Miss Harriet L. Moore, chairman
*Edward C. Carter, ex officio

*Frederick V. Field
Jerome D. Greene

Ray Lyman Wilbur, ex officio

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to also introduce into the record a letter from Mr. Frederick V. Field, dated August 22, 1939, to Miss Harriet

Moore, which discusses Miss Moore's writing an article for Amerasia and it goes into the subject matter of the thing.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 61" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 61

AUGUST 22, 1939.

MISS HARRIET MOORE,
American Russian Institute,
New York City.

DEAR HARRIET: I wonder if you would be interested in writing a little piece for Amerasia based on the enclosed propaganda blurb from Kinney of the SMR? Incidentally, would you return the blurb for our propaganda files?

What I have in mind is something roughly comparable, although I hope better done and a little more elaborate than the piece I wrote on Japanese propaganda in the Topics in Brief for our October 1938 issue.

This present item on the Manchoukuo-Mongolian border fighting of the summer seems to me particularly vicious because they use the names of at least two pretty decent American correspondents to support their allegations. I doubt very much, for instance, whether Steele of the Chicago Daily News ever filed a dispatch to the effect that "the Japanese aerial force was far superior to that of the Soviet and that the bravery and morals of the Japanese-Manchoukuo troops far excelled those of the Soviet-Mongolian forces." This, of course, may be true, but I am sure that neither Morris nor Steele said so, not to speak of the eight other correspondents mentioned. It would be interesting to compare what Kinney says these men said with what they actually sent their newspapers. Furthermore, it would be interesting to compare his account of the border fighting with what appears to have taken place. Incidentally, what did take place? That, too, would be pretty good news.

I really wish you would try your hand at this either in a Topics in Brief of three to five hundred words or in an article of a thousand or more. In answering this note as to whether or not you will agree to write the article you might also attempt a brief paragraph telling me the inner and outer significance of the Soviet-German trade treaty and accompanying Russian editorials.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

Mr. MORRIS. Here is a letter from Edward C. Carter to Dr. V. E. Motylev, September 11, 1939, Pacific Institute, 20 Razin Street, Moscow, from Sunset Farm, Lee, Mass., in which Mr. Carter discusses a forthcoming article by Harriet Moore on Soviet-German Relations, which was to appear in the Virginia Quarterly.

It says:

It is the best analysis that has appeared in this country thus far.

That is on the question of Soviet-German relations.

I would be grateful if you would let me have your criticisms of it.

I would like that in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 62" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 62

SUNSET FARM,
Lee, Mass., September 11, 1939.

Dr. V. E. MOTYLEV,
Pacific Institute, Moscow, U. S. S. R.

DEAR MOTYLEV: A copy of Miss Harriet Moore's article on Soviet-German relations will doubtless reach you in due course, but as second-class mail is sometimes delayed I am enclosing a copy herewith. It is the best analysis that has appeared in this country thus far. I would be grateful if you would let me have your criticisms of it.

I have just been asked to write on this subject for the Virginia Quarterly. My decision will depend a good deal on whether I can supplement my present information with fuller documentation. Perhaps you can help me with this. I have, of course, Stalin's speech in March, Molotov's speech in May, and also Molotov's more recent speech of August 31. You will know what material I most need in addition in order to round out the picture for a really complete and objective treatment, in the event of my deciding to accept the Virginia Quarterly's invitation.

With kindest regards, I am,

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. We have a letter dated November 28, 1942, from Mr. Edward C. Carter to Mr. William W. Lockwood, listing the rapporteurs for the Mont Tremblant Conference, which is the biennial conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, as follows:

Rapporteurs: Harriet Moore, Frederick V. Field, W. W. Lockwood, William Stone, Frank Coe, J. O. M. Broek, Karl Pelzer.

It shows Miss Moore was a rapporteur at that particular conference.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 63" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 63

NEW YORK CITY,
November 28, 1942.

Mr. WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD,
American Council, I. P. R., New York City.

DEAR BILL: Because of the increased membership of all the groups attending the Mount Tremblant Conference and because of the limited accommodations at the lodge, it has been necessary for us to limit our usual working staff. We would greatly appreciate it, therefore, if you could indicate which of your members and secretaries could be asked to act as rapporteurs, recorders, or stenographic secretaries and clerical workers. The following come to mind in each of the above categories:

Rapporteurs: Harriet Moore, Frederick V. Field, W. W. Lockwood, William Stone, Frank Coe, J. O. M. Broek, Karl Pelzer.

Recorders: Harriet Moore, J. O. M. Broek, Karl Pelzer, Carolyn Kizer, Miriam S. Farley, Dorothy Borg, Mrs. Eltenton, Fay Smith, Wilma Fairbank, Catherine Porter, Katrine Greene, Elizabeth Downing.

Secretaries: Katrine Greene, Elizabeth Downing.

Since the international secretariat staff is planning to leave New York December 1, I would greatly appreciate if you would answer this letter directly to Miss Hilda Austern, Mont Tremblant, Province of Quebec, Canada.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

NOVEMBER 28, 1942.

Memorandum to: ECC (copy to HA).

From: WWL.

In answer to your letter of today's date, I would like to submit the following suggestions on rapporteurs, recorders, and secretaries for Mont Tremblant.

Rapporteurs: Harriet Moore, Frederick V. Field, W. W. Lockwood, William To Stone, Frank Coe, J. O. M. Broek, Karl J. Pelzer, James Shoemaker, and Brooks Emeny.

Recorders: Harriet Moore, Karl J. Pelzer, Carolyn Kizer, Miriam S. Farley, Dorothy Borg, Mrs. Dolly Eltenton, Fayette Smith, Wilma Fairbank, Catherine Porter, Katrine Greene, Virginia C. Lockwood, Edith Field, Mrs. B. H. Kizer.

Secretaries. Katrine Greene, Rose Yardumian (and perhaps Mrs. Eltenton; we shall have to check when she arrives).

As I have already told Hilda Austern, most of the staff will of course be available for miscellaneous staff work at Mont Tremblant, as needed.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like also to make reference to an excerpt from *Windows on the Pacific*, which is the biennial report of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and this reads:

When Harriet L. Moore who served most ably as acting secretary for the year following William Lockwood's departure for the China war theater, resigned in the spring of 1944 to resume her duties as research director of the American Russian Institute, she was replaced by Raymond Dennett.

I would like to introduce that excerpt in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. That is an excerpt?

Mr. MORRIS. The whole volume will be put in the record by reference.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 64" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 64

HARRIET MOORE

Harriet L. Moore (1933, 1936, 1939), executive director, American Russian Institute, New York. Member of the international secretariat, IPR. (*War and Peace in the Pacific*, a preliminary report of the eighth conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations on wartime and postwar cooperation of the United Nations in the Pacific and the Far East. Mont Tremblant, Quebec, December 4 to 14, 1942, p. 160.)

When Harriet L. Moore who served most ably as acting secretary for the year following William Lockwood's departure for the China war theater, resigned in the spring of 1944 to resume her duties as research director of the American Russian Institute, she was replaced by Raymond Dennett. (*Windows on the Pacific*, biennial report of American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., 1944-46, p. 10.)

Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1931-1945. By Harriet L. Moore. Princeton. Princeton University Press, in cooperation with the international secretariat, IPR, Inquiry Series. 1945. 284 pages. \$2.50. A survey of the Soviet Union's foreign policy and relations with China and Japan from 1931 to 1945. (New IPR books, Institute of Pacific Relations, p. 4.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Massing, do you know Guenther Stein?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes; I met him in Frankfort-am-Main, just very casually. I didn't know him very well.

Mr. MORRIS. What did you know about him?

Mrs. MASSING. I knew he was in China. I knew he belonged to Richard Sorge's apparatus in China. I knew he was a coworker. I wasn't told he belonged to the apparatus but working with Richard Sorge I knew what it meant.

Mr. MORRIS. To what extent did you know that Guenther Stein was a member of the Communist organization?

Mrs. MASSING. I only knew it to the extent that he was a coworker of Dr. Sorge. Knowing that Dr. Sorge was an apparatchik of old standing, one of the most famous apparatchiks, I assumed that Guenther Stein was an apparatchik. Whether he was a Communist, I wouldn't know, but he certainly was with Richard Sorge.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Corliss Lamont at all?

Mrs. MASSING. I knew him quite well.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Corliss Lamont a Communist?

Mrs. MASSING. He didn't tell me he was a Communist, but everybody knows he was a Communist, as everybody knows that Frederick

Vanderbilt Field or Earl Browder is a Communist. I haven't seen his party membership.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you meet him?

Mrs. MASSING. When I first got here in 1926.

The CHAIRMAN. What was that last answer? "He didn't tell me he was a Communist, but everybody knows it"?

Mrs. MASSING. He didn't tell me.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you mentioned Field, and who else?

Mrs. MASSING. Earl Browder. What I mean to say is it isn't necessary for Earl Browder to tell me he is a Communist, because everyone knows it. That was true for Corliss Lamont. I met him several times socially. I saw him in Moscow in 1937 and I had a rather significant little meeting with him there because I wanted to send a message to Roger Baldwin, who was a friend of mine, to let Roger Baldwin know I was being kept in Moscow, hoping that he would arouse, if I should not get back, public opinion.

When I spoke to Corliss about the situation explaining to him what was going on in Moscow, the purges, that I was being held against my will, he listened to me. Obviously, he did not believe me.

He got back to the United States, saw Roger Baldwin, and said to him, "You know, Roger, I saw Hede. My, she has gone sour."

That was the impact of my great distress, that I told him I was being held a prisoner virtually and all he understood was I had gone sour. That is what he told Roger Baldwin.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce into the record an exchange of correspondence between Guenther Stein and W. L. Holland.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify this as having come from the records of the IPR?

Mr. MANDEL. I identify these telegrams and letters.

Mr. MORRIS. This is a letter dated February 20, 1942. It is from William Holland to Guenther Stein at the Press Hostel, Chungking, China. Mr. Holland asks:

Cable whether willing act as Chungking correspondent Institute Pacific Relations until May 1 supplying substantial fortnightly political economic reports similar China air-mail honorarium 75 monthly.

It is signed: William Holland.

One of the articles in the correspondence is a cable which Stein writes to the Institute of Pacific Relations with the one word, "Accepting," dated February 27, 1942.

I would like to introduce that.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 65" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 65

FEBRUARY 20, 1942.

GUENTHER STEIN,

Press Hostel, Chungking, China:

Cable whether willing act as Chungking correspondent Institute Pacific Relations until May 1 supplying substantial fortnightly political economic reports similar China air-mail honorarium 75 monthly.

WILLIAM HOLLAND.

K. P.: Send this if E. C. C. approves. Barnett and I have talked it over and still think Stein is a good enough bet to try until Bob gets to China.

W. H.

E. C. C. approved February 19, 1942.

CHUNGKING, February 27, 1942.

INSTITUTE PACIFIC RELATIONS,
New York:

Accepting.

STEIN.

FEBRUARY 27.

GUENTHER STEIN,
Press Hostel, Chungking:

Thanks. Will send honorarium when requested.

HOLLAND.

FEBRUARY 26, 1942.

GUENTHER STEIN,
Press Hostel, Chungking:

Desire mail reports only.

HOLLAND.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Olga Lang?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Was she a Communist?

Mrs. MASSING. Olga was the wife of Karl Wittfogel. She was a Russian. She was a representative of Trud, a Russian newspaper. She attended a unit of it, the Communist unit, of the dwelling that we lived in which was the Friedrich Ebert Siedlung. I think she was a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you mean you think she was?

Mrs. MASSING. She attended all party meetings. She worked at the Russian Embassy sometime. She was a Russian that had come as a correspondent of a Russian paper. Her associates were merely amongst Communists. I think she is a Communist. She was a Communist at the time.

Mr. MORRIS. She was at the time?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You know she was?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes. I don't know whether she is today.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the nature of the publication, Trud?

Mrs. MASSING. I couldn't exactly tell you what it was. I don't know. It is a Russian name. I never read it.

Mr. MORRIS. It is an official Russian publication?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes, a Soviet publication.

Mr. MORRIS. An employee of that is, in all likelihood, loyal to the Soviet organization?

Mrs. MASSING. Indeed.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know of any members of the apparatus or agents for the Soviet Union, or the Communist Party, as we understand it here in America, who were not Communists but only for hire? Would you take in somebody who did not believe in the philosophy and just pay them for what they did as agents?

Mrs. MASSING. No, not that I know of, not in my time.

Senator FERGUSON. All were believers in the philosophy?

Mrs. MASSING. There were variations. There were shadings as to the intensity of belief, but they would believe.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not just go out and hire a person as a stool pigeon and pay them a certain consideration for some work?

Mrs. MASSING. No, not in my time.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Massing, What steps have you taken to inform the American authorities of the evidence you have presented to this committee this morning?

Mrs. MASSING. I have spoken to the FBI at very great length. So has my husband, Paul Massing. I have testified before the grand jury twice and I was a witness in the Hiss trial. I have been terribly misrepresented and my thoughts were not clarified. So I decided to write an article series which I did, together with Eugene Lyons. Due to the limited space, I again felt it did not explain enough the motivation and the philosophy of Communists of my type. I decided to write a book which was published this March.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you a Communist now?

Mrs. MASSING. No, I am not a Communist now.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you drop the philosophy of communism?

Mrs. MASSING. The philosophy of communism I dropped much earlier than I left the party. I was critical for many years. I left the party and my job in 1938.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Massing, have you taken any other steps so the American public will understand what the facts are here?

Mrs. MASSING. I am now lecturing to groups and I write whenever I can.

Mr. MORRIS. There is just one thing I would like to introduce into the record.

There was a series of three articles written by Olga Lang for Pacific Affairs and for Far Eastern Survey. One is in Pacific Affairs, 1940, Bibliography of Recent Russian Literature on Buriat Mongolia, pages 45-62; a review of Soviet Islands of the Pacific, by M. A. Sergeev, pages 110-111.

There is a review by Olga Lang on Chinese Women: Yesterday and Today, by Florence Ayscough, pages 212-214.

There is an article on The Good Iron of the New Chinese Army, pages 20-33 in Pacific Affairs, 1939.

There is also a book Chinese Family and Society, Yale University Press, 1946, under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Institute of Social Research.

I would like the record to show that was Miss Lang's contribution under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator SMITH. I want to ask Mrs. Massing this question: there has cropped up in the hearing this morning the names of five men, which names have been used before, whether justly or unjustly, I am not here to say—Carter, Field, Lattimore, Stone, and Currie.

Did you ever have any conferences with any of those men?

Mrs. MASSING. No. I have met some of them socially. I have met Mr. Lattimore just once and I have met Mr. Field just once but not in any working connection.

Senator SMITH. Did you ever meet Mr. Carter?

Mrs. MASSING. No.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Stone or Mr. Currie, you never met?

Mrs. MASSING. I think I met Mr. Stone once.

Senator SMITH. Under what circumstances?

Mrs. MASSING. Also socially through Noel Field.

Senator SMITH. You mean in Noel Field's apartment?

Mrs. MASSING. No, it wasn't in Noel Field's apartment.

If I remember, I think it was at the World Fair where Noel Field came here to represent the League of Nations. I believe I met him. It might have been in Europe. I do not remember. I only met him once.

Senator SMITH. Did you meet any of these people in Washington at any time on your trips here?

Mrs. MASSING. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever try to recruit anyone else beside the two you have named or the three that worked for our Government, either in the State Department or any place else?

Mrs. MASSING. No. I recruited people from other walks of life but not the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Other Government positions?

Mrs. MASSING. No.

Senator FERGUSON. But from other walks of life?

Mrs. MASSING. Right.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they have any connection with the IPR?

Mrs. MASSING. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You have told us all you know about the people who were connected with that institute?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it, Mr. Chairman, it was your purpose, Mr. Morris, to bring out just the names. For that reason I am not going to ask you who the others were that you recruited if they were not connected with the Government.

The CHAIRMAN. There is one question I would like to ask: On how many occasions did you, as a courier, carry microfilms from this country abroad?

Mrs. MASSING. I am not certain whether it was 9 or 10 times, but about that amount.

The CHAIRMAN. Those microfilms were given to you by your superior or some person here for you to carry to get to the Russian agents?

Mrs. MASSING. They were always given to me, either by a superior or by the assistant to my superior who would be a Russian.

The CHAIRMAN. To whom did you deliver them?

Mrs. MASSING. I always delivered them to a Russian. I never knew who he was. I would meet him for 10 minutes, 5 minutes, and that is all I knew of him. The identification was always arranged in New York.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all I have.

Senator FERGUSON. It would be some means as you have indicated, a match box, or something else?

Mrs. MASSING. No; it wasn't. It was always a hotel room. I would be called from downstairs by a specific name and since nobody else could know that I was in this hotel room at that date, it was always the right man.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you be registered?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes. Under a different name, naturally.

Senator FERGUSON. That name would be called?

Mrs. MASSING. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you want to meet again, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. Tuesday, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We will reconvene on Tuesday, at 10.

(Whereupon, at 12:20 p. m., Thursday, August 2, 1951, the hearing was recessed until 10 a. m., Tuesday, August 7, 1951.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

TUESDAY, AUGUST 7, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE
TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Smith, Ferguson, and Jenner.

Also present: Senator McCarthy; J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

During the last few hearings we have been looking at the Institute of Pacific Relations and some of the personnel through the eyes of a former general in the Soviet military intelligence and a woman who was working for an international apparatus.

Today we have two outstanding scholars and professors in the field of oriental studies who will impart their somewhat different perspectives.

The first witness, Prof. Karl August Wittfogel, will discuss events of the 1930's and 1940's as they relate to the Institute of Pacific Relations.

In order to understand fully the events of the 1930's and how they have a direct bearing on the world, counsel has been asked, as much as possible, to relate the events of the 1930's as they occurred to the present.

Professor Wittfogel, you are a member of the faculty of Columbia University?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I am a member of the faculty of the University of Washington in Seattle, but my headquarters are at Columbia.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee, at the outset, wants to express its gratitude to you for the information that you have given and that you will give us here. The United States of America is fighting for its life, is fighting for its existence, and those who, like yourself, occupy important places, are to be commended for the courage and the forthrightness that you display in coming to this committee and giving us facts.

You are here under subpoena. The country will owe you a debt of gratitude for truth regardless of what may be the result. The Nation owes a debt of gratitude to all who tell the truth in these matters regardless of who may be affected.

Will you kindly stand and be sworn?

You do solemnly swear in the testimony that you are about to give before the Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, it will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I do.

TESTIMONY OF KARL AUGUST WITTFOGEL, NEW YORK, N. Y.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Give your full name and address to the reporter please.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Karl A. Wittfogel, 420 Riverside Drive, New York.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present position, Dr. Wittfogel?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I am professor of Chinese history at the University of Washington and director of the Chinese history project sponsored by this university together with Columbia University, where the project is located.

Mr. MORRIS. How long have you held those positions?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I was made professor at the University of Washington in 1947 and I have been director of the Chinese history project since 1949.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give us a short outline of your degrees and your educational training?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I was born in Germany and educated there in high schools and universities and took my Ph. D. in the year 1928 at the University of Frankfurt.

Mr. MORRIS. What are your other academic achievements?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I worked in the field of Chinese economic history from the middle of 1920 on and before leaving Germany I wrote a comprehensive study of Chinese economics and society.

I continued working in the field of Chinese institutional history in America, in China, where I lived from 1935 to 1937 and ever since.

Mr. MORRIS. Where were you born?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I was born in Woltersdorf in the province of Hanover in northern Germany in 1896.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us briefly about your political experiences in Germany prior to the time that you came to this country, Dr. Wittfogel?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I became a student and grew up in the chaotic times of the war and after-war situation of the First World War, and was a Socialist student in the period after.

I joined the Communist Party in 1920 and was a fee-paying member of the Communist Party until the winter of 1932 or the beginning of 1933, when Hitler came to power. I had disagreed with the party.

I may say more about that later, but I had disagreed about a number of things, including the attitude toward Hitler, who I considered a grave danger to German life and to European life. Because of my strong attitude against the Hitler movement, I was imprisoned and I was in several concentration camps in the year 1933.

Mr. MORRIS. How long were you in a concentration camp?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I was detained altogether for about 9 months. In the winter I was released, I left early in 1934, passed through England, where I spent about 8 months, and came to this country.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Wittfogel, after you left the organized Communist Party, did you remain, psychologically speaking, within the Communist periphery?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes. If you emphasize both, the psychology of the matter and the periphery, namely, the border-line situation, but in form, indeed, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, even though you were no longer an organized member of the Communist Party, you were hailed and welcomed by members of that party; is that right?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. You had minor differences with the party on which you retained your independence?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. The difference turned out to be much bigger than it seemed at that time. What seemed to be academic differences became a No. 1 controversy and the ideas which made me split away now are considered the No. 1 heresy in the Soviet Union.

At that time, it looked indeed that way. Also, my difference in attitude about the Hitler movement was conducted in such a way that although I was bitter about this ever since, I still continued to stay in the fringe of the Communist movement after I left Germany.

Mr. SOURWINE. Doctor, did you at that time, in 1934 or at the end of 1933, take any formal action to renounce the Communist Party or to sever your connection with the Communist Party?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you do anything which would have served notice to your Communist friends and acquaintances you were leaving the party or severing your relationship with it?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. No; I did not.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Wittfogel, I realize it is a difficult thing, since we are dealing with a tapering trend, but could you give us a date at which your break with the Communist periphery was really complete?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Before answering this, I would like to go back to the last question.

Mr. MORRIS. By all means.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I know that persons going to another country very often, or as a rule, when they wanted to take up or continue their Communist activities, reapplied. I did not. I made no effort, neither did the other side make any effort, to reenlist me here.

I was considered not a very, or shall I say, rather an obviously doubtful case. I know there existed minority Communists, minority groups in this country. I was never asked to join officially the German Communist group. Let me say, shyness was mutual.

Mr. MORRIS. Then we come to the next question: Do you recall it?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. You asked me about the time table.

Mr. MORRIS. If you could fix a date. I realize this is a tapering conclusion, but could you fix a date where you really made a direct break with all your Communist friends?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. There are in a gradual development points of climax. I would say from the late twenties on, the difference between me and the Communist movement in the key theoretical field became obvious.

In 1932, I was called, with great dismay, a man who believed in the objectivity of science, which may sound queer in this country, which

may be a compliment, but coming from the Soviets, it was a very strong form of disapproval.

During the coming of Hitler, my attitude toward the Communist movement became one of great bitterness about the situation.

So far as I could see, it brought Hitler to power in Germany. I had the feeling when I came to England and America these are not people who are proper leaders of a decent world labor movement. However, and I think I shared this with many people, not only in this country but in other countries—I mean this situation was being shared. I had been brought up as a young Socialist. I thought that there is practically everything wrong with this movement and with this country—the U. S. S. R.—that this country is the beginning of a new Socialist type of life, and as long as I had that belief I was still attached in a certain way. I was what I would call an ideological cripple. I couldn't move. I thought there was something which was nowhere else.

Mr. MORRIS. Roughly, what year was that?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. This conclusion I reached around 1936 or 1937. I came back to this country. Among friends I said it quite clearly; but when I came back to this country I found here the united front at its height and everybody was around everybody else's neck or arm, or whatever it was.

I had continued arguments, and particularly in that inner group we are dealing with, people like Jaffe—I still continued to have my connections in this group, talking less and less about certain things, becoming more angry and critical about others, but only in the year 1939 did I finally break connections with people whom I considered Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. That was in 1939?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Right; the summer of 1939.

Mr. MORRIS. While you were an organized Communist, did you ever encounter Dr. Chao-ting Chi?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us the circumstances?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. It was in the summer of 1929. I lived in Frankfurt-am-Main. There was convoked a Second Congress of the League Against Imperialism. This congress brought people to Europe from all parts of the world.

You may remember at the first congress Mr. Nehru was present. There was a Chinese group, and I remember very clearly Mr. Chi. He wasn't a doctor yet. I had long talks with him.

Mr. MORRIS. Would his appearance at that conference indicate to you he was a Communist?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. He came from the Comintern in Moscow. He had been working there. Usually the people who work there are not members of the YMCA.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you say working at the Comintern?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, at this point may I relate this name, Dr. Chi, has been coming up throughout the hearings.

Here Dr. Wittfogel has encountered him as a Comintern man in 1929.

We previously had testimony that Dr. Chi, who is the presently proposed Chinese Communist delegate to UNESCO, was the person who

was instrumental in bringing Mr. Frederick V. Field's registering as a foreign agent for four Chinese Communist principals. That was in 1950.

We have also had evidence introduced into the record that Mr. Holland has referred to this present Dr. Chi in Communist China, and I am quoting, "Chi may well prove to be one of our more influential friends in China." That is dated February 10, 1950.

We have also had testimony of Dr. Chi's long association with the Institute of Pacific Relations here in the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. From what did you read that excerpt?

Mr. MORRIS. That was a letter, dated February 10, 1950, from Mr. Holland, which we have already introduced into the record. It was introduced as exhibit No. 1-A, at the open hearing of July 25, 1951, testimony of E. C. Carter, page 18.

Even though, Mr. Chairman, we are dealing with something here now at this particular time—we are going to bring it down to date—it is important we stress these things about Dr. Chi being, in 1929, a Comintern man. I would like to make that point in response to your opening statement.

The CHAIRMAN. The exhibit to which you refer is already in evidence and part of the record.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. May I just say something? In order to be permitted to work in the Comintern, which is the headquarters of the Communist movement, you have to be not only a rank-and-file member of the movement but a very well trained and extremely well selected man.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me get that a little bit clearer. You are referring now to the Comintern. The Comintern is centered in Moscow?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. The Comintern is the nucleus or center of the Communist Party?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. The Communist Parties of the world.

The CHAIRMAN. You say that anyone who would work in the Comintern, as Dr. Chi had been working in the Comintern, must be not only one of the rank and file but must be quite qualified and highly trusted?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would put into the record what position Dr. Chi had in the United States during the war with respect to the United States Government?

Mr. MANDEL. I read from a letter addressed to Mrs. Dudley Stuart Blossom, from Edward C. Carter, dated August 1, 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the source of that letter?

Mr. MANDEL. This is taken from the Institute of Pacific Relations files, and it states here, referring to Dr. Chi, who—

went with our best wishes on the same plane to become General Secretary of the American-British-Chinese Currency Stabilization Fund of United States, \$95,000,000.

Mr. MORRIS. When they say "on the same plane," what is the reference, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. This was on the same plane with Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. MORRIS. Who had been appointed what?

Mr. MANDEL. Envoy to Chiang Kai-shek's government.

The CHAIRMAN. Appointed an envoy from what country?

Mr. MORRIS. Does it give a description of his position there?

Mr. MANDEL. I will read from the letter preceding the previous quote:

You doubtless know that on President Roosevelt's nomination, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek invited Owen Lattimore to go to Chungking as his personal political adviser. Lattimore arrived in Chungking 10 days ago. Another member of the International Secretariat, Dr. Ch'ao-ting Chi, went with our best wishes on the same plane.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to relate here is an event in 1939, which has a direct bearing on present-day events.

The CHAIRMAN. The letter from which you are reading, is that in the file at this time? If so, what is its number?

Mr. MANDEL. It has not been introduced.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce this letter, from which Mr. Mandel has read into the record as the next exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask a question here.

Mr. Mandel, in regard to those excerpts that you have read, where did you secure them?

Mr. MANDEL. From the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations as turned over to us from the organization.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted in the record and marked as designated.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 66" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 66

AUGUST 1, 1941.

Mrs. DUDLEY STUART BLOSSOM,
South Euclid, Ohio.

DEAR MRS. BLOSSOM: Since I last saw you, four governments have recognized the IPR's achievements and the high quality of IPR personnel by the following appointments.

You doubtless know that on President Roosevelt's nomination, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek invited Owen Lattimore to go to Chungking as his personal political adviser. Lattimore arrived in Chungking 10 days ago. Another member of the International Secretariat, Dr. Ch'ao-ting Chi, went with our best wishes on the same plane to become general secretary of the American-British-Chinese Currency Stabilization Fund of United States, \$95,000,000. Here we have a case of outstanding services of the IPR—in that of Lattimore, an American to the Chinese Government and in that of Chi, a Chinese to the American, British, and Chinese Governments. A former member of the Secretariat, Irving Friedman, for whom I secured an appointment and an opportunity to study India as an employee of the Indian Government trade commissioner in New York, has now been given an important research position in the Treasury in Washington, one for which he is highly qualified.

Officers in the Army, Navy, Federal Research Bank, Department of Commerce, and the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supplies are asking for and getting substantial help from our research staff. The Office of the Export Control Administration recently asked for the full-time service of all the American Council research staff for a long period. We had to persuade that office that our staff could render a greater service by continuing its work here as a well-balanced, experienced research group rather than by moving en bloc to Washington, where its services would be available only to a single Government department.

Another demand of a different kind has been made upon us. Mr. Henry R. Luce, Mr. Wendell L. Willkie, and Mr. James G. Blaine have asked me to serve as chairman of the disbursements committee which is making a very thorough-going survey of China's needs and how the \$5,000,000 fund, if raised, can best be spent for maximum relief and at the same time to contribute to long-range reconstruction.

All of the foregoing is for your private information, for part of it is obviously not for general circulation.

This service to governments has not, happily, thus far lessened our service to business groups, the press, and our university and secondary-school constituency. The demands for institute services from all these groups is greater than ever before, and I think we are furnishing more help in all these directions than ever before.

Nor has the international work of the IPR throughout the world been reduced by the war excepting in the case of France and Holland. In the case of Holland nearly all of the activities have been transferred to Batavia, where Van Mook, who has been the principal negotiator with Yoshizawa, has been the IPR leader. (Interestingly enough, Van Mook and Yoshizawa were members of the same round table for a fortnight during the IPR conference at Yosemite.)

While Prince Konoyo has been Premier, Ushiba, the chief IPR secretary in Japan, has acted as his private secretary. While Ushiba has been helping the Premier, Saionji, the grandson of the Genro, has acted as chief secretary of the IPR in Tokyo, save for the period of Matsuoka's visit to Europe. Saionji accompanied the Foreign Minister on his fantastic round of visits to Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin.

Bruce Turner, for many years secretary of the IPR in New Zealand, has just come to Washington with a member of the New Zealand Cabinet and will shortly be going to London to help get another New Zealand Cabinet officer there.

The Royal Institute in London has recently very greatly augmented its studies of the Far East. The Far Eastern program of the Canadian and Australian institutes is more fundamental and better supported than at any period in the past.

In view of the war emergency and the exceptional service which the institute is asked to render at this time, I am wondering whether you could not consider making a special and nonrecurring gift of \$250 to the American Council sometime before the 1st of September.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER, *Acting Secretary.*

Mr. MORRIS. Were you in England in 1934 while you were en route to the United States?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I was.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you encounter any Institute of Pacific Relations personnel in England at that time?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes; I met Mr. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe the circumstances of your meeting Mr. Carter?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that Mr. Edward C. Carter?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe the circumstances of your meeting Edward C. Carter in England in 1934, Dr. Wittfogel?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. The Institute of Social Research in Frankfurt am Main, which had belonged to the university, and which, like several other institutes of social studies, had been closed by Hitler, had gone to America, and was then located at Columbia.

A member of that institute contacted the Institute of Pacific Relations because it was my plan to go to China. When Mr. Carter passed through England, I was notified that I might come and see him.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you then?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I was living in England.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you relate the circumstances of your visit with Mr. Carter at that time, Doctor?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I think I met him in Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before Dr. Wittfogel goes forward with that, may I clarify one thing?

Is it the fact, Doctor, that the contact had been made with the Institute of Pacific Relations, or with Mr. Carter, by someone in your

behalf and that you were meeting him as an applicant for a position, or a connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Exactly.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was that contact?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. This was Mr. Julian Gumperz, who at that time lived in New York.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Wittfogel, will you relate the circumstances of your visit with Mr. Carter at that time?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I came to see him. Mr. Carter was there with two or three lady secretaries. After I had introduced myself, Mr. Carter asked me a question which embarrassed me no end, or more puzzled me than embarrassed me.

This was his first question: "Dr. Wittfogel, are you a member of the German Communist Party?"

I was not quite accustomed to this kind of thing, and I thought maybe in America everything is different from anywhere else.

I found out later in regard to this question, it was not frequently repeated here. It was a more individual thing.

I answered, "I was, but I am not now," whereupon Mr. Carter smiled somewhat and said, "Well, in any case, you are not a member of the Chinese Communist Party."

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Wittfogel, did he have the impression that you were still friendly with the German Communist Party?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. We did not go further into this.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, Dr. Wittfogel has already testified at that time and subsequent to that time he had done nothing overtly which would give anyone any notice he had broken with the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that so?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. So, at that time, when you told Mr. Carter that you had been a member of the German Communist Party, he had reason to believe that was the atmosphere in which you were presently discussing the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I do not know what was in his mind. It is a sheer guess, I would say, and that smile unfortunately no television has preserved for eternity.

I had the feeling he didn't believe me, even the fact I technically was no longer a member of the party. I did not discuss it with him.

Mr. MORRIS. His only reply was, "At least you are not a member of the Chinese Communist Party"?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. While you were in England, did you ever meet Michael Greenberg?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I was in Cambridge. I met him there.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us the circumstances?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I saw him there among English Communist friends and he was, according to the general attitude toward him and his own behavior, an organized Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. You met Michael Greenberg at that time as a Communist?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I hadn't seen his card, but I had seen him under circumstances which would indicate as clearly as you can in this way that this was his position.

Mr. MORRIS. So you had assumed he was a member of the English Communist Party at that time?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I certainly did assume so. I assumed so later when I met him here during the time of the pact when I was very surprised this man was connected with Owen Lattimore in Pacific Affairs as managing editor, or whatever it is.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you introduce into the record at this time documents showing what Mr. Greenberg's position with the Institute of Pacific Relations was, as well as what his position is with the United States Government?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here, as taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, a letter on the stationery of the White House, Washington, August 31, 1943, addressed to Miss Hilda Austern, Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York 22, N. Y.

DEAR HILDA: Mr. Currie has asked me to write you about the sending of IPR publications to William D. Carter in New Delhi, India. He says that he is baffled by the problem.

The only thing I can suggest is that you select a few books and try to get them out via OWI.

Sincerely yours,

signed "Michael," and the typed signed "Michael Greenberg." No title is attached to the document.

Mr. MORRIS. You say that is on White House stationery?

Mr. MANDEL. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Doctor, what was your understanding of Michael Greenberg's position during the war, 1943?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I don't remember having seen him after a somewhat unpleasant scene in the fall of 1941. I have to say before he proceeded to the White House, there was one man who was in charge of the so-called security. I am sure this man did his duty. I am not saying anything unpleasant about anybody, but that is just an epic fact. This man talked to me about Mr. Greenberg. I told him about my experience.

Sometime after I saw him, Mr. Greenberg landed cheerfully in the White House in a minor capacity.

Mr. MORRIS. As an assistant to Mr. Currie?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want this letter to go into the record or have it marked?

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to have the letter on the stationery of the White House from which Mr. Mandel just read introduced into the record as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It may go in properly marked.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 67" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 67

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, August 31, 1943.

MISS HILDA AUSTERN,

Institute of Pacific Relations,

129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR HILDA: Mr. Currie has asked me to write you about the sending of IPR publications to William D. Carter, in New Delhi, India. He says that he is baffled by the problem.

The only thing I can suggest is that you select a few books and try to get them out via OWI.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Michael
MICHAEL GREENBERG.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what position Michael Greenberg held in the Institute?

Mr. MANDEL. Senator Pat McCarran wrote to the Department of State inquiring as to the position of Michael Greenberg. On July 16, 1951, a reply was received from the Department of State from Mr. Carlisle H. Humelsine, Deputy Under Secretary, and I quote from that letter:

Michael Greenberg is not now an employee of the Department. He entered the Department on September 27, 1945, by transfer from the Foreign Economic Administration, under the provisions of Executive Order 9630. He was separated from the Department by reduction in force on June 15, 1946.

Another letter on the same matter came from the United States Civil Service Commission dated July 13, 1951, and signed by Robert Ramspeck, chairman, and states:

Michael Greenberg was appointed to a position with the Board of Economic Warfare on November 9, 1942. On July 7, 1944, he was transferred to the Foreign Economic Administration and on September 27, 1945, he was transferred to the Department of State. His employment was terminated due to reduction in force on June 15, 1946. In connection with his employment with the Foreign Economic Administration, an investigation of Mr. Greenberg was conducted by the Civil Service Commission to determine his general qualifications for Federal employment. As a result of this investigation Mr. Greenberg was barred from competing in civil-service examinations on March 7, 1947, because of questionable loyalty.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want those inserted?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, and marked with the next exhibit number.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 68" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 68

MICHAEL GREENBERG

To: Hon. Senator McCarran.

From: Robert Ramspeck, chairman.

Michael Greenberg was appointed to a position with the Board of Economic Warfare on November 9, 1942. On July 7, 1944, he was transferred to the Foreign Economic Administration and on September 27, 1945, he was transferred to the Department of State. His employment was terminated due to reduction in force on June 15, 1946. In connection with his employment with the Foreign Economic Administration an investigation of Mr. Greenberg was conducted by the Civil Service Commission to determine his general qualifications for Federal employment. As a result of this investigation, Mr. Greenberg was barred from competing in civil-service examinations on March 7, 1947, because of questionable loyalty.

Information received from: United States Civil Service Commission, Washington, D. C., July 13, 1951.

To: Hon. Senator McCarran.

From: Mr. Carlisle H. Humelsine, Deputy Under Secretary.

Michael Greenberg is not now an employee of the Department. He entered the Department on September 27, 1945, by transfer from the Foreign Economic Administration under the provisions of Executive Order 9630. He was separated from the Department by reduction in force on June 15, 1946.

Information received from: Department of State, July 16, 1951.

Mr. MORRIS. You came to the United States for the first time in what year?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. In the fall of 1934, having spent the greater part of the year in England.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you see Mr. Edward C. Carter again at that time?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. As soon as I settled down, I went to present myself in the Institute of Pacific Relations. I went there with Mr. Gumperz, who had established the contact. I met Mr. Carter and Mr. Field there.

The CHAIRMAN. That was in this country?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes, in the fall of 1934.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean your disclosure to Mr. Carter in response to his question at your first interview; that is, your disclosure that you had been a member of the German Communist Party, and your statement which you said you felt he did not believe that you had left that party, that did not interfere with your forming a connection with the institute? You were, in other words, hired, in spite of that?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I wasn't hired, but I was promised and given assistance.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you mean by "given assistance"? Do you mean your writings were purchased?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I was formally attached for several years to the institute with some titles which were technically meaningless, but made me look like a member of the institute.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you compensated for this?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I was not compensated. I was listed in Pacific Affairs later on as a research associate. I was listed under the secretariat, and so on.

So I was given a formal position which was very useful to me when going to China.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, the prestige that you received by this listing in connection with the IPR was of value to you?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. It was wonderful. At the time when people knew nothing about me, and I am sorry to say it because the people who gave it to me—I think some of them gave it because they liked me, but I don't know whether those politically in charge did. Anyhow, I had a lovely time. I was introduced to many people and was received by the president of Stanford University. Wherever I went, I was referred to as a man who had written a wonderful book. I knew my then friends, such as Mr. Carter, didn't read this book because they didn't read German.

Anyhow, I had a wonderful time. I must say, later on when I did something which contributed to the scholarship of this country, but I was no longer connected by an umbilical cord or otherwise with the Communists, I was deemphasized and I wasn't even introduced to the janitors of universities.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, while they thought you were a Communist, you received a listing; is that right?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. In that listing, then, you had entree to certain people and certain society; is that right?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. But when you were definitely known to be not Communist, then this all disappeared?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. The thing faded away.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you find they did not want you in the Institute of Pacific Relations as a non-Communist?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I didn't go near it, and I was not invited.

I will come to that later on.

I was invited to one more conference. I made myself disagreeable. After that time—whatever my scholarship was, objective sources seemed to think it had not decreased but increased. This didn't compensate for the wrong development of my political position.

Senator FERGUSON. You think by being a non-Communist in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations, they had no use for you?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is the way it looked.

Senator FERGUSON. You are satisfied as to that?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Dr. MORRIS. In 1935, Dr. Wittfogel, it is your testimony you were still within the Communist periphery?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. At that time, which is now late 1934, did you encounter Dr. Chi, T. A. Bisson, and Philip Jaffe?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe the circumstances of your meeting those three gentlemen?

The CHAIRMAN. Where was it, when was it, and under what circumstances?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I do not remember who took the initiative, but I was somehow told that there were two or three gentlemen who wanted to see me. I think it was in Mr. Bisson's office. I had been introduced to Mr. Bisson through the institute.

It suddenly comes back to me it was in the Foreign Policy Association in Arthur Bisson's room. Into the room marched a beaming Chinese and it was a gentleman I didn't know. The Chinese introduced himself: "Do you remember me? I am Ch'ao-ting Chi." It was Ch'ao-ting Chi with whom I had the long talks in Frankfort. He came into my house in Frankfort and we discussed many things. The foundation for the only historical book he has written was laid through these discussions.

So there was Chi. There was Jaffe. We had lunch together.

Mr. MORRIS. There was Bisson, Jaffe, and Dr. Chi, whom you had met before as a Communist?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. He wasn't a doctor yet. He was just writing a thesis.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chi?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did they come to you as Communists?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Between Chi and me, there was no problem. We had met in 1929. We carried on as a matter of fact. There were some changes. He was somewhat disgruntled in 1929 because he didn't like certain chores he had been doing in the Comintern. This was one of the reasons he had gone west, as he told me, in 1929. I never worked out the details of this. This had more or less dis-

appeared. He seemed to be a perfectly well-adjusted Communist, if I may say so. I was less well adjusted, but we were friendly, and he was a very pleasant man.

So there was no problem politically. I was introduced to Jaffe, who was working with this organization, the American Friends of the Chinese People.

Mr. MORRIS. Did they have a publication China Today?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did they discuss that organization and that publication at that time?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes, sir; they were proud of it.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked the question: Where did this meeting occur, and when? I do not think I got a specific answer.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I think late fall or early winter. I think late fall 1934, in New York. We met in Mr. Bisson's room. We proceeded to a Chinese restaurant.

Mr. MORRIS. Did they discuss the American Friends of Chinese People and the publication China Today as if that were a Communist organization and a Communist publication?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. You didn't have to discuss it with me. I had seen too many of these organizations. It was very obviously an organization which was run in the way in which Mr. Munzenberg, the greatest German Communist organizer, at that time, ran all these outfits. It was, so to speak, one of those. There was nothing particularly exciting about it for somebody who had seen that for about a dozen years.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you come to learn that those gentlemen wrote for China Today under pseudonyms?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember what Dr. Chi's pseudonym was in China Today?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it Han su Chan?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember what Mr. Jaffe's pseudonym was?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Something like Phil.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it Mr. Phillips?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Phillips.

Mr. MORRIS. While we are on Dr. Chi, I offer you a photograph from the Workers Monthly, which Mr. Mandel will characterize, and ask you if you recognize the man whose picture is there on the rostrum, and whether it appears to be Dr. Chi?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. It is kind of young. Yes; I would say it looks like him.

Mr. SOURWINE. For the record, is this the same picture which has been offered to another witness?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. To whom was it offered?

Mr. MORRIS. Edward C. Carter, and Mr. Carter did not identify the man whose picture appears on there as the picture of Dr. Chi.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Carter was shown the picture, both in this magazine and the original, was he not?

Mr. MORRIS. He was.

Mr. SOURWINE. And found more difficulty in the original than in the magazine print?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

I would like to also point out the caption under the photograph describes the person as C. T. Chi, which coincides with the name of the gentleman we are discussing.

Mr. Mandel, will you redescribe this exhibit?

Mr. MANDEL. The photograph accompanies an article by Robert Minor. The article is entitled "The First Negro Workers' Congress."

Robert Minor is a well-known leader of the Communist Party. The Workers Monthly, in which this appears, is dated December 1925. The Workers Monthly had been previously characterized as the official monthly organ of the Workers Communist Party of America. Under the picture is a quote from C. T. Chi, as follows:

The world of imperialism is passing. Let us join hands with all enemies of imperialism disregarding race, creed, or nationality.

Mr. MORRIS. Doctor, do you remember having a conversation with Mr. Joseph Barnes in this 1934-35 period?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes; I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you relate to us the circumstances of your conversation with Joseph Barnes?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I was introduced to him through Mrs. Elizabeth Field and we went together to a Chinese restaurant and had lunch together.

Mr. MORRIS. Elizabeth Field was then the wife of Frederick V. Field?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Is she now the present wife of Joseph Barnes?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That I don't know. I think she married him after her divorce from Mr. Field. I think she was divorced afterwards from Mr. Barnes.

Mr. MORRIS. Doctor, was the conversation that you had with Mr. Barnes the kind of conversation that would take place between two people who accepted each other as Communists?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. It was a friendly, political conversation. There was no friction and no argument between us. He told me about the work he and Mr. Field had been doing in building up the student movement in Harvard which was under Communist influence.

The CHAIRMAN. What was that?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. The students' association.

The CHAIRMAN. What movement is that?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. The students—what is the name of this?

Mr. MANDEL. The Liberal Club?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. No. It doesn't matter.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was building it up at Harvard?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I think Barnes was a leading man in building up this student group of which there were many.

Mr. MORRIS. Working in conjunction with Field?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. It was a Communist movement?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. This was a group which, at that time, was well known to be very strongly, if not completely, under Communist influence. I am sure you will remember that name. It was a students' organization which flourished at that time but later on lost its strength.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Wittfogel, was your conversation with Dr. Barnes of such a nature that you could conclude he was a Communist?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I had the feeling that he was informed about my background, which was a Communist background, and we proceeded in a very friendly way. I do not remember the details, but it certainly was conducted in a spirit of political congeniality. That is all I can say.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Wittfogel, what year was this?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. 1934, late in 1934. It may have been early 1935.

Mr. MORRIS. From that time, Dr. Wittfogel, or at that time, did you decide to make a trip to China?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us what route you took to China?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I went via Chicago, San Francisco, to Hawaii and Japan to China.

Mr. MORRIS. When you went to Japan, Dr. Wittfogel, did you encounter Chen Han-seng?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us who Chen Han-seng was?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Chen Han-seng was a Chinese economist who did not get along with the Nationalist Government and who lived more or less in exile in Japan. I knew that he had connections with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. What was his connection at that time with the Communist Party?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. A very friendly one. He told me that he was not an organized member, being somewhat of a Bohemian type, and didn't like discipline, and so on. Politically, he identified himself.

Senator FERGUSON. As what?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. With the Chinese Communist movement.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you come to learn later on he was an organized member of the Communist Party?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I heard later on in 1947 that he eventually had joined the Chinese Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. But at that time when you met him, and that is in 1935, in Japan, he was not an organized member of the party but someone who was very friendly to the Communist movement?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes. I think he would have considered them his people and they would have considered him their man.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Wittfogel, when did you arrive in China?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I think in June 1935.

Mr. MORRIS. While you were in China, Dr. Wittfogel, did you meet Owen Lattimore?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you relate to us your associations with Owen Lattimore at that time?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. He was editor of Pacific Affairs and lived somewhere in the country in the Province of Shansi. During that summer another member of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Mr. Bruno Lasker, whom I had also met in Japan, was now in Peiping or in Tientsin. I think in Peiping. I think he was connected with, or assistant editor of Pacific Affairs, so Mr. Lattimore invited him to come to his place.

There was a plan of two other gentlemen to take a trip. One of these, Dr. Woodbridge Bingham, was with Owen Lattimore, staying there in this cool summer place. I went originally to see Mr. Woodbridge Bingham, but then I met Mr. Lattimore, so our contacts were established. As a matter of fact, afterward, the three of us took a trip to the west of China together.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Wittfogel, did you tell Mr. Lattimore about your experience with Dr. Chi in Germany in 1929?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. We talked a great deal about Dr. Chi—Mr. Chi, I mean.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you amplify that conversation you had with Owen Lattimore about your previous experience with the then Mr. Chi?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. You see, there wasn't only one conversation. There were many. We had a lot of time. We traveled for days and sometimes we stayed for a half a day or a day in a Chinese inn. Mr. Lattimore was very much interested in Chi as quite a brilliant young man. He was just writing the thesis I have referred to, Key Economic Areas in Chinese History.

Since I had met Chi, too, we discussed the things which, from my point of view, were Chi's interest in my ideas which he later on dropped without much major difficulty, so I don't know. I had practically a vested interest in Chi as a man who took up some of my ideas, and Lattimore was interested in him. So naturally I told him about the circumstances I met him under, and that Chi had worked in the Comintern and came back at that time via Germany to America and that he was going on doing this political work.

Mr. MORRIS. You did tell him both of your encounter with the then Mr. Chi in Germany as well as your encounter with Jaffe and Bisson in 1934?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I sure did.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there any episode that took place that would corroborate your recollection of the fact that you had these conversations with Mr. Lattimore? Did you visit anybody connected with Chi?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right. Professor Chi, who I think has come up in one of those epic features of the Lattimore story, namely, this letter he wrote to Mr. Barnes about Mr. Chi, where he mentions the father and the son Chi. There he refers to exactly this old Professor Chi who had a high position at the university. I think he was commissioner of education at that time of the Province of Shansi, and he had been head of the law school.

We were kind of interested in how this Papa Chi would take his son's Communist adventures, and naturally we approached the matter subtly. You know that a Chinese is a very dignified man and well restrained. Like other fathers, you could see the papa was not too happy with the way his son developed, but he accepted it as the fact. He loved him nevertheless.

I met Professor Chi later on in America.

Mr. SOURWINE. At that time, did Mr. Lattimore know Ch'ao-ting Chi?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I think he had met him here in New York. I think they had discussed the beginning of his thesis.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you were discussing Dr. Chi with Mr. Lattimore, the two of you were then discussing someone known to both of you, not merely by reputation?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall, Dr. Wittfogel, whether or not you mentioned Mr. Bisson to Mr. Lattimore at that time?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I guess I did, but we didn't discuss him.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if at this time you would put into the record what Mr. Bisson did in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations, as well as what positions he subsequently held in the United States Government?

Mr. MANDEL. I read from a volume published by the Institute of Pacific Relations entitled "Windows on the Pacific," the biennial report of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., 1944-46, page 11. In referring to certain individuals, including Mr. Bisson, the quote says:

* * * T. A. Bisson of the international secretariat left for Tokyo, where they are working under General MacArthur on a research project concerned with problems of Japanese reconstruction.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was the date of that?

Mr. MANDEL. That was from a report of the institute dated 1944 to 1946. The date of employment is not given in the quote.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, do you have a record of Mr. Bisson's employment at General MacArthur's headquarters in 1948?

Mr. MANDEL. I will present that subsequently.

Mr. MORRIS. Doctor, did the question of your telling Owen Lattimore you were a Communist at this time ever come up?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes. There was an episode when the question came up. I was practically never asked the question whether I was a Communist, but one of the few instances occurred during our trip that we took, the three of us together.

Mr. MORRIS. This is in 1935?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who were the three?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Mr. Woodbridge Bingham, Mr. Lattimore, and myself. I think it was in the old fortress of Tung-Kuan. That is overlooking the Yellow River.

I had told about my experience at the time before Hitler came to power and certain episodes. I think once as the head of a mixed students' group, I had a discussion with the head of the Nazi student organization. I think I referred to Mr. Knickerbocker's book. The first chapter of the book essentially was devoted to a description of one of the biggest arguments we had in Berlin with the Nazi student leader, and I told this story, and others.

Mr. Knickerbocker thought I wiped the floor with the Nazis, and I still think I did. So I told it in due modesty, but I brought it out the way you do when you look back on things in the past. At the end Bingham asked me, "Karl August, after all you tell me, weren't you a member of the Communist Party?" This embarrassed me no end, because for some reason or other it does not come very natural to me to lie. So I hemmed and hawed and I said a number of things, but at the end I more or less said that I hadn't been.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, you denied you were a Communist?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. To Bingham?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you deny you were a Communist?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I had no intention of joining it again. I wanted to go to America. I want to build a new life, and I saw no reason to tell him this story which might, if handled indiscreetly, frustrate my future plans.

Mr. MORRIS. You knew Bingham at the time had no connection, or you felt he had no connection with the Communist Party?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. He never had.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you felt it was impertinent, however, of him to ask you so direct a question?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I think he is a very decent man. I think he asked it out of great naïveté.

Many people in New York who had a much greater interest in political matters but were more sophisticated never asked that question because they made up their opinion, and I think people didn't ask this kind of question. This is something which, in one way, sounds amusing, but in another way it is not so amusing. I have been told there were dozens of people in England who knew Fuchs was a Communist. Scotland Yard officers didn't know it, but there were dozens of people who knew it. You didn't talk much about it. It was known, but there were reasons why people, though they didn't like communism, maybe they had been former members of the Communist movement, but yet why should they get in more difficulty? So they kept it to themselves. So when people like Bingham asked that question, I think he did it because he was a naive young man at that time.

Lattimore, I think, was more sophisticated.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Wittfogel, did Mr. Lattimore ever make any comment on Bingham's question?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. He sure did. As soon as I was alone with Lattimore after Bingham had gone, he smiled the same nice smile for me which we didn't have a television set for yet, and made it very clear to me that he thought Woodbridge Bingham was a very nice man but he shouldn't have asked the question, and it was obvious what kind of an answer I would give under the circumstances.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Wittfogel, did Lattimore leave China shortly after that and go to Moscow?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes; in the spring of 1936 he left China.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you next see Mr. Lattimore after that trip down to the west?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. After the trip to the west, we went back to Peiping. He stayed there. I stayed on, but he went away to Moscow, England, and America, and came back in 1937.

Mr. MORRIS. When he came back in 1937, could you tell us whether or not he had discussed with you some of the deviations that you had expressed in Moscow?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I had made these deviations quite clear to him. I remember a number of talks I had with Lattimore about what I considered the growing bureaucratic monster in the Soviet Union. I had discussed my peculiar academic position in the interpretation of China. He obviously liked it. His writings show it—that he was very much interested. The largest book he wrote shows a great many traces of it. So he went to Moscow and told me he discussed my ideas with people there. As a matter of fact, in one of his last books, he men-

tioned that he had talked about an ex-Communist's ideas in Moscow. He may have forgotten the ex-Communist was I, but he told me he had discussed my ideas, and I think Freda Utley says the same, and he encountered some difficulties. They didn't like it as well as he thought they would.

Mr. SOURWINE. With whom in Moscow did he discuss your ideas?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. As far as I remember, the members of the Soviet group of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and maybe others, too.

Mr. MORRIS. Was any name of an American mentioned in that connection?

Was Harriet Moore's name mentioned?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. There was no mentioning of Miss Moore in that connection, but there was something else which kind of surprised me somewhat, though it didn't completely surprise me, because I had heard that Moscow did not think well of me before, when I wrote the novel on my concentration-camp experiences.

I first got back a letter. The Russians considered it the best book of its kind, and later made a movie of, or a movie was made, based on my main idea. They didn't publish the book for a long time because they thought there was something wrong about me politically. Owen Lattimore told me Harriet Moore had talked with people of the Comintern. They said, "There is something wrong with this Wittfogel because he went west; he should have come to the Soviet Union."

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what significance talking with people in the Comintern had to you, Dr. Wittfogel?

Should Harriet Moore have had access to the Comintern?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Maybe they changed the rules for her and made a special law for her, if she was not connected with the Communist movement, that is. I never knew of any non-Communist who would go in and talk with Comintern people about Communists. This is not the way it was being done. Sometimes the law of gravity may not work and stones may move upward, but if the stones fall down—I think the fact that Harriet Moore had access to this kind of information from the Comintern—well, I leave it to you. I think it is very obvious.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not she was making a study in relation to the U. S. S. R. in 1940?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. You mean later on?

Senator FERGUSON. In 1940.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. No; I don't remember.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether she went to the U. S. S. R. to make a study?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I knew she had all kinds of connections—headed various organizations connected with the U. S. S. R.

I know she wrote on foreign relations of the U. S. S. R.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we introduced in the record previously as exhibit 41 in our hearing of August 2, 1951, a letter from Mr. Carter to Mr. Lockwood. Assignment No. 3 on the first page of that letter reads, Mr. Carter talking to Mr. Lockwood, when they were discussing what should be done in connection with the development of the institute:

Send Harriet Moore to U. S. S. R. to go through all Government and party writings on postwar problems and supplement this by interviewing party and politburo chiefs.

That was assignment No. 3 that Carter was giving Harriet Moore. Would you read that, Dr. Wittfogel, and make comment on Harriet Moore's having access to the Communist records?

Senator FERGUSON. In your opinion could anybody other than a Communist do what was asked there in No. 3 at the bottom of that page?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. This is so very, very high up. This is a very unusual thing. I am not an expert to give more than my opinion. I have been a few times in the Soviet Union, and I have seen a bit of the wildlife of the Communist part of the world. I think it is too—people may assign any task to you, but I don't think such a thing could have any meaning or success if you were not connected with it.

Senator FERGUSON. If you were not a Communist and connected with it; is that your opinion?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Of course, whether you have to have a card is a question of bookkeeping.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not talking about a card.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes, politically.

Mr. SOURWINE. Doctor, how about your opinion of a person who would assign a non-Communist to do that job that is there described?

Mr. MORRIS. That is Mr. Carter.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. A non-Communist?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. If I may rephrase the question, would a person like Mr. Carter, as you know him, be at all likely in your opinion to assign a non-Communist to a job of that nature?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. After my first talks with Mr. Carter, I have had no close connection with him. I would be surprised if he would be so naive, but I cannot give a definite answer.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that our last witness, Mrs. Hede Massing, has identified Harriet Lucy Moore, whom we are discussing now, as a Communist. She said she had met her in Moscow as a Communist.

In addition, Mr. Chairman, I would like to call attention again of the Chair to a series of documents which were introduced at that time which show that Harriet Moore was a leading member, in fact acting secretary in the middle forties of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I would like those reintroduced in the record at this time, Mr. Mandel.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to identify them?

Mr. MANDEL. Exhibit No. 60, taken from the annual report of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated 1940 to 1941, shows Harriet Moore as holding the following offices: She was a member of the board of trustees. She was a member of the executive committee for 1941 and she was chairman of the nominating committee for 1941.

Mr. MORRIS. How many members were on that nominating committee, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. There are five, including two ex officio members.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify the members of the nominating committee in 1941 of which Harriet Moore was chairman?

Mr. MANDEL. Harriet L. Moore, the chairman; Edward C. Carter, ex officio; Frederick Field, Jerome D. Greene, and Ray Lyman Wilbur, ex officio.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have had testimony from Mr. Carter on the question of Harriet Lucy Moore. Mr. Carter saw fit to comment on a conversation that he had with Mr. David Dubinsky, head of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union. At that time, Mr. Chairman, the story that Mr. Carter told did not square with our records, and we elected to write Mr. Dubinsky to ask him his recollection of the testimony that Mr. Carter gave at this time.

I wonder, Mr. Mandel, if you will read into the record the letter that we sent to Mr. Dubinsky as well as Mr. Dubinsky's subsequent answer.

Mr. MANDEL. The letter is dated August 1, 1951, to Mr. David Dubinsky, president, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 1710 Broadway, New York, N. Y.:

DEAR MR. DUBINSKY: I enclose herewith testimony of Mr. Edward C. Carter before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee relative to Miss Harriet L. Moore and dealing with the Russian War Relief in which your name is involved.

We would appreciate it if, in the interest of accuracy, you would make a comment regarding what you remember actually took place.

Your cooperation in this matter will be deeply appreciated.

Sincerely,

ROBERT MORRIS, *Special Counsel.*

Mr. ROBERT MORRIS,

Special Counsel, Internal Security Subcommittee,

Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate,

Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. MORRIS: I have your letter of August 1, together with excerpts of testimony given by Edward C. Carter before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on July 26, in which my name and that of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, of which I am president, are mentioned.

I note Mr. Carter's statement to the effect that our refusal to participate in Russian War Relief because of the important position held in that organization as secretary by Miss Harriet Moore was based on mistaken identity.

At the outset, I want to emphatically deny his statement that I have ever "conceded" that my objection to Miss Moore was based on an error of identity. Mr. Carter's correspondence in 1941 did not even bring up the subject of another Miss Moore to whom he now refers.

Our attitude concerning Miss Moore and her record has not changed in the slightest although we later on contributed funds to Russian War Relief. This being the case, I deem it advisable to give a little of the history of the entire matter.

When Russian War Relief was organized in 1941 and an appeal was made to us to contribute to it, we had a study made of the officers because of our opposition to participating in any Communist-front organization. A member of our staff was assigned to this task and he submitted to us the enclosed memorandum. Based on this report, we definitely refused to be associated with Russian War Relief in any way and decided to make our contribution for Russian relief through the American Red Cross.

Several months later, Russian War Relief also made an appeal to the Rockefellers, who, having learned of our union's opposition to Russian War Relief, were interested in ascertaining the reason for our position in this matter. We thereupon submitted this same memorandum to them and they, too, based on the facts contained in the memorandum, refused to participate in the fund. Mr. Carter, fearful that this may affect the drive generally, formally inquired as to the reason for our opposition to Russian War Relief.

While this memorandum raised questions in our minds about Mr. Carter's own associations, it gave concrete evidence that Miss Moore was definitely tied up with communistic activities. We therefore contended that so long as she remained in the key position of secretary, our union would refuse to cooperate with Russian War Relief. We were subsequently notified by Mr. Carter that Miss Moore had resigned her post. Thereupon we changed our position and transmitted to Russian War Relief approximately \$500,000 over a period of a number of years.

Quite some time later, we learned that Mr. Carter, although complying technically with his promise to us as the head of the organization, in typical Communist fashion placed Miss Moore in another equally important position in Russian War Relief.

Now I learn that Mr. Carter is using my name and that of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union to alibi himself and Miss Harriett Moore in the proceedings before you.

Sincerely yours,

DAVID DUBINSKY,

President, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want that inserted in the record?

Mr. MORRIS. I would like both my letter and the letter of Mr. Dubinsky to me as well as the enclosure, the memorandum that was enclosed therewith, inserted into the record as the next exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record and marked consecutively.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 69-A" and "Exhibit No. 69-B," respectively, and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 69-A

INTERNATIONAL LADIES GARMENT WORKERS' UNION,
New York, N. Y., August 3, 1951.

Mr. ROBERT MORRIS,

Special Counsel, Internal Security Subcommittee,

Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate,

Washington, D. C.

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Sincerely yours,

DAVID DUBINSKY,
President, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union.

REPORT ON RUSSIAN WAR RELIEF, INC. (November 9, 1941)

SUMMARY

Russian War Relief, Inc., is probably the best organized and most innocent-appearing of all "innocent" fronts of the Communist Party. The long list of endorsers contain dozens of prominent, respectable personalities and relatively few of the shopworn stooges of the Marcantonio-Quill type, whose names have been attached to scores of Communist Party fronts in the past.

The real nature of the organization, however, is not determined by the endorser but by the character of the people who have organized the movement, who do its work, who hire the help, who write the publicity, and who make all the practical decisions. From this point of view, Russian War Relief, Inc., is as much an innocent front as any in the past.

On the board of directors of Russian Relief, Inc., there is a group of at least five—Edward C. Carter, Harriet Moore, Dr. Henry E. Sigerist, Vilhjalmur Stefansson, and Col. Raymond Robins—who have proven their sympathy with the Stalin regime in a network of propaganda organizations where they worked closely and harmoniously with outright Communists in furthering some particular aim of the Communist Party. Cooperation with Communists, especially in defense of the Moscow trials and during the period of the Stalin-Hitler Pact, may be taken as the highest mark of reliability. These five above-named directors of Russian War Relief, Inc., have never at any time hesitated to cooperate with known Communists. Furthermore, they have never engaged in any activity, such as Aid to Britain before June 22, 1941, which would have been obnoxious to the Communist Party.

In addition to these five, there are on the board of directors, Mrs. Vincent Sheehan, the wife of the writer who until the Stalin-Hitler pact was a frequent participant in innocent fronts.

The experience of all innocent fronts has been that the presence on a leading committee of a reliable group of experienced, active Communists and fellow travelers is sufficient guaranty that the organization will serve the needs of the Stalin regime and the Communist Party rather than the purpose for which it was established.

The arrangements for the Madison Square Garden meeting of October 27 and the demonstration against Lord Halifax which occurred there are proof that this organization is no exception to the general rule.

EDWARD C. CARTER

The initiator of Russian War Relief, Inc., and its present chairman is Edward C. Carter, secretary general of the Institute for Pacific Relations and director of the American-Russian Institute for Cultural Relations With the Soviet Union.

The executive secretary of the Institute for Pacific Relations, working under Mr. Carter, is Katherine Terrall, who was also national vice president of the American Peace Mobilization until the invasion of Russia. Another colleague of Edward C. Carter's is Frederick Vanderbilt Field, a director of the Institute for Pacific Relations. Mr. Field was elected national secretary of the American Peace Mobilization in September 1940. Mr. Carter may not himself have been a member of the American Peace Mobilization but his close association with agitators against Aid to Britain is significant.

Mr. Carter's reliability for the Communist Party was publicly demonstrated a number of years ago when the Moscow trials were beginning to disgust an increasing number of American liberals who had been sympathetic to the Soviet Union. A group of "friends of the Soviet Union" arranged a meeting in Mecca Temple on March 24, 1938, where Ambassador Troyanovsky and others "explained" the trials. Edward C. Carter also addressed this meeting, saying:

"When they (the Russian people) think of the trials, they are thankful that their Government has at last been firm in dealing with what they regard as Fascist-supported intrigue to overthrow the Government of the Soviet Union."

His speech, which reveals a great deal about his point of view, was printed in full in *Soviet Russia Today*, May 1938, a photostat of which is attached. It is further significant that the pro-Communist editors of that magazine had the following to say of Mr. Carter in the same issue:

"Dr. Edward C. Carter is the secretary general of the Institute of Pacific Relations. He was chief secretary of the YMCA with the American Expeditionary Force in France during the World War and later foreign secretary of the British YMCA. He has been decorated by a number of foreign governments for his signal contributions to international understanding. He is a frequent contributor to our leading periodicals, particularly on eastern problems."

The purpose and tone of this Mecca Temple meeting is indicated in the New York Times report of this meeting on March 25, 1928:

"Conceding that the facts revealed by the recent Russian trials 'were a great shock to all of us,' Alexander A. Troyanovsky, Soviet Ambassador to the United States, defended last night the 'elimination' of the 'conspirators' and said that the fate of Austria showed the folly of weakness or tolerance toward fascism.

"He belittled the importance of the defendants in the trials, contending that most of them had long lost all influence and had been repeatedly rejected by 'the vote of our democratic organizations.'

"Mr. Troyanovsky addressed a mass meeting at Mecca Temple, 130 West Fifty-sixth Street, which was held under the auspices of a committee of sponsors headed by Corliss Lamont and including Federal Judge Julian M. Mack, Lillian D. Wald, Maurice Hindus, Raymond Robins, and Francis J. Gorman, president of the U. T. W. of A.

"Upton Sinclair also addressed the gathering by telephone from his home in Pasadena, Calif. The other speakers were Dr. Edward C. Carter of the Institute of Pacific Relations and Vilhjalmur Stefansson, Arctic explorer; James Waterman Wise and the Rev. Thomas L. Harris of Philadelphia."

HARRIET MOORE

The Secretary of Russian War Relief, Inc., is Harriet Moore, who is also secretary, a director, and editor of publications for the American-Russian Institute.

Other directors of Russian War Relief who are also associated with the American-Russian Institute are Edward C. Carter, Dr. Henry Sigerist, Vilhjalmur Stefansson, and Col. Raymond Robins.

In editing the *American Quarterly* on the Soviet Union and a *Research Bulletin* on the Soviet Union, Harriet Moore has kept these publications in line with the policies of the Soviet regime at all times; giving the official Soviet versions of its policy and reprinting the official speeches and documents of the Soviet Union.

Beginning with the very first issue of the *Quarterly* in April 1938, there are articles whitewashing the Moscow trials and denouncing the "dissenters and highly placed counter-revolutionaries". This is followed in other issues by a glorification of the Soviet elections (October 1938) and an apology and defense of Soviet policy on oil sanctions against Italy during the Ethiopian War as well as Stalin's hand in Spain (The National Defense Program of the Soviet Union by Harriet Moore in the April 1939 issue of the *Quarterly*). Not a single issue either of the *Quarterly* or the *Bulletin* appeared under Harriet Moore's editorship without flattering accounts of Soviet penology, the Russian standard of living, Soviet music, Soviet genetics, etc.

As far back as September 30, 1936, Harriet Moore explained in the *Research Bulletin* on the Soviet Union how the new Soviet Constitution and the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia really amounted to a democratic system. She writes:

"Of what does the dictatorship of the proletariat consist? The dictatorship of the proletariat appears to be, at any given time, the particular organization of the state which assures the principle that nothing shall be done within the state detrimental to the interests of the builders of communism, foremost among whom are the proletariat. It must be regarded as a coercive power in relation to all opponents of this building, but as a cooperative power in relation to all other members of the working population insofar as their interests are identical with those of the proletariat.

"It (the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) is one of many types of popular organizations, like the trade-unions, cooperatives, etc., and enjoys exactly the same rights of participation in the Government as they do. * * *

Her article continues to praise the extent of national autonomy in the Soviet Union and concludes:

"* * * the Soviet Union has now achieved, if not a level of abundance, at least a level of national wealth at which it can guarantee to every citizen employment, social security, education, and leisure. These the Soviets have always considered as a minimum of the inherent rights of mankind for which they fought the revolution."

In the Bulletin of December 30, 1936, Harriet Moore discusses Criminal Law in the Soviet Union. She points out that the trials and executions that followed the assassination of Kirov in 1935 prove that the Soviet Union practices great leniency.

In the March 30, 1937, issue of the Bulletin Edward C. Carter reviews the court proceedings in the Moscow trials and concludes:

"For those who sincerely want to understand the Soviet Union and this series of trials this verbatim report will be welcome indeed. From it the student will discover the untenability of the theory that this was a 'frame-up.' The Kremlin's case was genuine, terribly genuine."

Harriet Moore discusses the nationalities question in the Bulletin of June 30, 1937, and finds that—

"Today the national policy of the Soviet Union have progressed to the point where the member nations are approaching real equality, culturally and economically."

Harriet Moore developed the same theme in the February 1936 issue of Soviet Russia Today.

The publications of the American-Russian Institute constantly attempt to describe Soviet institutions in such a light that they appear to be as democratic as those in this country. Discussing the Russian trade-unions, for instance, the Bulletin on the Soviet Union of October 3, 1941, says:

"Soviet trade-unions are voluntary labor associations markedly similar to those existing in this country in structure, functions, and activities."

In the next issue of the Bulletin an interview with the Metropolitan Benjamin of the Russian Orthodox Church is printed. This interview purports to show that the Russian people really enjoy full religious freedom under the Soviets.

In discussing Russian foreign policy and suggesting a diplomatic course for this country, Harriet Moore has at all times echoed the views of the Soviet Government and the Communist Party. Throughout all phases of Russian policy and even during the life of the Stalin-Hitler pact, Harriet Moore always stressed that the aims of the United States of America and the U. S. S. R. were identical and that this country ought to lift all embargoes and permit widest trade with Russia.

In an article entitled "U. S. S. R.'s Position in the Far East: What It Means to the United States" for the magazine Amerasia of May 1938, she writes:

"The foreign policy of the U. S. S. R., whether it be in the Pacific or in Europe, is no new thing. That it is one which pursues peace in as concrete and direct a manner as the meanderings of other powers permit is generally accepted even among liberals who in recent months have allowed their friendly interest in the Soviet Union to lapse. Nonaggression becomes a keynote * * * the U. S. S. R. has not sought foreign adventures."

Her reference to the liberals is undoubtedly directed at those liberals who become critical of the Soviet Union as a result of the Moscow trials and Stalin's role in Spain. The article continues:

"It is surprising how often communism and the Soviet Union can be used as a smoke screen. The general public ultimately glimpses the reality as the smoke is dispersed by actualities, but this has not discouraged the repeated use of this device. Few people are still deceived by the anti-Communist label attached to the alliance of Japan, Germany, and Italy. Nor do many American citizens actually consider Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. LaGuardia followers of Mr. Browder. Experience has dispelled the smoke screen in these cases but the same anti-Moscow fog is being generated, with as little cause, to becloud the issue of collective security."

"For those Americans who are interested primarily in preventing the extension of war, the Soviet Union again enters the picture with a similar interest. Those who favor a boycott of the aggressor and hope for an eventual Government-imposed embargo, automatically find themselves sharing with the Soviet Union a

belief in the efficacy of economic sanctions, collectively applied. For them the presence in the councils of the nations of the Soviet Union as a large power strongly advocating and ready to support such a plan is a very positive factor, whether or not they like its social system."

It is worth noting that this article and another in defense of the Stalin-Hitler pact which will be quoted later appeared in *Amerasia*, which is edited by Frederick Vanderbilt Field, a party liner who was national secretary of the American Peace Mobilization during the Stalin-Hitler pact and a "warmonger" before the pact and now again.

The first Bulletin on the Soviet Union following the Stalin-Hitler pact expressed the same confusion and attempt to reassure the followers that was seen in all Communist publications. The Bulletin even repeats the absurd argument that this was all a clever trick on the part of Stalin to break up the anti-Comintern alliance and expose Hitler. The Bulletin of August 31, 1939 reports:

"The new nonaggression pact, signed on August 23, is one of the series of similar treaties which the Soviet Union has made with its neighbors and others—with Afghanistan, China, Estonia, Finland, France, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Persia, Poland, Rumania, and Turkey. * * *

The article goes on to show that there is really nothing alarming about the Stalin-Hitler pact and after an elaborate quotation from Stalin it concludes:

"It dispersed the anti-Comintern smoke screen; it established one more treaty to be torn up before Hitler can move against the Soviet Union * * *

After the war broke out and Stalin began to share in Hitler's conquests, the Bulletin on the Soviet Union under Harriet Moore's direction continued to defend the line. On October 20, 1939, the Bulletin contains a long "historical" justification for Stalin's conquest of half of Poland and his policy toward the Baltic states.

The Bulletin of April 25, 1940, reporting on the Finnish war, declares:

"The termination of the Finnish war gave the Soviets a treaty which in their opinion 'reliably and durably' safeguards 'the security of Leningrad, Murmansk, and the Murmansk railway.'"

The same article justifies Stalin's diplomacy toward Rumania and indicates that Molotov's policy was that—

"Although the U. S. S. R. had never recognized the Rumanian seizure of Bessarabia it has never raised the question of recovering Bessarabia by military means."

As the war continued and British and American protests multiplied to the effect that Russian trade with America constituted a leak in the British blockade of Germany, the Bulletin on the Soviet Union (May 17, 1940) contains an article on Russian Foreign Trade and concludes that—

"There is little evidence that any of these purchases (copper, rubber, tin, etc.) have as yet exceeded Soviet consumption needs * * *

This theme is also developed by Harriet Moore in the November 1940 issue of *American Quarterly* on the Soviet Union. The article is entitled "American Relations With the Russian Empire and the U. S. S. R." and in it she deplores the hostility in this country for the Soviet Union, especially since the Stalin-Hitler pact.

Harriet Moore has an article called *Changing Far Eastern Policies of the Soviet Union* in the May 1941 issue of the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. It consists of the official Soviet version of the diplomatic steps that had been taken in recent years. Her judgment is that—

"The defense of the territory of the U. S. S. R. is the primary aim of all Soviet diplomacy * * *."

This was written after Stalin had partaken of all Hitler's conquests, after the Baltic States had been absorbed into Russia, and after the war with Finland.

Harriet Moore's feelings about the Soviet Union, the war, and America's part in it during the life of the Stalin-Hitler Pact are perhaps best expressed in an article called *Two Wars or One* in the January 1940 issue of Frederick Vanderbilt Field's magazine *Amerasia*. In this article she says:

"The Soviet foreign policy, whatever may be judged to be its motives, is clearly aimed at preventing the approach of any strong, antagonistic, capitalist power to its borders. The U.S.S.R. supported efforts to establish collective security in the hope of maintaining a balance of power in Eastern Europe and it was only the Munich settlement which made a Soviet-German agreement necessary."

The article goes on to stress a pact with Japan on the part of the Soviet Union as a possibility if the western powers arrive at another "Munich" settlement with Japan. The article continues: "Theoretically, American and Soviet interests in the Far East are similar in that both countries want a free and inde-

pendent China—America for trade and investment, the U. S. S. R. as a peaceful and progressive neighbor." Harriet Moore concludes with this suggestion for an American foreign policy: "It (the U. S. A.) should exert its influence to stop the European conflict as soon as possible by means of a negotiated, balance-of-power peace, such as were originally envisaged in Wilson's 14 points."

In the Far Eastern Survey, a publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations of March 12, 1941, Harriet Moore has an article entitled "Soviet 'Enigma'?" The point of the article is that Russia is not on Germany's side, but is really neutral and that there is no reason why America should not extend more trade to the Soviet Union. She denies that trade with Russia helps Germany and insists that "Britain and the United States have found little reason to be critical of Soviet far-eastern policies * * *."

A few months later, after the Nazi invasion of Russia, Harriet Moore wrote another article for the same magazine (August 11, 1941). Here she enlarges on the theme that the United States and the Soviet Union have a "historical community of interest." She criticizes those Americans who, during the life of the Stalin-Hitler pact, pointed to the similarity between National Socialism and Bolshevism. She holds this view to be incorrect and that this view has hindered the proper relations between this country and the Soviet Union. As for the problem of democracy in the Soviet Union, Harriet Moore quotes with approval the opinion of Edgar Snow: "There are many levels of democracy. For purposes of international political mobilization against a common menace, it might have been well to take a nation's word for the kind of government it prefers to think it has."

DR. HENRY E. SIGERIST

Another member of the board of directors of Russian War Relief, Inc., is Dr. Henry E. Sigerist. He is also a director of the American Russian Institute.

Dr. Sigerist was on the committee sponsoring the March 24, 1938, meeting in Mecca Temple at which Ambassador Troyanovsky and Edward C. Carter spoke. This meeting is described on page 4.

In March 1937 and again in May 1938 he signed special appeals to American liberals urging them to support the Moscow trials. These statements are such that only very close sympathizers of the Communist Party, if not members, could possibly sign their names to it. Copies of these statements are attached.

The Daily Worker of November 5, 1937, carries an advertisement for a "Twentieth Soviet Anniversary Ceremonies" meeting which names Dr. Henry E. Sigerist as a speaker, together with Troyanovsky, and Vilhjalmur Stefansson. The meeting was sponsored among others by Col. Raymond Robins.

In November 1937 and again in November 1938 (Dr. Sigerist wrote articles for Soviet Russia Today reporting on his trips to the Soviet Union and his discovery that the U. S. S. R. has a better system of public health than we have in this country).

Throughout the period of the Stalin-Hitler pact and the Soviet war with Finland, Dr. Sigerist continued to visit Russia and write articles for Soviet Russia Today on "Soviet medical progress" (Soviet Russia Today, November 1939, January 1940).

VILHJALMUR STEFANSSON

Another director of both Russian War Relief, Inc., and the American-Russian Institute is Vilhjalmur Stefansson, the Arctic explorer.

He wrote laudatory articles for Soviet Russia Today, in April 1938, about Soviet explorations in the Arctic and, in February, 1940, during the Soviet war with Finland.

On October 25, 1937, under a Moscow date line, the Daily Worker prints a report of the Golden Book of American Friendship for the Soviet Union, which was presented to the U. S. S. R. on its twentieth birthday. Among the signers of this book, the Daily Worker reports, was Col. Raymond Robins and Vilhjalmur Stefansson.

He addressed the twentieth anniversary mass meeting of the Soviet Union together with Troyanovsky and others. (See p. 13).

Mr. Stefansson addressed the mass meeting on the Moscow trials at Mecca Temple on March 24, 1938, together with Ambassador Troyanovsky and Edward C. Carter. (See p. 3).

Most recently, Vilhjalmur Stefansson's name is found on the sponsoring committee of a "Rally to Honor Eight Years of United States Soviet Ties" (Daily Worker, Nov. 9, 1941).

"RALLY TO HONOR EIGHTH YEAR OF UNITED STATES-SOVIET TIES

"Louis Bromfield and Van Wyck Brooks, both Pulitzer prize winners, are among the noted sponsors of a meeting in honor of the eighth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, to be held in Manhattan Center, Eighth Avenue and Thirty-fourth Street, Monday evening, November 17.

"Other sponsors include Ales Hrdlicka, director of the Smithsonian Institution; Dr. Walter B. Cannon of Harvard University; Dr. Dick J. Struik of Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Kenneth Leslie, editor of the Protestant Digest; Frank Bancroft, editor of Social Work Today, Marcy Blitzstein, composer; Richard Storrs Childs, publisher; Vilhjalmur Stefansson, explorer; Herman Shumlin, producer; Donald Ogden Stewart, writer; Paul Robeson, singer; Alice Stone Blackwell, women's leader; Clifford Odets."

"RALLY MARKING UNITED STATES-SOVIET TIE TO HEAR OFFICER—LIEUTENANT
COMMANDER SEELY AND OTHER NOTABLES TO SPEAK MONDAY

"Lt. Comdr. Charles S. Seely of the United States Navy (retired) will analyze the military prospects and situation in the Soviet-German war at a meeting next Monday evening, November 17, in Manhattan Center, Thirty-fourth Street and Eighth Avenue.

"The meeting, which marks the eighth anniversary of American-Soviet diplomatic relations is sponsored by the American Council on Soviet Relations.

"Commander Seely spent 15 months in Europe just before the beginning of the war. Upon his return to the United States he wrote Russia and the Approach of Armageddon.

"Other speakers at the meeting will be Mrs. Joseph E. Davies, wife of the former ambassador to the Soviet Union; Prof. Arthur Upham Pope, chairman of the Committee for National Morale; Clifford T. McAvoy, legislative director of the Greater New York Industrial Union Council; Corliss Lamont, national chairman of the American Council on Soviet Relations; Jack McMichael, chairman of the American Youth Congress; and Thomas L. Harris, former adviser in religion at Harvard University. Dr. Henry E. Sigerist, director of the Institute of the History of Medicine at Johns Hopkins University, will preside."

COL. RAYMOND ROBINS

A fifth member of the board of directors of Russian War Relief, Inc., is Col. Raymond Robins who was head of the Red Cross Mission to Russia in 1917 and has been a director of the American-Russian Institute.

In an article for Soviet Russia Today in November 1937 the colonel reported that there is "Equality of opportunity for every child born under the Red Flag * * *" and in foreign affairs he reported that "today the whole influence of mighty Russia, through its wise foreign policy, guided by Stalin and Litvinoff, is being used to prevent the threatened Fascist world war."

Colonel Robins signed the open letter to American liberals on the Moscow trials, referred to on page 13.

He signed the Golden Book of American Friendship for the Soviet Union. (See p. 14.)

EXHIBIT No. 69-B

AUGUST 1, 1951.

MR. DAVID DUBINSKY,

*President, International Ladies Garment Workers Union,
1710 Broadway, New York, N. Y.*

DEAR MR. DUBINSKY: I enclose herewith testimony of Mr. Edward C. Carter before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee relative to Miss Harriet L. Moore and dealings with the Russian War Relief in which your name is involved.

We would appreciate it if, in the interest of accuracy, you would make a comment regarding what you remember actually took place.

Your cooperation in this matter will be deeply appreciated.

Sincerely,

ROBERT MORRIS, *Special Counsel.*

Dr. WITTFOGEL. A few things come to my mind to supplement what was said before. Point 1: I think it was American Students Union, ASU, which I was thinking of.

Senator FERGUSON. You are talking about Harvard?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. The organization which you said Mr. Barnes was extremely active in promoting?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

Point 2: When you asked me about whether Lattimore knew that in these early days I was a Communist—he has later written me a letter in which he told me that he hasn't been aware of this—we do not have to refer to the nonexistent television set. As I said, all our talks about Chi the son and Chi the father made sense only in connection with the background of the Chis' story when it was perfectly clear that we were dealing with a man who had this Communist background, and my relations were in the same set.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before you go into point 2, Doctor, at one point in line with your previous testimony that you and Mr. Lattimore had gone to see the elder Chi, partially at least for the purpose of finding out how he reacted to his son's Communist escapades—

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Not quite. We were in the town where he lived and we thought of looking him up.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there any discussion between you and Mr. Lattimore on the question of how the elder Chi would react?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes, exactly. We talked about it, but we were going to see him anyhow and in this connection the question came up, how is he going to take this? How is he taking his son's political escapades?

Mr. SOURWINE. There is then no question whatsoever that prior to the time you actually went to see the elder Chi, both you and Mr. Lattimore knew the younger Chi to have been a Communist?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Quite, quite.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you discuss with Lattimore the fact that Chi was a Communist before you went to see the father?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes, sure.

Senator FERGUSON. When did Lattimore write you a letter?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Last winter, in December.

Senator FERGUSON. Last December?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I think so.

Senator FERGUSON. What were the contents of that letter? Do you have a copy of it?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. It was a letter in which he said that he had heard something about testimony I had given before the Un-American Committee in secret session—some of it leaked out in the press—and he challenged me; one of the statements was—would you like to see this?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I would like to see the letter.

Dr. WITTFOGEL (reading):

In your testimony—

Senator FERGUSON. You are reading from the letter?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. From the letter.

In your testimony, as quoted in the newspaper, you mention that we first became acquainted in 1935. You apparently did not mention, however, that you did not tell me that you had been a Communist Party member, although you

did not disguise either your immense reading and scholarship in Marxist literature or the fact that you were intensely hostile to the Stalinist regime in Russia.

The letter was written on December 18, 1950.

Senator FERGUSON. What is your comment on that? Was there any doubt in your mind that you had told him?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Since 1947 I have learned that Lattimore brazenly denies facts that can be established, so I just thought this was a repeat performance of something that happened between me and Lattimore in 1947; and I said at the end, this is the end of our relations. I can place no more belief in what he says.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you had a disagreement with Lattimore in 1947?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. They will cover that later, but you had mentioned it in the letter, and I thought it should be covered at this time in the record.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes; I think it is kind of pertinent, because I would say that Lattimore's story when he came back in 1947 telling me about what he had heard about Harriet Moore does not make much sense either, if he is not a political imbecile. Comintern people do not comment just on the political views of whether people should have gone to Russia or somewhere else, unless they feel they belong in their field of jurisdiction. Lattimore seemed to be fully aware of that at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. You have no doubt in your own mind, Dr. Wittfogel, that you had told Lattimore about Dr. Chi?

Mr. WITTFOGEL. No doubt whatsoever.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the subject of discussion on your visit to the elder Chi?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Mandel informs me that we now have Mr. Bisson's record with the United States Government which was not available when we came to Mr. Bisson's name in the testimony. So I will ask him if he will very briefly describe what Mr. Bisson's employment with the United States Government was.

Mr. MANDEL. I read from Who's Who, volume 24, where T. A. Bisson is listed as former adviser, Government Section, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Tokyo, Japan, principal economist, Board of Economic Warfare in 1942-43.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the year of his employment at Tokyo?

Mr. MANDEL. That will be given.

A letter to Senator Pat McCarran from Robert Ramspeck, Chairman, United States Civil Service Commission, dated July 13, 1951, states:

Thomas Arthur Bisson received appointment as principal economic analyst on the Board of Economic Warfare on January 22, 1942, in which position he served until July 10, 1943, when he resigned voluntarily. On October 4, 1945, Mr. Bisson was appointed to a position with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Department of War. His employment with that Department was terminated on May 23, 1947, due to the completion of his contract.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Dr. Wittfogel, can you recall an invitation that you received to make a trip to Yenan?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. To Yen-an? You mean the then capital of Communist China?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. In the early summer of 1937, I was still in Peiping. Lattimore was there; a number of other people around, and during that time Mr. and Mrs. Jaffe and Mr. Bisson came to visit Peiping. The person who I thought was around, too, was Ed Snow, the author of *Red Star Over China*. He was just writing that book.

Mr. MORRIS. Peiping, and this is 1937?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Early summer of 1937.

Mr. Snow had been the first known foreigner who went to see Yen-an, as you remember, and that is what gave, among other things, his book great news value. I knew him fairly well at that time. As a matter of fact, I am partly responsible for the unfriendly remarks about the Soviet bureaucracy which appeared in the first edition and which were very much softened in the later editions of his book.

Snow had told me how he had had his Communist contact and how they organized it for him to go to Yen-an. So, Snow came to me one day and said, "You see, there is a possibility of some persons going to Yen-an," and I said "Who?" He said; "Jaffe, Bisson, Lattimore, and yourself."

Now, as I have indicated, I was on my way out, not of the party but of the fringes. It was a time when I had ever more angry arguments. I had some very unpleasant arguments with Jaffe and Bisson, Bisson being particularly generous concerning the execution of Tukhachevsky and other top-ranking generals. He said, "It doesn't matter; they have so many generals." It was a very large gesture, and it indicated the kind of difference in feeling and sense of direction. So I said, "I don't think I want to go." Whereupon, instead of myself, Mrs. Jaffe joined the group, and the four of them went.

Mr. MORRIS. Could any group have gotten together to have gone to Yen-an, the capital of Communist China?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. You mean spontaneously?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is ridiculous.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you explain that?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. The place was very isolated. You had to have the cooperation, and the people from the other side would be very careful whom they would let in.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there an iron curtain around Yen-an?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. There was the Nationalist region, and troops were around it, although conditions had very much relaxed after the Sian incident. Still the Nationalist Government didn't like it particularly, and obviously; and there was the other side of the story, too.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you need Chinese Communist cooperation?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Certainly you would need cooperation, but in this case it went further. Snow told me the thing was organized—I mean between him and his Chinese contact man—in Peiping. He did not disclose who made the choice, who was behind it.

Mr. MORRIS. But you knew this trip then was organized by Snow and his Chinese Communist contacts?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Dr. Wittfogel, why did you decline to go on that trip? What was your reason?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Because I wanted to disentangle myself. I did not want to go further into this.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you were in the stage where you were becoming disentangled, breaking away from the Communist organization, and you felt such a trip like that would be the act of someone who would be getting closer to the organization?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. It might very well lead to closer relationship. They all came back very cheerful and warmed up. As said by others, Yen-an had a very good way of organizing friendly ways of receptions.

The CHAIRMAN. Who went on that trip?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Mr. and Mrs. Jaffe, Mr. Bisson, and Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. MORRIS. The four of them made the trip?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Did they discuss the events on the trip later with you?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you amplify that to the best of your recollection? Did they run into anybody else on the trip, for instance, on the way up to Yen-an?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. There was a queer incident. Yes; they told me. I remember Bisson's story. I think it was confirmed later by the others. I met Bisson first; I was at the seashore when he came back. This was a thriller, and also I mean it will go into the history of human stupidity, of which several volumes shall be written.

I asked him whether there were any other foreigners moving toward Yen-an. He said, "Yes; there was another car." This is a very rugged country. They were very unhappy, and one of the key remarks, I am sure not only of Jaffe, but others, because human memory is of that kind. Jaffe was somewhat angry. He said, "I wish the Japanese would come and clean up this mess." For a pro-Communist it was a very funny remark to make. It was repeated with a certain smile afterward by Bisson.

So, it was kind of difficult country, and why anybody should go up on a trip up there is not very likely to imagine.

They saw there was another car moving in the same direction. There were rivers; there were few bridges. They had to get together. In certain parts there was maybe only one ford. According to this account, they found out that the people in that car were Russians. These Russians were not very talkative men. They were very restrained. I said, "What kind of Russian were they?"

"We occasionally talked with them there, particularly the chauffeur, who spoke English quite well."

Mr. MORRIS. Bisson said he spoke to the chauffeur; you did not?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I didn't. They talked with one of these chauffeurs, they talked with him; and they were told these were White Russians who were going to Yen-an to do business.

Mr. MORRIS. To do business with the Chinese Communists?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. This is one of those unique experiences. According to their own records, the Chinese Communists did business with nobody; and to a Communist the White Russian was not exactly the most attractive man in the world to do business with, the way I knew White Russians. That is, those who were really white were hated. They certainly would not seek out Communist business partners. There wasn't much business to do. Anyhow, that is the story they told.

I said, "Did these men in that mysterious car arrive in Yenan, too?"
They said, "Yes, they did arrive."

"What happened?"

The four went on, yodeling, had theater performances, they had a wonderful time. The Russians just disappeared. There was no indignation. These guys were not thrown out. They were just there and disappeared, and nobody paid any attention.

It puzzles me still today, and I just throw it in as one of these little incidents.

Mr. MORRIS. At this time I should like to introduce in the record a letter that Mr. Lattimore wrote to Mr. Field on April 19, 1937, bearing on a record of Lattimore's conversations with Mr. Wittfogel at that particular time.

I wonder, Mr. Mandel, if you will identify that letter and read the last two paragraphs thereof.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It is on the letterhead of Pacific Affairs but inserted is an address, 33, Ta Yuan Fu Hutung, Peiping, China, dated April 19, 1937. The letter is signed by Owen Lattimore and is addressed to Frederick V. Field.

I read the following excerpts:

The amount of stuff under which my desk is groaning has prevented me from taking full advantage of the easy settling down: but of course we have already accumulated to our credit a number of hours of Wittfogelian conversation and dined there one night with the Bissons and Bertram and Ida Pruitt. By the way even Wittfogel's enthusiastic and triumphant letters don't give any adequate idea of the bulk, quality, and really fundamental importance of the work he has been doing. He has an organizing and executive ability that could give Henry Ford a start and a licking; and on top of the unbelievable quantity of work that he and his wife have been doing, he has found time to supervise a survey of source material that I needed for my work.

You sure have piled Amerasia on the market here; and I believe you've made a dent. When I've had a chance for more of a talk with Bisson, I'll see if I can't do more toward pulling my weight as a member of your editorial team.

All the best,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce that letter in the record, Mr. Chairman, as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 70" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 70

PACIFIC AFFAIRS,
THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS,
New York City, April 19, 1937.

FREDERICK V. FIELD, Esq.,

American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York City.

DEAR FRED: Your letter of February 26 gives us I think the starting point for the suggested article on the problems with which the Chinese language school is designed to cope. I am presuming that the first school will be held this summer. If so, the article should be planned for our December number, so that Kennedy can include the experience gained from the first trial in his article. This would also make it possible for you to get the criticism of the Wittfogels, both on the article, when drafted, and on the general problems. I think they both have some pretty shrewd ideas as a result of their work in the language school here, which has both strong and weak points.

Your biographical note on Kennedy was a help; obviously I had underestimated him. By the way, what about putting pressure on him to review Chinese and

Japanese books occasionally? I have thought for a long time that we ought to mobilize as many as possible of the people living in countries like America and England and Holland who can review books in Chinese, Japanese, and Russian, but have never known quite how to go about it. As a general proposition however, the idea of a panel of such people, each of them turning in an occasional review of a book in one of these languages ought not to be unreasonable.

Finally, having brought the subject thus far, and being handicapped in carrying it further by the time lag in correspondence, may I leave it to you to push the proposed article through the next stage?

Your reference to your annual report: I shall go through this shortly and let you know if I can make useful suggestions.

I'm glad you like our March issue. I am afraid I may have let Catherine down on the June issue; as it turns out, there was plenty of material floating around, but I had not sufficiently insured myself against accidents of delays en route, change of boats, and so on, with the result that I am afraid that Catherine had to take at the last moment more decisions than it was fair to impose on her. I'm especially glad you liked Freda Utley's article. I remember suggesting to you some time ago that both she and George Taylor might make good contributors for Amerasia; but of course I don't know what your policy is with regard to non-American contributors.

The articles suggested to you by Arthur Christy on Shinto Nationalism in Japan and on contemporary face-lifting operations on Confucianism in China reached me in Nanking. I took up the question there with Bates, for the article on Confucianism but he had no suggestion. For the Shinto article he suggested a man named Holtom in Japan, who contributed an article on State Shinto during 1935 to the Japan Christian Year Book 1936. I shall accordingly write to Holtom making the suggestion. If in the meantime you flush any coveys of talent for the companion Chinese article, you might let me know.

Owing to the fact that we sublet our house while we were away, to people who were nice and orderly and left everything right side up, we settled down again here with miraculous ease. Inside a couple of hours everything was unpacked and in its right place, and you would not dream that we had been away for more than a year. David, at whose age it is really quite a strain to be yanked around the world with one arm perpetually almost out of its socket, settled down blissfully. Of course we met a dust storm in the first couple of days, and poor David got it in the neck, the inside of the neck, in the form of a streptococcic throat, but he is practically well already.

The amount of stuff under which my desk is groaning has prevented me from taking full advantage of the easy settling down, but of course we have already accumulated to our credit a number of hours of Wittfogelian conversation and dined there one night with the Bissons and Bertram and Ida Pruitt. By the way even Wittfogel's enthusiastic and triumphant letters don't give any adequate idea of the bulk, quality and really fundamental importance of the work he has been doing. He has an organizing and executive ability that could give Henry Ford a start and a licking; and on top of the unbelievable quantity of work that he and his wife have been doing, he has found time to supervise a survey of source material that I needed for my work.

You sure have piled Amerasia on the market here, and I believe you've made a dent. When I've had a chance for more of a talk with Bisson I'll see if I can't do more toward pulling my weight as a member of your editorial team.

All the best,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

Mr. MORRIS. I would also like to introduce in the record a letter from Wilma Fairbank on October 19, 1943, on the letterhead of the Department of State to Mr. Bisson. I am introducing this letter at this time purely to show that Mr. Bisson was at that time acting editor of Pacific Affairs, which was the publication of the International Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I would like to introduce it after it has been authenticated.

Mr. MANDEL. For that purpose alone.

I read in the record a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated October 19, 1943, on the letterhead of the Department of State, Washington, marked "Personal," addressed to

Mr. T. A. Bisson, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City, addressed "Dear Art" and signed "Wilma Fairbank," with both typewritten and handwritten signature.

The letter reads as follows—

Mr. MORRIS. Just read that part which shows he is acting editor of Pacific Affairs.

Mr. MANDEL (reading) :

Harriet writes me that Chien Tuan-sheng's article on local government (?) is going to be published in the December issue of Pacific Affairs. I understand that you are now acting editor.

Mr. MORRIS. That is all we would like in the record at this time, Mr. Chairman. We would like the whole letter in the record, but we call attention only to that portion.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 71" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 71

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, October 19, 1943.

Personal.

Mr. T. A. BISSON,

American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,

New York City.

DEAR ART: Harriet writes me that Chien Tuan-sheng's article on local government (?) is going to be published in the December issue of Pacific Affairs. I understand that you are now acting editor. I don't know what financial arrangements may have been made but this letter is a request that whatever payment is made for the article be made through me. This is not to get me a cut as literary agent but because Chien has asked me to send out to him whatever he earns in greenbacks and by hand. My last attempt on his behalf was to hand John Davies five \$20 bills for his Foreign Affairs article to be delivered to Chien in Kunming. The money, in John's brief case, went halfway down by parachute with him into the Naga Hills, dropped the rest of the way and was finally returned intact by the tribesmen several days later for a 40-rupee reward.

I trust that you got the copy of your article republished in Chinese which John sent you from Chungking, and with it a letter of explanation and commendation from John.

Sincerely,

WILMA FAIRBANK.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Dr. Wittfogel, did you have any arguments with Lattimore of this period—namely, 1937—about the Russian purges which had just been effected?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I think we talked about the purges in 1937, too, and I am quite sure I told him about the argument I had had with Bisson and Jaffe about it. At that time that was all there was. After he had been in Yen'an I met him in America and he wrote a note in Pacific Affairs which has been a comment on the purges in which he, contrary to other observers, thought the terror of that time made the people in Russia more eager to speak up against their Government and kind of developed the spirit of democracy.

I talked to him about it, and I told him I thought that was an absurd argument.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, he did defend the purges?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes; that is on record. I put now on record that I heard an argument with him and disagreed with him on his defense.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know a man who wrote under the name of Asiaticus?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you meet him in Shanghai in 1937?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you relate to us the circumstances of your meeting a man known as Asiaticus in Shanghai in 1937?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. The name "Asiaticus" was known to me in Germany as the name of a German Communist who had held a leading position in the German party, who was known as Heinz Moeller,¹ and who I think in the middle of the twenties left Germany. His faction was defeated, and one of the ways of leaders of such groups would be to make themselves useful in Moscow and be reassigned, as Gerhardt Eisler was later on.

This man went to China and participated in the early developments of the expansion of the Kuomintang regime, when there was cooperation with the Communist Party at that time, from Canton into the Yangtze Valley up to 1927. And Moeller, who, like I think a number of other Communists, held a position in the Kuomintang government, as Mr. Stalin would say "apparatus."

He worked there in some kind of press or publicity center and put his articles and some others together in a book which was published I think in 1928 in Germany under the title, translated, "From Canton to Shanghai."

Mr. MORRIS. Did a Communist publishing house publish that, Dr. Wittfogel?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes, that is right, in Germany, and I was interested. He was a protege of Gerhardt Eisler's, and I thought this was not a very good book. It was poorly written, and I think it was dull stuff. So I inquired about the circumstances and I heard more about this Heinz Moeller. It was published at that time. It was just before the fall of Eisler; and Eisler wanted it, and he was then powerful. The book was printed.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you met Asiaticus in Shanghai in 1937?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us the circumstances?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I met him in the house of, I think, some doctor, some people from Europe who I don't think were political. I don't remember any details about them. They said there was a man who would like to see me, and he introduced himself as Asiaticus-Moeller. He told me he had been expelled—maybe I knew it, I don't remember exactly how this came about—from the party, but that he had made his peace with the great father in the Kremlin, and that he had been back in Moscow and that he was in good standing again, and at that time he was writing for Izvestia, which would indicate indeed he was in good standing.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you did meet him in Shanghai in 1937?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Wittfogel, I would like to present to you a copy of a letter which we introduced into our official files here as exhibit No. 4 on the first day of the hearings. This is a letter from Mr. Lattimore, of July 10, 1938, to Mr. Carter.

¹ Heinz Moeller also spelled Hans Mueller.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. What was the date?

Mr. MORRIS. July 10, 1938. I would like to call your attention to this paragraph, which I will ask you to read. It is the next to the last paragraph on that first page of the letter of Lattimore to Carter, dated July 10, 1938.

Dr. WITTFOGEL (reading) :

I think you are pretty cagey in turning over so much of the China section of the inquiry to Asiaticus, Han-seng, and Chi. They will bring out the absolutely essential radical aspects, but can be depended on to do it with the right touch.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know the three people referred to in that article?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes; I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know the three of them to be Communists?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. The Chi story I have told. No doubt I have said I discussed it with Lattimore. The Asiaticus story I told you and I talked to Lattimore after he came back here. We talked about Asiaticus, too, several times. I told him the story the way I knew it; I told Lattimore that.

Senator FERGUSON. When was he writing for Pravda?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. For Izvestia?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. In the summer of 1937 he said he wrote for Izvestia.

Senator FERGUSON. There was no doubt that he told you in 1937 he was in good standing again and had been up to the Kremlin in Moscow?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right, and that he had come back. So the two of them are men who I would say were technically Communists and the third was politically a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know what the China section of the inquiry was?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. No; I don't know the details of it. I know it would take up the various aspects of China during the war, its background and what it might lead up to, a general idea.

Senator SMITH. Talking about Mr. Lattimore and these other three men, do you know whether or not Mr. Lattimore was or is a Communist?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. In all my correspondence with him and in person the exchange of remarks with Lattimore he has always taken the position that he is not a Communist, not an organized member of any political—

Senator SMITH. What is your judgment from what you know of him and your contacts with him?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. For reasons which may be shown later I would not take Lattimore's statements at their face value, and this letter of which I have seen other parts in the press indicate him as a key man at the time, but I was not aware of it. I would say during his earlier days his ideological attitude was a much more easy-going one, let me say, but many features of his own political inclinations that I have discussed so far showed, I am certain, that a consistent pro-Soviet pattern had developed.

Senator SMITH. Do you know whether or not he ever was a full-fledged member of the party?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. No; I do not know.

Senator JENNER. For all intents and purposes he might as well have been; is that right? He was following their line, their philosophy, playing their game?

Mr. MORRIS. Senator Jenner, I think Dr. Wittfogel would rather relate, as we come along through the years, the particular incidents and episodes that he had vis-à-vis Lattimore and let the committee draw its conclusions about that. Mr. Wittfogel has been very careful to testify to his actual experience with Mr. Lattimore. He wants to lay great stress on what actually did happen rather than for him to draw any conclusions.

Senator SMITH. When was the last time you saw Mr. Lattimore?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I think a few months ago in a room in the Institute of Pacific Relations. We both listened to a report given by Mr. Holland.

Senator SMITH. Have you had contact with him by telephone or correspondence since the announcement that these hearings were to begin?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. No; I have not.

Senator FERGUSON. Last December was the last correspondence you had?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Dr. Wittfogel, have you any doubt in your own mind as to Asiaticus, Han-seng, and Chi?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. They would be just 100 percent. I would say from the point of view of careful political maneuvering, it would be an idiocy. If I would have run any undercover organization or anything which should look respectful and achieve some usefulness for the Communists, this was a silly suggestion. You see, if you lay all your cards on the table, how can you play the game?

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Wittfogel, do you recall having an argument or a conversation with Lattimore as editor of Pacific Affairs at that period of time, I mean in 1937, in which you complained that there were too many pro-Communists and Communist writings in Pacific Affairs?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I think I had such a talk after his return from China. I met him in New York. We talked about many things.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you recall as much as you can of that conversation?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I don't remember any details, but I remember the gist of the argument very clearly. That was that I said, "Now there is a feeling that is a kind of unbalanced thing you have, too many Communists and pro-Soviet people."

He said, "You think so?"

Like many advices or criticisms I have given, I think it made no impression.

Mr. MORRIS. At that time he was editor of Pacific Affairs?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Frederick Field in this period, 1938?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I had met him in 1934 or 1935, and I met him again during this period.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you try to obtain a Rockefeller grant through Field and the Institute of Pacific Relations at this time?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you relate that to us?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. To continue the work which Mr. Lattimore so flatteringly described in the letter you cited, I wanted to ask for a grant to write up this large amount of material from the Dynastic Histories.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Field aided you in that?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. He made the application in 1948, in the spring.

Mr. MORRIS. I realize the limitation of words, Dr. Wittfogel, but would you describe yourself at that time as a person still within the Communist periphery?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I was very much at the periphery, but I was still there. This is one of those things—maybe most people who have taken my own development just moved faster, but I would say, taking myself as an exhibit it is something interesting: I came back with the feeling that the last asset was gone, which I still had upheld, that maybe everything may be rotten, but there is still some hope for socialism in Russia.

I had discussions in the Institute of Social Research. I said this quite clearly, but afterwards for over a year I was still sticking around. It was just very hard to break away from a group of people whom you have known and the environment you have been in for a long time.

Some ideas you still hold, and then there was the great fight against Hitler. At that time they were very much in it, and that overshadowed everything else. Thus I was still seen from the outside, and I think objectively, at the fringe of it.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you get out?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. All contacts were broken in the summer of 1939.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Wittfogel, did you know Phil Jaffe and stay at his summer house in the summer of 1938?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. This I have to preface by a remark about my relations. You see, it was not quite easy going.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is, did you stay at his house in 1938?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now you may make your explanation.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. The thing was doubtful, because I had had so many clashes with Mr. Jaffe that the invitation which was made a long time ago wasn't repeated. Finally, Mrs. Jaffe repeated it because of my mother. Once I said when Jaffe visited me in this country place of his, "Phil, if you think Soviet Russia is so wonderful, why don't you go there yourself and see what the thing looks like? It might make some impression on you." It made him so angry he bypassed a red light and got a ticket.

Afterward, it was in the fall when the clashes got sharper and sharper, I said to him, "Why did you invite us to your summer house"—he wasn't there, he was in town—"if that is the way you feel about it?" But I stayed at his house.

Mr. MORRIS. At that time did you know that Jaffe was a friend of Browder and a friend of Willy Muenzenberg?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. He told me he was not an organized Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Jaffe told you?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Jaffe told me, but he told me all his activities, the way he described them, were activities of a Communist and pro-Communist kind, and he told me that Browder was his good friend. He

said, really his good friend. Field only told me he saw Browder from time to time, but Jaffe made it quite clear he was a good friend of Browder's.

Mr. MORRIS. What did he say about Willy Muenzenberg?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. He was very interested in Muenzenberg who was, as I said, a genius of an organizer. Even as you read Nehru's biography—I think Nehru even now thinks the First Congress of the League Against Imperialism was not a Communist-controlled thing. This was really a tribute to Mr. Muenzenberg. He certainly could put up a good show.

Mr. MORRIS. How did he work for the Communist International?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Muenzenberg was a big shot in the German Communist Party. He was for many years a member of the Reichstag. There was nothing hidden or conspiratorial about him. He was the father of innumerable outlying front organizations. They were not fronts in the sense of those here, because it was very obvious in most cases, except maybe for some strangers, that these things were run by the Communists.

Now, Jaffe talked with me a great deal. He wanted to know all about it, because he had a great admiration for Muenzenberg, and he thought that was the kind of thing he would like to imitate in America.

Mr. MORRIS. Do they conceal the fronts here much more than they did in Germany at that time?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. They do the work, but they are concealed; is that the idea?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes. Of course, I cannot talk about the time after I left Europe, but in the early days they were big mass parties, and the majority of the people just did not hide their affiliation. It was a completely different political picture.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Dr. Wittfogel, where did you stay later on in the summer of 1938? That was early in 1938?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right. Then I went to Provincetown.

Mr. MORRIS. Where did you stay there?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I stayed in the house together with a gentleman who was a graduate student at Columbia. His name was Moses Finkelstein.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Moses Finkelstein in the summer of 1938 run a summer camp or a summer study session?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Not that summer. He later became a very active organizer of some academic front organizations, of which you know, and which had many prominent persons of the campus and I think of some other campuses in them. He was a very skillful man that way. He had sometimes, it seems, study groups assembled in his house.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he a Communist?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he tell you he was a Communist?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Sure.

Mr. MORRIS. Was this study group that he ran a Communist study group?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Well, it was a discussion among a group of friends, of people who belonged to his political creed. There was no problem about that.

Mr. MORRIS. Now would you tell us who some of the members were of that particular study group which you have just characterized?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. It was a very small group. There were just a very few people that I met there. One person I met afterward was Mr. Rosinger.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify Mr. Rosinger, Dr. Wittfogel?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Beg pardon?

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify Mr. Rosinger? Is he Mr. Laurence Rosinger?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Laurence Rosinger.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to ask Mr. Mandel if he will identify Rosinger, tell what his connections were with the Institute of Pacific Relations as well as positions with the Government.

Mr. MANDEL. Laurence K. Rosinger was a writer for the Institute of Pacific Relations. According to a release dated May 20, 1950, released by the State Department and published by the Tydings committee on pages 1826 to 1831, Laurence Rosinger is listed among those who submitted a memorandum to the State Department in connection with a round table conference at the Department on October 6, 7, and 8, and also participated in the conference.

Mr. SOURWINE. What year?

Mr. MANDEL. That was May 20, 1950, the date of the release. The year of the conference is not given.

Mr. MORRIS. It is October 1949. Do you not find that date in there somewhere?

Mr. MANDEL. It probably was 1949 because the release refers to a subsequent year.

Senator FERGUSON. I think we can check the record of the Appropriations Committee. I think that is the meeting.

Mr. MANDEL. In the same release it refers to a round table discussion on October 6, 7, and 8, 1949, arranged by the Office of Public Affairs.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, that record shows Mr. Laurence Rosinger was acting as adviser to the Secretary of State on far eastern policy?

Mr. MANDEL. Correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Wittfogel, can you tell us more about Laurence Rosinger's experience at that time? You testified about Moses Finkelshtein's Communist study group and Rosinger was a member of that. Can you tell us anything further?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I don't remember whether it was a permanent group. I was invited a very few times. I met Rosinger there, and he was treated as a Communist and spoken of as a Communist by Finkelshtein; and afterward I met Rosinger a number of times and up to my formal break he was a very friendly man. Afterward he behaved, I mean I would say with a smoothness which I think is more becoming to an eel than to a human being, smiling all the time, but keeping away from me as if I were a poisonous affair.

Senator FERGUSON. What happened to you after you broke as far as the Communists that you had been associating with were concerned?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. We just cut each other on the street and didn't talk to each other. Some would manage this uneasy friendly smile, while they desired to get away as fast as possible.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that what happened with Rosinger?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes. Maybe he hoped I would have the same kind of poor memory which seems to be a political disease in certain groups and forget what happened. Anyhow I think he tried to avoid me as much as possible.

Mr. MORRIS. Now did you know he had been called down by the Secretary of State to be an adviser on Far Eastern policy in 1949, Dr. Wittfogel.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. You mean whether he wrote a memorandum and whether he was in that discussion?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. Mr. Mandel has read that he submitted a memorandum and actually participated in the 3-day conference.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes, I heard that.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know about that at the time?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I knew about it because I, too, wrote a memorandum.

Mr. MORRIS. What did you stress in that memorandum, Dr. Wittfogel?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. In my memorandum I criticized the weaknesses of our attitude toward China and said we have paid a price for not fully understanding what we are doing. As a matter of fact, I warned not to have the same ideological advisers on other parts of Asia which we had had on China. Looking at Rosinger's and others' beginning to write on India now, I had the feeling that the ideological demolition squad which has done such a good job on China is now doing it in India. I therefore said that we should be much more aware of their tricks and try to work out devices which will enable us to protect ourselves against further disaster in other parts of Asia.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have copies of that?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes, one. It is my last copy.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator Ferguson would like to see it now.

Senator FERGUSON. What happened with the State Department after you told them about this demolition squad?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. There were more things. I warned them against things you find rampant all over the white book and which I found at least in the mind of one high-ranking gentleman in the State Department with whom I once had an opportunity to discuss Chinese affairs, the idea that the Chinese Communists may be different from other Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. Who is this high-ranking gentleman?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. John Davies.

Mr. MORRIS. John P. Davies?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. John P. Davies. You find extreme positions taken in Lattimore's memorandum about the necessity of giving as much as we can and leaning over backward. Otherwise we might—this is a formula which you find again and again—drive the Chinese Communists in the arms of the Russians. In my opinion this is one of the funniest remarks I have ever heard in my life. You don't have to drive them very hard. I think it is insulting the intelligence of this country to make that kind of remark.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think the Communists of China are of the same type?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. The genuine brand. I have written so in several articles translated also abroad.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you discuss this memorandum with anyone in the State Department?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I belonged to that small minority that was not invited to the conference.

Mr. MORRIS. You wrote the memorandum, and after you wrote the memorandum you were not asked to the conference?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. First I did not write the memorandum. I wrote to Dr. Jessup whether he really wanted something serious because I thought it was an emergency situation and the thing should be discussed seriously; otherwise I wouldn't write. He said, "Yes, write fully and really say what you have to say."

So I wrote this pamphlet, a rather full analysis of what I consider the basic weaknesses in our concept and procedure and the reasons why we had been deceived, in order not to be deceived again.

Mr. MORRIS. After you wrote this and sent it in, then you were not invited to the round-table discussion; is that right?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Most of the other people who submitted memoranda were invited to the round-table discussions?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. According to what I read later in the published statements, yes.

Senator JENNER. Did you ever ask Dr. Jessup why you were not invited?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I haven't seen him since.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you will put in the record Mr. Laurence Rosinger's latest work in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations and whatever other pertinent information you have showing his connection with the institute?

Mr. MANDEL. I have in my hand a book published in 1951, issued under the auspices of the American Institute of Pacific Relations. The title is "The State of Asia, a Contemporary Survey by Laurence K. Rosinger and Associates." On the wrapper is the following: Laurence K. Rosinger has covered far eastern events as a member of the research staff of the American Institute of Pacific Relations and Foreign Policy Association."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that book introduced in the record together with the excerpts from the flyleaf which Mr. Mandel has read, not to be printed but inserted in the record by reference.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be put in the files of this committee and will be a reference.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 78" and filed for the record.)

Mr. SOURWINE. Dr. Wittfogel, at that point you had discussed in your own way the question of the connection, actual or ideological, between the Chinese Communists and the Russian Communists. I wish you would comment for the benefit of this committee on the recent official suggestions that Mao Tse-tung might be becoming an anti-Stalinist, that a rift might be growing between Stalin and Mao Tse-tung, and there might be some parallel between the direction in which Communist China is going and the direction in which Yugoslavia has gone. Are you familiar with the suggestions to which I refer?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you comment, please?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. It seems to me that we have to look at the Chinese pattern as a general pattern. The Yugoslav pattern is an extreme exception. In Yugoslavia you have, it may be called a geo-military situation where a member of the satellite zone very badly treated, might break away successfully because he sits in a part of the country which even Hitler's army could not take. It is a very strong position for such a possibility.

There is another factor which at that time may have been conducive to what Tito did, and that is the much stronger impression that the Western and American Armies made in Europe than they did on the Chinese mainland. A man like Tito has seen the Western World's industrial and military capacity clearly, and I think he had at that time the feeling, and I think he has still that, in the case of an open military clash that the West has a good chance of winning. So burdened by things which he describes in his correspondence as excessive exploitation by Stalin, he severed his relations.

I think the Chinese picture is entirely different. The movement was established from the beginning on a freer footing. It was much more impressed with Soviet power, both industrial and military, because in that part of the world, against the Japanese, the Soviet Russians made a very good showing. The possibility of developing together with the Russians full control over Europe and Asia I think is an enormous attraction for Mao Tse-tung.

I think it is important when discussing the Tito-Mao relations not to forget one thing that in this country should be particularly well known. England overplayed its hands once against its colonies and dominions. This was against the United States, and it lost this old colony. It never overplayed it since.

To assume that Stalin will be so stupid to repeat the mistakes which he has made in Yugoslavia, to overplay his hand and to destroy all the enormous powers of attraction, is a marginal possibility. So I would say, statistically speaking, that is a completely minor point.

Stalin will do everything not to overstrain relations and from Mao's point of view everything is to be gained by staying with Stalin. He looks forward to the coming of the next world war and I think Mao thinks he belongs in this camp. He has to be victorious, or go down, with it. I think that is his deep conviction; he has said so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Dr. Wittfogel, Mao Tse-tung is a fairly indoctrinated Stalinist Communist?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes, he is.

Mr. SOURWINE. And has been brought up in the party?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. He has been brought up in the party. It seems that the final soaking with Stalinist ideas came in the middle of the war, in 1941 to 1942. He was technically speaking, in spite of minor differences certainly—he had some argument in the twenties—a faithful Communist, and I think he is completely monolithic in his ideas too since the early forties.

Mr. SOURWINE. His emergence as the leader of the Communist Chinese is not a spontaneous thing, is it, Doctor?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. No, it was beautifully organized. He learned it. It is not the ultimate reason why he would stay, because gratitude in politics is very rare, but I think communism, the way it has de-

veloped, is a device of gaining dictatorial power and maintaining it, by using social and racial unrest, weaknesses, and disturbances.

The great academy for this has been Moscow, and Mao Tse-tung and his people have profited immensely from it in the past and I think they hope to profit immensely in the future. If the greater part of agrarian Asia would come under Mao Tse-tung's wings—you have to see this really in terms of the Communist economic evaluation of power—it would still be a world of peasants; and the great center of heavy industry, the big armaments center, things which in the eyes of both Mao and Stalin are decisive—would still be the great Eurasian-Russian heartland.

So the Russians can go very far in letting Mao be supreme in his part of the world. Much more, he may take the whole of India under his jurisdiction; and he will still be the number two man. Stalin may have a lot of trouble, but don't forget it, if you read in the papers, Russia is full of trouble. The Communist system has existed with continuous frictions and explosions. The fact that there are numerous frictions does not mean that things cease to hang together. This is a Communist axis with very tight relations.

If you think back to all the things Mussolini did. He double-crossed Hitler. They didn't like each other. They were not closely allied. Mussolini gave hints to the Soviets. Nevertheless when it came to the ultimate test of the war, Mussolini stuck by Hitler, because that was where he institutionally belonged, and he fought with him and went down with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. There are perhaps two questions which tie together. Are you familiar with the fact that at the time when there were many in this country who were urging that we should help the Chinese Communists they used among others two favorite arguments, one that the Chinese Communists were simply agrarians, and the other that the Chinese Communist movement was a parallel to Titoism and a chance to build something in China which would combat Stalin?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That was the second version of the same thing.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are familiar with that?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. That argument died down after it was more or less contradicted by history?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Right.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are familiar with the fact that that argument has had a resurgence very recently after stimulation from official or semiofficial sources?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I am aware of that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any theory which would logically explain the resurgence of that idea?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. There may be several reasons. There may be different people who have this feeling for different reasons. I have looked at Hitler Germany and many of my friends, you know, and whenever there was a crack and whenever there was conflict or shooting we said, "This is the end of the thing."

So there were a number of people who genuinely believed this. I think there was a difference in the size of a basketball or something,

and people disagreed on matters of sport, so some people thought: "Here now, really the whole thing is cracking up. Even on the playgrounds, the rift asserts itself." But there may be much worse rifts without consequence. I think there are people who just genuinely are wishful thinkers.

I have several friends who proved scientifically and mathematically that Germany must collapse, that it cannot conduct a war. It has to fall to pieces; and Hitler couldn't conduct the war. I think there are a number of people now who think wishfully that the enormous Communist axis will crack because conditions are strained. I am sure they are strained, and I am sure the Soviet Russians are not very popular in China. That may be why the Soviet names have been taken off the slogans. But that is no reason to assume that the whole thing may fall to pieces, it has survived much more serious crises. That is an extreme possibility, but I don't think it follows necessarily.

Senator FERGUSON. Does not communism adjust itself to some of these stresses and strains?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Exactly, to many of them, with an enormous vitality. The history of the Comintern is the history of explosions, of conflicts. But it shows an amazing healing capacity, you know, assuring the survival of the general pattern.

Senator FERGUSON. One central figure and one common denominator?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, I think at this point we had better recess until 2 o'clock. Doctor, you will return at 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the hearing was recessed until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Senator SMITH (presiding). The committee will come to order.

Mr. MORRIS, you may proceed with the examination of the witness.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, at the termination of the last session, chronologically, we had gotten as far as Dr. Wittfogel relating his experiences at a certain Communist study group in the summer of 1938. We had mentioned that the school was run by Moses Finklestein and that one of the people at the study group was Lawrence Rosinger who, in the course of conversation with Dr. Wittfogel, indicated he was a Communist.

Who were some of the other students at this study group?

TESTIMONY OF KARL AUGUST WITTFOGEL, NEW YORK, N. Y.—

Resumed

Dr. WITTFOGEL. There was a talented and pleasant young man who was studying in the Japanese Department at Columbia. His name is Herbert Norman.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he a member of this study group?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. To your knowledge, did he know it was a Communist study group?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes, it was obvious.

Mr. MORRIS. To you?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I think it was obvious, in general.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it obvious therefore that he was a Communist?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would introduce into the record, first of all, a letter that would indicate Herbert Norman's association with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated May 30, 1940, from Edward C. Carter to Owen Lattimore. It reads as follows:

Herbert Norman was in the office about a fortnight ago on the even of his sailing for Tokyo as language officer in the Canadian Legation. He is very eager to continue active contact with the institute and in the field of Japanese political history. He would like to do some writing on the key figures of the Meiji period.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Holland as it may be that he will see ways of using Norman on writing that might not be quite within the scope of Pacific Affairs.

I think that Norman may be able to do some writing for Pacific Affairs on contemporary matters, providing he writes under a nom de plume.

I imagine that by now you have read his inquiry book, Japan's Emergence as a Modern State. This is probably the most fundamental study that has yet appeared in the inquiry series. I am hoping that all of us may find some way of continuing Norman as a contributor to the IPR publication program in one form or another.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. That date is approximately 2 years after the episode testified to by Dr. Wittfogel, is it not?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there any further material on that series of letters that is pertinent to this?

Mr. MANDEL. There is another letter, apparently a memorandum headed "ECC from WLH." E. C. C. is apparently Edward C. Carter, and W. L. H. is apparently W. L. Holland, and it is dated September 5, 1940. It is on a typed letterhead of the Giannini Foundation, University of California, Berkeley, Calif. I will just read an excerpt from that letter.

Phil is leaving tonight and is taking with him Landon's book on the Chinese in Siam and the major part of Yasuo's Industrial Japan. Among the other manuscripts to be sent to him very shortly will be Laura Thompson's book on Guam for the American Council, Wentworth's on Filipino living standards in Hawaii, the new catalog, and Wittfogel's monograph on oriental society. I am hoping to have the two big books by Mills and Keesing published commercially in this country. Phil will be in Japan from about September 18 to October 6, and can be reached care of the Japanese IPR. Any very secret messages might be sent him care of Herbert Norman at the Canadian Legation. Phil will cable us after he arrives about whether the Japanese want him to remain for an extra week or two to help them with their publications, and will also indicate his probable date of arrival in Shanghai. His temporary address in Shanghai, until we hear that he has actually arrived, will be care of the American Express Co.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer that in evidence and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

I would like to ask Dr. Wittfogel, however, if he would care to comment on the statement:

Phil will be in Japan from about September 18 to October 6 and can be reached care of the Japanese IPR. Any very secret messages might be sent him care of Herbert Norman at the Canadian Legation.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I do not think I can.

Mr. MORRIS. You know 2 years previously Herbert Norman was a Communist?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I might say there is nothing in this letter that would indicate on its face who Phil was at this time. We have to check to see who that is.

Senator SMITH. They are received.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 72" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 72

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,
New York, N. Y., May 30, 1940.

OWEN LATTIMORE, Esq.,
300 Gilman Hall, Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore, Md

DEAR OWEN: Herbert Norman was in the office about a fortnight ago on the eve of his sailing for Tokyo as language officer in the Canadian Legation. He is very eager to continue active contact with the institute and in the field of Japanese political history. He would like to do some writing on the key figures of the Meiji period.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Holland as it may be that he will see ways of using Norman on writing that might not be quite within the scope of Pacific Affairs.

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I imagine that by now you have read his inquiry book, Japan's Emergence as a Modern State. This is probably the most fundamental study that has yet appeared in the inquiry series. I am hoping that all of us may find some way of continuing Norman as a contributor to the IPR publication program in one form or another.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

GIANNINI FOUNDATION, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
Berkeley, Calif., September 5, 1940.

E. C. C. from W. L. H.:

By air express I am sending you Bloch's Manchukuo manuscript, over which Phil and I have sweated and cursed mightily. We have been so irritated by it at times that it is hard to give a balanced opinion of it, but after duly leaning over backward I think I can safely say that with a little more work and with some very necessary checking of the tables by someone like Kate or Jack working together with Bloch, it can be made into a valuable report.

I enclose a letter to Bloch for you to pass on to him after you have looked over the manuscript or got Kate and Jack to look at it. You will note that my suggestions involve some additional work for Bloch, probably 3 or 4 weeks, and you will have to decide after talking to him whether this could be arranged and at what expense.

Some of the weaknesses in the report derive from the inevitable inadequacies and inconsistencies in the source materials, and no doubt some of the gaps might be filled by a person like Matsuo who has presumably had more recent first-hand acquaintance with developments in Manchukuo. Other weaknesses, however, may be attributed directly to Bloch's apparent carelessness in the handling of some of the statistics and to his very irritating habit of elaborating on some minor incidental aspect of a problem instead of first giving the broad outline in simple, straightforward language. This is particularly noticeable in the chapters on railways and economic planning. A certain number of these intellectual diversions are pardonable, if only because they serve to show up some of the absurdities and inconsistencies in the materials released by the Japanese themselves, but they should not be included at the expense of more elementary information which the general reader will want.

I suppose a good deal of the manuscript will have to be retyped, but there may be some chapters, e. g., on mining and manufacturing, in which our pen-

cilled corrections can be transferred to another carbon copy or written more legibly in ink on the present copy.

I shall leave it to you and Kate to decide whether the manuscript should be submitted to the advisers after the present corrections have been made or only after Bloch has done the additional work I have suggested in my letter to him. There are, of course, some advantages in submitting it now in that Bloch will be able to take account of the advisers' comments in the final revision, but I am afraid that both Denney and Condliffe would object to the inadequacies of the chapters on foreign trade, railways, and economic planning; and Angus might object to the somewhat critical tone of the whole study. I suspect that Condliffe will be critical of the report anyway, since you will remember that he had some reservations about the wisdom of assigning the study to Bloch or to anyone who had not had recent first-hand experience in Manchuria, and close cooperation from the Japanese. On the whole, therefore, I should personally recommend waiting until Bloch has had a few weeks to amplify and rearrange the study.

I have had a telegram from Yasuo saying that he has been unable to complete the additional sections of his book on industrial Japan, owing to the pressure of heavy business, but that he is trying to finish it in 3 weeks and is writing me. I assume this is in response to your intercession. The additional sections are to deal with Manchukuo, and I would suggest that you ask Yasuo for an extra carbon copy which Bloch can use in connection with his revisions.

I enclose a suggested revision of the editorial note for Chi.

Although I shall have a good deal of additional work to do on Pat Glover's manuscript, on Keesing's book on The South Seas in the Modern World, and on Mills' book on Hong Kong and Malaya, I wonder if there is not another inquiry manuscript which you could send me in the near future, e. g. Tamagna's? Shouldn't you also send another frantic appeal to Colegrove, asking what in the world is delaying his report on the Japanese military?

If it would relieve the load on the New York staff, I should be glad to look after the proofreading of some of the forthcoming inquiry reports, e. g. Fahs, Dietrich, and Taylor. This might involve my employing Mrs. Ward for more than the present 3 days a week.

Phil is leaving tonight and is taking with him Landon's book on the Chinese in Siam and the major part of Yasuo's Industrial Japan. Among the other manuscripts to be sent to him very shortly will be Laura Thompson's book on Guam for the American Council, Wentworth's on Filipino living standards in Hawaii, the new catalog, and Wittfogel's monograph on oriental society. I am hoping to have the two big books by Mills and Keesing published commercially in this country. Phil will be in Japan from about September 18 to October 6, and can be reached care of the Japanese IPR. Any very secret messages might be sent him care of Herbert Norman at the Canadian Legation. Phil will cable us after he arrives about whether the Japanese want him to remain for an extra week or two to help them with their publications, and will also indicate his probable date of arrival in Shanghai. His temporary address in Shanghai, until we hear that he has actually arrived, will be care of the American Express Co.

Mr. MORRIS. Who else was in this study group?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is all I remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Daniel Thorner in the group?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. No. I met Mr. Thorner through the head of the group. Mr. Finklestein treated him as a man of his political confidence.

Mr. MORRIS. Thorner himself did not participate.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. He did not. Mr. Finklestein said, "You might give a lecture on China in the history student club; there is our friend Thorner, and I will arrange it with him." Which he did; and I spoke there.

Mr. MORRIS. You did speak there?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. This is during the period when you were still within the Communist periphery?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right. I saw Thorner afterwards. He came to me occasionally. He showed a great interest in Marx's writing

on India. He was studying India. He took me once over to the basement of the Columbia Library to show me Marx's articles on India.

In these writings, Marx acted like a Socialist-Fascist and Imperialist. That is, these articles are now particularly abhorred in Moscow. I throw that in to show how complicated the ideological developments are. At that time, I am sure, Thorner wasn't aware of it. He thought this was good, pure, doctrine. We talked it over. I would say his behavior was that of a man who moved along that line. Our talk was not specific.

But there is a little episode I might add. This was during the time of the pact and before Italy entered into the war.

Mr. Thorner came back from India via Italy and France, and I met him on the street. If I had any doubt that he was a Communist, it was removed then. I had been long enough in the movement to know. The card is a question of bookkeeping, and whoever has been near this business knows there are many ways of being connected with this gigantic political machine. The second highest man in the German Communist Party until 1924 is said to have never paid any fee in the early days, Mr. Thalheimer.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you spell that?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. T-h-a-l-h-e-i-m-e-r.

Mr. MORRIS. Your testimony is he never had a card?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. He never paid any dues. This was the episode: Mr. Thorner told me about his experiences. He was very warm about Fascist Italy. This was a fine country, very good. Compared to this things were stinko in France, which was then under the stress of war.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean Italy was a fine country?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes. According to the Communist Party line, the main enemies then were England and France, and fascism wasn't quite so bad. After he told me this, I wouldn't say I kicked him off the boardway, but I told him something that you cannot say in Sunday school. For me, I had no desire to see him again. If that is the way he felt about fascism and about the defense of the western world, I had no desire to see him again. This is the end of my experience.

I heard later that he is now in the only institute in America dealing with India, he and his wife, in Philadelphia. I know some other "unpartial" men, like Chen Han-seng have also worked at this institute.

Mr. MORRIS. You say Chen Han-seng was with the institute?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. As far as I remember. Yes, in Philadelphia.

Mr. MORRIS. You say further Thorner was closely associated with Moses Finklestein?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you develop that a bit?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is all I know.

Mr. MORRIS. You say closely associated. Politically?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. He was a political friend, I would say.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know what Moses Finklestein is doing now?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I think he is teaching history at Rutgers College in New Jersey.

Mr. MORRIS. Under that name, or has he changed his name?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I think he assumed the name of Moses Finley.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you get your Rockefeller grant?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes; I got it early in 1939.

Mr. MORRIS. That was prior to the Hitler-Stalin pact?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You did get your grant from the Rockefeller Foundation?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you describe to us your reaction to the Hitler-Stalin pact, particularly discussing that portion of your reaction which had to do with these people in the Institute of Pacific Relations whom we have been discussing.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. My general reaction was if the only thing I gave them still credit for, to fight Hitler, if they are washed up even there, then really everything has gone down the kitchen sink of history. That was the general thing. In the institute not much happened. Mr. Field, who by the way, all the time behaved like a gentleman toward me, he lost interest in the institute. He got restless. He wanted to do something else. Finally, he went into this peace mobilization work. I thought he had gone completely crazy. I saw very little of him.

I would like to say as far as the Institute of Pacific Relations handled the technical part of my work, they behaved without reproach. Later on, it came to the publication. This was a big book. Assuming there were some people who did not like the anti-Stalin attitude of social science in this work, I don't think those people were aware of it. It was a nice big book. It looked very scholarly. It was a feather in the institute's cap; I think from the point of view of the book I have nothing to complain.

Mr. MORRIS. When was that published?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. It was finished by the middle of the '40's. It was published very slowly because of the difficulties of printing, in 1949.

Mr. MORRIS. I think we are running a little ahead of ourselves by advertising to it now.

Did you have a controversy or conversation with Joseph Barnes during the Hitler-Stalin pact?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. It was either at the end of the pact or shortly after. I had heard that Barnes had kind of weakened. Some people said "Even Barnes can't stand this any longer and even he seems to be somewhat shaken."

I rang him up several times. I found him not very eager to see me. I was insistent, and we had a conversation. Just by accident, Owen Lattimore was in town. We had a conversation, the three of us. It was one of those attempts, I thought, "Here, you might pull Barnes out of what he has been in. He has been in it, but maybe he has seen the light." I pulled in vain.

I tried to disentangle him, to uproot him as far as I could. I told him many things about my own experience. I have had some experiences which made me very sure that the Comintern engineered the fight between the German Communists and the Social Democrats to confuse the anti-Fascist front, and to bring Hitler to power, not because they were political perverts but because they wanted a big war

in the west. They thought this was the way to achieve it. They would have preferred a military conservative government. They took Hitler. He was the lesser evil.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you would develop that? I think it would be pertinent if you would develop that argument that you just alluded to.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. If I may say, and I would like to put this on the record for history and not just for our hearing, this will be a very big issue for years to come, and it will be one thing which the Communists and Mr. Stalin will never live down, if it is fully developed.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you develop it so we will understand the basis of the problem?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. In 1931 to '33, the German Communists were told that the "main enemy" to fight was not fascism and Hitler but it was the Social Democrats. Later they changed the formula from a main enemy to the "main support" of capitalism.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that from your own knowledge?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Sure. I was in the midst of it. I have seen the most devastating development. And the people knew what they were doing.

In the summer of '32 I was in Moscow. I will not forget. A man who has become part of modern American folklore—Mr. Gerhart Eisler—stood there. He was a man who goes around claiming he was sent out by the German party, which he never was. And that he was a great fighter against fascism. Actually he took exactly the line against the "Social Fascists" the others took. There was, my old friend, Madjar. He was a Hungarian originally, who wrote the best book at that time about agrarian China in the Soviet Union, and he was full of deviations. Madjar stood in front of the Comintern building. There stood Gerhart Eisler next to him.

Madjar said 20,000 of the best labor leaders in Germany will have to be killed. I said, "What do you mean?"

He said that Hitler has to come to power. His whole face was distorted. There were other people who talked about it the same way. This was the great line of the Comintern, to bring Hitler to power, not because they loved him; they did not. They thought that through him they would get the big thing going.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say, "get the big thing going," what do you mean?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. The big war, which the Soviets would support, the thing which they got going in '39.

So when I heard my friend, Madjar, say this, Mr. Eisler, the great fighter against fascism, stood there, and nodded strongly. So Madjar said, "Come, let's discuss it tonight. Come along, Gerhart." Gerhart didn't turn up. He was a cautious man. That is why he lives so long.

There were many other incidents which made it very clear to anybody, you don't need personal experience. Only sit down for an afternoon and read the Comintern literature from 1931 to 1933. If you look at it under this angle, you will see that one of the great monstrous crimes were committed. I myself thought at first the Russian Communists were just dumb. Gradually, I realized myself that this was a very big strategy to get one of the great wars of modern times going. This took some time, but it succeeded in 1939.

I told Barnes about it. Of course, there was no reason why he should have known all these things, but what interested me was that his reaction was to take up the defense of Mr. Stalin's policy and the Comintern without going into the facts. If he had an open mind, he should have said, "Let's really weigh the facts."

But he pretended to be a man who knew all. I said, "You know a lot about Russia which I don't know, but I happen to know this very well. Let's go over the documentation."

I saw here a man who was fanatical. He stuck by his allegiance to the Comintern which he defended in an abstruse manner. He didn't care about the facts. I got the feeling the man is just a fanatic. That was the end of my contact with Barnes.

Later, when I saw Lattimore and I said, "Is Barnes such a fellow traveler as he was previously?" That was linked up with this episode.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember having a clash with Michael Greenberg in the fall of 1941, Dr. Wittfogel.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe that, if that is the correct time?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. This was at a time when Mr. Lattimore had been appointed special envoy or adviser to Chiang Kai-shek.

The Pacific Affairs had to be run by somebody else. I see that technically it was Mr. Carter, but as for the second man it was Mr. Greenberg. As far as I could see, he became the actual editor.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know who was instrumental in having Michael Greenberg take over the running of Pacific Affairs?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. No; I know nothing about this.

Mr. MORRIS. But at that time you knew Mr. Greenberg was a Communist?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I had seen him in America before. First, when I saw him he didn't know about my own development. He tried to continue talking in the way in which we had talked in Cambridge about a couple of years ago.

Mr. MORRIS. In 1934?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right. I made it clear I was sorry he didn't develop.

Mr. MORRIS. Away from communism?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. The way I had. So I saw little or nothing of him. When he became the editor or managing editor of the magazine, I had two book reviews written for it that summer. They were thrown together by him in a funny way. I knew they wouldn't like certain points in my reviews. Greenberg certainly wouldn't like them, from his point of view.

Mr. MORRIS. What was his point of view?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. The argument had something to do with the interpretation of Chinese society.

Mr. MORRIS. You knew he wouldn't agree, for the simple reason you had known in 1934 he was a Communist and from all appearances he was still a Communist?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. This was against the Communist doctrine.

Mr. MORRIS. What you had written?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Sure. Anyhow, he published the stuff and threw it together with things which had nothing to do with each other,

history of philosophy and some modern stuff. As he edited it, it looked silly, in my opinion.

Then when we had a talk about another book which should be reviewed, I said why don't you let me review the book?

He said, "You know too much about the subject."

I said, "Michael, I think when you come with this argument we are through. When you make this kind of a pretext, I fear we shall not cooperate. I mean, seeing the way you conduct this business, I think that I will never write a line for Pacific Affairs again," and I did not.

Mr. MORRIS. That was in the fall of 1941?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have any association with Pacific Affairs from that time on?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. No.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Amerasia?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I have written one article in the first year; none since.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce into the record, Mr. Chairman, two names that have come in this last portion of the testimony in an excerpt from the Library of Congress.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify that and read the significant names?

Mr. MANDEL. The Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress was asked to make for us a study of the research fellows and students in the Walter Hines Page School headed by Mr. Owen Lattimore. They sent this study which is being inserted into the record for 1940 to 1951.

Among those listed as research associates, fellows, or students in seminars, are these two names which appear in our present investigation. One is Dr. Chen Han-seng and the other is Mr. Daniel Thorner. This is dated August 6, 1951.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce that in evidence and have it marked.

Senator SMITH. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 73" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 73

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE

Washington 25, D. C.

RESEARCH FELLOWS AND STUDENTS IN THE WALTER HINES PAGE SCHOOL, 1940-51

(Compiled by Helen Miller, Government Section, August 6, 1951)

The following list was compiled from the Johns Hopkins University circular and president's reports for the years 1940-51.

The Walter Hines Page School of International Relations is primarily for research into far-eastern affairs. Its personnel consists principally of faculty members and students who have received their doctoral degrees. According to the 1950-51 university circular, "fellows in the Page School are appointed primarily to enable them to undertake independent research work." Consequently the names appearing here were listed as research associates, fellows, or students in seminars. The Legislative Reference Service has written to the Johns

Hopkins University for a definition of these terms and a more complete list of students at the school since 1940. Until we have further information from them this list is the best we can submit.

Dr. David F. Aberle.
 Dr. William M. Austin.
 Miss Ruth F. Bean.
 Mr. Schuyler Cammann.
 Mr. Chih-yi Chang.
 Dr. John De Francis.
 Mr. Clive E. Glover.
 Mr. John Gombojab Hangin.
 Dr. Chen Han-seng.
 The Dilowa Hutukhtu.
 Mr. Nobutaka Ike.
 Mr. Catesby Jones.

Mr. George Mct. Kahin.
 Dr. Karl H. Menges.
 Dr. Francis Henry Michael.
 Mr. Peter Urgunggi Onon.
 Dr. Karl J. Pelzer.
 Mr. Martin R. Ring.
 Mr. Richard Schraml.
 Mr. Daniel Thorner.
 Mr. Ho Tze-Ch'Uan.
 Mr. H. H. Vreeland, III.
 Dr. Leo Waibel.
 Mr. Thomas G. Wiener.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall a dispute you had with Owen Lattimore in the fall of 1944 on the subject of Korea?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you relate that to us?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Our relations had become less and less intense and also less and less cordial. We had more political arguments, which I may bypass for the time being.

I had a long talk with him in 1940, which I think led to nothing. There was some argument in 1942 when I said something like this: "You talk about Russia and about communism without being fully experienced. These are very tricky things. You ought to know your watch when you talk about it." We use the formula for a watch maker. We had an argument on that.

In 1944, when he came back from the trip with Vice President Wallace, I saw him. First we had a cheerful encounter about Mr. Joe Barnes, which made him very angry; then we went to some other matters.

Mr. MORRIS. Angry at you or at Barnes?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. It made Lattimore very angry.

Mr. MORRIS. At you or at Barnes?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. He was angry at me.

It is shown in his letter to me. The fact that I referred to Barnes as a fellow traveler, he thought was very insulting. I shall come back to the correspondence. I said, "You know Joe Barnes talked there about things about which he had obviously no great experience." Lattimore himself took up the argument on Germany. It was very easy to see that he did it with the same light cargo on his shoulders; namely, he didn't know anything about it either. Whereupon I told him so rather bluntly, as we used to do.

He finally said, "O. K. You think I know little about Europe. Maybe I don't, so let's talk about that part of the world where you admit I know something about, namely, the Far East." So we talked about Korea.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the date of this conversation?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. It was October 1944, I think. We talked about possible solutions in the Far East. He said for Korea it would be the best solution, a good conservative solution, if the Soviet Union would take the country over, which upset me very much. I blew up properly and thought this was not exactly the way a representative of the American Government should talk about its interest.

Mr. MORRIS. You say he is a representative of the American Government. What do you mean?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. He was still a official of the American Government. He was still connected with OWI. He was no longer the Deputy Director, but still a member of that Government organization.

Mr. MORRIS. He had just come back—

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Maybe he was too snooty to deal with the State Department. He talked with President Roosevelt and he went around with a Vice President of the United States. These are no small men, it seems to me. He had the right to feel kind of important. I thought this was an extraordinary statement coming from a man of these connections and these responsibilities.

So our conversation ended kind of sadly. He knew I did not take many of his other ideas very seriously, but I thought that in the field of Mongolian, Inter-Asiatic and Chinese relations he had great experience, almost unique experience, I would say. Thus I still maintained the plan to have him supply the introduction to our first volume here which deals essentially with these relations.

We went on with correspondence after that.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember having a discussion with him on the disposition of the Mikado?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. This came up at the end of this whole affair. As I said, we tried to patch up our relations from both sides.

Mr. MORRIS. This is after the 1944 conversation?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. In 1944 to 1945. He even sent me his Solution in Asia. I wrote him a nice letter about the book, and said what I wanted for the project. To me he was still a leading expert in this field. I would like to say this here: The fact that Lattimore lacked formal academic training does not impress me.

Mr. MORRIS. Does not impress you adversely?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. As very relevant. I would say if Johns Hopkins gave him a big position, it honors Johns Hopkins.

Lattimore might have trouble today in the Soviet Union, where they are now ridiculously pedant about academic titles and positions, but in a democratic country like ours persons with an unusual contribution may be given unusual opportunities, also in the universities. In my opinion this is something to be proud of, but the generosity should be properly appreciated by him who benefits by it. In Lattimore's case, here was a man who was a real authority in a limited field. This was before he tried to build himself up as a global expert. Here was a man who had been given great trust and shown great generosity—I think that is a conclusion we might draw—but he would have to justify it and not abuse it.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you think he abused that trust?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes. But if you will permit me to go on with our story—

Mr. MORRIS. By all means.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. So there was this problem of the introduction. I personally was very unhappy. In my letter of 1945 I was in a great conflict. I did nothing about his introduction. This has been done before in the bureaucratic world. I just let it wait. We went on printing the general introduction. I thought of a way of getting out of his contribution. This finally offered itself by Lattimore asking

me, at the end of 1946, whether he couldn't write the introduction. He wrote in such a way that I in my reply could answer, "I think we gave you enough credit. Let's call it a day." Whereupon he said, "No, I would like very much to write the introduction."

He had seen a good deal of the manuscript. It is the work of a group of fine scholars. It is not only my personal work. I may therefore say, it represents good scholarship.

So, a correspondence developed which finally brought in big political matters.

Do you want somebody else to read it?

MR. MORRIS. No, this is your file. I would like you to make reference to it. These are the copies that we have made up.

Will you identify those as copies of your own letters?

DR. WITTFOGEL. Yes, I do. Let me go back to the letters before these.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce these records that we are referring to in the record. They are going to be made a part of the record.

Senator SMITH. They will be inserted.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 74, 75, and 76," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 74

FEBRUARY 18, 1947.

DEAR OWEN: Your letter of January 29 is very flattering to me, but it places you in a somewhat peculiar light—if I accept your statement of your attitudes.

You know that I have never sought any important political position. In fact, I have refused to consider positions of this kind even when they have been suggested, for, although I as a citizen have taken a deep interest in the commonweal, I do not feel myself fitted for political leadership. You, on the contrary, have held political positions of great responsibility—positions in which your judgment and advice affected vital features of this country's foreign policy. Nevertheless you state that my political opinions are "much stronger" than yours. Do you really think that I, the simple citizen, take political opinions more seriously, than you; the man who occupied important political posts? Do you really mean to say that you voiced important political opinions without holding them strongly?

When you, in conversation with Esther and me after your return from the U. S. S. R. suggested that Korea might advantageously be taken over by the "conservative" forces of Soviet Russia, you certainly expressed a startlingly significant political idea. Did you or did you not mean what you said? When, during the war, you urged the removal of the Mikado, you certainly expressed a politically significant idea, and one which, had it been accepted, would probably have cost hundreds of thousands of American lives. Did you hold these views when you uttered them? Did I, when expressing others, contradict your real opinions or opinions which you really did not hold? (In your letter you remark that I have tried to convert you from opinions "which I do not hold").

You say that I express my political opinions more vehemently than you do. There are probably differences in temperament which manifest themselves as differences in expression. But it seems to me that for a number of years we exchanged many ideas, political and otherwise, without getting into any heated argument. After your trip with Wallace, your tone changed. If I hurt you by my vehemence, I am sorry. Even strongly felt conviction should not be so expressed. There may have been a good reason why I reacted violently to your attitude—and I think there was; but whatever the reason, I certainly do not defend the passion of my expression.

But please examine the substance of your argument in your last letter. If it is difficult to understand what your political opinions are, how can I be sure about your scientific views? There are systems of political ideas, just as there are systems of scientific ideas. To make sense they have to operate—and, can be apprehended, checked, and argued in an orderly fashion. For some time, I have felt that your system of values, scientific as well as political, is not an

integrated one. In the past you have made fine scholarly contributions, and I shall never hesitate to acknowledge them; but, in view of your lack of certainty regarding your present ideas, collaboration between us had better wait until they have recrystallized. I am looking forward to the day when I can again talk with you about opinions which you do not only seem to hold, but which you really hold.

Sincerely,

EXHIBIT No. 75

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
Baltimore 18, Md., February 20, 1947.

DR. KARL AUGUST WITTFOGEL,
Chinese History Project, Columbia University,
New York City.

DEAR KARL AUGUST: Your letter of February 18 bears out, I am afraid, the opinion which I expressed in my last letter to you—that your ideas and feelings on political matters are more extreme than mine and more vehemently expressed. As examples of trying to convert me from opinions which I do not hold, I cannot imagine how you could have got the idea that I believe that "Korea might advantageously be taken over by the 'conservative' forces of Soviet Russia." As for the removal of the Mikado, I have never argued that America should remove him; my position has always been that American policy should not be committed to support of the Mikado, particularly if there should arise a strong Japanese demand for his removal.

In view of these misunderstandings it is obvious that when we meet we shall get on best if we confine the conversation to those subjects in which I can exercise my respect for your enormous and in some ways unrivaled knowledge.

Sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

EXHIBIT No. 76

MARCH 19, 1947.

MY DEAR OWEN: Your letter of February 20 showed me again how far apart we are, not only in our recollection of the spoken word, but in our interpretation of the printed fact.

Regarding the matter of Korea, it will always remain your memory against mine and Esther's and those few friends to whom we repeated, in our dismay, your statement made some minutes previously in the cafeteria of the Social Security Building.

Likewise, our conversation at dinner, just before your Columbia lecture on Japan, regarding your new man, Carter's improper handling of archaeological material of the Southwest (this from archeologists) and my own criticism that he had been equally remiss in dealing with the historical data. Such a blatant scientific deficiency bothered you very little—your answer, semantically not literally, ran something like this: "Oh, I myself have been criticized for bending the facts." Certainly an astonishing response, and a very irresponsible one, from a person of your scientific achievement and academic position. But perhaps you don't remember this incident either—and again it is a question of your memory and mine, your spoken word and mine.

Your statement on the Mikado is something else again. Here you are on record in your book, *Solution in Asia*, page 189. Here you write:

"If the Japanese themselves decide to do without an Emperor, well and good. If not, we should show that militarism has been so catastrophically defeated that we, the victors, do not need to use the Emperor. He and all males eligible for the throne by Japanese rules of succession and adoption should be interned, preferably in China but under the supervision of a United Nations commission, to emphasize united responsibility. His estates, and estates belonging to members of Zaiibatsu families and important militarists, should be made over to an agrarian reform program, conspicuously without his sanction and by order of the United Nations. Eventually, after his death and after a new civil service and a new management of finance and industry have taken hold, the remaining members of the imperial line can be allowed to go where they like. New vested interests will by that time be able to prevent the restoration of a monarchy."

Did you remember this when you wrote me in your last letter, "As for the removal of the Mikado, I have never argued that America should remove him; * * *"?

The question between us is really a simple one. Can we be of scientific value to each other while your opinions are held so lightly, denied so readily, and interpreted so arbitrarily?

Sincerely.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I mentioned in the preceding letters the difference in our political attitudes. He said, "Your political opinions are much stronger than mine, much more vehemently expressed." Whereupon, I answered.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe that letter? That is a letter you have written to Lattimore?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. To Lattimore. He said, "Let's make up our difference. We have a political difference. Maybe we can still go on in our scientific field."

Mr. MORRIS. What is the date of this letter?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. This is February 18, 1947.

Mr. MORRIS. You are writing to Lattimore?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Answering his charge that I hold my opinions so strongly. My letter reads:

Your letter of January 29 is very flattering to me, but it places you in a somewhat peculiar light—if I accept your statement of your attitudes.

You know that I have never sought any important political position. In fact, I have refused to consider positions of this kind even when they have been suggested, for, although I as a citizen have taken a keen interest in the commonweal, I do not feel myself fitted for political leadership. You, on the contrary, have held political positions of great responsibility—positions in which your judgment and advice affected vital features of this country's political policy. Nevertheless you state that my political opinions are "much stronger" than yours. Do you really think that I, the simple citizen, take political opinions more seriously than you, the man who occupied important political posts? Do you really mean to say that you voiced important political opinions without holding them strongly?

When you, in conversation with Esther and me after your return from the U. S. S. R. suggested that Korea might advantageously be taken over by the "conservative" forces of Soviet Russia, you certainly expressed a startlingly significant political idea. Did you or did you not mean what you said? When, during the war, you urged the removal of the Mikado, you certainly expressed a politically significant idea, and one which, had it been accepted, would probably have cost hundreds of thousands of American lives. Did you hold these views when you uttered them? Did I, when expressing others, contradict your real opinions or opinions which you really did not hold? (In your letter you remark that I have tried to convert you from opinions "which I do not hold".)

You say that I express my political opinions more vehemently than you do. There are probably differences in temperament which manifest themselves as differences in expression. But it seems to me that for a number of years we exchanged many ideas, political and otherwise, without getting into any heated argument. After your trip with Wallace, your tone changed. If I hurt you by my vehemence, I am sorry. Even strongly felt conviction should not be so expressed. There may have been a good reason why I reacted violently to your attitude—and I think there was; but whatever the reason, I certainly do not defend the passion of my expression.

But please examine the substance of your argument in your last letter. If it is difficult to understand what your political opinions are, how can I be sure about your scientific views? There are systems of political ideas, just as there are systems of scientific ideas. To make sense they have to operate—and, can be apprehended, checked, and argued in an orderly fashion. For some time I have felt that your system of values scientific as well as political, is not an integrated one. In the past you have made fine scholarly contributions, and I shall never hesitate to acknowledge them; but, in view of your lack of certainty regarding your present ideas, collaboration between us had better wait

until they have recrystallized. I am looking forward to the day when I can again talk with you about opinions which you do not only seem to hold, but which you really hold.

Whereupon, Mr. Lattimore answered me as follows:

FEBRUARY 20, 1947.

Your letter of February 18 bears out, I am afraid, the opinion which I expressed in my last letter to you—that your ideas and feelings on political matters are more extreme than mine and more vehemently expressed. As examples of trying to convert me from opinions which I do not hold, I cannot imagine how you could have got the idea that I believe that “Korea might advantageously be taken over by the ‘conservative’ forces of Soviet Russia.” As for the removal of the Mikado, I have never argued that America should remove him; my position has always been that American policy should not be committed to support of the Mikado, particularly if there should arise a strong Japanese demand for his removal.

In view of these misunderstandings it is obvious that when we meet we shall get on best if we confine the conversations to those subjects in which I can exercise my respect for your enormous and in some ways unrivaled knowledge.

Sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

To which I answered, and this is the last letter and the end of my relations as a human being with self-respect to Owen Lattimore:

Your letter of February 20 showed me again how far apart we are, not only in our recollection of the spoken word, but in our interpretation of the printed fact.

Regarding the matter of Korea, it will always remain your memory against mine and Esther’s—

I wasn’t alone—

and those few friends to whom we repeated—

I think Professor Taylor was there—

in our dismay, your statement made some minutes previously in the cafeteria of the Social Security Building.

Likewise, our conversation at dinner, just before your Columbia lecture on Japan, regarding your new man, Carter’s improper handling of archeological material of the Southwest (this from archaeologists) and my own criticism that he had been equally remiss in dealing with the historical data. Such a blatant scientific deficiency bothered you very little—your answer, semantically not literally, ran something like this: “Oh, I myself have been criticized for bending the facts.” Certainly an astonishing response, and a very irresponsible one, from a person of your scientific achievement and academic position. But perhaps you don’t remember this incident either—and again it is a question of your memory and mine, your spoken word and mine.

Your statement on the Mikado is something else again. Here you are on record in your book *Solution in Asia*, page 189. Here you write:

“If the Japanese themselves decide to do without an Emperor, well and good. It not, we should show that militarism has been so catastrophically defeated that we, the victors, do not need to use the Emperor. He and all males eligible for the throne by Japanese rules of succession and adoption should be interned, preferably in China but under the supervision of a United Nations commission, to emphasize united responsibility. His estates, and estates belonging to members of Zaibatsu families and important militarists, should be made over to an agrarian reform program, conspicuously without his sanction and by order of the United Nations. Eventually, after his death and after a new civil service and a new management of finance and industry have taken hold, the remaining members of the imperial line can be allowed to go where they like. New vested interests will by that time be able to prevent the restoration of a monarchy.”

Did you remember this when you wrote me in your last letter, “As for the removal of the Mikado, I have never argued that America should remove him; * * *

The question between us is really a simple one. Can we be of scientific value to each other while your opinions are held so lightly, denied so readily, and interpreted so arbitrarily?

He denied not only what he said before two witnesses about Korea, but he denied even what he had printed in his own book. I felt this was a brazen attitude and a complete lack of responsibility.

I decided never to touch that man again. I saw him, however, shortly after that at a conference at Princeton. He addressed me and said: "You were probably pleased that you caught me with the one about the Mikado." I said that I was ashamed rather than delighted, and I was embarrassed by the shabby way in which he made this concluding remark; which, by the way, was heard—I think—also by Professor Taylor. I was deeply ashamed. It was something that was very undignified. It was something which I do not think I care to experience either in personal or political relations.

I think this was a brazen way of handling key political matters, matters of great importance, and it should give pause for thought to all those who consider the Lattimore cult a part of their citizenship activities.

Mr. MORRIS. Doctor, have you found in Owen Lattimore's writings any terminology that would demonstrate his intrinsic devotion to Communist interpretation?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Generally speaking, he has avoided the jargon. I have seen that letter of—

Senator FERGUSON. Do you care to comment on that whole letter?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I think I have not much to add. I think the newspapers have well commented on it.

Senator FERGUSON. What is your comment about it? You were talking about "jargon" and the use of language.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. It would show obviously how somebody tries to proceed along certain political lines without showing himself. There would be a technical term for it. Proceeding in a pro-Communist way without "exposing yourself"; this would be the technical Communist Party term for such an attitude.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that a Communist philosophy or trait?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I think that is a general line of procedure, of course. If you work as a man who does not come out openly as a Communist—Mr. Foster and Browder would not work that way—but people who officially pretend to be something else, would speak that way. It is a division of labor.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that a strange method?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes. You would say it is the method which would be used by those elements of the periphery who are really closely coordinated and integrated into the movement, but who try to promote the advantages of the movement without exposing themselves. As a matter of fact, I remember that once Owen said to me. "You know, Karl August, I never read Marx, because if I don't read the stuff nobody can ever accuse me of using the Marxist jargon when saying anything pro-Soviet."

Senator FERGUSON. Who said that?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Mr. Lattimore. So he avoided even learning the jargon in order not to become too conspicuous. It was somewhere around 1938 or 1939.

Mr. Morris asked me whether there were instances in which Mr. Lattimore had taken up the Communist terminology clearly and openly. In answer to this, I would like to read a few lines. Before

Mr. Lattimore went to Russia with Henry Wallace in March of 1944, he wrote a review article for *Pacific Affairs* called a Soviet Analysis of Chinese Civilization. In this article he goes over a number of articles written in this symposium which looks at Chinese society and culture obviously from the point of view of several disciplines.

He says here on page 83:

Here, of course, it is to be expected that a Communist writer has paramount Communist theses to maintain.

He enumerates a few, something about Lenin, and then he comes to Stalin. He mentions—

Stalin's definition of foreign imperialism in China as a force which supports, inspires, cultivates, and conserves feudal survivals.

Senator FERGUSON. What year was that?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. March 1944—

and the entire bureaucratic-militaristic superstructure.

The term "feudal survival" is absurd. It has become a standard formula as Stalin's description of Chinese society. How a society can consist of survival, I will not go into, but anyhow, this as a key formula of Stalinism.

Owen Lattimore in 1944 recognized it as such and listed it among the "paramount Communist theses" to be maintained by Communist writers.

In another part of this article, he says,

The social data are somewhat obscured by loosely used terms like "semi-feudal" and "feudal survivals."

This was in 1944.

Senator FERGUSON. Was the Communist line in China that they had a feudal government, a feudal system?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right, but by "feudalism" they meant something no human being ever thought of. They didn't think of feudal knights and serfs. They talked just about the tenancy system.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, when they described tenants, they called that a feudal system. When an experienced man in government speaks of feudalism, he goes back to the lord and the manor and the serfs, and the big estates.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words where the economical, the political, and the military system was under the state. That was feudalism?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. A unified system of these institutions. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Does Stalin claim his system of government is new and has no roots?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. No precedent in history, and here comes the catch and the clash with the contention of most real social scientists about countries like China and India. They say that there, with powerful bureaucratic machines, bureaucracy is a ruling class and property plays a secondary part. By concentrating the whole problem on what they call "feudal" land ownership, the Communists focus the energy of the peasants to the property question, and divert it from a ruling bureaucracy which they have had in the past and which the Communists intend to establish everywhere in the future. The term

"feudal" is a technique to concentrate the energy of the restless masses on the property question and not to see the enormous danger of what Lenin once called a bureaucratic monster state. This is a very handy term. It confuses the situation. It concentrates. It manipulates the energy in a way which is useful for the destruction of the old order without endangering the masters of the new, those who want to benefit from it by setting them up as the masters of the new state apparatus, what I call the new apparatchik society.

The term "feudal" is a wonderful cover term. Lattimore, in 1944 described it as still quite openly as part of the Communist outfit.

Senator FERGUSON. Is "agrarian reform" a similar term now being used?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. The Communists usually talk about agrarian revolution, not reform. What they undertake really is a revolution, not a reform. It would be much better to call this violent change in rural conditions an agrarian revolution, which it really is. I think the use of the term "land reform" was just one of those ways of selling it, of making it look nice.

Mr. MORRIS. The technical terminology would be Communist revolution rather than Communist reform?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Lattimore's statement talks about the "feudal survivals" being one of the paramount Communist theses to be maintained by Communist writers, and then a statement that these terms are not good, that they obscure somewhat, completely confuse the social data. That means they are harmful for the social scientist. In this study which was made under Mr. Lattimore's direction by the members of the Walter Hines Page School on Sinkiang on which a preliminary résumé published in the Far Eastern Survey on March 10, 1948—

Mr. MORRIS. That is 4 years later than the previous communication?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

We find it says it was directed by Owen Lattimore and included among others: Chen Han-seng, and John De Francis, and Daniel Thorner.

So you find here in the part about economic conditions a description of the situation in which you find reference to the "semifeudal" agrarian relations.

We find later on a description as to the relations between landlords and rich peasants, agricultural laborers and tenants who are "semi-feudal." You will not be surprised also to hear that the relations between the two groups of this system, namely, the two types of lands, are the "survival" of feudal lands. So you find your survival of feudalism appears here quite cheerfully.

Mr. MORRIS. That is in Lattimore's writing?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. This is a study which he directed and which was published by his school under him.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you mind reading a pertinent sentence or two that would indicate that for the record?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Some of these are long.

Mr. MORRIS. Just parts of them, then.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. (reading) :

Cultivation of this idle land depends on solution of correlated problems (a) irrigation projects, which are dependent on railway construction; (b) deficien-

cies of livestock and fertilizers and of water supply; (c) the development of a substitute fuel supply—

All these are rather technical points, the way they are treated here, and then

(d) semifeudal agrarian relations.

This is the only term which deals with the over-all agrarian situation.

I see the term "semifeudal" in the following context: "Land distribution among various rural groups classified according to economic status." The report then goes on with statistics and says:

The relation between landlords ("ba") and rich peasants, on one hand, and agricultural laborers ("bivantel") and tenants ("dikhan") on the other hand, are semifeudal.

Furthermore—

mention must be made of the institution of "mulk and wakf". The former is the survival of feudal land granted by the former ruling Khans with attached "chakar" or serfs.

Mr. MORRIS. I think that is enough on that.

Mr. Mandel, in connection with Daniel Thorner, about whom there was just testimony, I would like to introduce into the record, Mr. Chairman, a letter dated June 2, 1942, from Catherine Porter to Edward C. Carter.

I wonder, Mr. Mandel, if you will vouch for the authenticity of that letter and read it into the record?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It is dated June 2, 1942, and it is entitled "Memo to E. C. C. from C. P.," presumably Catherine Porter and E. C. C. is presumably E. C. Carter. It reads:

My 4 days in Washington last week were fruitful in ideas if nothing else. Several things came up which Bill Lockwood has suggested that I pass on to you.

1. W. Norman Brown (British Empire section of the COI, Library of Congress Annex), whose specialty is India, was full of good intentions and would very much like to see some arrangement made whereby an organization like the IPR would have access to material and personnel in the various Washington departments—

Mr. MORRIS. What is COI?

Mr. MANDEL. That stands for the Coordinator of Information.

He is going to suggest to someone in the Office of Facts and Figures that they consider making the IPR a semi-official channel for releasing certain information to the public. This was his own idea, and coming from him it might carry some weight.

I spent quite a while with Bill Carter in the hope that some way could be found of securing for the IPR such releases as the monitoring department can distribute. Bill felt that the only way that such an agreement could be made would be by an important IPR person making an appeal directly to MacLeish or someone of equal importance. Bill realizes that the IPR would make far better use of the releases than some of the newspapers which evidently do get the benefit of this service. It does seem ridiculous that an office like ours has to depend upon newspaper stuff at second or third hand.

Would you be willing to write to MacLeish presenting the problem which the IPR is facing now that it is cut off from most far eastern news, and ask whether it would be possible for certain information secured through the monitoring service to be released to us for use in the Survey, Pacific Affairs, et cetera?

2. The people who are working on India seemed to show more interest in IPR and its potentialities than anyone else I met in Washington. Eric Bee-

croft (Board of Economic Warfare) talked to me at length about his desire to see the Far Eastern Survey and other institute publications give adequate attention to India. He thinks it important that we add a scholar on India to our staff and raised the question of making such an appointment. Having in mind the possibility of a Rockefeller fellowship for such a person, I asked Beecroft whether he could suggest any candidates. He mentioned (I suppose this should be treated confidentially) Daniel Thorner who is in the COI working under Brown's direction. Brown has an extremely high regard for Thorner, and Beecroft thinks he is one of the most promising young men in the country. He does not know—

It is not clear here, but resuming the quotation—

background beyond the fact that he is a New York man, that he studied at Columbia and he wrote his thesis on the history of Indian railways in relation to the progress of industrialization in India. Beecroft says that Thorner probably knows more about the transport problem in India than any other person in this country.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, that is the Daniel Thorner we have had testimony on here just a short while ago.

Mr. MANDEL. (reading):

It is Beecroft's notice that a fairly attractive offer here would wean Thorner away from his present Government job. (Beecroft is not sure what Thorner's present salary is. He thinks it is probably \$2,600 or \$3,200. I have discussed this somewhat briefly with Bill Lockwood. He is a little uncertain about the second fellowship for the American Council staff. If this fellowship could be made available, or if you could find it possible to give Thorner a secretariat appointment, it would certainly mean a great deal to the IPR program for the the next year.

3. I was very much interested to find a large number of our friends in Washington bemoaning the fact that the whole IPR was not located in Washington, or at least that a branch office was not in full operation there. Several people mentioned to me the dinner meeting which was called by Graves on May 13 to discuss the whole problem of India and the presentation of information about India in this country. Every person who attended that dinner was delighted that the opportunity had been given him, and said quite honestly that if it had not been for Graves' action, they would probably not have sought the opportunity to discover what other departments of the Government were doing in their field of particular interest. It was pointed out that an active IPR office in Washington could do a great service by calling together frequent meetings of this kind. I wish it were possible for our staffs to have someone in Washington full time. We are certainly missing opportunities of service to ourselves and of usefulness to others.

All in all, it is very heartening for a member of the IPR staff to discover how highly the organization and its publications are regarded everywhere in the Capital City.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce that in the record.

Senator SMITH. It will be inserted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 77" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 77

JUNE 2, 1942.

Memo to E. C. C. from C. P.

My 4 days in Washington last week were fruitful in ideas if nothing else. Several things came up which Bill Lockwood has suggested that I pass on to you.

1. W. Norman Brown (British Empire section of the COI, Library of Congress Annex), whose specialty is India, was full of good intentions and would very much like to see some arrangement made whereby an organization like the IPR would have access to material and personnel in the various Washington departments. He is going to suggest to someone in the Office of Facts and Figures that they consider making the IPR a semiofficial channel for releasing certain information to the public. This was his own idea, and coming from him it might carry some weight.

I spent quite a while with Bill Carter in the hope that some way could be found of securing for the IPR such releases as the monitoring department can distribute. Bill felt that the only way that such an arrangement could be made would be by an important IPR person making an appeal directly to MacLeish or someone of equal importance. Bill realizes that the IPR would make far better use of the releases than some of the newspapers which evidently do get the benefit of this service. It does seem ridiculous that an office like ours has to depend upon newspaper stuff at second or third hand.

Would you be willing to write to MacLeish presenting the problem which the IPR is facing now that it is cut off from most far eastern news, and ask whether it would be possible for certain information secured through the monitoring service to be released to us for use in the survey, Pacific Affairs, etc.

2. The people who are working on India seemed to show more interest in IPR and its potentialities than anyone else I met in Washington. Eric Beecroft (Board of Economic Warfare) talked to me at length about his desire to see the Far Eastern Survey and other institute publications give adequate attention to India. He thinks it important that we add a scholar on India to our staff and raised the question of making such an appointment. Having in mind the possibility of a Rockefeller fellowship for such a person. I asked Beecroft whether he could suggest any candidates. He mentioned (I suppose this should be treated confidentially) Daniel Thorner who is in the COI working under Brown's direction. Brown has an extremely high regard for Thorner, and Beecroft thinks he is one of the most promising young men in the country. He does not know background beyond the fact that he is a New York man, that he studied at Columbia and wrote his thesis on the history of Indian railways in relation to the progress of industrialization in India. Beecroft says that Thorner probably knows more about the transport problem in India than any other person in this country. It is Beecroft's notion that a fairly attractive offer here could wean Thorner away from his present Government job. (Beecroft is not sure what Thorner's present salary is. He thinks it is probably \$2,600 or \$3,200.) I have discussed this somewhat briefly with Bill Lockwood. He is a little uncertain about the second fellowship for the American Council staff. If this fellowship could be made available, or if you could find it possible to give Thorner a secretariat appointment, it would certainly mean a great deal to the IPR program for the next year.

3. I was very much interested to find a large number of our friends in Washington bemoaning the fact that the whole IPR was not located in Washington, or at least that a branch office was not in full operation there. Several people mentioned to me the dinner meeting which was called by Graves on May 13 to discuss the whole problem of India and the presentation of information about India in this country. Every person who attended that dinner was delighted that the opportunity had been given him, and said quite honestly that if it had not been for Graves' action, they would probably not have sought the opportunity to discover what other departments of the Government were doing in their field of particular interest. It was pointed out that an active IPR office in Washington could do a great service by calling together frequent meetings of this kind. I wish it were possible for our staffs to have someone in Washington full time. We are certainly missing opportunities of service to ourselves and of usefulness to others.

All in all, it is very heartening for a member of the IPR staff to discover how highly the organization and its publications are regarded everywhere in the Capital City.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Dr. Wittfogel, what have you done in the last 10 years to express your opposition to the Communist movement of which you were an organized member and from which you gradually broke away, according to your testimony, finally in 1939? Would you give that information to the committee?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I shall be glad to. But first I would like to add one more remark to this "semifeudal" and "feudal survival" business. I want to avoid the impression of narrow word catching.

In an active fight against Communist ideological infiltration the thing which should be avoided at all cost is emphasis on symptoms without studying them. There are persons who might use the term "feudal" about agrarian Asia without knowing any better and living

in the innocence of paradise. It would be terrible if anybody would do any harm to them and would accuse them of any Communist leanings or indoctrination.

But a man like Lattimore who for years has studied these things—he has discussed them with his friends, they are in his letters to me, and he presents them as communistic criteria in his own life—when such a man turns around and in a weak moment comes forth with such terms that has a political significance.

I think it is very important to see both this specific significance and to avoid any danger of drawing political conclusions from the naive use of the terms without examining the circumstances.

Mr. MORRIS. What have you done personally to express your opposition to the Communist movement?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Since the last 12 years, since the last ties between me and the Communist fringe have been broken—

Mr. MORRIS. And, Mr. Chairman, I would like this record to show that this question searches for information on the general phenomenon of how long it takes a man to break away from the Communist Party and what he can do and how effective such a man is who has broken away from the Communist Party if he has genuinely determined to take a stand in opposition to it. That question bears on evidence relating to that point.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I do not know whether I will live up to this description, but after a long period of preparation, which I will not go into—I think I will do that later—I had thoroughly worked through the main points that made me break on the political and ideological issues.

First, during the war I concentrated myself primarily on reorganizing the project from an essential translation project to a project of interpretation and translation. The Rockefeller Foundation was extremely generous in letting me make that change. You will find in this interpretation, many of those great ideas of real social science which Mr. Stalin and his ideological henchmen tried to destroy. I concentrated essentially on developing this scientific work in a way which I considered my possibility and my duty.

However, I was not altogether idle politically. I supported personally somebody who in the United States has done more than anybody else during the war in the field of German anticommunism. That was Ruth Fisher, who was very modestly and personally aided by myself at that time—she did a great deal to discredit and shake the Free German Committee which was set up here parallel to the Moscow and Mexican committees of the same type.

I hoped that my advice might be of some use. Obviously the Institute of Pacific Relations had some use for men who eventually worked in the historical field, such as Mr. Norman. I was invited only to one of the IPR conferences. This one took place in the fall of 1941. This was, by the way, the time I had an argument with Greenberg. I knew that the Communists were building up the line, "We must get the Mikado, we must make no compromises concerning the Mikado." This I considered a suicidal policy.

It would cost millions of American lives because, I feared, the Japanese might just die en masse in order to defend what to them seemed very sacred. So I took the line we should not make the

Mikado a special issue, and we should understand the particular religious and psychological aspect of the matter.

This was the last contribution I made to any IPR conference. I was never invited after that.

I may now come back to a point I made this morning, and that is that Mr. Carter at the beginning had taken an interest in my Communist past. I heard that the same day he had talked to a Communist friend of mine, Maurice Dobbs, one of the prominent Communists and an organized Communist.

Mr. Carter saw him immediately after he had seen me, Professor Dobbs told me that. Mr. Carter asked him whether Mr. Wittfogel is persona grata with the Soviet Union. Whereupon Maurice Dobbs answered as far as he knew Wittfogel has some academic argument there. This was a reference to my disagreement on the interpretation of Asia, but otherwise, he is persona grata. I have not heard that Mr. Carter has ever tried to find out whether I was persona grata with the American Government.

I said that this Mikado question should not be made an issue. In doing so, I took as my criteria what should be to the benefit of this country and the American GI's who were dying there en masse. But that was the end of my political contribution to IPR conferences.

I spoke and advised many friends in the Government who were interested in my views. I may mention Prof. George E. Taylor, with whom I had many discussions about how the Russians treated America as potential enemies and not as people with whom we would be living in harmony ever after.

After the war I have been criticized for my insistence on the Soviet issue by some of my colleagues, but I hope that today many of them see things differently.

I may have been one of the first persons who raised the question among the Orientalists that we have to adjust ourselves to a world which is not one world. We held the first convention of American Orientalists in the spring of 1946, and the president of our professional organization discussed the lessons of the war.

In my own paper I took the line that the Orientalists have to become realists and to be aware that we are not going to live in one world, but maybe in five, three, and possibly two; and that we might as well prepare for that.

Year by year I have tried to show we cannot work in the modern field of oriental history and study what is going on in modern times without understanding communism in general and without understanding the connection between the various countries and the Soviet Union.

We had a bicentennial meeting in Princeton in 1947, where I tried to bring this out very strongly. Mr. Lattimore was there, and Mr. Chen Han-seng, but neither of them argued with me.

I think it was in 1948 in Philadelphia at a meeting where the majority of the speakers like Rosinger and others neglected the aspect of America's security. What I tried to recommend seemed to appeal strongly to the students. I may say this because it shows that the question of our intellectuals is somewhat more hopeful than our pessimists think. I said when looking at China, we might look at the security of this country, and we should defend China even though the Nationalist Government is a weak government with enormous

mistakes and weaknesses. It is still better to defend this Government and to keep it out of the Soviet power system and strengthen the other side. The students understood it without difficulty, but many more mature minds still had a few years to go before understanding the point.

In my talk at the State Department I tried to expose the Tito illusion; "Let us be nice to the little Chinese tiger, and it will not develop into a big tiger but into a pussycat." I argued that this is not the proper type of applied zoology.

At the end of the year, together with some of my friends in Seattle, I wrote a memorandum which was officially sent by the Seattle IPR, to ask IPR in New York to remove Mr. Rosinger from his position as research secretary, or whatever it was. The memorandum was of no avail.

From 1949 to 1951 in articles, reviews, speeches, besides my scientific work proper, I have continued to combine the interest in our field with the full awareness of the present political situation—the very dangerous situation in which the Western World in general and America in particular lives at the moment. The memorandum to the State Department which I wrote in the fall of 1949 was part of these efforts.

In 1950-51 I went on lecturing about the problem of how to recognize the methods of the ideological war as conducted by the U. S. S. R. Our friends the biologists have no difficulty in recognizing the absurdity of the Soviet position. They handled the Lysenko attack very nobly and very clearly without witch hunting and in an efficient manner, because they had studied the material. They were fully masters of the situation, and in a powerful and convincing way settled it. They do not close the door to new ideas, which I think we should never do. Any new terms, any new idea, even if they occur also in the Soviet Union, I am sure, freemen in a free society should discuss freely.

But we should get no counterfeit money in our field. We should learn how to recognize counterfeit. The greatest freedom of ideas provides the opportunity for constructively exerting the greatest vigilance. This has been my attitude throughout these years. This is what I have to say about myself.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to incorporate by reference the History of Chinese Society and I also would like to introduce at the same time excerpts from a commentary of various scholars on that project. I would like to incorporate that by reference into the record today.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 79" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 79

STATEMENTS MADE CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF CHINESE SOCIETY, LIAO

C. Martin Wilbur, Columbia University, American Anthropologist, July-September 1950: "One of the great contributions made in America to far-eastern history * * * "

Esson M. Gale, director, International Center, University of Michigan, letter: " * * * most important contributions on the highest scientific level, to knowledge of a significant era in Chinese and central Asiatic history."

Woodbridge Bingham, University of California, Far Eastern Quarterly, May 1950: "The book under review presents for the first time in any Western language a whole Chinese dynastic period with detailed material drawn directly

from the basic sources and arranged in categories so as to explain the functioning of its society."

Homer Dubs, Oxford University, England, letter: "You have indeed opened up an almost new field and done it effectively."

W. F. Albright, Johns Hopkins University, Bulletin of American Schools of Oriental Research, December 1949: " * * * a volume of extraordinary interest and importance for Orientalists in general, far outside the field of Sinology proper. Practically everything of interest to any branch of the social sciences has been classified and interpreted. Nothing comparable is as yet available in near-eastern fields, so the volume before us is a challenge as well as a stimulus."

William E. Lingelbach, American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia; former head of department of history, University of Pennsylvania, letter: "Returning to your history, I am more convinced than ever that it will revolutionize the approach to Chinese history, especially the use of the literary histories. That this will make for a more intelligent understanding of present-day China is, I believe, certain, despite tragic development in recent years * * * I wish our foreign policy in the Far East savored more of the real understanding of the background and its tremendous importance, such as you and your associate, Feng Chia-sheng, reveal."

George P. Murdock, Yale University, letter: "You are doing a job which, in my humble opinion, promises to be more valuable than all the social philosophies written since the beginning of time rolled into one."

Clyde Kluckhohn, Harvard University, letter: "It is clearly something unique in the history of scholarship—the first really firm social-science analysis of a large historical period."

Fred Eggan, University of Chicago, letter: "It should put Chinese studies on a new plateau."

George Sarton, editor, Isis, Harvard University, letter: "You have raised Chinese historiography up to a higher level."

R. H. Tawney, University of London: "Your work should effect a revolution in Chinese scholarship, and have a most beneficial effect not only on that but on historical studies in several different fields."

K. Grønboch, University of Copenhagen, Denmark, Acta Orientalia, XX1, 2, 1951: "The book is invaluable to students both of Chinese history proper and of the nomad empires, and will for many years remain the standard work on its subject."

Bertold Spuler, University of Hamburg, letter: " * * * a monumental achievement which opens up completely new paths for the writing of Chinese history and generally for the fruitful use of oriental sources."

S. Wada, Tokyo University, letter: "The History of Chinese Society, Liao, published under your editorship, is believed to be one of the greatest achievements America ever made on the studies of far-eastern history."

Mr. MORRIS. The next witness will be Dr. George Taylor.

Senator SMITH. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you shall give at this hearing being conducted by a duly constituted subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Dr. TAYLOR. I do.

TESTIMONY OF PROF. GEORGE EDWARD TAYLOR, DIRECTOR, FAR EASTERN INSTITUTE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, SEATTLE, WASH.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give your name and address to the stenographer?

Professor TAYLOR. My name is George Edward Taylor. The address is the University of Washington, Seattle, Wash.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present position, Dr. Taylor?

Professor TAYLOR. My present position is director of the Far Eastern Institute of the University of Washington.

Mr. MORRIS. How long have you held that position?

Professor TAYLOR. That particular position since 1946, but I have been a professor there since 1939.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Dr. Taylor, could you tell us what degrees you have achieved by way of education?

Professor TAYLOR. Most of my education was in England where I got the M. A. degree. I was reeducated in America at Johns Hopkins and Harvard Universities. That is the extent of my formal degrees, but not the end, I trust, of my education.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Dr. Taylor, when did you join the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Professor TAYLOR. I joined the institute in March of 1941.

Mr. MORRIS. At whose invitation?

Professor TAYLOR. That I don't recall, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. You do recall that you joined in 1941, however?

Professor TAYLOR. I checked on that by ringing up the office.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Taylor, have you heard complaints while you have been a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations that it is Communist-influenced or Communist-controlled?

Professor TAYLOR. Yes, sir. I have heard many people say that there are Communists in the IPR, and some people have even thought of it as being controlled, and some as not.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there any way that you as a member of the IPR could conclude with any degree of satisfaction that there are Communists in the IPR?

Professor TAYLOR. It is an extremely difficult thing to do, Mr. Morris. I have always operated for a very long time on the general principle that the Communists will infiltrate anything from a Sunday school to the FBI and that when you remember that Lenin's right-hand man was planted there by the Czar, one can believe almost anything. I have therefore taken it as a general principle that the IPR is not likely to be left aside by our friends, who are looking around for a good thing to infiltrate, but the question of deciding how, in what manner, is extremely difficult.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Dr. Taylor, have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?

Professor TAYLOR. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there any way you could have of conclusively determining whether a person was a Communist unless you had been a member of the Communist Party or else he had told you he had been a member of the Communist Party?

Professor TAYLOR. I took the precaution of cultivating the friendship of a fairly large number of ex-Communists, and I found in talking with them I enjoyed their anti-Stalinist conversation, and I found in talking with them I got certain cues and sometimes actually precise information as to who has belonged in a certain area and who does not, but in direct answer to your question, Mr. Morris, one has to look as through a glass, darkly.

You have to build up a frame of references as to what the Soviet Union is after in general, what its relationships are to parties in the rest of the world, how they operate in general and how they operate in particular. Then you have to study your own field. You have to find out—and there are ways of doing this, of course—you have to find out what the general party line is on a given subject at a given time.

Then in the areas you know best you examine a man's writings and by what he leaves out sometimes as well as by what he puts in you decide whether he is dealing with all the facts that he should know if he knows anything about it at all or whether he is angling them in any particular manner.

Obviously with that type of interpretation it is extremely difficult to say exactly where a man would be in the hierarchy, how far away from the sun he would be, but you can, I think, with reasonable assurance over a given length of time decide whether certain people are following a consistent line or whether they are not.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the secondary test really. The first test would be to talk to somebody who was in the Communist Party and let them tell you who was in it; otherwise, you have to use a standard such as yours?

Professor TAYLOR. Or both.

Mr. MORRIS. Or both?

Professor TAYLOR. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Now did you have any encounters with members of the IPR during the last 10 years by which you applied the standard you just described and therefore have been able to come to a conclusion satisfactory to your own purposes? For instance, did you have a conversation with Frederick V. Field in which you were able to apply such a standard as you described to us?

Professor TAYLOR. There is on the record, Mr. Morris, a written conversation with Mr. Field.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe what that is?

Professor TAYLOR. We had a certain dispute in 1942 as to whether a book I had written was any good or not. Mr. Field wrote a somewhat critical review of it, which he is thoroughly entitled to do, in *Pacific Affairs*, and attacked the book, which was called *America in the New Pacific*, and attacked it I think mainly on the point that I had described the war we were in as four wars rather than one war.

The general line at the time of course was that this was one war, war against Fascism. I said that there were four wars wrapped up in one.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say general line, what do you mean by that?

Professor TAYLOR. The Communist Party line, and it has been adopted by a good many other people, too.

I argued that the first war was a war between democracies and Fascist Axis. The second war—and this is where we came to grief—was a war between the two competing totalitarian revolutions, that between Germany and Russia. This was not to be mixed up with the first war.

The third war was the struggle between the colonial countries to take advantage of the situation to recover their independence.

The fourth war was the war in which the Fascist and Communist countries were gobbling up the little fellows that they found around them.

The main point of Mr. Field's review was that this way of presenting and analyzing the situation was divisive—the word he used, I believe—was divisive and was making no contribution to the war effort.

The New Masses went so far as to say that the book was worth two divisions to the enemy. I thought they were short-changing me a little, but that was their figure.

I thought that Mr. Field who, though he had been personally very delightful to me, had made his position sufficiently clear, however, by this time without the assistance of any written conflict on my book. So I had to assume that he was certainly acting like a member of the party, and I differed with some of my friends in the institute as to the influence that he would have on the institute.

They felt—and these are two different views—that his views on the Soviet Union had no influence whatsoever upon his work in the institute. I frankly found it difficult and I have still found it difficult to accept that view. That is one example.

MR. MORRIS. Did you have a similar experience with Michael Greenberg?

Professor TAYLOR. Mr. Greenberg, I was tipped off by Professor Wittfogel here as to his previous party affiliations and therefore was looking for trouble, but it was not very difficult to find. I think a blind man could have found Mr. Greenberg's views very, very quickly. He did not take too much trouble to conceal them.

I would say without any hesitation whatsoever that within a very short time one came to the conclusion that he was following very closely the general party line.

MR. MORRIS. Was that at the time he was acting editor of Pacific Affairs?

Professor TAYLOR. Yes. On the other hand, he did publish my reply to Frederick Field in the next issue of Pacific Affairs.

MR. MORRIS. Is there anything more about Michael Greenberg which you could put in the record at this time?

Professor TAYLOR. I was a little surprised to see him turn up in Washington, quite frankly.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did he turn up in Washington?

Professor TAYLOR. He turned up in what was called, I believe, the Board of Economic Warfare. Then he turned up in Lauchlin Currie's office for a period of time. That was the last I saw of him.

Senator FERGUSON. That was in the White House?

Professor TAYLOR. The office was in the Old State Department Building.

Senator FERGUSON. It was connected with the Executive Department?

Professor TAYLOR. Technically.

MR. MORRIS. You were surprised because of the blatancy of his ideas that he should assume such a high position in the Government?

Professor TAYLOR. I was surprised, yes.

MR. MORRIS. Did you have an opportunity to observe Laurence Rosinger, who is editor of the latest publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Professor TAYLOR. Professor Wittfogel has already testified that as a trustee of the IPR, which I have been since 1946, and I still am, that as a trustee I sent in to the proper officials a memorandum written by three people, who try to be scholars, which is an analysis of Mr. Rosinger's books. This was done within channels in a purely constitutional manner, and our general argument was that Mr. Rosinger

was not an objective scholar. We felt that we had demonstrated this in the memorandum, but Mr. Clayton Lane, to whom it was sent and those with whom he consulted, decided that we were wrong.

The decision has been accepted, but I certainly have not changed my view. In fact, the last publication of the IPR in which Mr. Rosinger had two or three chapters further confirms my view of Mr. Rosinger's lack of objectivity in handling such problems as contemporary China and the Communist movement in contemporary China.

Senator FERGUSON. Along what line do you claim he deviates from the normal channel?

Professor TAYLOR. I would say that in general he is far—I will put it this way, that he gives no sign of understanding the real nature of China's communism or Soviet imperialism in Asia. I find it difficult to believe that he has not had the documents available to him that have been available to the rest of us, and even in this last book there is nothing to indicate the quality and character of the Communist movement in China.

The man who reviewed the book in the New York Times states the thing much better than I can, off the cuff, anyway, in this review he points out how Mr. Rosinger's analysis of the Communist regime is:

Based on published plans, regulations, constitutions, proclamations, Communist statistics and percentage figures, and is comparable to an attempt to describe the Government of the Soviet Union on the basis of the 1936 constitution. The violent anti-United States propaganda, militarism, Soviet imperialism, and penetration, and the compulsory apparatus to which Mr. Rosinger gives little attention were all apparent even in the honeymoon period to which he limits himself.

That is a perfect example of what you are talking about—the problem of nailing a fellow down when you see that he walks like a duck and talks like a duck and has wings like a duck.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Taylor, will you tell us about the project behind that publication? Was there a grant behind that, do you know?

Professor TAYLOR. I don't happen to know. I have the impression that Mr. Rosinger himself was supported by a Rockefeller grant. It is probably on the cover somewhere.

Senator FERGUSON. The name of that book is the State of Asia?

Professor TAYLOR. The State of Asia.

I agree with the reviewer that the book on the whole is an extremely good book. It has a lot of excellent stuff in it. He ends up by saying:

Mr. Rosinger's chapters, however, must not be allowed to detract from the high standards set by the other writers.

I would add one more criticism to what he says, and that is I really don't see how we can write about Asia today without including the Soviet Union as an Asiatic country. If not the Soviet Union as such, then it seems to me the nature of Soviet imperialism and the connection between the Soviet Union and all the other Communist movements in Asia should certainly come in for slightly more vigorous treatment than it meets at the hands of Mr. Rosinger.

Senator FERGUSON. That book is sponsored by the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Professor TAYLOR. Yes, sir; this is sponsored by the IPR. There was a Rockefeller Foundation grant.

Mr. MORRIS. Is the amount given there, Dr. Taylor?

Professor TAYLOR. No.

I just want to point out that the IPR also published or joined in the publication of my own book in 1942, which was so bitterly criticized by Mr. Field.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Taylor, you have testified that you have been a member of the board of trustees in the Institute of Pacific Relations since 1946. In view of your conclusions about the institute and the fact that according to your standards it has been infiltrated, why have you held on so long?

Professor TAYLOR. For several reasons, sir. I think this book is an excellent example. I would say that the proportion of nonobjective work in here is about the same sort of proportion I have always thought there was in the institute as a whole.

In other words, I do not think the battle is lost because it is the sort of battle that never ends. This is going on forever.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, Doctor, if you pulled out men who think as you do, then there would only be the one side?

Professor TAYLOR. Well, the Communists would take over. What they don't take over they destroy.

Senator FERGUSON. You had a chapter in Washington, did you not, of the IPR?

Professor TAYLOR. I think during the war years there was a chapter, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it now a chapter?

Professor TAYLOR. Offhand I don't know, sir. I don't believe there is one here now.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean in your State of Washington.

Professor TAYLOR. In the State of Washington?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Professor TAYLOR. Yes, sir, we had a very vigorous branch in Seattle, in the State of Washington, which we merged into a World Affairs Council about 6 months ago.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did that chapter in the State of Washington leave the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Professor TAYLOR. I think there were several reasons. I think there was a general tendency all over the country toward these World Affairs Councils of cities the size of Seattle and even bigger.

Another reason, I think, is that the group in Seattle has been at loggerheads to some extent with the main office in New York. Some of that was due to the difficulties that always arise in large organizations. Some of it is due to political differences, the sort of thing we are talking about now, the general feeling that there was far too much nonobjective scholarship getting into IPR publications.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the Communist line have anything to do with it?

Professor TAYLOR. That is what I meant to say then, sir. And I suppose there were financial reasons, the difficulty of maintaining a group together in Seattle with sufficient money to make it worth while. Then the pressure from other people to join the World Affairs Council.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have any experience at all with Lauchlin Currie during the war?

Professor TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. That bears on this point?

Professor TAYLOR. Yes, sir. I saw Lauchlin Currie several times. I was trying to remember just when. I imagine it must have been in 1943. I don't recall I had met him before. He had asked me to go over to his office every Wednesday morning, which I did.

Mr. MORRIS. You were then working with the Office of War Information?

Professor TAYLOR. The Office of War Information in Washington.

I found out what he wished to talk about was what the OWI was doing in China. He helped me get some film strip for China, I recall, by writing a note on White House stationery, and he was generally helpful.

Then he organized some meetings on China. I have the impression that he had a sort of special assignment to look after China on behalf of the President. He called together people who were in various departments of the Government, the man who was functionally connected with China, and there were somewhat desultory discussions in his office in the Old State Department Building. They occurred I imagine about every 2 or 3 weeks, and then at the end rather suddenly I was requested to write up the discussion on which I had taken no notes. I did this to the best of my ability.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the head of the China section of the State Department John Carter Vincent?

Professor TAYLOR. Yes. I remember he was there once at the meetings. I think his deputy was there at one time.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was his deputy?

Professor TAYLOR. I am sorry, it escapes me at the moment. Then there was somebody from the War Department. They used to send a different man every time—the various departments of the Government.

At the end of the memorandum I wrote a special paragraph of my own in which I recommended that as the chances of Kuomintang-Communist cooperation was negligible, we should provide Chiang Kai-shek with sufficient arms and ammunition to shoot up the Communists even during the war.

Senator FERGUSON. When was that?

Professor TAYLOR. That was about the fall of 1943, I believe. It was a slightly unusual view even for me, I think, but I verified it last night by ringing up somebody who remembered it. My relations with Mr. Currie ended about then.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that had anything to do with the ending of your relations with Mr. Currie?

Professor TAYLOR. I don't know, sir. I don't know what was in his mind. He might have thought I was too dumb; he might not have had the time. I cannot say under oath what the timetable was, but it was around about that time I turned up the next Wednesday morning, and his secretary said, "Awfully sorry, he had another appointment," and I got the hint.

Mr. MORRIS. Prior to that time he showed a great interest in you; did he not?

Professor TAYLOR. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You had had considerable experience in the Far East, you had been writing on the Far East and so forth, is that not right, and you had charge of that section at that time?

Professor TAYLOR. In the Washington office, yes, I was in charge of the China Section in the Planning Division of the Washington office.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he ever consult with you after that?

Professor TAYLOR. I never saw him again.

Senator FERGUSON. That was the last you saw of him?

Professor TAYLOR. As far as I know.

Senator FERGUSON. You had been with him up to that time every week?

Professor TAYLOR. Weekly, Wednesday morning at 10 o'clock.

Senator FERGUSON. Doctor, we want to thank you for appearing here. Is there anything you want to add by way of explanation?

Professor TAYLOR. No, sir. I would like to say that I think the Institute of Pacific Relations is an organization that has done a very great deal for the far-eastern field and one which I personally hope—some of my friends do not agree with me—I personally hope will survive and be useful again.

Senator FERGUSON. You do feel, though, that where the Communist influence enters an organization, particularly one as important in foreign relations as the Institute of Pacific Relations, it could become a danger to our Nation?

Professor TAYLOR. Yes, sir; but I believe we are in danger everywhere. The American Government is going to be infiltrated just as much as the IPR, the labor unions, and all the rest, and we have to fight the battle wherever we meet it.

Senator FERGUSON. That is why you say it must be eliminated from such organizations?

Professor TAYLOR. I couldn't agree with you more, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Thank you very much.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you would read into the record before you go your analysis of Rosinger's writings. I think you have alluded to it. I wonder if you would leave it here and we can incorporate it by reference as part of the record.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received as part of the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 80" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 80

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

China's Wartime Politics, 1937-44. Princeton University Press, 1944 (quoted as Rosinger, 1944).

China's Crisis, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1945 (quoted as Rosinger, 1945).

Restless India, Headline Series, No. 55, Foreign Policy Association, 1946 (quoted as Rosinger, 1946).

The three above-listed writings of Rosinger are characterized, as are practically all his writings and speeches, by the accumulation of a great deal of detail and the careful avoidance of value judgments and a cliché terminology. In the discussion of the role of the Communists in China and of their Russian background, there are endeavors to present both sides of a possible argument. However, the objectivity is apparent rather than real. The books of 1944 and 1945 both show him in a number of critical instances either disregarding the obvious connection with the U. S. S. R. or directly denying such connection when factual evidence to the contrary exists and must have been known to him.

I

According to Rosinger, "The first major steps toward internal unity were taken on August 1 and 31, 1935, when the Chinese Communist Party issued two appeals for national resistance to Japan" (Rosinger, 1945, p. 17). The Communist movement is described as essentially domestic in its aspect and motivation. No attempt is made to explain the coincidence of the Chinese Communist turn toward a united front with the corresponding change in the policy of the Communist International in the summer of the same year, 1935. In view of Rosinger's thesis that the Chinese Communists, in spite of their sympathy toward the Russian outlook and purpose, were "for more than a decade and a half" (obviously from 1927 to 1942) "essentially on their own" (p. 94), it would have been highly significant to show whether the strong change in the line of the Chinese Communist Party in 1935 had anything to do with the policy of the Communist International. The reader has a legitimate claim to be informed that an argument exactly like the one promoted by the Chinese Communist Party in August was made at the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International in Moscow in the same summer, 1935.

N. B.—It would also be worthy of Rosinger's attention to see the coincidence of an earlier Communist step toward a united front with the Nanking Government in 1933 and Russia's growing concern in 1932 and 1933 about the threat of a Japanese attack against the Soviet Union. Mao Tze-tung considered the first Chinese offer for a united front sufficiently important to mention it in a speech in 1938. Rosinger's reference to the move of the Chinese Communists "for a united front" in 1933 (Rosinger, 1944, p. 11) neither explains clearly the character of the Communist move nor does it in any way discuss its connection with what Stalin on January 19, 1933, called the "complications in the Far East"—complications which from the Soviet point of view were considered so serious that, according to Stalin's own statement, significant changes in the military sphere of the new second 5-year plan were made.

II

Rosinger describes the "moderate, democratic domestic program that the Chinese Communists adopted in 1935-37" as a program to which they adhered "despite all changes in the foreign relations of the Soviet Union" (Rosinger, 1945, p. 95). In the context surrounding this thesis, Rosinger tries to prove the essentially Chinese-conditioned character of the Chinese Communist policy. Since Rosinger clearly states the importance of this issue, it is a pity that he considered it unnecessary to quote Mao Tze-tung's own statement on the "great concessions" which the Chinese Communists made during this period and particularly in 1937. "Those political concessions were made for the sake of the establishment of the united front * * * for the formation of the united front against the Japanese imperialists, these concessions were excellent and correct" (Mao, 1938).

The connection between the Communist effort to involve the Nanking government in a war with Japan and the effect of diverting the pressure from the Soviet Union was too obvious to permit silencing over. The Russian interest in supporting the Chinese war against Japan in order to ward off a Japanese attack against herself was clearly seen by Harriet Moore, who in the January 1940 issue of *Amerasia* wrote, "There is a fighting China between the Soviet Union and Japan, and the Soviet Union can thus ward off a Japanese attack by continuing her support of China." Mrs. Moore wrote for the same magazine, *Amerasia*, of which Rosinger has been a permanent contributor, and it seems most unlikely that he has not seen her analysis. Instead of making unsubstantiated claims concerning the internal change of the Chinese Communist Party, Rosinger should have made the reader familiar with Mao's insistence that this change was conditioned by considerations of the war against Japan and not by any abstract domestic reasons. Whether or not the change in the internal Chinese party line had anything to do with the attitude of the Comintern, Mao in 1938 takes pains to assert agreement between his party and the Comintern and with the defense situation of the Soviet Union, this is such a vital problem and Mrs. Moore's comment of 1940 is so suggestive, that Rosinger's attempt to becloud this vital issue is a highly deplorable feature of his book.

III

Rosinger's praise for Russia's material assistance to the Chinese Government during the first years of the war is highly unrealistic because it does not take

into consideration the practical advantages derived by Russia from such an action. It was obviously much cheaper for the Soviet Union to "ward off a Japanese attack by continuing her support of China" than to fight such a war herself.

IV

Rosinger's treatment of the increased friction between the Chinese Communists and the Nanking government and the refusal of the Communists to participate in the session of the People's Political Council in March 1941 (Rosinger, 1944, p. 39) sounds completely incidental, and by implication it is suggested that the change was caused by certain Kuomintang circles losing their interest in remaining allied with the Communists. There is no doubt as to the existence of such a trend within the Kuomintang, but it remains a fundamental weakness of Rosinger's study that it completely disregards the vital changes in the relations between the Soviet Union and Japan which took place exactly at the end of 1940 and early in 1941.

Negotiations between the U. S. S. R. and Japan for the conclusion of a neutrality pact began in July 1940, Matsuoka was in Moscow in March and April 1941, and the pact was concluded on April 13. Rosinger forgets to mention this background when describing the increased estrangement between the Chinese Communists and the Nanking government during this period which culminated in the refusal of the Chinese Communists to attend the People's Political Council in March 1941.

Very little is said by Rosinger about the Russo-Japanese Pact of April 1941 and this treatment may be justified by the fact that neither of the two signatories were Chinese, but it is highly regrettable that Rosinger did not reproduce—or discuss at least in substance—the declaration made by the Chinese Communist Party on the occasion of this pact. It is well known that the pact implied the mutual recognition of Russia's position in Outer Mongolia and of Manchukuo, the Japanese puppet state, that had been recognized so far only by members of the Axis. Mao Tse-tung's earlier expectation, expressed in 1936 in his interview with Edgar Snow, that Outer Mongolia would be part of a Chinese Federation, is silently dropped. While the Chinese Central Government was deeply concerned about what, it feared, might be Russia's indirect recognition of Manchukuo, the Chinese Communists did not find any flaw in the Russian procedure which they on the contrary tried to justify. The Communist declaration stated: "By this treaty the U. S. S. R. has not disappointed and never will disappoint China." The full text of the Chinese Communist statement was reproduced in *Amerasia*, the magazine to which Rosinger contributed regularly, but his book on China's Wartime Politics does not consider it necessary to discuss the fact and the extraordinary political attitude of the Chinese Communist Party to it.

V

All these features go to show that Rosinger in his two books on China tried to minimize and in part to hide the relations between the policy of the Chinese Communists and the needs of U. S. S. R. power politics. Rosinger's over-all study of recent China (Rosinger, 1945) tries, like his other writings, to bypass critical points without committing himself in one way or the other, but in his larger documentary study of 1944 he indicates on a number of occasions his affinity to the Russian interpretation of Chinese society and history. Rosinger is without doubt fully familiar with the Russian line to avoid the application of the concepts of oriental despotism to Chinese society and to use a "feudal" interpretation instead. But he throws in remarks about Confucius and Mencius as supporters of a "feudal social order," which perfectly fit the Russian pattern. His description of those elements particularly interested in the maintenance of the existing Chinese Government places the "rural landlords" before the gentry and officials (Rosinger, 1944; cf. Rosinger, 1945, p. 5 ff.), fully in conformity with the Russian attempt to create the impression that China's ruling class was (and is) predominantly constituted of a landlord class not dissimilar to the western and Russian type. His illustrations for the actual conditions in a Chinese village are taken from utterances of the Moscow-trained son of the Generalissimo, Chiang Ching-kuo, who speaks of "the overpowering dominance of feudal forces of the landed local political bosses and wicked gentry" (Rosinger, 1945, p. 6). Faced with these passages, Rosinger could always answer that in the case of Confucius and Mencius he was only referring to the earlier part

of Chinese institutional history and that in the second instance he only quoted somebody else's opinion. This is absolutely correct, but it is characteristic that in the second case he used a Moscow-trained guide and that in both cases he avoided explaining the haphazardly used Soviet type of ideology. Rosinger is fully familiar with the counterthesis, as it was, among others, presented by his friend, Chi Chiao-ting. His avoidance of taking a clear-cut stand in the controversy, as well as his indirect acceptance of the Soviet Russian side of the argument, is indicative both of his glib method of presentation and of his actual stand in the matter.

VI

Rosinger's study of restless India shows the same peculiarities of a carefully shielded adjustment to the Soviet type of analysis. The adherent of the Stalin-shaped ideology has to avoid drawing attention to the managerial-hydraulic functions of Asiatic government and the resulting development of an all-powerful and all-oppressive type of state, oriental despotism. In his India book Rosinger refers to irrigation in such a way as not to give the impression that the direction of public waterworks has been an essential factor of India's traditional society. Irrigation is mentioned as something that occurred in prehistoric times (p. 38) and as an element of village economy (p. 43), but not in connection with the structure of government and society. On page 47 the great irrigation projects in two territories are mentioned in connection with recent attempts at modification; that is, not as features of India's traditional society but in the setting of British colonial policy. On page 49 a clear-cut classification of the traditional Indian system of land tenure and taxation is avoided. It is only said that in the areas ruled by native princes "conditions are similar to those existing in Europe under feudalism"; and in explanation of this thesis it is said that "the peasants have to rent virtually every economic right" from the princes and that "there is widespread forced labor." It is characteristic that the connection of this forced labor—obviously state-directed forced labor—is left undefined and furthermore that the only classification reference in the whole argument is to feudalism and to a feudalism similar to a European one. The treatment of India, like that of Chinese society, followed in a veiled manner the basic concepts outlined by the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International in 1928.

Senator FERGUSON. Dr. Wittfogel, did you have anything else you wanted to offer the committee?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I think you have been very patient.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, the committee appreciates the appearance of a man before it who has been a Communist and, as it were, bares his soul as a witness. The committee owes thanks to the people who are willing to come in here and testify on the record as they really see things. We appreciate it.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Thank you very much.

Senator FERGUSON. The committee will recess until Thursday at 10 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., the hearing was recessed until Thursday, August 9, 1951, at 10 a. m.)

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